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The book examines the growing tension between social movements that em-
brace egalitarian and inclusivist views of national and global politics, most no-
tably classical liberalism, and those that advance social hierarchy and national 
exclusivism, such as neoliberalism, neoconservatism, and national populism. 
In exploring issues relating to tensions and conf licts around globalization, 
the book identifies historical patterns of convergence and divergence rooted 
in the monotheistic traditions, beginning with the ancient Israelites who 
dominated the Near East during the Axial Age, through Islamic civilization, 
and finally by considering the idealism-realism tensions in modern times. 
One thing remained constant throughout the various historical stages that 
preceded our current moment of global convergence: a recurring tension be-
tween transcendental idealism and various forms of realism. Transcendental 
idealism, which prioritizes egalitarian and universal values, pushed period-
ically against the forces of realism that privilege established law and power 
structure. Equipped with the idealism-realism framework, the book examines 
the consequences of European realism that justified the imperialistic venture 
into Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America in the name of liberation 
and liberalization. The ill-conceived strategy has, ironically, engendered the 
very dysfunctional societies that produce the waves of immigrants in constant 
motion from the South to the North, simultaneously as it fostered the social 
hierarchy that transferred external tensions into identity politics within the 
countries of the North. The book focuses particularly on the role played 
historically by Islamic rationalism in translating the monotheistic egalitarian 
outlook into the institutions of religious pluralism, legislative and legal au-
tonomy, and the scientific enterprise at the foundation of modern society. It 
concludes by shedding light on the significance of the Muslim presence in 
Western cultures as humanity draws slowly but consistently towards what we 
may come to recognize as the Global Age.
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Globalization often appears as a geopolitical and economic spectacle, but on 
a deeper ref lection it reveals itself as a transformative force anchored in tran-
scendental values and human empathy. The values and attitudes that form 
our current historical moment grew within the monotheistic traditions that 
shaped the trajectory that took us down the corridors of history and placed 
us at the verge of a global order. The work presented in this volume purports 
to shed light on this exceedingly complex and remarkably dynamic process 
at the heart of world history and to reveal the creative synthesis achieved by 
the monotheistic traditions that make our current global moment possible. 
The claims might sound a bit startling in the face of modern scholarship’s 
sustained efforts to obscure the role played by monotheism in general, and 
Islamic monotheism in particular, in setting the foundation of the unfolding 
global age the world cautiously approach. The ongoing efforts to unite dif-
ferent peoples and cultures in a system of heightened cooperation that rec-
ognizes the equal dignity of diverse humanity have never been perfect, but 
they have been attempted twice in the last two millennia by monotheistic 
traditions. The first took place under the Islamic civilization, and reached 
its pinnacle in the fifteenth century, while the other is currently underway, 
driven by universal ethos rooted in modern civilization.
The fuzzy sketch of an ever-globalizing world outlined above grew grad-
ually in my mind over the years and inspired me to explore the ideas and 
values at the core of the globalization process in its first and second mani-
festations and understand the sources of the millennia-old convergence that 
has gradually pulled humanity into a singular global experience. My early 
fascination with globalization goes back to my formative years, ever since 
I became aware of the ability of the transnational corporations to elicit the 
cooperation of hundreds of thousands of people across diverse cultures. I was 
not only puzzled by the source of the ambition that drive people to build en-
terprises that can make profits many folds beyond the immediate and future 
needs and desires of those who passionately run them but also at the ability 
of enterprises of such magnitude to maintain the high level of cooperation 
required for its persistence and growth. My intellectual interests in global 
cooperation, however, were shaped during my postgraduate research that was 
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later published under the title of The Challenge of Modernity: The Quest for 
Authenticity in the Arab World. The book focuses on issues of modernity and 
tradition and the impact of modernity on pan-Arab and pan-Islamic thought 
and politics. Much of my subsequent research addresses various facets of Islam 
and modernity, peace and conf lict, and religion and politics, so the current 
volume is in many ways the culmination of three decades of contemplating 
the questions tackled in this book.
I have been equally fascinated with religion and religious commitments, as 
I have been always curious to understand the connection between the struc-
ture of consciousness and social structures. Religion, as a human experience 
anchored in transcendence, appeared to me as having much broader inf luence 
than modern literature is willing to admit. I was able to observe religious 
sentiments in clearer light in areas of human endeavors that appear far re-
moved from what we subsume today under the rubric of religion. I could see 
the religious spirit in social action and interaction that belong to realms we 
define as “secular,” including actions we define as artistic, political, financial, 
social, or patriotic. These observations highlighted in my mind the mystical 
core of human experience and problematized the modern tendency to ignore 
the internal ground that inspires collective actions. Somehow, we the mod-
erns succeeded in separating spiritual values from their religious foundation 
but continued to embrace them as guidelines to direct social and political 
decisions and to judge the personal character of individuals around us. This 
awareness inspired the search that culminated in this study, as the following 
chapters present religion in a broader light than it is usually allowed in liter-
ature dealing with history and society, as the religious is often confined to 
the institutions charged with managing religious rituals and dogmas. Rarely 
does modern scholarship associate religious consciousness and action with the 
work of political leaders, scientists, or soldiers who do not eagerly advertise 
their faith in their day-to-day endeavors.
Another remark relevant to religion, in the context of assessing the role of 
monotheism in the rise of the global order, concerns the habit of fragmenting 
monotheistic traditions, and to treat Judaism, Christianity, and Islam as sepa-
rate religions, rather than seeing them as different facets of the same religious 
awareness. This distinction between religions is at once desirable, real, and 
unavoidable, as each has its distinctive founding prophet and its own specific 
religious rituals, language, and history. Yet as this study illustrates, they all 
share in the Abrahamic faith that extenuates the principles that distinguish 
them from other world religions. In addition to their unity in the person of 
Abraham, and the line of prophets that preceded and succeeded him, they 
also share core moral values and common understanding of the meaning of 
human life and the purpose of history. Furthermore, their understanding of 
the purpose of revelation has converged over the last millennium as a result 
of theological and intellectual exchange and mutual leaning. The conver-
gence has been far more than what the religious leaders of different Abra-
hamic traditions would like us to believe. Toynbee who spent his academic 
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career studying world religions and civilizations concluded, as will be ex-
pounded later, that when future historians look back on the twentieth cen-
tury, they will not distinguish it by its technological, medical, or political 
advancement but will rather see it as the time when religions converged.
***
The debt I incurred in writing this volume is acknowledged, first of all, in 
the citations I made throughout its pages in reference to the many scholars 
and thinkers from whom I gained great insights by consulting their works. I 
am equally indebted to the countless scholars, students, and colleagues who 
inspired me throughout my academic career and steered me to deal with the 
host of issues I tackle in this work. They are too many to mention here, and 
I will forever be grateful for their generous spirits and munificent examples. 
I must nonetheless single out a few, beginning with my doctoral advisor 
Phil Abbott, whose support was immense, allowing me to embark on my 
academic journey. I would similarly like to acknowledge the support and in-
spiration of Sayyid Syeed, Jamal Barzanji, John Esposito, Patrice Marks, Ab-
dul Hamid Abu Sulayman, Ahmed Davutoglu, Syed Imtiaz Ahmed, Azizah 
al-Hibri, Sulayman Nyang, Tamara Sonn, Ahmed Yusuf, Mumtaz Ahmed, 
Jasser Auda, Saif Adul Fatah, and Fayez Bulbul.
I must express my gratitude to Robert Langham, senior editor and pub-
lisher at Routledge, for his professionalism and unfailing help. His support 
and smooth management of an otherwise tenuous review process during the 
Covid-19 pandemic was remarkable. I am particularly grateful to my wife 
Razan for her unfailing love and encouragement and to our four children, 
Lubna, Rahaf, Munir, and Mackeen, whose warmth and love have been a 
great source of tenderness and joy.

Islam resurfaced in the last decades of the twentieth century on the world 
stage with an angry grumble generated by its fiercest supporters and utmost 
critics. It came back on the international scene after decades of withdrawal 
into complete silence that stretched through the first part of the twentieth 
century. On the surface, the return appears to take the form of angry protests, 
violent outbursts, and unapologetic rejection of modernization, westerniza-
tion, and globalization. It came back with old garment and Bedouin accent, 
and with the chant of “God is great” often expressed at the most unfortunate 
moments. The return of Islam with the level of noise we all heard in the 
last three decades is still an enigma that has not been explained, particularly 
when the return contradicts every prediction advanced by modernization 
theory. Daniel Lerner, a leading modernization theorist, confidently declared 
in 1958 that Islam was on the way out from exerting any significant inf lu-
ence on Middle Eastern society, let alone outside its historically recognized 
boundaries:
Whether from the East or the West, modernization poses the same ba-
sic challenge: the infusion of “a rationalist and positivist spirit” against 
which scholars seem agreed, “Islam is absolutely defenseless.”1
Modernization theory itself disappeared suddenly in late 1980s without fan-
fare and, ironically, without ever having to explain what happened in the 
Middle East that led to the complete turnaround that brought Islam back as a 
major player in the region and beyond. Perhaps its fatal prescriptions for “the 
passing of traditional society” might have to do with its decision to f lee the 
scene without attempting to mend the divisions it sowed under the guise of 
progress. Or could it be that the angry face of Islam, which many Muslims 
have real difficulties recognizing, is the product of the process of moderni-
zation itself? Many scholars who have a deeper understanding of the Middle 
East and Islam, like Olivier Roy and Judith Butler, testified in their writings 
that the Islamic fundamentalism that popped up suddenly on the scene, and 
practiced a nihilistic form of jihadism, is “modern” at heart and has little re-
semblance with traditional Islam.
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2 Introduction
The picture becomes a bit more intricate and complex when we realize 
that Islamic resurgence does not have one face but multiple expressions and 
that its relationship with modernity and globalization is much more compli-
cated than many specialists are willing to admit. Like the neoliberal agents of 
globalization, Islamist neo-fundamentalism is not content with state boarders 
but is more at ease operating on a global level, using technology and social 
networking to advertise its intentions and actions. The profiles of the per-
petrators of 9/11 terrorist attacks reveal a picture of financially stable and 
highly educated and aspiring young individuals. They were all well calculat-
ing, trained in modern education systems, capable of navigating the modern 
world at ease, had no difficulties with mastering the advanced techniques 
of f lying jetliners, and had no issues in violating the traditional teachings of 
Islam’s prohibition of the deliberate attacks against noncombatant, declaring 
it to be as evil as wiping out the human race.2 There are many questions 
concerning the way Islam emerged on the global scene and why some of its 
followers are behaving the way they do that cannot be answered from within 
the current modernization theory framework, because the theory assumes 
that modernity could be articulated from within the horizons of the Enlight-
enment, while the social forces that do impact modern society and the glo-
balization process that continues to expand in scope are rooted in events and 
sociopolitical patterns and trends that precede the Enlightenment and even 
the Protestant Reformation that made it possible. The proper horizons for 
understanding the rise of sociopolitical forces like classical liberalism, neolib-
eralism, neo-fundamentalism, or national populism are not that of the En-
lightenment but of the Axial Age in which monotheistic idealism unleashed 
the globalization process and set it on a particular trajectory that we need to 
examine to appreciate its momentum and direction. Gaining insights into 
the emergence of Islam and other sociopolitical movements at this moment of 
globalization and examining their impacts on current debates and actions, as 
well as on future developments, are essential to this book, as we try to pursue 
a number of key questions within a broader historical framework.
In exploring Islam’s impact on globalization, we need also to examine the 
latter’s structure and dynamics more closely. Is globalization an economic 
and technological process signifying the projection of Western power? Or is 
it a series of transformative moments in world history delineating profound 
sociocultural changes destined to usher in a global age? The debate over these 
questions is in full swing, but the jury is still out as the evidence presented by 
the two sides of the debate is inconclusive. Seen from one vantage point, the 
interconnectedness of the world has never been at this level before. Produc-
tion, communication, education, science, technology, commerce, entertain-
ment, social mobility, and a host of other forms of human interactions have 
become greatly interdependent and integrated so as to render even the mere 
suggestion of reversing this trend unthinkable. Yet viewed from the opposite 
side, the world is still experiencing incongruent diversity and fierce resistance 
to current globalization trends, thereby making any talk of a new global age 
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unreal. As we see in subsequent chapters, Islam and Muslim societies are 
generally believed to be among the most visible antagonists of globaliza-
tion. Given the fact that Muslims constitute more than one-fifth of world 
population, and that they are geographically spread out across the globe and 
situated in key strategic locations, a global age in which a significant part of 
the human race is opposed to its materialization is unstable if not altogether 
untenable. The opposition though is not limited to Muslims but can also be 
found in many cultures and states, including Western democracies.
The return of Islam is not however limited to violent outbursts. The first 
surge of contemporary Islam took an intellectual and self-critical form in 
the mid-nineteenth century in response to colonial aggression by European 
powers. The nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries gave rise to a host 
of reform movements such as the Young Ottomans in Turkey, the Constitu-
tional Movement in Iran, and the Arab Awakening Movement in the Levant. 
The same period witnessed the advent of reformist thinkers, including Ja-
maluddin al-Afghani, Muhammad Abdu, Abdulrahman al-Kawakibi in the 
Near East, and Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Muhammad Iqbal in India. The 
period of intense debates generated critical thinking regarding lost meanings 
and distortions, raised questions about sources of Muslim decline and stagna-
tion, and suggested strategies and approaches to overcome those challenges. 
Ideas, activities, and experimentations that aim at reform are central to Is-
lamic awakening. Modern Islamic thinking forced Middle Eastern societies 
to reevaluate themselves and realign their priorities and values. Similarly, 
Islam’s encounter with Europe and the modern West through young gen-
erations of Western Muslims and the struggles of immigrant Muslims who 
seem genuinely committed to a life of faith while immersing themselves in 
local and global politics have pushed the modern West to undertake a similar 
evaluation as it tries to figure out issues of meaning, spirituality, and diversity 
in ways that it has never experienced since the Enlightenment. The return of 
Islam to Europe has many problematic aspects but has also positive ones, as 
it coincides with great transformations in Western society and a global order 
that began to manifest non-Western inf luences and inputs for a more inclu-
sive global modernity.
Contemporary political and sociological scholarship has the tendency to 
locate the origin of rational discourse in the Enlightenment thought and to 
present modern rationalism as completely independent from anything that 
has ever transpired in human history. The only rational thought recognized 
as relevant to modernity is that of the Greek philosophy and culture. Yet, a 
careful examination reveals that modern thought is more intimately con-
nected with Islamic rationalism than with Greek philosophy, as the latter 
has little resemblance with modern ethos. Islam appears at first glance as the 
opposite of modernity and its complete other, while as this book illustrates, 
the main ideas and institutions that shape modern experience are rooted in 
transcendental idealism that was perfected over a millennium, before it was 
adopted, adapted, and systematized by the modern West. Modernity as we 
4 Introduction
know it today has been nurtured and shaped by Western society but received 
its founding ideas and institutions from the Arabic civilization that provided 
a creative synthesis of the Axial-Age civilizations. This assertion is particu-
larly interesting given the perception that Islam serves today as the main 
disrupter of the current modernization trajectory, forcing new realignments 
and self-evaluation as humanity stands at the verge of what appears as a global 
breakthrough into new state of consciousness and reality. For those who are 
eager to set a global aristocracy, Islam suddenly reappears at the dawn of the 
global age out of a state of dormancy, and in a way that defies all scholarly 
wisdom and expectations. It returns in modernized forms that do not fit 
comfortably with its early historical manifestations, except its unwavering 
rejection of social stratifications and hierarchies. Most Muslims are startled 
as they watch the growth of the unfamiliar face of Islamist extremism, while 
some Western scholars, including Judith Butler and Olivier Roy, recognize it 
as a postmodern mutation and assert that Islamic neo-fundamentalism has a 
familiar modernist character.
Modern scholars are, though, far from an agreement on the nature of the 
current Islamic resurgence, as they are divided in their assessments of the 
reasons behind the rise of Islamic resurgence and its future potentialities. 
Neo-fundamentalism has been identified as a counter-globalization response 
and anti-Western reaction, as well as a sign of the rigidity of Islam itself. 
Anyone who has some familiarity of Islamic history and society knows that 
the diversity and adaptability of Islam make such claims problematic if not 
completely absurd. Islam cannot be at once the ground of modernity and 
globalization, as well as the social force that conspires to undermine them. 
While Islamist violence is real and disruptive, we need to find its root causes, 
and understand how it relates to the internal dynamics of contemporary Is-
lamic societies, as they continue to actively involve with Western ideas and 
powers. As we argue in this book, the Islamic resurgence we currently expe-
rience represents a reaction borne out of the transcendental idealism that has 
historically emerged to counter all forms of realism and positivism, whether 
these forms of consciousness and social organization take transcendental or 
materialistic forms. While Islamic fundamentalism reacts in violent and de-
structive ways, Islamic idealism has increasingly taken more intellectual and 
measured reactions, partly to contain the violent outbursts of fundamental-
ism, through the work of Muslim intellectuals like Ai Mazrui, Mahmud So-
roush, Sherman Jackson, and Seyyed Hossein Nasr. Western rational idealism 
has also emerged recently to undertake a similar project through the work of 
neo-Kantian intellectuals like John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas.
To sort out the intricate issues of postmodern society, this work aims to 
understand the global transformation currently underway by connecting the 
global moment we confront today, a moment of ambivalence toward the 
past and uncertainty toward the future, to the Axial Age where humanity 
invented the first written form of intellectual communication, transforming 
casual conversations to deep and systematic elaborations. Human progress 
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accelerated exponentially with the invention of scrolls as early civilizations 
were able to leverage intellectual exchange of ideas and information, thereby 
commencing the process of accumulation of knowledge and the documenta-
tion of human experience. The thread that made such a connection possible 
is subsumed in this work under the rubric of “transcendental idealism,” a set 
of notions, values, and attitudes that were initially rooted in the monotheistic 
traditions, particularly in the Islamic rationalism of the Mutazilites where 
we encounter the first full-f ledged intellectual movement within the Abra-
hamic traditions. The connection appears at the beginning as a strange and 
puzzling claim, for the Axial Age seems quite remote from modern experi-
ence, and so is monotheism which has been outpaced by the modernization 
project. The modern is frequently presented as the moment in which Europe 
liberated itself from its premodern religious dogmatism and from the struc-
ture of tyranny that modern historians are quick to associate with it. Such 
a presentation of history undoubtedly captures elements of the past but fails 
to grasp the sociopolitical dynamics that led to the rise of dogmatic think-
ing in Latin Christianity. Understanding that dynamics and identifying the 
grounds of the modern moment of Western civilization in earlier moments 
that preceded the Enlightenment is a major thread in this investigation. The 
Enlightenment moment is an important juncture in the human journey to-
ward the modern age, but it was an advanced juncture in a road that began 
way back in the Axial Age. The journey, examined in Chapter 3, began much 
earlier in Abraham’s rebellion against objectified divinity and inauthentic 
faith. The Abrahamic faith evolved for centuries in living communities that 
experienced frequent upheavals and underwent numerous changes in reli-
gious practices through successive reformist movements led by the Hebrew 
prophets, before it was articulated in an intellectual form as monotheistic 
prophecies ended and the rational articulation of faith began first in Latin 
Christianity and later in the Islamic discursive tradition. These moments of 
contemplation, articulation, and reform constitute together the breakthrough 
path that propelled humanity to its global moment that we confront today. 
While the monotheistic traditions formed the social movements that carried 
the discursive tradition that clearly emerged in Islamic rationalism, it was the 
transcendental idealist tradition in those sociohistorical movements that pro-
duced the progressive elements in the monotheistic movement and, therefore, 
holds the key for delineating the ideas and the forces that brought us to our 
modern moment, as it also holds the key for untangling the strings that hold 
us back and prevent us from overcoming the misgivings, confusions, and fears 
that define our current postmodern predicaments.
The book is about globalization and the place and role of Islam in the 
emerging sociopolitical reality that constitutes late modernity. The modern-
ization process that was initially envisaged as a process of convergence by the 
twentieth-century scholars began to bifurcate as the century drew to a close, 
producing anxieties and ambiguities about its trajectory. Islam also seems 
to bifurcate into competing interpretations as Muslim experiences take new 
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forms in relation to the modern order and as Muslim reformers attempt to 
reconcile Islamic and modern epistemes. Meanwhile, autocratic regimes in 
the Arab world have managed to breed new forms of violent extremism un-
der conditions of extreme repression and suffocating external manipulation 
and control. The new breeds of radical Islamism often mirror in their ruth-
less and brutal attacks the brutality they experienced under Middle Eastern 
regimes in the name of modernization. The social agony and psychological 
anguish experienced for decades in Muslim societies eventually spilled over 
into Western societies with the inf low of Muslims and the incursion of the 
very practices that produced the inf low in the first place. This development 
has also coincided with increased fragmentation of Western politics, and the 
difficulties in developing inclusive notions of the common good, as well as 
with the renewal of the religious-secular tensions as religious narratives con-
f lict with liberal values and democratic principles, both in the West (the fight 
over abortion) and in the Middle East (the fight over Palestinian rights). The 
sociopolitical map gets more complicated as the conservative religious alli-
ance gives birth to another significant alliance between the vocal voices of 
Western Muslims against the excesses of neorealism in Muslim societies on 
the one hand and those of liberal progressives who condemn what they see as 
unsustainable practices of the economic imperialism of the neoliberal elites 
and the political imperialism of the neoconservative movement. The rising 
tensions cannot be reduced to any singular reason, but one of the more appar-
ent reasons is the lack of inclusion, which is often cited by protest movements 
that question both secular elitism and neoliberal exclusivism. Secularism has 
gradually grown from a formal framework, consisting of a set of principles 
intended to advance religious tolerance and provide free space for generating 
political consensus, into a substantive discourse, committed to historically 
limited assumptions and understandings, and intolerant of interpretations 
opposed to the dominant secular discourse of the day. To safeguard the sec-
ular order, essential for maintaining a civil space and preserving individual 
freedom, secularism should be reexamined and rethought in order to allow 
for more meaningful engagement with evolving moral epistemes and social 
experiences intrinsic to the globalizing world of the twenty-first century.
The sociopolitical experiences and transformations we need to explore in 
this study are significantly broad and expansive and appear at times over-
whelming as the horizons we chose to think about globalization stretch back 
in time to the Axial Age, around the year 500 BCE. The task is made more 
daunting by identifying Islam as the locus of the historical breakthrough 
that channeled the ideas and experiences of Axial-Age civilizations, as it un-
dertook the creative synthesis that set the global ground. The challenge lies 
in the contrast between the popular perception of Islam as an anti-modern 
religion and culture and the historical presentation that portrays it as the 
ground for modernity and possibly an essential partner in ensuring smooth 
sail toward the global age. Such a project requires more expansive theoret-
ical work, and my hope is that this book does provide enough evidence to 
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challenge the current assumptions that make any meaningful debate difficult 
if not impossible. I would consider this endeavor satisfying if it succeeds in 
stimulating further debates and explorations of the issues raised here, and if it 
generates interests in pursuing further philosophical insights relevant to the 
objectives stated above, and in matching those insights with the historical re-
cords that are available on the subject. I also attempt in various chapters, but 
particularly in the last one, to outline a possible strategy to redefine the polit-
ical and religious in ways that facilitate the inclusion of Islam and Muslims in 
the public spheres of secular society. As we will see in Chapters 3 and 4, the 
concept of religious and political pluralism can be traced back in Islamic ex-
perience to the Medina constitution (732 CE) and the interreligious contracts 
that formed the foundation of the moral autonomy enjoyed by confessional 
communities under Islamic law.
The book purports to develop an understanding of the nature of the pro-
cess of globalization in both world history and modern societies. It particu-
larly focuses on Islam’s place in world history as the last civilization that 
shaped certain intellectual and cultural forms that impacted Middle-Age 
Europe and shaped the development of Western modernity. It begins by re-
viewing the two main interpretations of the trajectory of modern society 
advanced by Fukuyama and Huntington; the former based in the theory of 
cultural convergence and the latter in cultural conf lict. I argue in the next 
two chapters that the two conceptions capture only part of the emerging re-
ality and therefore arrive at partial and contradictory conclusions. I attribute 
their divergent conclusions to the horizons in which they contemplate the 
origin and patterns of globalization, as both assume that it was born in the age 
of Enlightenment, and suggest that a better understanding requires broader 
horizons, comparable to those afforded by the Axial Age as proposed by Karl 
Jaspers. For it is in the Axial Age that we find the roots of the six world civ-
ilizations that Huntington reviewed with great suspicions and deep concerns 
and assumed that they are incapable of sharing a framework of cooperation 
with Western civilization. At that distant but relevant age we encounter the 
emerging framework of cooperation, that grew to reach its premodern zenith 
in the Islamic civilization. The framework does not immediately provide 
any working model for us today but give us insights to new possibilities that 
could replace the open conf licts predicted by Huntington with cooperation 
and competition within a global framework. The ability to come to this 
conclusion is markedly enhanced, I contend, by recognizing the patterns of 
world history. From the Axial-Age horizons we could see the beginning 
of world convergence and patterns of unity and cooperation among nations 
and religions. From there we could also see Islam’s close affinity to Western 
civilization, thought, and morality. The new horizons for contemplating mo-
dernity would, I propose, help us recognize with some clarity the ground for 
modern global experience.
I argue, throughout the chapters of this book, that globalization is a his-
torical process rooted in the worldviews of the monotheistic religions and the 
8 Introduction
Abrahamic moral traditions. It is rooted in the humanistic visions and values 
inspired by the prophetic traditions that focused on the transformation of 
human society into a more just and compassionate society. Such an assertion 
might be difficult to fathom for many readers, but it is difficult precisely be-
cause of the absence of the historical records that are necessary to connect the 
modern age with the Axial Age, where the much-acclaimed Greek heritage is 
located. I argue in Chapters 3 and 4 that transcendental idealism that emerged 
in the monotheistic traditions rooted in the Abrahamic faith, and in the He-
brew prophetic reforms and Islamic rationalism, constitutes the breakthrough 
that led human civilization down the history to the modern age, where the 
European Enlightenment was the recipient of intellectual and cultural tra-
ditions that emerged from a multitude of human civilizations. Islam in the 
Middle Age presents us from this vantage point with the moment of unity 
and provides the creative synthesis and the intellectual inheritance that were 
further developed by the West into the current forms we experience today. 
From our new vantage point, Islam appears as a partner for the development 
of modernity. The fact that this narrative is absent from the common under-
standing of modern society is a sufficient reason for shedding light on the 
grounding of modernity, as the unfortunate absence of the grounds of the 
Enlightenment rational traditions is creating doubts about its meaning not 
only to non-Western societies but even for the internal debate of Western 
rational traditions.
The values and beliefs that define transcendental idealism were articu-
lated in a discursive tradition throughout the history of ancient Israel, as the 
prophetic mission never ceased but took rational forms in the Islamic mon-
otheism as it became clear that it was the responsibility of the scholar and 
intellectual to assume the reformist mission assumed earlier by prophets. This 
gave rise to the rational idealism of the Mutazilite movement. The movement 
set itself against the transcendental realism of the hadith movement obsessed 
with defending the status quo and ensuring the unity of the Muslim commu-
nity. The transcendental idealism of the Mutazilites was crucial for confront-
ing political usurpation and misuse of power and for pushing Islamic society 
toward higher realization of its ideals by transcending the hard compromises 
made by the realists. The Mutazilite movement was instrumental in persuad-
ing the Abbasid Caliphs to support philosophy and science and translate the 
scholarly work of early civilizations. They justified such an enterprise by as-
serting the universality of the scientific enterprise and the unity of humanity. 
By the ninth century, the Mutazilite rational idealism was characterized by its 
commitment to reason, moral agency, science, and humanity. By the twelfth 
century, the Sufi movement created the most ambitious synthesis in the his-
tory of monotheism, combining the three scholarly traditions of mysticism, 
rationalism, and realism.
Modern historians of science, who anchor modern thought in the Greek 
philosophy, have all along argued that the eight centuries of Islamic scholar-
ship and science added nothing new to scientific knowledge and, therefore, 
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Western thought owes nothing to the Arabic and Muslim civilization. Re-
cent investigations and translations of a specimen of Muslim scholarship and 
science have shown, at least to those who engaged in such research, that this 
claim is not true and that modern West would have been impossible without 
the huge amount of copying and borrowing from Muslim learnings. What is 
problematic about the effort to hide the modern connection to Muslim learn-
ing, whether intended or not, is not simply a matter of giving credit where 
credit is due but of disconnecting modern science and scholarship from their 
intellectual roots. Western historians and sociologists continue to ignore the 
contributions of Middle Age Muslim philosophers and scientists. This has 
done modern scholarship great disservice given the extent to which modern 
scholarship found its vocation by engaging for centuries Islamic works. By 
so doing it has locked the doors and throw the keys to the place where some 
of the secrets and unsolved puzzles of modern intellectualism is hidden. The 
lack of grounding laid at the feet of modern rationalism by postmodern phi-
losophers is partially related to the Enlightenment efforts to hide the origins 
of its concepts and notions in the scholastic works of the Middle Age that led 
to Europe’s religious reformation and the origin of Middle Age learning in 
the work of Islamic philosophers and scientists.
Anchoring modernization in diverse historical experiences opens the pos-
sibilities to diverse paths to modernity and lifts the burden of limiting the 
grounds of modern intellectualism to Greek philosophy. Freeing our mod-
ern understanding from the limitations of Greek-to-modernity path opens 
new avenues for us to contemplate the possibilities of new creative forms of 
human interactions and organizations apart from the European path. As the 
European understanding of Western experience began to dominate the in-
tellectual debates, increased demand for the secularization of the social space 
increased, producing reactions that could threaten the very notion of the 
secular state. This concern is evident in the recent works by liberal scholars 
whose commitment to secularism is never doubted, including those of John 
Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, and Richard Taylor.
Forces and patterns in historical transformation
Are there discernable patterns and identifiable structures of historical change? 
This question occupied for centuries many philosophers of history, and we 
will review the main theories of world history in Chapter 2. For now, I 
would like to identity certain patterns and dynamics that seem to repeat 
themselves over time, particularly in the history of monotheistic cultures that 
are the focus of this study. The sociopolitical dynamic of historical change 
appears to follow certain configurations that can be discerned through his-
torical analysis. It might be helpful at this point, before we begin exploring 
and analyzing the social forces that help shape modern society, to outline 
the sociocultural dynamic that leads to the historical process we call globali-
zation. The dynamic is complex, intricate, and subtle and cannot therefore 
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be fully captured in a comprehensive conceptual framework. This does not 
mean, however, that we should shy away from providing a simplified frame-
work capable of reproducing key elements of the dynamic that govern the 
historical evolution of humanity. The intellectual rendering of the historical 
dynamic is crucial for any theoretical endeavor to understand the meaning of 
history. Since illuminating the historical grounds of modern thought and po-
litical formation is at the heart of this study, we will attempt the second-best 
thing by examining the sociopolitical forces responsible for shaping modern 
society. We will have to reduce complex historical patterns into a set of key 
concepts, posited as ideal types, and then strive to relate these concepts to 
each other to formulate an explanatory framework. The dynamic of the his-
torical process is explained in reference to four interrelated notions: idealism, 
realism, positivism, and materialism. These categories are in turn subsumed 
under the meta-categories of transcendentalism and naturalism.
The most important element in the historical process of globalization is 
idealism, particularly rational idealism that asserts the primacy of the transcen-
dental ideals that were originally encountered in the monotheistic prophetic 
tradition, particularly the ideal of equal dignity of all peoples and the moral 
responsibility of rational humanity. Idealism grounds human experience in 
rational and teleological consciousness and in the transcendental essence of the 
material world. Idealism can be observed in history in the Hebrew prophetic 
tradition, Islamic rationalism, and the German idealism. Idealism, while as-
serting the moral nature of the ultimate reality, bifurcates into theistic and 
pantheistic forms. Theistic idealism insists that the ultimate reality transcends 
the phenomenal world and, hence, cannot be fully experienced within tem-
poral existence, while pantheistic idealists contend that the ultimate reality 
is immanent in the world and can be fully experienced in history. The pan-
theism we encounter in Hegel for instance has clear elements of realism and 
represents hence an effort to compromise the ideal with the real by idealizing 
the contemporary real. Kant’s moral philosophy provides the best modern 
example of theistic transcendental idealism, while Hegel’s thought represents 
an instance of pantheistic idealism. Hindu and Greek Neoplatonism provide 
counterexamples of pantheism outside the monotheistic traditions, though 
both belong to transcendental realism. Realism is the counterforce to idealism 
as it represents the belief that the essence of reality is captured in the actual 
representations of the individual expressions and in the manifestations of co-
ercive power through bilateral and multilateral relationships. Realists accept 
the human condition of any sociopolitical situation on its face value and deals 
with it as a presentation of being rather than that of becoming.
Realism is consistent in both its transcendental and naturalist manifestations 
as it has always shown the tendency to privilege socially and historically estab-
lished powers and, hence, assumes a high degree of determinism. Realism can 
be observed historically in the approach of Jewish rabbinical order and Latin 
Christianity and in the attitude of the juristic tradition in Islam. In modern 
times, realism is associated with the efforts of both liberal and conservative 
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actors to promote imperialism and political domination in general, including 
intellectuals such as James Mill, Hans Morgenthau, and Henry Kissinger. 
Positivism is another counterpart to idealism as it is characterized by the be-
lief that laws and their operation derive validity from the fact of having been 
enacted by authority or derived logically from existing decisions, rather than 
from any moral considerations, such as supra-legal equality or justice. The 
belief may be systematized into a naturalist belief system, such as naturalism 
or deism, when it asserts that only that which can be scientifically verified or 
is capable of logical or mathematical proof can be claimed to be true, thereby 
rejecting metaphysics and theism. Leibniz, Comte, and Weber are important 
proponents of positivism. Finally, materialism is another sociopolitical force 
that emerged in opposition to idealism as it promotes a worldview that privi-
leges material possessions and physical comfort and considers them more im-
portant than spiritual values in explaining the world and guiding action. This 
belief takes a naturalistic turn among individuals who deny the supernatu-
ral ground for existence and therefore concludes that nothing exists except 
matter and its mutations and transformations. Marxist thought is the most 
important instance of materialism in contemporary times. Yet materialism 
could be well subsumed under transcendentalism, as it often emerges during 
the advanced stages of sociocultural development of monotheistic traditions 
distinguished by a life of plenty and extravagance. Of course, the grounding 
of realism, in both its positivist or materialist manifestations, cannot be easily 
established and detected unless it is discursively articulated in a worldview. 
However, even when the worldview is expressed, we often need to examine 
the way the ideas are acted out and not only their discursive representation. 
The tensions and interactions between the various sociocultural forces and 
worldviews are schematically summarized in Figure 1.
In the political realm, and in the policy formation exercise, realism is a 
higher category that subsumes both the positivist and materialist understand-
ing of the social order. The most salient features of positivism relate to its insist-
ence that positive law is the final criterion for judging actions and its uncritical 
support of those who exercise political power. Materialism, on the other hand, 
is mainly concerned with the accumulation and allotment of societal wealth. 





Figure 1 Dynamic of sociohistorical movements.
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evident in the tendencies of positivists and materialists to generate imperialism 
and social hierarchy. Political idealism, on the other hand, privileges egalitar-
ian politics rooted in universal human values and the moral necessity to ever 
pursue their potential realization in society. They also manifest themselves in 
social movements that demand reform of deformed social structures so as to 
ensure fairer distribution of power and the accountability of those who control 
financial resources and political power. The tendencies of sociopolitical move-
ments in many ways complement each other and create a healthy interaction 
that ensures the stability of society, as long as the channels of communication 
remain open and social forces remain responsive to the demand of other social 
components of society. Obviously, maintaining positive institutional relations 
among sociopolitical movements is desirability, as it ensures the combination 
of stability and progress necessary for any functioning society.
The above key concepts are crucial for understanding the forces and pro-
cesses of the evolution of global human society under the inf luence of reli-
gion over time. They reveal patterns we encounter across time, beginning 
with the ancient Israelites and later through the Islamic intellectual tradi-
tions, and finally in the Enlightenment rationalism. Although these catego-
ries and patterns in which they appear and repeat themselves are elaborated 
in some details in subsequent chapters, identifying those patterns here and 
commenting on the way they interact among each other should help the 
reader anticipate those patterns and the significance of their formation and 
transformation. We will first encounter those forces and processes in the dis-
cussions presented in Chapter 1, in the context of understanding what is 
posited as a shift from the politics of social unity into fragmentations and 
the rise of identity politics. The fragmentation is evident, for example, in 
the sociopolitical transformation of American society from the single iden-
tity expressed in American liberalism to identity politics in which American 
liberalism shows signs of fragmentations and social divisions. While identity 
and difference are intrinsic to social grouping and have always provided the 
mechanism for social mobilization, their appearance in an advanced stage of 
modernity, widely recognized as “post” modern, assumes a problematic and 
concerning form. Identity politics brings modern society back to nationalism 
as it repudiates the idea of global convergence, bringing the international 
order closer to the Lewis’s and Huntington’s notion of clash of civilizations. 
Convergence and divergence, unity and plurality, cooperation and conf lict, 
and coexistence and clash have always been intrinsic to human progress, and 
as such they could not be avoided all together. The unnecessary provocation 
of destructive conf licts that could be avoided, as was the case with the mo-
ment of rapprochement between the United States and China in the early 
1960s. The Sino-American agreement represented a moment of reconcilia-
tion between two projects, capitalism and communism, that were competing 
over world dominance with each hoping to achieve global convergence. The 
agreement cemented a clash-avoidance strategy that turned the clash into 
competition and reduced the possibilities of destructive wars. Eventually, the 
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Soviets rolled back and imploded as China chose the route of cooperation and 
limited convergence. China embraced globalization and internalized specific 
aspects of liberalism that seem to resemble the neoliberal model of limited 
social hierarchy, albeit a model that is more colored by a traditional Chinese 
conception of political authority and organization. Because this study focuses 
on societies with a predominantly monotheistic traditions, no claims are be-
ing made as to the meaning and significance of Chinese transformation over 
the past 30 years. However, China has practically passed the communist ide-
ological phase, although it is still governed under the same political structure.
The possibility of realizing global peace is in jeopardy unless identity pol-
itics is reformed into a more equitable and inclusive political order. The on-
going convergence is unlikely to be completely reserved, but the world might 
enter into a prolonged period of conf lict and misuse of resources that would 
significantly delay the process of convergence. Obviously, the clash is un-
likely to produce a dominant force but could produce new realignment away 
from any exclusivist force that may seek global domination. But if history is 
of any guide, any exclusivist force, whether religious or nationalist, is likely 
to meet the fate of the nationalism forces of the twentieth century and bring 
self-destruction to those who chose to move against the f low of history that 
goes back several millennia. Exclusivist movements are more likely thought 
to produce internal frictions alongside any international friction. The rea-
lignment is already at work in political societies across the world, as current 
convergence and divergence are driven by the divergence of values and in-
terests among transnational social movements. The realignment is already at 
work currently in the international system along the lines that separate three 
major sociohistorical forces: idealism, materialism, and positivism. These 
sociohistorical worldviews have already fragmented liberalism into three 
political groups: classical liberalism, neoliberalism, and ethnic nationalism. 
Figure 2 illustrates this fragmentation schematically.
Classical liberalism has already set the foundations of the international or-
der in the 1950s and 1960s and perfected its legal framework in the form of 
international law and organizations. This meaningful and inclusive system 
seems to fade away under the erosive actions of neoliberalism and nation-












Figure 2 Liberalism and elite worldview.
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The latest transformation makes the world more susceptible to clashes and 
conf licts, as both neoliberalism and ethnic nationalism possess imperialist 
impulses. The current sociopolitical formation also suggests that unless ra-
tional idealism represented in the thought of intellectuals like Rawls and 
Habermas takes the lead, globalization is likely to abandon the global gov-
ernance trajectory and likely to further push on the self-destructive trajec-
tory of corporate and national dominance, a trajectory that is more likely to 
exhaust modern civilization itself. Convergence and conf lict are two con-
ceptual frameworks that have been invoked by Fukuyama and Huntington 
in their efforts to identify the trajectory of globalization. The concepts form 
a conceptual duality and are closely interrelated in systematic thinking and 
historical progress. The convergence-divergence f luctuation in relation to 
the sociohistorical movements is schematically illustrated in Figure 3.
They both are internal to a dialectical relationship that is essential for so-
cial change, for convergence and conf lict are internal to social grouping as 
interests and values in any social setting converge and diverge, leading to 
alignment and realignment of social forces. This dialectical relationship was 
captured in the work of the German idealists, beginning with Kant, but more 
clearly in the work of Fichte and Hegel. Hegel posited the dialectics as the 
logic of historical change. The dialectic signifies the nature of the relation-
ships among sociopolitical forces that aim to shape human reality in accord-
ance with competing values and interests. The relationship takes the form 
of individual and group struggles as the result of conf lict of interests and/or 
values. Marx has adopted the same logic to develop his theory of historical 
materialism, but he nonetheless remained Hegelian despite rejecting the pri-
macy of ideas. In the end he embraced the same triumphalism we encounter 
in Hegel as both assert a moment of ultimate triumph of a particular type of 
social formation.
The temptation to declare the end of history in the moment of observation 
of the dialectical unfolding of history, similar to the one experienced by He-
gel and Marx, or most recently by Fukuyama, must be resisted as it violates 
the very logic of the dialectal process. The end of the historical process is nei-


















Figure 3 The politics of convergence and clash.
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endless involving repeated synthesis that combines antithetical historical mo-
ments, unless one is willing to assert that humanity has arrived at the moment 
of absolute perfection. The Germanic state that Hegel thought it was the end 
of history was nothing more than the antithesis of the aristocratic spirit and its 
egalitarian negation, leading to the republican principle that grounded elite 
competition in popular choice. Similarly, communism as posited by Marxism 
as the end of history appeared from a materialist framework as the triumph 
of the impoverished proletariat over capitalism. What we instead achieved 
was the synthesis of the two opposing moments in the welfare state that were 
introduced in Europe and North America in the aftermath of World War II 
and the efforts to role it back by triumphant capitalism since the rise of the 
Reagan-Thatcher neoliberalism. Hegel’s and Marx’s writings and analyses 
have been quite helpful in providing a penetrating analysis of the nature of 
the sociopolitical forces of their times, but they both failed thoroughly in 
their predictions, precisely because they violated the logic of history they ad-
vanced. The end of history cannot be predicted by philosophical insights by 
those who are trapped in its waves and cycles. Rather, portraying history as a 
dialectical process means that we can only anticipate the trajectory outlined 
by the dialectic but can never identify or foresee its conclusion.
The f laws of the Enlightenment account of progress and historical changes 
become visible in the postmodern moment, as the postmodern critique illus-
trated to all that can behold that modern thought has eroded over the past 
two centuries the very foundation upon which its formidable fortress is built. 
Postmodern analysis reveals that modern ideas, values, and postulates require 
a theoretical and historical foundation to stand firmly on. The postmodern 
analysis shows that the Enlightenment is not the ground of modernity, be-
cause it is itself in need for a ground. It reveals what modern scholars and 
historians have managed to keep out of the public view for centuries, that the 
foundations of the modern ideas and values are grounded in previous times 
and spaces and that the founding text of the modern age is missing and need 
to be discovered. It is in the postmodern moment that we feel the urge to 
search for broader horizons to identify the beginning of the modernist narra-
tive and to find more concrete grounding for the evolution of human knowl-
edge and experience. The pronouncements of the Enlightenment scholars 
and the claims of achieving a rupture with the human past and the ancient 
world were to a great extent a rupture with Middle-Age Europe but not with 
earlier human civilizations. The rupture that the Enlightenment achieved 
was not substantive but formal and was not sculpted in the evolution of the 
historically constituted ideas and values but in the way they were represented 
and arranged.
Topics and themes
In the context of examining the interplay between Islam and globalization, 
this book focuses on the interrelationship between Islam and the West as has 
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evolved over a millennium and the way Islamic societies have been coping 
with Western modernity. It is also about shedding light on the area of ten-
sions and misunderstandings that result from the fact that the Western and 
Islamic cultures seem to operate in different historical time-zones, never able 
to fully understand each other or understand their strong historical and in-
tellectual connections. The two cultural time-zones seem to be joined at the 
hip while their minds and thoughts are wondering in different directions. 
Over the last millennium the Western and Muslim worlds have interacted 
deeply, learned from each other, and drew closer to each other in many ways 
that exceed what the two civilizations are willing to admit. By admitting and 
recognizing their similarities they must see the globalization project—which 
was developed historically through the profound contributions of their two 
monotheistic sociohistorical movements that struggled for centuries to bring 
about a global society—as grounded in a more or less similar set of transcen-
dental values and the vision of humanity that was first articulated in their 
sacred scriptures. What is at stake here is whether the world would converge 
to create a global order on the basis of universal human rights or whether it 
will clash to undermine an inter-millennial struggle and take humanity back 
to exclusivist nationalism or tribalism that would only undermine human 
progress. As we will see throughout the book, the efforts to impose one’s 
own worldview on the other would not work and would eventually exhaust 
the rivaling traditions.
The postmodern moment of globalization offers great opportunities to 
overcome misunderstanding and create more cooperation as Western Mus-
lims struggle to become an integral part of Western experience and allow 
more direct and contemporaneous debate. The emerging Muslim commu-
nities in Europe and North America under the conditions of religious and 
political pluralism, never experienced before, should help in developing new 
understanding of similarities and differences, and appreciate the rich cul-
tural developments this experience could achieve. The jury is out on how 
the current experimentation would proceed, given the rising tensions, or-
chestrated by rigid and fundamentalist views within the three Abrahamic 
traditions. Islam and the Trajectory of Globalization is concerned with under-
standing the sociopolitical structures that control the processes of conver-
gence and divergence and the dynamics that govern sociocultural change. 
The research uncovers the key components that placed the historical process 
of globalization in motion by focusing on the interrelationship between the 
powerful impact of transcendental ideals on the rational pursuit of meaning 
and purpose and, more specifically, on the efforts to connect the revela-
tory elements of the monotheistic tradition with the tradition of rational 
idealism.
We endeavor in subsequent chapters to advance several interrelated themes 
that aim at showcasing Islam’s historical contributions to the rise of a more 
inclusive and progressive political order and the challenges posed by West-
ern imperialism, disguised as political realism, toward the formation of a 
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more inclusive and peaceful global order. As we proceed through the various 
chapters of the book, a number of important themes emerge, including the 
following:
1  Globalization is a historical process that accelerated in the past three 
decades under neoliberalism, but the neoliberal approach to globali-
zation is unsustainable, and it has been increasingly generating anti- 
globalization forces that threaten to undermine the liberal democratic 
foundations of the international order, which is essential for the stability 
of globalization.
2  The globalizing socioeconomic order we experienced since the collapse 
of the Soviet Union is rooted in sociohistorical epistemes that date back 
to the Axial Age. The ideas and values that give the modern world its 
structural dynamics transpired in the monotheistic civilizations and ac-
quired their rational intellectual forms in the Islamic civilization, before 
it was later developed to their current forms in the Western civilization.
3  Modern civilizational structures and institutions are grounded in tran-
scendental idealism, and the progressive elements of modernity are 
inspired by the rational idealism strand of the evolving monotheistic 
traditions.
4  Transcendental idealism that characterizes the drive toward equal dignity 
in modern times emerged in its foundational forms within the Islamic 
rationalist movements of the Mutazilites and Asharites, and contempo-
rary Muslim reformers have been drawing from the same foundation in 
an effort to reconcile Islam and modernity.
5  Autocratic regimes in Muslim countries use secularism and liberal claims 
as tactics to stif le democratization and frustrate the process of reconcilia-
tion. The sociopolitical conditions developed under Arab autocracies are 
breeding violent extremism, forcing waves of South-to-North migra-
tions, and are threatening to undermine global convergence and increase 
global conf licts.
6  Islamic reform has been underway since the mid-nineteenth century, 
and Islamic reform movements have the capacity to make a positive con-
tribution to a more liberal and democratic future, but that is conditioned 
on their ability to disavow extremist voices and overcome autocratic rule.
7  The emergence of Islam in Western society and the growing Muslim 
communities in Western democracy provide an opportune moment to 
create more meaningful and direct communication between Islam and 
the West and could potentially contribute to overcoming the millennia- 
long confrontations and aggressions over the Christian- Muslim frontiers.
8  Islamic presence in the West might be a necessary condition for develop-
ing the pluralism the world needs to ensure a fairer and more engaging 
global governance. However, the ability of the interactions to generate 
a cross-cultural consensus is still a work in progress, surrounded with 
uncertainties and dangers.
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9  Engaging non-Western cultures and religions in a globalizing social 
setting cannot rely on the subjective rationality proposed by Kant in 
his reliance on universal maxims or the organic rationality proposed by 
Hegel which has succumbed to positivist limitations. Instead, there is 
a need to adopt rational rules developed through dialogical consensus, 
similar to the overlapping consensus developed by Rawls, and to achieve 
cross-cultural pluralism based on the principle of equal dignity of all 
human beings.
These major themes are discussed over the ten chapters that constitute this 
book. In Chapter 1, we lay out the various layers of the globalization process 
and explore the subordination of the cultural and moral dimensions of life to 
the economic and geopolitical interests of the corporate world that reduces the 
meaning of human development to financial growth. We examine the transfor-
mation of international liberalism, envisaged by classical liberals like Locke and 
Kant as world peace, into neoliberalism under the inf luence of political realism 
and neorealism and shed light on the role neoliberalism plays in undermining 
liberal democracy abroad and at home. We look at the two major conceptions 
regarding the trajectory of globalization into the future: convergence and clash 
of social orders. Convergence is often promoted by the advocates of liberalism 
as best represented in the work of Francis Fukuyama, while the clash theme is 
advanced by conservatives and neoconservatives and best articulated by Samuel 
Huntington. We finally take note of the efforts by ethnic nationalists to de-
monize Islam and paint it as the complete ‘other’ of modern civilization.
We turn in Chapter 2 to review theories of world history in an effort to 
understand the relationship between culture and civilization and to assess the 
trajectory of liberal democracy. We look into the idea that world history is the 
theater for the evolution of freedom proposed by Kant and later developed into 
a full-f ledged theory in the philosophical writings of Hegel. We also review 
the works of two prominent philosophers of history, Spengler and Toynbee, 
and explore the complex relationship between culture and history, pointing 
out that unlike what Huntington assumes, culture forms the intellectual and 
moral ground on which economic and technological developments we associ-
ate with civilizations take place. We also explore the proposition of the “Axial 
Age” introduced by Karl Jaspers and underscore the qualities that make this 
period in human history an important starting point to understand historical 
change in general and the monotheistic outbreak in particular.
The role of monotheism in setting the stage for the evolution of humanity 
from the Axial Age to the modern age through the process of globalization is 
examined in Chapter 3. We identify transcendental idealism with its four dis-
tinctive features (rational agency, moral responsibility, universal equality, and 
purposive history) as the dynamics that drove the monotheistic communities 
and set them on their historical journey that forms the essence of globaliza-
tion. We examine the role of the intellectual, who emerged as the promoter 
of transcendental rationalism, leading to the rise of rational idealism that 
was advanced first by Islamic rationalism, and later by Western liberalism. 
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We also explore the contributions of Islamic rationalism to the development 
of the theory of natural rights that was adopted by European scholasticism 
beginning with Thomas Aquinas, before it was used by the Enlightenment 
thinkers to justify democracy and classical liberalism.
In Chapter 4, we further investigate the bifurcation of Islam into rational 
idealism and juristic realism and shed light on the idealism-realism dialectics 
under Islam, and the generation of a discursive tradition that was crucial to 
keeping the socio-religious and socio-historical groups engaged in an open 
debate. This leads us to examine the ethical foundations and the humanistic 
dimension of Islam that gave rise to religious pluralism and facilitated the estab-
lishment of worldwide civilization that brought unity to the Axial-Age socie-
ties and to the rise of the high culture in metropolitan cities from Central and 
South Asia in the East to the Iberian Peninsula in the West. We also examine 
in this chapter the contractual relationships between Muslim and non-Muslim 
communities that allow non-Muslims greater moral and religious autonomy.
The ability of Muslim jurists to keep the state out of the legislative process 
throughout Muslim history is discussed in Chapter 5. We focus in this chap-
ter on the consequences of the Muslim jurists’ success in maintaining their 
autonomy through their collective power to promulgate Islamic law. Not 
only did the Muslim jurists acquire the power to check state actions and limit 
its inf luence on legal and constitutional matter, they were also successful in 
keeping civil society vibrant and independent of state power by developing 
the institution of Waqf (public trust) and protecting it from external inter-
ferences by political and social actors. The Waqf institution also helped the 
jurists to maintain financial independence as it provided funding to social 
and public services, including setting schools, paving roads, and circulating 
wealth to less fortunate social classes.
The inf luence of Islamic philosophy, science, and culture on the rise of 
modern West is discussed in Chapter 6. Between the tenth and fourteenth 
centuries, European students of philosophy and science oozed into Andalusian 
universities, particularly the University of Cordoba, from all regions of West-
ern Europe. Andalusia formed historically the Western frontier of the Islamic 
civilization with Europe and was as such a zone of contact where Christians in-
teracted with one of the most advanced centers of Muslim learning. The fall of 
Cordoba to the Visigoths gave Europe access to Cordoba’s library and to price-
less source of philosophy, science, and literature. We examine in this chapter 
the rise of European learning as a result of their exposure to new sciences and 
shed light on the breadth and depth of the transmission of knowledge from 
Muslim Spain to Western Europe and show that contrary to the claims of 
many European historians modern sciences that emerged in Europe through 
the eighteenth century were the outcome of centuries of labor by Muslim 
scientists and philosophers and have little resemblance with what European 
sources claimed to be grounded in the Greek philosophy of the Axial Age.
Chapter 7 examines the rise of European colonialism and its impact on the 
Muslim world. We review in this chapter Europe’s efforts to remold Muslim 
societies in the image of the West and the reaction of Muslim intellectuals and 
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societies to these efforts. It highlights the extent to which Muslim societies 
have internalized Modern European thought and culture. It also uncovers the 
European obsession with transmitting European cultural practices and not 
only liberal ideals, and the willingness of Western powers to support tyrants 
and dictators to do so at the expense of the internal stability and well-being 
of non-Western populations. We also point out why the secularization pro-
ject in the Middle East was ill-conceived and identify the struggle for reform 
undertaken by Middle Eastern intellectuals and social movements.
We turn in Chapter 8 to study the impact of Western management of the 
Middle East on the growth of economic disparity internationally and locally 
and on the waves of migration from the countries of the South to the North. 
The encounter of Europe with its increasingly religiously conscious Muslim 
populations is discussed in this chapter, exploring the meaning and impli-
cation of such encounters for the globalizing world. We also look into the 
nature of neo-fundamentalism and its roots in modernity and contrast it with 
the struggle of mainstream Western Muslims to engage in self-assessment and 
adaptation to bring transcendental values and ideals to the modern age.
Chapter 9 shows that Muslim transformations and policies adopted by ne-
oliberal and neoconservative elites are having varying impacts on Western 
society and on the growing populist antagonism toward both liberalism and 
globalization. We examine protest movements that pose a challenge to lib-
eralism and liberal thoughts, focusing particularly on far-right and neocon-
servative political discourse, as we also shed light on the resurging national 
populism. We explore in this chapter the role played by right-wing political 
movements and the advocates of neoliberalism to mobilize Western societies 
against their fellow Muslims and against Islam in general and show why such 
efforts are ill-conceived and wrongly heading.
Finally, Chapter 10 reviews attempts by leading Western thinkers grounded 
in neo-Kantian idealism, most notably John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, to 
come up with a new understanding of pluralism and social consensus in the 
postmodern society and to identify the ground rules and procedures that 
would allow a morally and culturally diverse humanity to engage in more 
inclusive social consensus and political decision-making. We also explore the 
capacity of modern Muslims to engage in national and global debates to 
bring out overlapping consensus and ensure that political pronouncements 
and public policy continue to rely on public reason rather than subjective 
beliefs and understanding.
Notes
 1 Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Societies (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 
1958), 45.
 2 “…if anyone killed a person not in retaliation of murder, or (and) to spread mis-
chief in the land—it would be as if he killed all mankind, and if anyone saved a 
life, it would be as if he saved the life of all mankind” (Qur’an 5:32).
Globalization as currently perceived is a historical process originated in Eu-
rope and has its roots in the rational impulse of the Enlightenment. The 
impulse is liberal democracy that has survived the turmoil of the twentieth 
century, including two world wars and a long cold war that produced count-
less skirmishes. With the defeat of European nationalism in WWII, com-
munism expanded into East Europe, further invigorating the former Soviet 
Union. The liberal democratic project nonetheless continued with the same 
vigor, as it remained confident of the superiority of its vision that it developed 
a new field of modernization studies that anticipated the eventual transfor-
mation of non-Western societies, particularly those of the Middle East, from 
religious-traditional to secular-modern cultures. Modernization theory’s as-
sessment was not without merit, as Middle Eastern societies embraced liberal 
democracy, first in Egypt in 1919 as a result of a popular revolution that 
ended British colonial rule and established a parliamentarian democracy, and 
later in Syria in 1947 as it ended the French colonial rule and established the 
first republic in the Arab world. Liberal democracy did not survive for long 
in the Arab societies and was replaced by military rule. The collapse of the 
two Arab liberal regimes was not protested by Western democracies. Instead, 
the new military dictatorships were immediately embraced; for example, two 
coups were orchestrated by the Truman’s administration in 1949 and 1952 in 
the Middle East. By the early 1970s, the call to return to traditional Islamic 
culture and politics was echoed across Arab and Muslim countries, as an 
increasing number of people became disillusioned with coercive secularism 
and fake elections managed by the Arab junta, as well as the open attacks on 
Islamic symbols and cultural traditions. One such attack took place in Syria, 
in 1981, when Hafiz Assad, the father of the current president, sent his par-
amilitary forces to the streets of Damascus to force women to take off their 
headscarves.1
The Soviet Union eventually collapsed in the late 1980s, leading Fuku-
yama to declare the end of history and the triumph of liberal democracy 
as the United States won the cold war against Soviet communism. Yet two 
years later, Huntington surprised the academic world when he declared the 
end of hope in modernization’s ability to plant the spirit of liberalism outside 
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the Western world and urged the West to end its faith in global convergence 
and focus instead on the coming clash of civilizations. The far-right and 
the anti-globalization forces took Huntington’s thesis to heart, as it spoke to 
their fears and prejudices. Huntington’s clash of civilizations thesis soon be-
came the rallying cry of the neoconservatives and, most recently, of national 
populists who have invoked it frequently to explain international and local 
events, particularly violence committed by Islamist groups. The clash para-
digm constructed by Huntington is disturbing not only because it forecloses 
the possibility of greater cooperation but also because it empowers extremist 
movements across the world. The clash paradigm represents an impulsive 
reaction by a decorated scholar who decided to bail out from the intellectual 
framework he embraced throughout his academic career. The arguments he 
makes are complex and reveal contingencies and raise questions that he never 
considered or asked. Why did liberal democracy fail to establish a foothold 
in Muslim societies? Did the United States pursue the right strategies in the 
Middle East, Africa, or South America to bring the populations in these re-
gions closer to liberal democracy? Could liberal democracy take alternative 
forms, and pursue different paths, in non-Western societies? These are rele-
vant and important questions in the debate about the future of globalization 
and the fate of liberal democracy that need to be asked, and we will address 
two of these questions in this chapter, leaving the third question to be tackled 
in subsequent chapters.
World order and the global threshold
The fall of the Soviet Union in 1989 emboldened the advocates of conver-
gence theory that anticipated the emergence of a global culture, galvanized 
around the notions of democracy, open society, and free enterprise. Fran-
cis Fukuyama published in the same year his widely read and cited article, 
later expanded into a full-f ledged book titled The End of History and the Last 
Man. The article-turned-book declared the end of the rivalry among com-
peting political ideologies and the triumph of liberal democracy, announcing 
thereby the end of the search for alternative political ideologies. The for-
mal dissolution of the communist system and the emergence of a democratic 
Russian Federation led to more intense discussions in political and academic 
circles about the nature of the emerging reality that replaced the cold war. 
This led to various formulations around the notion of “globalization.” Glo-
balization as an academic notion predates the end of the cold war but has 
become quite popular since the early 1990s, as its usage underscores the need 
for a new term to describe the expanding networks of social processes and 
new models of communication, collaboration, and exchange that brought 
greater integration among social, economic, and political actors. Along with 
the collapse of the Soviet Union came the liberation of Eastern Europe from 
totalitarian governments, the reunification of Germany, and the weakening 
of authoritarian regimes in South America and East Asia.
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Fukuyama labored in The End of History to ground his arguments in Hege-
lian philosophy, which gave his thesis greater depth as he placed it firmly in 
world history. He did that partly by uncovering patterns of historical change 
and partly by grounding his arguments in Greek psychology. Before we turn 
to examine his arguments and their theoretical foundations, it might be useful 
to contemplate the significance of the historical moment that distinguishes 
our current sociopolitical conditions. Undoubtedly, the fall of the Soviet Un-
ion generated, for those who believe in freedom and accountable govern-
ment, new optimism and excitement, as the end of the greatest totalitarian 
system accompanied the advent of new technologies, particularly in the field 
of digital communication that made information easily and freely accessible 
across the globe. The advancement in computing technology, the explosion 
in Internet use, the mushrooming of global TV networks, and the conver-
gence of information technology in the smartphones and tablets, all reduced 
distances and brought people closer in ways never experienced before. The 
last decade of the twentieth century has also seen the expansion of world 
trade and the rise of China and the Asian Tigers: Hong Kong, Singapore, 
South Korea, and Taiwan. The economies of these East Asian and Southeast 
Asian countries were celebrated by neoliberal economists as miracles and as 
testaments for the wonders of neoliberalism.
Yet globalization cannot be explained purely by technological and eco-
nomic developments, as we must consider the sociopolitical dynamics gen-
erated by the advocates of classical liberalism. Technological advancements 
and recent breakthroughs in communication and transportation technologies 
have been instrumental in bringing about the phenomenon we call globali-
zation, but at the heart of this new experience lies international systems and 
worldwide networks that facilitate collaborations and exchanges among po-
litical, economic, and corporate actors. Globalization as we know it today is 
shaped by the development of international law and organizations, and ad-
vanced by optimistic political and intellectual visionaries, who believed in the 
power of global cooperation for improving the human condition. Globaliza-
tion owes its ability to expand in the postcolonial world to international law 
and organizations that provide the infrastructure for economic and political 
cooperation. The call for building governing institutions to maintain world 
peace was first introduced by the United States at the conclusion of WWI and 
led to the foundation of the League of Nations. President Woodrow Wilson 
who led the efforts was rebuffed by the United States Congress and by the 
American public that was then wary of imperial politics. The United States 
was also instrumental in the second attempt to form an international govern-
ing body after WWII, as President Roosevelt announced the formation of the 
United Nations (UN) Organization in 1945. Globalization is rooted today in 
an elaborate international system that grew gradually around UN activities. 
This relatively brief international experience has successfully laid down the 
infrastructure for a burgeoning global governance, which we may perceive 
as “the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, 
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manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which con-
f licting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action 
may be taken.”2 The word “governance” is key here as it distinguishes the 
evolving political structure that lies at the foundation of the emerging global 
order from a closely related and more familiar term, i.e. “government.” Both 
government and governance refer to a system of rules administered by po-
litical agencies. However, while government involves activities undertaken 
and supervised by a formal authority, commanding law enforcement bodies 
to ensure compliance, “governance refers to activities backed by shared goals 
that may or may not derive from legal and formally prescribed responsibilities 
and that do not necessarily rely on police powers to overcome defiance and 
attain compliance.”3
Global governance is a better term to describe the complex system of rules, 
agencies, and networks that coalesce to produce the international conditions 
that place us at the threshold of an emerging global order. At its most basic 
level, global governance includes the system of international norms shared by 
peoples who belong to different nations and cultures. The rules of interna-
tional law, which grew out of treaties and agreements among the member- 
states of the UN, have created a system of soft law administered by a growing 
number of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). By the turn of the twen-
tieth century, over 3,666 multilateral new treaties were concluded, admin-
istered by a myriad of IGOs, including the United Nations Environment 
Program (UNEP), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO), and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to 
name just a few. These organizations provide many services necessary for 
formulating and implementing decisions and policies made by the special-
ized bodies within the UN, including “information gathering and analyt-
ical functions, dispute settlement procedures, and operational capabilities 
for managing technical and development assistance programs, relief aid, and 
force deployments.”4
One interesting aspect of the growing networks of organizations linked to 
global governance, that could potentially have a far-reaching impact on the 
emergence of a global civil society, relates to the formation of nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs) that work along with IGOs. The number of 
NGOs has grown to more than 6,500, with considerable input and inf luence 
over the work of the international governmental organizations. Topping the 
list of internationally active NGOs are household names, such as Wikimedia 
Foundation, Partners in Health, Oxfam, BRAC, International Rescue Com-
mittee, PATH, CARE International, Médecins Sans Frontières, and Danish 
Refugee Council and Ushahidi. The institutions of global governance have 
no enforcement mechanism and rely completely on the voluntary agreements 
of member-states to abide by international treaties. However, many member- 
states find themselves unable to resist the benefits they could get by abiding 
by international rules. The existence of IGOs and NGOs dedicated to the 
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verification of compliance of established rules is helpful but far from being 
effective. There is still considerable amount of arbitrariness, unfairness, and 
inadequacy in the way global governance works. We will return to consider 
further this aspect of the current system of global governance, but, for now, 
it is important to point out that the system is in full sway as many states are 
eager to enjoy the benefits of direct capital investment and reduced tariffs and 
thus must submit to the WTO and, in turn, are subject to considerable fines 
or loss of membership if they fail to abide by the WTO rules. Similarly, the 
IAEA, set up to ensure that signatories to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, provides an incentive to states that 
voluntarily abide by the terms of treaties in the form of technical assistance 
programs to non-nuclear weapon countries for developing peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy.5
The myriad of institutions and organizations currently involved in the in-
ternational system has evidently laid the foundation for global governance, 
but the ability of the system to grow into the framework necessary for the 
emergence of just global order remains in doubt. There are still many issues 
and challenges that need to be overcome with regards to public accounta-
bility of IGOs and NGOs, the accessibility to the international power struc-
tures, and the need for democratic processes and mechanisms for ensuring the 
fairness of global governance. Given the remarkable developments achieved 
over the past century, these challenges are not insurmountable, particularly 
if some of the stumbling blocks that divide humanity today are overcome 
and a more inclusive and tolerant culture committed to the principle of equal 
dignity of all peoples is promoted. Advancing global governance that brings a 
democratic order while ensuring high degree of autonomy for participants is 
highly desirable for world peace. Whether such a thing is possible is a wholly 
different matter and must be thoroughly examined. Engaging in intellectual 
debates on the global level and identifying possible paths toward the desired 
end are undoubtedly a part of the efforts to overcome the current conditions 
that make the international order subject to manipulation and abuse. The 
political idealism that set the foundation of international law and organiza-
tions has receded by the early 1980s, and institutions of global governance 
are increasingly controlled by neoliberalism, led by corporate power that has 
broken out of the control of the nation-states and is increasing its global net-
works and using its newly founded power to control the nation-state system. 
This is not exactly the international order that was envisioned when the UN 
was set in pursuit of global peace.
The triumph of liberal democracy
Many advocates of modern liberalism see in the drive toward free markets 
and democratic governments a clear evidence of the superiority of liberal 
democracy in comparison with all competing political ideologies. The newly 
founded liberal optimism was best articulated by Francis Fukuyama who 
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underscores, in The End of History, the ability of liberalism to outlive its main 
existential challenger: the Leninist-Marxist ideology. Drawing on Hegel’s 
philosophy, Fukuyama outlines a clear vision of globalization, whereby fu-
ture progress within the emerging global order can only lead to the consol-
idation of liberal democracy. Tracing the progress of liberal democracy over 
the past two centuries, Fukuyama sees the emerging order as one rooted in 
the Swiss, French, and American revolutions that paved the way to the for-
mation of the early liberal democratic governments around 1790. He notes 
the constant increase in the number of societies that embraced the liberal 
democratic tradition from 3 in 1790, to 5 in 1848, to 13 in 1900, to 36 in 
1960, to 61 in 1990. The pattern demonstrates a clear and unmistakable em-
brace of democratic governance over the past two centuries, reaffirming a 
“common evolutionary pattern for all human societies—in short, something 
like a Universal History of mankind in the direction of liberal democracy.”6 
The failure of communism to mount a successful challenge to the liberal 
spirit should be seen, Fukuyama insists, as the vindication of the ideas of 
the liberal visionaries of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Indeed, 
Kant saw this moment coming three centuries ago as he argued that the 
“[h]istory of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness 
of Freedom.”7
The connection between human drive to freedom and the structure of 
world history, that Kant intuitively asserted, was later elucidated in the work 
of Hegel. Hegel believed that freedom was the outcome of a dialectical logic 
that governs world history. He argued that human progress is the result of 
social contradictions and the struggle to overcome them. The struggle pro-
duced profound changes in behaviors, institutions, and technologies. Social 
evolution and political change eventually led to the rise of liberal democracy 
where, for the first time, social contradictions, which form the motor of 
historical change, ceased to exist. With the disappearance of inner contra-
dictions, humanity reaches the end of history with the advent of the liberal 
democratic state.8 While social contradictions helped develop equal freedom 
in history, the advancement of science and rational thinking, the emergence 
of industrial societies, and the massive movement of rural populations to 
urban centers have expanded the realm of freedom and rationality across cul-
tures and societies. “It is the demand for rationality that imposes uniformity 
on the social development of industrializing societies.”9 The application of 
scientific methods, the pursuit of economic development, the use of modern 
technology, and the implementation of rational organizations, have all served 
to bring uniformity to modern societies and, hence, bring about the conver-
gence predicted by modernization theory.
On the surface, global expansion is shaped by economic dynamics, but 
the motor of historical change is rather psychological as it is rooted in “the 
struggle for recognition.”10 Drawing on Alexandre Kojeve’s interpretation 
of Hegel, Fukuyama presents a somewhat complex conception to explain 
the psychological drive that underlines sociopolitical progress, namely “the 
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desire for recognition.” The concept of “recognition” embodies three dis-
tinctive yet interrelated layers of meaning: the sense of personal worth, the 
quest for glory, and the drive for equal dignity. The sense of personal worth is 
an innate human quality associated with people’s desire to be recognized, 
respected, and acknowledged. This innate sense of self-worth is manifested 
in the expectations people have that others treat them with dignity. People 
expect to be treated as end in themselves and not as object to be used by 
others. Individuals desire to be treated as autonomous persons and as worthy 
members of the community. When their dignity and self-worth is ignored, 
people respond with anger and indignation; when the individual fails to live 
up to his or her self-worth they experience shame; and when their self-worth 
is recognized they experience a moment of pride and self-esteem.11 In early 
societies, when people lived in a state of nature prior to the development of 
the state of law, the struggle for recognition led people to compete for supe-
riority and control. Dignity was then achieved by those who were willing to 
risk their lives to stay free and impose their will on others. Those who stayed 
alive after losing the battle, and feared to end their lives in violent death, were 
reduced to slavery. This was the beginning of lordship and bondage, and the 
rise of the society of masters and slaves that distinguished antiquity.12 The 
drive toward the recognition of the superiority of those who were willing to 
risk it all for prestige was historically epitomized in the aristocratic society of 
antiquity, where people were divided between two classes: the aristocrats and 
the peasants. The struggle between these two classes eventually led to the rise 
of modern liberal democratic society.
Fukuyama finds in the master-slave dialectic proposed by Hegel a better 
explanation of historical change than the class struggle identified by Marx. 
Hegel placed “warrior ethos” at the center of social transformation from aris-
tocratic to democratic Europe, affording the Hegelian conception of class 
stratification and struggle deeper insight than that of Marx. Many traditional 
aristocratic societies initially arose out of the “warrior ethos” of nomadic 
tribes who conquered more sedentary peoples through superior ruthlessness, 
cruelty, and bravery. After the initial conquest, the masters in subsequent 
generations divided the land into separate estates and assumed an economic 
relationship as landlords exacting taxes and tributes from the vast mass of 
peasantry slaves over whom they ruled.13 In contrast to the warrior ethos 
that distinguished the aristocratic strata of society, the subjugated population 
whose survival depended on its ability to produce gradually developed work 
ethos, which proved to be much more powerful for reversing the power re-
lationship with the aristocratic class, producing a power struggle that culmi-
nated in the liberal transformation and the birth of democracy. The working 
slaves found their recognition in work and production. As such, work proved 
to be a more important element for the evolution of humanity and the de-
velopment of human society. Work, no less than freedom, is the essence of 
humanity and the motor of history, for it is “the working slave who creates 
human history by transforming the natural world into a world habitable by 
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man.”14 While the master class may successfully induce work among the slave 
population, forced labor alone is insufficient for the emergence of a “culture 
of work.” Such culture presupposes “work ethic” which in the European case 
is the result of a particular work ethic, the “Protestant ethic.” Fukuyama re-
jects the utilitarian basis of capitalism and embraces the Weberian argument 
that capitalism is an economic system grounded in the Protestant ethic that 
emerged with the Protestant reformation in the fifteenth-century Europe.
Weber argued that the development of capitalism was inf luenced by new 
religious consciousness brought about by religious reformers such as Luther 
and Calvin, whose religious teachings connected salvation to the worldly 
success in pursuing one’s “calling,” or one’s career niche in society. The Prot-
estant ethic that laid emphasis on “frugality, self-discipline, honesty, cleanli-
ness, and aversion to simple pleasures” was at the root of the work culture that 
brought about industrialization and economic development in the modern 
world.15 The puzzle of the passion for work exhibited by capitalist society 
can easily be explained by the this-worldly asceticism of Protestant religios-
ity. Fukuyama argues that the religious consciousness that induces capitalist 
entrepreneurship is not limited to Protestantism but can be found in other 
religions, including the Jodo Shinshu that informs Japanese work ethic.16 Yet 
Fukuyama, following the example of Hegel, has ambivalent and conf licting 
views of the impact of Christianity on the evolution of liberal democracy. 
While acknowledging the contribution of Christianity to the promotion of 
human equality in modern times, he distinguishes between Christian and 
liberal sense of equality. Liberals understand human equality through the 
notion of equal rights, whereas Christians see human equality more in terms 
of the moral capacity that people equally share and the equal competence 
people have in making moral choices. In the same manner, Christianity rec-
ognizes human freedom but managed to reconcile human freedom with a 
life of slavery. Eventually Fukuyama agrees with Hegel that Christianity has 
the tendency to produce a servitude ideology.17 Fukuyama’s description of 
the Christian and the liberal attitudes toward the notion of equal dignity is 
evident in the main, but the distinction could be tricky and the categories of 
Christian and liberal are not necessarily mutually exclusive, particularly in 
the American settings.
Despite of its intellectual rigor and elaborate exposition of the founding 
ideas that ushered in the liberal tradition, Fukuyama seems to be uninterested 
in the reality of the liberal democratic order as it has been exercised and lived 
in the late twentieth century. Liberal ideas can eventually be assessed not in 
their theoretical arguments, but in their historical manifestations and the way 
they manifest themselves in actual society. Fukuyama is not interested, for 
example, in examining how liberal democracy is experienced in its economic 
exposition through the ideas and policies of neoliberalism. Throughout his 
book he seems completely oblivious to the impact of the neoliberal order 
on the populations of the countries that have embraced liberal democratic 
Globalization facts and faults 29
government in one way or the other. Most notably, the book is completely 
silent on neoliberal policies that seem to increase economic disparity be-
tween developed and emerging economies, as well as within the developed 
economies of liberal democracies. We turn, therefore, to examine two sets of 
ideological systems rooted in the liberal tradition: classical liberalism and ne-
oliberalism. The two systems are presented as subsets of the liberal tradition, 
but as we will see in the next two sections they represent two completely dif-
ferent approaches to political organization that diverge from the initial liberal 
impulse, with the neoliberal brand exhibiting the greatest divergence of all.
Neoliberalism and the perturbation of the 
liberal tradition
Neoliberalism has played a crucial role in the evolution of the global eco-
nomic system that governs economic interactions throughout the globe. On 
its face value, neoliberalism is rooted in the American anti-statist attitude 
toward political power and the deep mistrust of concentration of power. It is 
grounded in the faith corporate leaders place in the superior capacity of the 
free market to self-regulate transactions among market agents in compari-
son to regulated markets by governmental agencies. Neoliberal economists 
have driven global economic policies in the past three decades. On closer 
examination, one can see neoliberalism has been able to break out from 
state control by dominating electoral politics and ensuring that the state is 
unable to regulate private enterprise. Neoliberal ideas and views dominate 
both academic and policymaking circles, as they insist that they alone have 
the right formula to grow the economy. The early steps that led to the rise 
of neoliberalism took place during the Bretton Woods Conference (New 
Hampshire, 1944) that culminated in the establishment of two powerful in-
ternational economic organizations: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank (WB). Three years later, the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was added to help shape and enforce multilateral 
trade agreements. GATT has been incorporated into the WTO that was 
founded in 1995.18
The dominant economic system today came to life in the wake of WWII, 
and continues to play a key role in opening national markets around the 
world to free trade, facilitating the movement of capital, and providing loans 
to developing countries when they agree to integrate their markets to global 
economy under IMF terms. By 2010,
the total value of world trade exploded from $57 billion in 1947 to an 
astonishing $14.9 trillion in 2010. In that year, China, the world’s leading 
manufacturer, was responsible for 11 per cent of global exports while the 
US, the world’s most voracious consumer, accounted for 13 per cent of 
global imports.19
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This staggering financial growth does not ref lect, however, real growth, as 
much of it happened in “high-risk hedge funds” and future market deal-
ings.20 The IMF and World Bank play central role in the transformation of 
national economies and linking them to the global economic system. The 
secret of this success lies in the structural adjustment policies, a set of ten 
stipulations attached to loan offered by the World Bank and administered by 
the IMF.21 Structural adjustments aim to curb budget deficits by reducing 
government spending and downsizing bureaucracy, reducing tax and tariffs, 
undertaking trade and financial liberalization, and other measures to stim-
ulate direct investment and free exchange. The ten stipulations, otherwise 
known as the Washington Consensus, are applied uniformly to all countries 
requiring loans for economic development.
While stimulating trade, neoliberal policies came under criticism for ef-
fecting serious problems that threaten the global economy, most notably 
contributing to a staggering rise in public and private debts, and generating 
economic disparities and unequal global development. Global debt as of July 
5, 2020, exceeds $61 trillion.22 This amounts to 44% of global GDP, which 
approached $139 trillion as of July 5, 2020.23 Economic inequality between 
rich and poor countries is enormous. Median income in countries like Bu-
rundi, Nigeria, Sudan, or Kazakhstan is less than 2% of that in rich countries 
like France, Switzerland, or Belgium.24 Similarly, neoliberal policies are gen-
erating an environmental crisis. The degradation of world ecology as the air 
quality continues to degenerate as gas omission reaches a critical level. Un-
controlled air pollution threatens to increase global temperature and hence 
causing unrepairable damage to the global ecosystem. At the heart of the 
critique of neoliberalism is the controversial IMF’s structural adjustments that 
seem to be tailored toward protecting the interests of the creditor nations at 
the expense of the economic development of debtor nations. IMF is accused 
of forcing reduction in public spending crucial for the development of human 
capital, thereby undermining the capacity of developing countries to achieve 
economic competitiveness. Neoliberal demands on smaller governments “in-
evitably lead to poorer performance in education and other programs that 
develop human capital.”25
The lack of sensitivity to local needs was the subject of an extensive study 
by Cal and Evelyn Clark on the impact of structural adjustments policies in 
two countries, Chile and Taiwan. They found that the IMF’s insistence on 
reduction of government spending across the board in Chile resulted in the 
deterioration of the overall economic conditions as the result of the reduc-
tion in education spending. Chile’s compliance with the required reduction 
in government spending meant that the goal of allowing the country access 
to more capital conf licts with its ability to improving its social capital. In 
effect, the additional income that was made available by IMF’s stipulations, 
intended to service Chile’s outstanding national debt to international credi-
tors, is achieved by forcing it to spend less on the education and health of its 
own citizens. IMF policies have had therefore devastating effects on Chile’s 
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long-term prospects for real growth. Taiwan was able, on the other hand, to 
escape Chile’s fate by ignoring the neoliberal ideology and sidestepping its 
tenets of deregulation and reduction in government spending:
The major argument in this book is that Taiwan’s export-led develop-
ment strategy succeeded precisely because it discarded the ideology of 
neo-liberalism and unfettered laissez-faire. In particular, rapid industri-
alization in Taiwan could only occur because the government promoted 
a series of fundamental economic transformations during the post World 
War II era. In addition, radical land reform and mass education reduced 
inequality and created the human capital necessary for an industrial 
workforce and highly entrepreneurial business class. In sharp contrast, 
neoliberalism in Chile worked primarily to reinforce the economic po-
sition of the traditional economic elites; indeed, it actually undercut the 
economic position.26
This assessment of the neoliberal policies has been shared by a growing lit-
erature that focused on the human toll of structural adjustments and their 
long-term impact. There is a growing sense that neoliberalism does not only 
undercut the long-term economic growth of countries that come under their 
inf luence but that it also undermines the very principles of democracy and 
liberty. Neoliberalism, the argument goes, threatens the “livelihoods, social 
cohesion and environmental conditions” of societies subjected to its philo-
sophical outlook.27
Neoliberal policies tend to create unequal development and growth not 
only among nations but also within societies where it prevails. This can be 
seen in both India and China. Both countries have experienced, ever since 
they embraced neoliberal remedies, disparity of income among their pop-
ulations. Growth in China is taking place mainly in the commercial and 
industrial centers of Shanghai, Shenzhen, Qingdao, Guangzhou, and Tian-
jin. Similarly, India has experienced enormous development in financial and 
industrial growth in few cities, such as Bangalore, Chennai, and Kolkata. 
While growth in financial and industrial centers has produced an enormous 
wealth, only small segments of highly educated and well-connected individu-
als benefit from the newly founded economic transformation. The rest of the 
population are growing poorer with less control over their immediate envi-
ronment and life.28 The corrupting impact of neoliberalism is not limited to 
splitting the populations into haves and have-nots; it is increasingly reaching 
to NGOs that emerged initially to repair the damage caused by financially 
focused governance and to challenge the neoliberal approach responsible for 
social, educational, and ecological damage. NGOs, particularly in develop-
ing countries, are susceptible to the inf luence of neoliberal elites running 
the government and the economy, as they need funds to run their operation. 
NGOs are increasingly drawn into the neoliberalism orbit, and some have 
even been charged as becoming “the ‘rolling out’ of neo-liberalism.”29
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The adverse consequences of the unequal development of national econ-
omies of developing nations can be observed in the rise in the number of 
immigrants who leave the crumbling economies of their home countries to 
more advanced economies, as they f lee the increasingly suffocating socio-
economic conditions in the countries of the South. This South-to-North 
migration can only be understood in light of internal dynamics created by 
unequal economic conditions stemming from neoliberal policies. Increased 
migration is the unintended consequence of the one-size-fits-all IMF poli-
cies that entail high cost for working classes in countries of the South. A study 
of the impact of neoliberal recipe for economic growth has shown steady 
increase in unemployment in countries that adopt such policies promoted by 
IMF. The initial high growth in GDP experienced by Ghana and Poland as 
a result of implementing IMF requirements in the 1990s was associated with 
rise of unemployment, as internationally supported enterprises paralyzed lo-
cal ones. After the initial 5% rate of GDP growth in the 1990s, Poland’s GDP 
growth fell to 1.2% by 2002, reducing the annual per capita income to less 
than $5,000. This pattern is also replicated in Ghana in the 1980s and 1990s, 
as the sharp increase in in GDP was followed by reduction in growth, as 
“two-third of the country’s parastatal enterprises and significant reductions 
in its civil service.”30 Both countries experienced rapid outmigration of their 
skilled labor force, which in turn led to the degradation of their socioeco-
nomic conditions.
Neoliberal policies raise serious questions about the locus of liberalism in 
the neoliberal approach to society and the economy. Neoliberalism is overly 
concerned with creating free markets that work well for the sustained growth 
of capital, with little regards given to the well-being of current and future 
societies. The freedom of movement is guaranteed to capital but not to labor. 
The only exception is reserved to skilled labor, as immigration and naturali-
zation policies in many advanced economies favor highly educated segments 
of the populations of the developing South. Furthermore, in examining the 
direction of neoliberal policies one starts to see convergence between neo-
liberalism and political realism. An increased concern with power and will-
ingness to tolerate rising inequalities within local populations and among 
nation-states are evident. The convergence between neoliberalism and neo-
realism is observed in two Arab countries in a recent study by Nadine Kreit-
meyr. In a paper published in 2018 under the title “Neoliberal Co-optation 
and Authoritarian Renewal,” she charged that several neoliberal organiza-
tions have been engaged, for almost two decades, in nurturing
social entrepreneurship networks (SENs), composed of social entrepre-
neurs, business and political elites, and international actors in the MENA 
region. The paper analyzes how the local actors in SENs actually “join 
up and foster the renewal of authoritarianism via neoliberal means.”31
The paper focuses on Jordanian and Moroccan social entrepreneurship net-
works (SENs), illustrating the efforts to align SENs with the political agendas 
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of authoritarian regimes. Drawing on the findings of growing literature that 
covers the activities of SENs in the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) re-
gion and South America, she documents the efforts of transnational organiza-
tions, including Ashoka (United States), Synergos (United States), the Schwab 
Foundation (Switzerland), and the Skoll Foundation (United Kingdom), to 
groom authoritarian elites in Morocco and Jordan “to respond aggressively to 
the triple threat of globalization, markets, and democratization.”32
What is different about the types of support offered by these neoliberal 
organizations relates to the selective nature of the networks of entrepreneurs 
and political elites, the closed and long-term membership of the operators 
within those networks, and their connectedness to authoritarian state power:
Analysis of these international organizations shows that they differ from 
other types of support organizations with regard to the types of link-
ages they have with social enterprises and entrepreneurs. They provide a 
combination of financial support, advice and skill development through 
fellowships and awards. They cultivate novel types of relations and are 
based on a selection process that includes personal recommendations or 
nominations, documentation, interviews and field visits. Although the 
terms of these fellowships and awards vary from support organization to 
support organization (e.g. duration, selection process, extent of support), 
they share several commonalities. Instead of merely applying for and re-
ceiving project grants, social entrepreneurs get stipends for a specific pe-
riod of time (2–3 years) or a cash prize and become fellows for life who 
can attend meetings and training sessions.33
Neoliberalism is evidently committed, in this rapidly globalizing world, to 
foster anti-liberal and anti-democratic forces in the MENA region. It is prac-
tically engaged in social engineering whose likely outcome is the perpetua-
tion of the very social hierarchy that liberalism emerged to dismantle. Rather 
than advancing the liberal tradition that laid emphasis on equal opportunities 
for all people and the conformation to a form of government that represents 
the citizenry and protects their civil and human rights, neoliberalism has de-
veloped into an elitist platform concerned with the perpetuation of political 
and economic privileges of global elites that have undergone a gradual trans-
formation from striving for human liberation to aiming at political domina-
tion. Neoliberalism appears increasingly as the amalgamation of international 
liberalism with neorealism. Traditionally, the egalitarian and optimistic in-
clination of liberalism stands in complete contrast to the power-centered and 
pessimistic ideas propagated by neorealism. This divergence seems to change 
with the recent mutations in the two significantly antagonistic doctrines. 
However, as the international system approached the global threshold, and 
with the realist’s abandoning of the principle of national sovereignty as the 
locus of power, it started to embrace a new approach that seems in tune with 
neoliberal thinking. For the neorealists, sovereignty is still attached to the 
state, but not all states. Only states that enjoy “national decision-makers as 
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rationally pursuing a pluralist world order based on ‘sovereign’ states which 
are strong in terms of independent legal authority and hard power” are enti-
tled to the privilege of sovereignty.34
There is a general agreement within the international relations studies that 
neoliberalism and neorealism, while they defer significantly on the level of 
macro-theory, share more nuanced approach to international politics, shaped 
by constructivism that brings them closer at the level of policymaking.35 
They both share an epistemology firmly rooted in rational positivism,36 as 
they stand in dichotomy with rational idealism that guides the advocate of 
liberalism. They also share the paradigm of the anarchic international order. 
The difference is that neoliberals, while agreeing that the international sys-
tem lacks an overarching authority, have greater optimism in the capacity 
of states to engage in economic cooperation rather than being occupied, as 
the realist would have it, in a constant state of antagonism and war. What 
is of interest for understanding the manipulative environment created by 
the neoliberal-neorealist paradigm is the rejection of any ethical foundation 
for human interaction in matters of politics. This rejection leads them to 
treat the rules defining international relations from a constructivist perspec-
tive rooted in Hugo Grotius’s understanding of interstate relations.37 The 
rules that define international relations are not based on international law or 
norms. Rather, they are rules of the game nations play. Contrary to classi-
cal liberals, neoliberals and neorealists do not recognize that the interaction 
between nations produces international norms worthy of affirmation as the 
rules of international law. From the constructivist perspective embraced by 
the neorealist-neoliberalist paradigm, no “tacit rule or norm is socially de-
structive.”38 Consequently, it is not international norms, human rights, or 
any other sets of shared values that matter, but rather the identity and rational 
thinking of the decision-makers. And while neoliberal and neorealist diverge 
in their evaluation of the institutional context of decision-making (the real-
ists being keen to give more deference to the national structure of authority, 
whereas the neoliberal locates it in the international structure), they converge 
in those situations where national social structures align with international 
social structures.39 This is a disturbing frame of reference for any attempt to 
develop world peace, but it is equally important for contemplating the source 
of unscrupulous foreign policy actions taken by Western democracies on the 
world stage. The paradigm also raises concerns about the disruptive impact of 
neoliberalism on global politics.
The clash of civilizations and the arrival of 
identity politics
The optimism we encountered in Fukuyama’s account of a world converging 
toward liberal democratic order was utterly rejected by Samuel Huntington, 
who published in 1993 his controversial article “The Clash of Civilizations” 
in The Foreign Affairs journal. The article begins by asserting that the source 
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of all future international conf licts would be cultural rather than ideological. 
No more will conf licts take place among states that collide because of clash of 
ideas and interests, “but between nations and groups of different civilizations. 
The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines be-
tween civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.”40 These dramatic and 
shocking conclusions seemed completely out of place and uncalled for, as they 
profoundly contradicted the dominant thinking in academia and international 
politics. But what appeared to be weird fragments of thought became in less 
than two decades the defining moment and the idea that was celebrated by 
radical voices throughout the world. Perhaps the most sticking part of Hun-
tington’s argument lies in his use of the notion of civilization. The notion was 
made into a full-f ledged concept in the works of Oswald Spengler and Arnold 
Toynbee few decades earlier. Both made a clear distinction between culture 
and civilization and established a dynamic relationship between the two. Hun-
tington, on the other hand, makes no significant distinction between culture 
and civilization, as he presents the difference in terms of geographic expan-
sion. “Civilization and culture both refer to the overall way of life of a people,” 
he argues. “They both involve the ‘values, norms, institutions, and modes of 
thinking to which successive generations in a given society have attached pri-
mary importance.’”41 The main difference is in size, as “a civilization is a cul-
ture writ large.”42 As such, a civilization is the largest unit of cultural unity in 
which different societies, states, and cultures share common values and world-
views. Moreover, civilizations are “mortal” as they persist over generations 
and can survive “political, social, economic, even ideological upheavals.”43
Huntington identifies seven major civilizations that are likely to clash 
with Western civilization, with varying degrees of severity: Sinic, Japanese, 
Hindu, Islamic, Orthodox, and Latin American.44 He dismisses the idea of a 
universal world civilization, opting more toward the idea of a perpetual ri-
valry and competition among civilizations.45 His dismissal of universal world 
civilization is not complete, as he seems to recognize that the return to the 
rivalry among the seven major civilizations is the result of the decline of 
Western powers and the demise of unidirectional impact of Western civi-
lization. The decline of Western civilization, therefore, marks a transition 
from a phase whereby the West was dominant to a new phase of “intense, 
sustained, and multidirectional interactions among all civilizations.”46 The 
impact of the West on other civilizations represents the triumph of political 
ideology over religion. Huntington argues that Western civilization, unlike 
previous civilizations, produced no major religion. Instead, it gave rise to 
myriad of political ideologies. He asserts that the great political ideologies of 
the twentieth century, including “liberalism, socialism, anarchism, fascism, 
and Christian democracy,” were all the “products of Western civilization.”47 
The decline of the West will therefore have a monumental impact on the 
nature of world conf licts, transforming them from intra-civilizational clashes 
among political ideologies to inter-civilizational clashes among cultures and 
religions.
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Huntington realizes that globalization has brought many societies closer 
to one another, creating common values and understandings, but he dis-
misses the increase of cultural affinity as a sort of “Davos Culture” whose 
impact is limited among power elites. “Davos culture,” as important as it is, 
would not suffice to create a universal culture. “Worldwide, however, how 
many people share this culture?” Huntington asks. “Outside the West, it is 
probably shared by less than 50 million people or one percent of the world’s 
population,” he retorts. Apart from the relatively small number of people 
around the world who share common culture, this group of people are not 
in a position to promote this shared culture, he insists, because these leaders 
“do not necessarily have secure grip on power in their own societies.” Hun-
tington examines at length the prospects for “universal civilization” only 
to deny the possibility of such eventuality. He contends that the similarities 
produced by the expansion of Western values, institutions, and cultures are 
quite superficial, limited almost to the food and entertainment industries. 
“The essence of Western civilization is the Magna Carta, not the Magna 
Mac. The fact non-Westerners may bite on the latter has no implications for 
their accepting of the former.”48
Westernization, Huntington insists, is not working because the modern-
ization process is producing alternative advanced cultures instead of unify-
ing diverse world cultures in the Western mold. As modernization advances 
outside the West, it tends to revive indigenous cultures of the non-Western 
societies and eventually results in the de-Westernization of non-Western so-
cieties. “Modernization then alters the civilizational balance of power be-
tween the West and the non-Western society and strengthens commitment 
to the indigenous culture.”49 For Huntington, the problem is not simply that 
the forces of globalization, which have expanded the process of moderniza-
tion beyond Western societies, are failing in creating world civilization and 
universal culture. Rather, modernization has contributed to the decline of 
the West, relative to non-Western civilizations, and has created a lash back 
against Western hegemony.
The non-Wests see as Western what the West sees as universal. What 
Westerners herald as benign global integration, such as proliferation of 
worldwide media, non-Westerners denounce as nefarious Western im-
perialism. To the extent that non-Westerners see the world as one, they 
see it as a threat.50
Huntington spent much of his academic life before writing his inf luential 
work, “the Clash of Civilizations,” celebrating the convergence of world cul-
tures into modern democracy and heralding the coming of democratic rule 
to developing societies. His sudden turnabout came as a big surprise. It is not 
clear what brought his remarkable departure from his early line of think-
ing, but his new stance on political development is astounding. Convergence 
of world cultures is not possible because, as he puts it, it presupposes the 
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emergence of universal culture or civilization, while recent history shows 
no evidence of that. More specifically, the two main conditions necessary 
to bring about universal convergence, namely the emergence of universal 
language and universal religion, are far from being at hand.51 Huntington’s 
disillusionment with democracy and the spread of democratic culture is due 
largely to the very fact that democratic consciousness no more does inspire 
non-Western cultures to wholeheartedly embrace Western culture. To the 
contrary, democratization is increasingly affirming local cultures and reli-
gions, rather than Western culture and religions.
In the 1960s and 1970s Westernized and pro-Western governments in 
developing countries were threatened by coups and revolutions; in the 
1980s and 1990s they are increasingly in danger of being ousted by elec-
tions. Democratization conf licts with Westernization, and democracy 
is inherently a parochializing not a cosmo-politanizing process. Politi-
cians in non-Western societies do not win elections by demonstrating 
how Western they are. Electoral competition instead stimulates them to 
fashion what they believe will be the most popular appeal, and those are 
usually ethnic, nationalistic, and religious in character.52
It is not difficult to see in the worldview of Huntington that none of us is safe 
unless we live in a world that has completely converged into a single global 
culture. But is this really what we need to establish world peace? Do we have 
to do away with all religions and embrace one secular creed to survive? Must 
we engage in global wars because we do not share one global culture? These 
questions do not come up in any of Huntington’s writings precisely because 
he is convinced that the answer to them is in the affirmative. World history 
shows that this is not true. The Persian, Roman, and Islamic civilizations 
f lourished over long periods of time while showing openness to diversity 
and nurturing multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multi-cultural civilizations. 
And they f lourished, as we will see later, not despite of the diversity of their 
civilizations but because of it. Huntington’s insistence on cultural uniformity 
as the only way to achieve global peace can only be explained from within 
the limited horizons that he considers for coming to his conclusion and 
underscores the importance of broadening those horizons beyond the En-
lightenment. Huntington recognizes that the religious resurgence of the late 
twentieth century is provoked by the very nature of the modernization pro-
cess itself. For the resurgence of religious consciousness is indeed a “reaction 
against secularism, moral relativism, and self-indulgence, and a reaffirmation 
of the values of order, discipline, work, mutual help, and human solidarity.”53 
Religious resurgence was also prompted by the failure of state bureaucracy 
to respond to the social needs of society; “the provision of medical and hos-
pital services, kindergartens and schools, care for the elderly,” he contends, 
“prompt relief after natural and other catastrophes, and welfare and social 
support during periods of economic deprivation.”54
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Although Huntington regards all religious resurgence movements as 
anti-secular, anti-universal, and anti-Western, he seems to be particularly 
alarmed by Islamic resurgence. Islam poses serious challenge to the West, 
he contends, because its cultural, social, and political resurgence exhibits an 
evident “rejection of Western values and institutions.”55 In Muslim societies 
“Islamic fundamentalist groups in the few elections that have occurred” have 
succeeded in mobilizing society “against Western-educated and Western- 
oriented elites.”56 The challenge lies though in the fact that Islamic resur-
gence is not limited to fundamentalist and extremist groups, but is more 
pervasive, encompassing broad intellectual, cultural, social, and political 
movements prevalent throughout the Islamic world.57 Huntington devotes a 
good deal of discussion to the relationship between Islamic and Western civ-
ilizations. It is obvious that he sees a monumental collision between Islam and 
the West in the making, a collision that is much more serious than the skir-
mishes currently taking place with Islamic militants across the globe. An im-
portant ingredient for his pessimistic view of the Islam-West relations comes 
from the extended historical conf lict between Islam and Christianity that, he 
believes, dwarfs the contemporary conf lict between liberal democracies and 
the communist block throughout the cold war.58 In portraying the evolving 
relationship between Islam and the West, he seems to lean more toward the 
views advanced by Western Orientalists such as Bernard Lewis and Michael 
Walzer—that the Islamic attitude toward the West is intrinsically antagonis-
tic and completely irrational.59 He is quick to dismiss any critique coming 
from the Muslim world regarding Western practices in the Muslim world as 
hostile, as he did with Fatima Mernissi’s work, Islam and Democracy. The fact 
that Mernissi was equally critical of views and practices rooted in modern 
Islam does not matter in the face of her criticism of the exploitative practices 
by the West toward Muslim society, subsuming these practices under a label 
commonly used in social sciences such as “militaristic,” “imperialistic,” and 
“colonial terror.”60
Nor does it matter that Western policies and practices toward Muslims 
have led to the very antagonism that unsettles Huntington. More concerning 
though is Huntington’s resentment of a Muslim scholar for being critical of 
Western imperialism and considering such critical views a justification for 
switching from cooperation to conf lict, from convergence to clash. Religious 
resurgence and reaffirmation of religious identity transform, Huntington is 
now convinced, the nature of conf licts from ones that take place among ideo-
logical states to ones that occur among civilizations. The new wars do not set 
states against one another, but pit civilizations against each other. According 
to Huntington, Western civilization, dominated by Catholicism and Protes-
tantism, has three major rivaling civilizations: the Orthodox, the Confucian, 
and the Islamic. Russia, China, and Muslim countries pose the future threat 
to Western civilization, but none among them is more threating than those 
countries that have experienced Islamic resurgence. This is because the global 
political shift constantly creates new fault lines that run at the fuzzy borders 
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of the seven major civilizations, and the most dangerous are those that delin-
eate the borders of the Islamic civilization. In a section titled “Islam’s Bloody 
Borders” Huntington has the following to say about the emerging fault lines:
The overwhelming majority of fault line conf licts, however, have taken 
place along the boundary looping across Eurasia and Africa that separates 
Muslims from non-Muslims. While at the macro or global level of world 
politics the primary clash of civilizations is between the West and the 
rest, at the micro or local level it is between Islam and the others.61
To explain the reasons behind Islam’s bloody borders, Huntington points to 
three factors: (1) Islamic militarism and the fighting spirit of Islam, (2) the 
“indigestibility” of Muslims and their refusal to dissolve in other religious 
communities, and (3) their proximity to non-Muslim groups as they move 
into territories inhabited by people of other faiths.62
Huntington dismisses as irrelevant the argument that “Western imperial-
ism and the subjugation of Muslim societies in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries produced an image of Muslim military and economic weakness and 
hence encourages non-Islamic groups to view Muslims as an attractive tar-
get.”63 He however rejects this argument as an unconvincing cry of “Muslim 
victimization” that does not explain “conf licts between Muslim majorities 
and non-Muslim minorities in countries such as Sudan, Egypt, Iran, and 
Indonesia.”64 The division of the world into separate civilizations was not 
intended as a tool to make sense of the various cultures and their historical 
grounding in the premodern age; rather, it was used as a tool to build thick 
boundaries and declare an open war across civilizations. I will not attempt 
to examine here the grounds of Huntington’s notion of civilization and will 
postpone its full examination to Chapter 2. Instead, I will explore the affinity 
of the civilizational clash he advocates to political realism and to his defense 
of white American culture. The ground of the radical shift in thinking about 
international relations is brought to the fore in the last book he published in 
2004 under the title Who Are We? In responding to this question, Hunting-
ton abandoned the idea that America is built by immigrants from the four 
corners of the world, who are united in the American creed built around the 
country’s founding ideas of liberty, equality, individualism, democracy, and 
constitutionalism. For him, those ideas do not provide the full story, as they 
all constitute only one dimension of the American identity, the political di-
mension. Before the United States was built by “immigrants” it was founded 
by “settlers,” who shared four additional characteristics that are central to the 
American identity: race, ethnicity, culture, and religion.65 With the Amer-
ican identity defined in those piercing terms, Huntington opened fire on 
multiculturalism, declaring the process of evolving more inclusive Ameri-
can culture as betrayal of the Eurocentric essence of the American culture. 
Multiculturalism is, he proclaimed, an anti-Western ideology.66 Huntington 
protested that immigrants from Latin America and Muslim countries were 
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not keen to assimilate but that the metaphor of the “melting pot” as the path 
of immigrants to get integrated in American society is replaced by that of the 
“tossed salad.” This new reality posed a threat for Huntington since the Latin 
American and Muslim cultures were inferior to the European culture.67
Huntington’s assertion that culture and religion are intrinsic to the Amer-
ican identity is preposterous as both comprised of a complex set of beliefs and 
values specific to the early settlers. The argument in support of the univer-
sality of a Protestant culture is Eurocentric at best, as the most sympathetic 
explication of such claim is to affirm that non-European Americans are in-
capable of generating authentic and moral expression on their own. This is 
an astonishing conclusion, given the fact that Huntington wants to define 
the universal in cultural and religious terms. In what sense can the histori-
cally bound European experience be described as universal? The irony of the 
above sentiments aside, the question we need to ask is, how could anyone 
declare his particular culture, rather than a set of universal values, the crite-
rion for judging other actual and potential forms of social consciousness and 
organization? And whence can we find it acceptable to close human horizons 
and deny other cultures the potential to take humanity to higher grounds? 
The absurdity of Huntington’s thesis cannot be shoved aside, as it speaks to 
the convictions of a significant segment of society, who have for decades been 
inhibited to share their preposterous thoughts with the world but do now 
feel empowered by the arguments of a leading public intellectual. Nor can 
we overlook the assumption made by Fukuyama that liberalism is the system 
that governs the Western society or is truly leading the globalization process 
in the late twentieth or early twenty-first centuries. Exploring the theoretical 
foundation for Fukuyama’s contention of the end of history and examining 
the inevitability of the clash of civilizations will be the main focus of Chapter 
2. I would like in the remainder of this chapter to locate the origin of the 
ongoing hostility toward Muslims, and the demonization of Islam, in the 
broader framework of political realism, which has cleverly and successfully 
transposed the imperialist impulse of old Europe to post-WWII American 
foreign policy.
Political realism and the drift toward imperialism
Political realism emerged in the United States after WWII, with the arrival 
of European emigres, most notably Hans Morgenthau, George Liska, Nich-
olas Spykman, and Henry Kissinger.68 Before the emergence of realism, it 
was generally accepted that classical liberalism dominated political discourse. 
This was Louis Hartz’s main thesis in his widely read and acclaimed work, 
National Liberalism, published in 1955. For many American thinkers of the 
time, realism’s pessimism and its saturation with power seemed at odd with 
the optimism of the American liberal tradition and its forward-looking out-
look, as well as its deep faith in human progress. Realism’s frame of reference 
seemed more in tune with “European-formed” thinking.69 Commenting on 
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George Kannon’s realism, David Mayers underscores the pessimistic views 
of human nature that he shared with the leading scholars of international 
theorists, particularly those upheld by “Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans Morgen-
thau, and Henry Kissinger.”70 Gradually however, realism found place in the 
hallways of American power and became the favored outlook of American 
bureaucrats serving in the state department and foreign missions and has most 
recently metamorphosed into its more current form—namely, neorealism. 
The realist framework became the weapon of choice for the diplomatic game, 
ready to be deployed whenever the political leaders of developing countries 
adopted a policy or a political position contrary to perceived Western inter-
ests. Liberal and democratic concerns were not completely abandoned, and 
talk of human rights never ceased, but they were apparently considered sec-
ondary to national interests as defined by those who were in charge of for-
eign policy at the time. We do know that realism advocates see politics as a 
game to be played on rules specific to the case at hand, but we do not have 
sufficient database to judge the extent to which this game has been played in 
the Middle East and other countries of the South. What we know, however, 
that it was indeed played countless times to bring down legitimately elected 
governments in Africa, the Middle East, and South America, and that three 
of them took place in the Middle East against countries that never recovered 
from the disruptive impact of the realist interventions.
Ever since Middle Eastern countries achieved independence from Euro-
pean colonialism, successive American administrations have resorted to secu-
rity agencies who have used both overt and covert operations to ensure that 
Middle Eastern countries are governed by pro-American elites, even if that 
meant that they would be ruled by political elites who act in the most illib-
eral and undemocratic fashion. There are widely accepted rumors by Middle 
Eastern people that the United States and European countries secretly ma-
nipulate their rulers and give them all the support they need to suppress their 
populations and keep them in check. But these are just “rumors” that lack a 
clear evidence to support. For sure many of the rumors do rise to the level of 
conspiracy theories intended to lift the responsibility for missteps taken by 
local leaders and place them at the feet of former colonial powers. Yet what 
is difficult to def lect as rumors are few cases we are more certain about, as 
they are supported by concrete and plausible evidence, that show that the 
Pentagon and other U.S. intelligence and security agencies have been em-
ployed to compromise military generals and use them to undermine genuine 
democratic processes in pursuit of real or perceived American economic or 
geopolitical interests. These subversive interventions persisted through both 
liberal and conservative administrations.
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been involved, since its in-
ception in 1947, in missions that aim at supporting strong dictators as long 
as they remain committed to advancing American objectives in the region. 
The most publicized CIA operations in the Middle East took place against 
democratically elected governments and in support of two dictators. Both 
42 Globalization facts and faults
were undertaken in the name of modernizing and secularizing the Middle 
East. Syria and Iran are today under sectarian governments that have become 
the breeding ground for violent extremism. The first military coup d’état 
against an elected government took place in Syria in 1949. Steven Meade, a 
WWII veteran and CIA officer, was tasked to help a Syrian colonel—Husni 
al-Za‘im—to plan and execute a coup against the government of Shukri al-
Quwatli, the first president to be elected after Syria achieved independence 
from France in 1947. Meade, who officially served as a military attaché in the 
American diplomatic mission in Damascus, worked under Miles Copeland Jr. 
who was in charge of CIA operation in Syria and who later worked with Kim 
Roosevelt to plan and execute Operation Ajax, the 1953 coup d’état against 
then prime minister of Iran, Mohammad Mosaddegh.71 The details of this 
operation is well documented in Meade’s memoir and several other books au-
thored by Copeland with detailed accounts of covert operations conducted by 
the CIA in the Middle East. Although the official accounts of his operations 
were mired in controversy, Copeland’s account of the CIA’s involvement in 
the coup has been collaborated by Deane R. Hinton, a junior political officer 
in the U.S. legation to Syria. According to Copeland account, in his 1969 
book The Games of Nations, one could only conclude “that Za‘im’s coup plan 
was a CIA operation from start to finish.”72 Although Meade later walked 
back from his early account, his role in orchestrating the coup was con-
firmed by Deane Hinton, who later “went on record stating that Copeland 
and Meade had indeed conspired with Za‘im.”73 Testimonies of individuals 
involved in the coup also reveal that Za‘im was aware of the need to sup-
port American priorities in exchange for the support of the United States, 
as he made his intentions clear to his CIA handlers. Evidently, the CIA’s 
support of Za‘im was provided in exchange for two strategic interests: ratifi-
cation of oil pipeline project and reversing the Syrian government’s position 
of supporting the Palestinians and opposing the recently established state of 
Israel. Indeed, in the 113 days he was the absolute ruler of Syria, he moved 
on to “ratify the much-delayed TAPline concession (delighting ARAMCO’s 
James Terry Duce and Bill Eddy in Washington).”74 Similarly, shortly after 
assuming power, he “announced his plans to improve Syrian relations with 
both Turkey and Israel,” and expressed his willingness to resettle a quarter 
of a million Palestinian refugees in Syria and even meet personally with the 
Israeli prime minister, David Ben-Gurion.75 He, indeed, directed his prime 
minister Muhsin al-Barazi to begin secret negotiations with the Ben-Gurion 
Office, and the announcement of the meeting was in the working when he 
was toppled by another coup masterminded by another military officer and 
he was executed shortly thereafter.
What is of significance to our examination of political realism is the atti-
tude and thinking behind those operations in which Meade himself was a key 
player. The attitude was revealed by a key player in the Middle East, Kermit 
Roosevelt, the nephew of President Franklin Roosevelt who oversaw another 
military coup against a duly elected government in Iran in 1953 that brought 
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the government of Mosaddegh down. While ostensibly providing support to 
democracy in the Arab world, he had the following to say about Arab democ-
racy. Hugh Wilford, the historian who documented the CIA’s operations in 
the Middle East, ref lects on Roosevelt’s justifications of his subversive actions 
of democratically elected governments by noting:
American democracy was, he now pointed out, the product of a spe-
cific set of historical conditions that were not necessarily present in the 
modern Arab world, while the position of the Young Effendis had been 
severely compromised by recent events. In these circumstances, such uni-
versal human values as “dignity, decency, and individual liberty” might 
stand a better chance of being defended by a form of government other 
than “a self-styled ‘democracy,’” even if that meant the United States 
supporting autocracies. “To favor democracy and oppose imperialism,” 
Kim concluded, ominously, “cannot … entirely do away with the hard 
fact that empires have existed and, though abbreviated, still do exist.”76
Given Roosevelt’s conviction, the 1949 coup become, according to Copeland, 
a standard reference point for future operations in the countries of the South 
and was “studied in CIA training classes for the next two decades.”77 The 
modus operandi used in Syria was reportedly repeated in Egypt, as Kim Roo-
sevelt was tasked in 1951 by then CIA director Allen Dulles to support a coup 
against King Farouk if he refused to undertake reform demanded by the 
United States. Roosevelt developed a friendship with Gamal Abdul Nasser, 
who led in 1952 a military coup, along with the group of young Egyptian 
military officers, that ended the constitutional monarchy rule and established 
a republic that was ruled by an iron-fist dictatorship.78 The details of Nasser’s 
collaboration with the CIA are sketchy, but the coup in Egypt was a replica of 
the one undertaken in Syria in 1949, though Nasser was more shrewd a leader 
than Za’im of Syria, and proved later that he could not be owned completely 
by his American handlers.
These forms of clandestine interventions provide us with perfect exam-
ples of subordinating the advancement of liberty and democracy in favor of 
special economic and geostrategic interests, promoted by successive Western 
governments since WWII. Half a century later, the realist insistence on mi-
cromanaging the Middle East has gradually turned the Middle East into a 
region of failed states, in the case of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya, 
and into hostile and resentful states, particularly in Iran and Turkey. The 
games played in the Middle East to advance corporate interests and colonial 
control were later played in Latin America and have been supported by both 
Democratic and Republican administrations. Realist “games” are not only 
creating great miseries for countries that have been subjected to an arbitrary 
and inconsistent foreign policy approach; they are also increasingly affecting 
Western democracies, with the inf lux of refugees from the South nations to 
the North and do increasingly threaten to undermine liberal democracy in 
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the North. The game theory approach has crept into the United States and 
can be observed in the way American elites attempt to use undemocratic and 
illiberal methods to deal with a multicultural society that characterizes the 
West today and with the inf lux of refugees from countries in an increasingly 
impoverished South. The Middle East has been drifting toward a state of an-
archy and turmoil as the result of haphazard “game play” operations. Dealing 
with the Middle East as a theater of games-of-nations never ceased, as the 
United States and Europe continue to support right-wing Israeli govern-
ments that insist on suffocating the native populations within cantons in the 
occupied territories, and justify holding Palestinians in the West Bank and 
Gaza under the conditions of colonial rule, undercutting the very possibilities 
of realizing liberal democracy and privileging nationalism and religious ex-
clusivism. In many ways, the outcome of the realist approach has been simply 
the short exchange of advancing democracy with promoting imperialism in 
the name of short-term national interests, dealing a serious blow to the de-
clared goal of advancing a liberal democratic world order.
Given the essential analytical concepts of neorealism, the clash-of- 
civilizations paradigm introduced by Huntington embraces the main ne-
orealist tenets: anarchy, hierarchy, power, national interest, and pessimism 
(incorrigibility). While he does not seem to believe that the international 
order is chaotic, his analysis reveals an attitude toward the globalizing older 
that borders on anarchy. He has lost his faith in the possibility of globaliza-
tion leading to a cooperative world, despite the many signs that point in that 
direction. China as a rivaling power might have been an element in his new 
worldview, but more so is the resurgence of Islamic identity. His solution 
to the diversity of the world is not based on negotiation and communitive 
action, or on advancing a middle ground; rather, it centers around the use 
of power and force. Yet, aside from power politics among states, the account 
provided by Huntington and Fukuyama of the nature of Islamic assertiveness 
and Muslims’ relationships with, and attitudes toward, the West is simplistic 
and misinformed. It lacks contextualization and proportionality. Fukuyama’s 
summary evolution of the role of Islam seen through the fundamentalist 
prism is benign but could not see the forest for the trees. Fundamentalism is 
indeed an outburst of a larger problem, partially a sign of internal tensions 
within Muslim culture and partially a problem connected with autocratic 
governments and external pressures by Western powers to mold Middle 
Eastern societies in modern (read European) cultural forms. We will return to 
examine the path of modernization in Muslim societies in later chapters of 
this book—Chapters 7 and 8.
The West-backed dictators understand these contradictions and 
shrewdly represent themselves as the defenders of liberal values against 
reform movements, who they accuse of undermining freedom and free 
choice. Less appreciated is the fact that dictatorships have provided the 
breeding grounds for extremist movements. Rather than contributing to 
expanding liberal ethos, they are undermining freedom and distorting the 
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image of liberal democracy which they pretend to support by employing 
an iron-f ist strategy toward opposition and critics. The surge of political 
Islam throughout the Muslim world is fueled by the presence of brutal and 
corrupt dictatorships, who f ight efforts to hold them accountable by cur-
tailing free speech and closing the political space in the name of f ighting 
terrorism and extremism. This inconsistency between espousing liberal 
democratic values and the preference for dictatorial regimes that advance 
the narrowly def ined national interests of established democracies is at 
the heart of global tensions and the rise of political extremism in many 
Middle Eastern countries. The failure of liberal democracies to be true to 
liberal values and the domination of antidemocratic values and practices 
by neoliberalism and neorealism should also be part of the political debate 
about future trajectory of globalization. The rise of economic disparity 
between the rich and the poor undermines liberal democracy; so does the 
selective use of economic and military power in responding to the plight 
of oppressed communities, as we saw in places such as Rwanda, Palestine, 
and, most recently, in Myanmar and Syria. The interconnectedness of 
societies, the advanced level of integration in capital and labor markets, 
and the emergence of sophisticated global governance have made limited 
impact in improving the quality of life in emerging economies and soci-
eties. Despite tremendous economic resources, a large number of people 
continue to experience abject poverty, and despite the development of 
international law and organizations, powerful nations continue to domi-
nate and exploit less developed societies. Exploitation is often done in the 
name of advancing national interests of powerful nations, and justif ied by 
layers of theoretical frameworks, such as the dominant theories of politi-
cal realism, which seriously undermine the efforts to develop a principled 
approach to international politics.
Islam’s rejuvenation and disavowal
The liberal ethos of Western society balances out the amoral approach of 
political realism and has been able to overcome realist thinking on several 
occasions, most notably in Bosnia in the mid-1990s and in Kosovo a decade 
later. Yet liberalism has displayed ambiguity and indifference in supporting 
democratic transition in Arab and Muslim societies, evidently because dem-
ocratic forces in Muslim societies have consistently appealed, with varying 
degrees, to Islamic ethos. This ambivalence is evident in Western response 
to popular struggle to end military dictatorship in Iran in the 1950s, Algeria 
in the 1990s, and most recently in Egypt and Syria after the popular upris-
ings better known as the Arab Spring. The main source of the ambivalence 
has to do with the Islamic ethos evident in these uprisings and the presence 
of small but vocal faction of religious extremists. The inconsistencies of the 
liberal democratic approach to emerging Muslim societies was recognized by 
Bernard Lewis, who was the first to describe Muslim revolt against Western 
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dominance as “a clash of civilizations.” Lewis portrayed the clash of civiliza-
tions in striking terms (The Roots of Islamic Rage, 1990):
It should by now be clear that we are facing a mood and a movement 
far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments 
that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations—the per-
haps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our 
Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide ex-
pansion of both. It is crucially important that we on our side should not 
be provoked into an equally historic but also equally irrational reaction 
against that rival.79
Lewis went on to assert that Western civilization has been guilty of impe-
rialist practices, only to excuse those practices as falling in line with similar 
imperialist practices historically committed by the Ottoman, Mongol, and 
Arabs, and earlier civilizations.80
While intellectuals like Lewis and Huntington justify political realism in 
dealing with Muslim societies, Fukuyama sees the situation from a slightly 
different perspective. Fukuyama locates Islam among the competitors of lib-
eral democracy.81 He contends that Islam seems to be successful in overtaking 
liberal democracy in the Middle Eastern countries that experienced Islamic 
resurgence, but he insists that the appeal of Islam is limited to the very Mus-
lim countries that have had this experience.
The appeal of Islam is potentially universal, reaching out to all men as 
men, and not just to members of a particular ethnic or national group. 
And Islam has indeed defeated liberal democracy in many parts of the 
Islamic world, posing a grave threat to liberal practices even in countries 
where it has not achieved political power directly.… Despite the power 
demonstrated by Islam in its current revival, however, it remains the case 
that this religion has virtually no appeal outside those areas that were 
culturally Islamic to begins with.… Indeed, the Islamic world seem more 
vulnerable to liberal ideas in the long run than the reverse, since such 
liberalism has attracted numerous and powerful Muslim adherents over 
the past century and a half.82
Fukuyama’s juxtaposition of Islam with liberal democracy reveals a deep 
misconception as to the relationship between faith and politics in Islam. He 
also seems oblivious to the role played by Muslim scholars and scientists in 
advancing the groundwork necessary for the emergence of liberal thought 
in Europe and the formation of modern outlook. Given the growing rift 
between the Christian and Muslim worlds, between the West and the East, 
it is imperative that this interconnectedness is revealed through a systematic 
examination of how Islam relates to modern society and to the very liberal 
tradition that is at the root of liberal democracy.
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Similarly, Huntington in the Clash of Civilizations links the attitudes he 
ascribes to Muslims to the Islamic faith, asserting that the problem lies in 
Islam and not simply in certain groups or cultures within the global Muslim 
community. In an astounding sweeping generalization, Huntington writes, 
“The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is 
Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority 
of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power.”83 Then 
he goes on to remove any fault from Western powers that have been man-
aging the Muslim world for over a century, as he denies that the CIA or the 
U.S. Department of Defense have anything to do with the unfolding political 
tensions and the violent outbursts by fringe groups taking advantages of the 
missteps of U.S. foreign policy:
The problem for Islam is not the CIA or the U.S. Department of Defense. 
It is the West, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the 
universality of their culture and believe that their superior, if declining, 
power imposes on them the obligation to extend that culture through-
out the world. These are the basic ingredients that fuel conf lict between 
Islam and the West.84
This astounding statement reverses completely the dynamics of the situa-
tion, so now the Muslims who have for all partial purposes embraced mod-
ern culture, and whose societies have all the imprints of the modern West, 
are the ones who reject the West as the bearer of universal values and not 
the West as a force possessed with domination and imposition. Evidently for 
Huntington, the expectation is that all cultures and societies are required 
to accept without any question or protest Western culture in all its details. 
The question is now how do we make sense of this serious misreading of the 
 Islam-West relationship? Is it possible that the clash of civilizations antici-
pated by Lewis and Huntington is conditioned in the first place by clash of 
perceptions and a serious misreading of the conditions of the Islamic other? 
The attitude toward Islam as the other has a long history in European thought 
that could be traced back to the work of European Orientalism. This attitude 
was well exposed by Edward Said’s Orientalism. Said’s critique transformed 
the way Islam has been approached in the field of Islamic and cultural studies 
but did little to change the mind of scholars of international relations. Said 
points out to the impact of media coverage of Islam on general perception 
and attitude in his book, Covering Islam, and faults dishonest scholarship for 
the media’s misrepresentation.85 The book not only undertakes an extensive 
review of misrepresentations of Islam in Western media but also manages to 
identify examples from the work of international relations specialists. Evi-
dently, the media takes its clues from intellectual and literary sources, and 
there are plenty of them to support prejudicial views of Islam that facilitate 
the misrepresentation and demonization crucial for every act of othering. 
On the other hand, Muslims have enough people in their ranks, particularly 
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at the religious extremes, who are more than willing to provide examples that 
feed into the narrative of Western detractors of Islam. Extremist voices in all 
religious communities have no problem to wear their values and faith on the 
outside but make little efforts to examine their own lives and actions in the 
light of the faith and values they proudly profess. The problem is exacerbated 
by the absence of meaningful channels of communication across cultures, 
to complement and check the official channels of diplomacy occupied and 
managed by the agents of political realism.
Meanwhile, those committed to deepen the divide out of either igno-
rance or malice are at work painting Islam and Muslims with one brush. 
There is no shortage of examples to illustrate the systemic efforts that aim 
at othering Muslims by demonizing their faith. We will review some of the 
more systematic and highly f inanced projects to undermine Muslim com-
munities in the West in Chapters 8 and 9, but let us for now look brief ly 
at the campaign led by Geert Wilder, the Netherlander MP who leads the 
Party of Freedom, and whose main agenda has been to discredit Islam and 
marginalize European Muslims in the name of freedom. Wilders has cam-
paigned to stop what he views as the “Islamization of the Netherlands.”86 
He has compared the Qur’an to Hitler’s Mein Kampf and has campaigned 
to have the Muslim sacred book banned in the Netherlands.87 He advo-
cates ending immigration from Muslim countries and supports banning 
the construction of new mosques. Wilders was a speaker at the Facing Jihad 
Conference held in Israel in 2008, which discussed the dangers of Jihad, 
and has called for a hardline stance against what he termed “street terror” 
exerted by minorities in Dutch cities. His controversial 2008 film, Fitna, 
featuring his views on Islam is widely criticized for its extreme vilif ication 
of Muslims and their faith. Wilders, who views himself as right-wing lib-
eral,88 aligns himself with European far-right leaders such as Jean-Marie 
Le Pen of France and Jörg Haider of Austria. Wilders was able to success-
fully form a parliamentary group in the European parliament that claimed 
parties from nine European countries, including French National Front, 
Austria’s Freedom Party, Italy’s Northern League, and Belgium’s Flemish 
Interest. Wilders has laid many accusations against Muslims evidently with-
out showing any interest in dialogue or to f ind the truth behind his claims. 
For example, he complained against the apathy of moderate voices within 
the Muslim communities, claiming that they never condemned the attack 
that took the life of Kurt Westergaard, who drew a cartoon depicting the 
prophet of Islam wearing a turban shaped as a bomb. As he put it, “If the 
attack was a reaction to Kurt Westergaard’s drawing of the Muslim prophet 
Mohammed with a turban shaped as a bomb, then it should be rejected and 
condemned by all Muslims.”89 This was a false claim as two years prior to 
the publication of the book, the Organization of the Islamic Conference 
(OIC) issued a statement condemning the attack and was reported on the 
CNN news on January 4, 2010. Indeed, OIC has denounced the call for the 
use of violence against the cartoonist as early as 2006.90
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The sentiments shown by Wilders are not confined to controversial politi-
cal figures, but ones that can be confronted among scholars who should know 
better. Michael Walzer has addressed the issue of Islam and Islamic extrem-
ism more delicately and made an important distinction between Islam and 
Islamic radicalism. The issue that attracted his attention most recently was 
not rising Islamophobia in the West, but the sympathy of intellectuals of the 
left with Islamic movements, as well as their efforts to link the Islamic rage 
to Western imperialism. To convince the left of the need to speak freely, and 
to give them some tips as how to overcome the fear of being called “Islamo-
phobic,” he wrote an article in which he reminded the left that “the Islamic 
revival is a kind of testing moment”91 for both the left and the right. Wal-
zer raises legitimate concerns with violence committed by extremist Muslim 
groups he cites, such as al-Qaeda, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 
Hezbollah, and Boko Haram but rejects any efforts to link such violence to 
U.S. foreign policy or to examine its root causes. Walzer focuses instead on 
side issues, most notably his claim that the left has been quiet, even sympa-
thetic to Islamist movements for fear of Islamophobia. Despite his efforts to 
separate the “moderate” from “extremist” Muslims, he remained oblivious 
to Muslim pain and suffering and the adversarial conditions created by the 
occupation of Muslim territories and to Western support to Arab and Muslim 
dictators. He does not hide, for instance, his feeling of being offended when 
the Muslims in Europe are called the “new Jews.”
I have heard Muslims called the ‘new Jews.’ that’s not a helpful analogy, 
since Muslims in today’s Western Europe have never been attacked by 
Christian crusaders, expelled from one country after another, forced to 
wear distinctive dress, barred from many professions, and slaughtered by 
Nazis.92
The pathetic attempt to trivialize the targeting of Muslims by the far right, 
Walzer did not miss the chance to take a jab at Edward Said for claiming that 
contemporary Arab world “is an intellectual, political, and cultural satellite 
of the United States,” lamenting that “Islamic revivalism is nowhere antic-
ipated in Said’s book.”93 In Covering Islam, Said cited an article titled “The 
Islam Explosion,” published in The New Republic, as an instance of Orientalist 
logic of mystifying Islam by treating it as an immediate object of contempla-
tion incapable of any type of mediation or qualification by historical time or 
geographical space. Said takes Walzer to task for addressing his general audi-
ence by pretending that he was a layman about important issues and making 
unacceptable generalizations that are bound to obscure the subject and con-
fuse the audience. As Said put it:
A noteworthy instance [of mystifying Islam] is an essay by Michael Walzer 
in the December 8, 1979 issue of The New Republic. Walzer’s title is “The 
Islam Explosion,” and he deals as a self-confessed layman with the vast 
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number of important if (according to him) largely violent and unpleasant 
twentieth-century events—in the Philippines, in Iran, in Palestine, and 
elsewhere—which, he argues, can be interpreted as instances of the same 
thing: Islam. What all these events have in common, says Walzer, is first 
of all that they show a persistent pattern of political power encroaching 
on the West; second, that they are all generated from a frightening moral 
fervor (for instance, when Palestinians resist Israeli colonialism it is Wal-
zer’s firm assertion that such resistance is religious, not political or civil 
or human); and third, that these events shatter “the thin colonialist facade 
of liberalism, secularism, socialism, or democracy.” In all three of these 
common characteristics it is “Islam” that can be discerned, and this “Is-
lam” is a force overriding the distances in time and space that otherwise 
separate all these events.94
The only way to make sense of this insistence on blaming Islam for all the 
ills and mistakes, regardless if they originate with Muslims or Western ac-
tions, is to recognize that Islam is being used as a scapegoat and buzzword. 
It is a convenient tool used by scholars and politicians who must be able to 
distinguish actions rooted in political struggles from those grounded in faith, 
but still prefer to bring Islam as the favored explanation, for they know that 
the term invokes an irrational reaction borne out of intergenerational preju-
dice. Although anti-Islam rhetoric is confined to small group of people, their 
impact is amplified because of the absence of strong Muslim constituency to 
push back and bring clarity to the ongoing debate. Globalization though has 
changed the dynamics and might well provide a new opportunity to over-
come one of the longest standing religious antagonism of all times.
Notes
 1 Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East (London: I. B. Tauris, 
1988), 426. Assad attempted to replicate the strategy used earlier in the twentieth 
century by the Turkish leader Mustafa Kamal (Ataturk).
 2 Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbourhood: Report of the 
Commission on Global Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 2
 3 Margaret P. Karns et al., International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of 
Global Governance (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2015), 4.
 4 Ibid, 5.
 5 Ibid, 13.
 6 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Avon Books, 
1993), 48.
 7 Ibid, 60.
 8 Ibid, 64.
 9 Ibid, 79.
 10 Ibid, 135.
 11 Ibid, 164–67.
 12 Ibid, 153–165.
 13 Ibid, 148.
 14 Ibid, 224.
Globalization facts and faults 51
 15 Ibid, 227.
 16 Ibid.
 17 Ibid, 196–198.
 18 Manfred B. Steger, Globalization: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 53
 19 Ibid, 55.
20 Ibid, 57.
 21 Ibid, 68.
  
 22 The Economist, “Global Debt Clock,” online service (accessed July 5, 2020).
23 Statista.com, “GDP,” online service (accessed July 5, 2020).
 24 Credit Suisse, Global Wealth Report 2019. see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Economic_inequality (accessed July 5, 2020).
  
 25 Cal Clark and Evelyn A. Clark, Neoliberalism Globalization and Economic Miracles 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2016), 18
 26 Ibid, 2.
 27 Adrian Smith, Alison Stenning, and Katie Willis (ed.), Social Justice and Neoliber-
alism Global Perspectives (London & New York: Zed books, 2008).
28 Ibid, 17.
 29 Ibid, 50
  
 30 Ibid, 67.
 31 Nadine Kreitmeyr, “Neoliberal Co-optation and Authoritarian Renewal.” 




 33 Ibid, 6.
 34 Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson, International Organization and Global 
Governance (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 120
 35 O. Waever, “The Rise and the Fall of the Inter-Paradigm Debate,” in Interna-
tional Theory: Positivism & Beyond, eds. K. Booth et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 163
 36 S. Smith, “Positivism and Beyond,” in International Theory: Positivism & Beyond, 
eds. K. Booth et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 17.
 37 Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson, International Organization and Global 
Governance (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 144.
 38 Ibid, 146.
 39 Ibid, 123.
40 Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3 
(Summer 1993), 22.
  
 41 Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilization (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
2003), 45.
 42 Ibid, 46
 43 Ibid, 43.
44 Ibid, 45–46.  




 48 Ibid, 58.
 49 Ibid, 76.
 50 Ibid, 66.
 51 Ibid, 59.
 52 Ibid, 94.
 
 53 Ibid, 95.
 54 Ibid, 98
 55 Ibid, 102.
52 Globalization facts and faults
 56 Ibid, 94.
 57 Ibid, 110.
 58 Ibid, 209.
 59 Ibid, 213.
60 Ibid, 214.
 61 Ibid, 255.
  
 62 Ibid, 264.
 63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
 65 Samuel Huntington, Who Are We (New York: Simon & Schuster), 2004.
 66 Ibid, 171.
 67 Ibid, 129.
 68 Keith I. Shimko, “Realism, Neorealism, and American Liberalism,” The Review 
of Politics, vol. 54, no. 2 (1992): 282.
  
 69 Ibid, 281–282.
 70 Ibid, 287–288.
 71 Hugh Wilford, America’s Great Game: The CIA’s Secret Arabists and the Shaping of 
the Modern Middle East (New York: Basic Books, 2013), 100–102. Timo Kivimäki, 
“Democracy, Autocrats and U.S. Policies in the Middle East,” Middle East Policy 
Council (Washington, DC), vol. XIX, no. 1 (Spring 2012), 64–71. https://mepc.
org/democracy-autocrats-and-us-policies-middle-east (accessed June 29, 2020).
 72 Ibid, 101.
 73 Ibid, 102.
 74 Ibid, 105.
 75 Ibid.
 76 Ibid, 99.
 77 Ibid, 104.
 78 Ibid, 135–137.
 79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
 81 Ibid, 211–212.
 82 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Avon Books, 
1993), 45.
  
 83 Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 217.
84 Ibid.  
 85 Edward Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See 
the Rest of the World (New York: Vintage Books, 1996), 65.
 86 Geert Wilders, Marked for Death (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2012), 
101, 1–3.
 87 Ibid, 73.
 88 “In Quotes: Geert Wilders,” BBC, October 4, 2010 (accessed June 7, 2018).
 89 Wilders, Marked for Death, 73.
90 “OIC Denounces Cartoons Violence,” BBC News, February 21, 2006. 




 91 Michael Walzer, “Islamism and the Left,” Dissent, vol. 62, no. 1 (Winter 
2015), 2.
 92 Ibid, 4.
 93 Ibid, 5.
 94 Said, Covering Islam, 65.
The fall of the Soviet Union produced two competing theories regarding the 
emerging global order, which we examine in this chapter. The political ri-
valry between the United States and the Soviet Union throughout the better 
part of the twentieth century locked these two superpowers in a power strug-
gle for global hegemony. The struggle ended in 1989 with the capitulation of 
the Soviets and the demise of communism and the triumph of free economic 
enterprise and liberal democracy. Frances Fukuyama produced in the same 
year the first theory of the emerging world order in his widely cited work, 
The End of History and the Last Man, a theory that announced the end of the 
political evolution of human societies, ushering in the worldwide embrace of 
liberal democracy. Three years later, Samuel Huntington challenged Fuku-
yama’s account of the future direction of world politics in an article pub-
lished in 1992 under the title, “The Clash of Civilizations,” where he rejected 
global convergence, warning instead of an imminent clash of civilizations 
and signaling Islamic and Confucian states as the most likely civilizational 
contenders for the imminent clash.
Although the two accounts are diametrically opposed, they both seem to 
explain aspects of the behavior of the sociohistorical forces that have im-
pacted in significant ways the current state of the world affairs we call glo-
balization. The markedly divergent views of two leading public intellectuals, 
highly regarded not only in the academia but also among political practi-
tioners, point to the complexity of historical changes that began around the 
close of the twentieth century. They also point to the state of inf lux that 
characterizes world politics in the post-cold war era. The two competing 
narratives advanced by Fukuyama and Huntington do not only rally facts 
and observations to support their claims; both are also grounded in events 
and philosophical arguments of modern history. The fact that the two nar-
ratives represent broader views in the intellectual and political communities 
makes the task of examining the global realities they describe unavoidable 
and indeed informative. Furthermore, the narratives at hand underscore the 
importance of religions and cultures in shaping world history while still leave 
a great deal to be desired in their account of the impact of religious and cul-
tural diversity on the convergence and conf lict that shape both world history 
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and human consciousness. They, in particular, mystify how various religious 
and cultural forces interacted historically in their efforts to shape our global 
reality. Given the contradictory historical patterns they present, and the con-
f licting narratives of the evolution of our globalizing world, an effort to 
achieve partial or total reconciliation is in order. Equally in order is the need 
to unpack the confounding presentations of the inner dynamics of religious 
and cultural traditions and their patterns of conf lict and exchange. Indeed, 
understanding these patterns is crucial for making sense of the f low of history 
that continues to shape our reality today, as it is crucial for our ability to judge 
which of these diametrically opposing accounts is better grounded in long-
term historical experience.
The two versions of world history and modern historical evolution, which 
we discussed in some detail in the previous chapter, are predicated on the 
notions of reason, progress, culture, and civilization and are organized into 
two unifying themes: convergence of cultures and clash of civilizations. We 
identified two competing grand theories inf luencing the way we think to-
day about human progress—one is rooted in the optimistic conception of 
human nature, enshrined in liberal idealism that emphasizes human inclina-
tions to work together and cooperate for the greater good of all, whereas the 
other is rooted in the pessimism of realism and, to some extent, neoliberal-
ism which has close affinity to it. Liberal idealism gave rise to the dominant 
views among the Enlightenment scholars, which were used by Fukuyama to 
ground his theory of global convergence, whereas conservative realism with 
its obsession with power politics and zero-sum games pushed Huntington to 
project a future with perpetual conf lict among civilizations. Huntington’s 
use of the notions of culture and civilization, central to his account, is con-
trary to main theories of civilization and, hence, requires further examina-
tion particularly in light of the frequent use of his narrative by conservative 
groups to explain unfolding world events. The study of civilization occupies 
the work of Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee, but Huntington does not 
construct his notion of history from their works; instead, he uses the popular 
imaginary of the millennial conf lict between Christianity and Islam to ad-
vance his notion of history.
Taken at face value, both narratives concerning the patterns of globaliza-
tion are rooted in modernization literatures and derive from concepts orig-
inated in the Enlightenment traditions, though Huntington’s worldview is 
more grounded in the history of European politics and traditions that pre-
dates the Enlightenment. His attitude toward the future is fairly inf luenced 
by his views on Islam and its resurgence in the second half of the twentieth 
century. His views are also grounded in the Protestant traditions that shaped 
the consciousness of the modern West, as he conveyed equal apprehension 
and skeptical attitude about the capacity of the Latino culture to advance the 
American liberal ideals, through his work, Who Are We?, which was pub-
lished after the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001 (or 9/11). This 
would require us to examine the historical exchange between Christianity 
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and Islam and the significance of their grounding in the Abrahamic faith. 
Our concerns with the nature and meaning of the global moment we began 
to experience, our interest in understanding the trajectory of human pro-
gress, and the process of globalization, all lead us to devote this chapter to 
answer some important questions that seem essential for examining the pos-
sibilities of convergence and divergence, peace and conf lict, and cooperation 
and hostility. Several questions are paramount: Is there such a thing as world 
history? Is human history interconnected? Are their patterns of development 
we could clearly identify in world history? And if the answer is in the affirm-
ative, what are those patterns? How do they inf luence our world today as we 
stand at the verge of the global threshold?
Convergence and divergence in history
The forces of convergence among nations and cultures have accelerated in 
the past century. The past 50 years in particular have brought about a new 
experience unparalleled in human history, namely the emergence of what 
has been termed the global village. Marshall McLuhan recognized the ongoing 
formation of a global human experience in as early as the 1960s and coined 
the term “global village” to describe it. He used the term in two books he 
published successively in the early 1960s, first in The Gutenberg Galaxy: The 
Making of Typographic Man (1962), and later in Understanding Media (1964), to 
illustrate how the once-fragmented world societies have increasingly become 
integrated and united as the result of employing advanced technologies.1 
New technologies permit fast and easy transport of people and commodities 
across the globe and the instantaneous transmission of information from the 
four corners of the world to every geographical location.2
Convergence among peoples and cultures is not a recent experience 
though, as it has persisted over the past three millennia, ever since the Ro-
man and Persian Empires brought diverse cultures and religions under cen-
tralized legal orders. We are more familiar with the Pax Romana that relied 
not only on a highly disciplined military force to keep the Roman Empire 
together but also on the rule of law to keep the peace and was later trans-
formed into a more exclusive and uniform political order with the triumph 
of Roman Christianity. The Roman Empire was greatly weakened as it split 
into Eastern and Western realms, leading to the collapse and fragmentation 
of its Western wing with the invasion of the Germanic tribes. This coincided 
with the rise of the Arabian tribes into a world power, as they were united in 
the new Islamic faith. Islam further expanded the global unity brought about 
by the Romans and Persians. Islamic empires brought together numerous 
religious and ethnic communities as they unified the territories once occu-
pied by both. The Islamic order stimulated trade and cultural exchange from 
the Iberian Peninsula, Southern Italy, the Balkans, and East Europe in the 
West, through Africa, Central Asia, and India, to China and Southeast Asia 
in the Far East. These very diverse communities have become interconnected 
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through an elaborate system of trade, scientific, and cultural centers across 
the globe. In many ways, the expansion of Western civilization literally en-
compassed the entire globe, first through colonialization and direct military 
occupation, and most recently through the soft power of the United States 
and Europe, backed by a military force that has been used occasionally to 
assert their imperial world status. The questions on the mind of many today 
relate to the nature of current political arrangements and the direction of 
the unfolding of postmodern society and politics. Does current globalization 
constitute the last stage of the expansion of Western civilization? Or are we 
confronting a new global age unlike anything the humanity encountered 
before?
Historically, the experience of bringing greater unity among separate pop-
ulations and diverse cultures has always coincided with the advanced stages 
of major world civilizations, as these stages are often distinguished by the 
expansion of dominant cultures across large territories and populations. The 
expansion of Persia and the rise of the Persian Empire in the sixth century 
BCE, followed by the expansion of Rome and the creation of Pax Romana 
in fourth century BCE, provided the conditions for extensive commercial 
and cultural exchange and brought about remarkable convergence in ideas, 
institutions, and traditions. The expansion of the Islamic civilization reached 
its peak in the fourteenth century as it spread out from southern France at 
the boarders of the Iberian Peninsula through North and West Africa to 
China and South Asia, before it retreated under the expansion of the rising 
European powers, first in Spain and later in East and Southeast Asia. Are we 
facing a similar situation today, as Huntington is apparently convinced that 
the current Western civilization is threatened by a burgeoning Confucian 
and Islamic civilizations?
Huntington’s suggestion that Western civilization is losing its ground to 
reemerging civilizations rooted in the pre-modern world is problematic, as it 
ignores the participation of those “civilizations” in the very global infrastruc-
ture developed in the past century. It ignores the remarkable convergence 
achieved in ideas and institutions; in social, political, and economic organ-
izations; and in education and cultural attitudes. Democratic governance is 
becoming the new model of political organization throughout the world, and 
is now embraced by the majority of world populations, though in varying de-
grees of success. Russia and the Central Asian republics have already rejected 
communism and are gradually drifting toward liberal democratic forms. The 
Arab Spring movement reveals a strong desire by new generations of Arabs 
who challenged their autocratic elites, demanding a liberal democratic form 
of government and paying the ultimate price for such a demand. In addition, 
there is a broad sense of equality and shared humanity across cultures. Ed-
ucation systems, scientific learning, and professional training and practices 
across the globe carry the imprint of the modern West. In particular, there 
is a broad acceptance of political ideas matured in Western cultures, includ-
ing such ideas as accountable governance, political participation, and human 
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rights. Attitudes and practices are not uniform across societies and cultures, 
and many societies continue to suffer from authoritarian regimes and corrupt 
governments, but the overall trend is moving steadily in the direction of open 
societies governed by the notions of equal rights and opportunities.
The frameworks provided by Fukuyama and Huntington are helpful in 
underscoring challenges and forces at play in globalization but have not been 
able to provide clarity as to how to deal with such challenges meaningfully 
and effectively. The two accounts have provided us with general patterns that 
need to be reconciled. It is not clear, for instance, whether the reemergence 
of postmodern “civilizations,” asserted by Huntington, is happening within 
the overall patterns of convergence or in opposition to those patterns of con-
vergence. Do these patterns represent efforts to push back against the excesses 
of Western powers? Or are they pushing for the return to premodern political 
structures? Are we seeing the beginning of a metamorphosis toward a global 
order capable of coordinating through institutions of global governance? Or 
are we seeing the emergence of global anarchy? These questions require that 
we further examine the notions of culture and civilization and engage the 
broader literatures that deal with cultural formation and the way by which 
cultures relate to civilizations. We need equally to explore the very notion 
of civilization that has been used by Fukuyama and Huntington without 
grounding it within any philosophical and sociological understanding of its 
formation and structure. We turn therefore in the next section to explore the 
meaning and structure of civilization in the work of two inf luential thinkers 
who devoted their works to examine the reality and inner dynamic of civili-
zation and its formation and structure.
Cultures and civilizations
The twentieth century gave us two incisive observers of world history—
Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee. Both saw world history as the theater 
on which successive cultures shaped by vibrant religions give birth to suc-
cessive civilizations. Both rejected the unilinear view of history advanced by 
the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophers of history, most no-
tably, Hegel and Marx. And both observed the toil and creativity of early 
civilizations embedded in the most recent ones. Toynbee began building his 
theory of civilization by realizing that the state is more a territorial than 
transformational force in world history. For sure, states are important for 
understanding the politics of the day, but the understanding of the direction 
of interstate rivalries requires broader units of analysis, namely civilizations. 
“While the state of which we happen to be citizens makes more concrete and 
more imperious claims on our allegiance, especially in the present age,” he 
contends, “the civilization of which we are members really counts for more 
in our lives. And this civilization of which we are members includes—at most 
stages of its history—the citizens of others states besides our own.”3 States 
and political societies are centers of action and allegiance, but their history 
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and sociopolitical developments can only be understood when located in the 
larger social context of a civilization. American or French history and insti-
tutions are only intelligible in the context of Western civilization.4
Toynbee locates the nation-state within the larger historical and cultural 
settings of civilizations. Civilizations constitute distinct “worlds” in which 
the cultural activities and the social and political institutions of a particular 
society can be understood. These civilizations or worlds are closely asso-
ciated with particular religions. Hence states such as “the United States or 
Great Britain or France or Holland” are parts of a larger grouping which 
Toynbee refers to interchangeably as “Western Christendom, Western Civ-
ilization, Western society, the Western World.”5 The larger formation of 
political societies, which he calls “civilization,” is closely associated with a 
particular religious tradition. To understand the history of countries such as 
Greece, Serbia, or Russia, we arrive at “Orthodox Christendom or Byzantine 
World.”6 Similarly to understand the history of Morocco or Afghanistan, 
we arrive at the “Islamic World.”7 Toynbee sees world civilizations as living 
entities in constant evolution and change. They have beginnings and ends, 
they expand and contract, and they rise and fall. They learn from each other 
and build on the achievements of one another. “While civilizations rise and 
fall and, in falling give rise to others, some purposeful enterprise, higher 
than theirs, may all the time be making headway, and, in a divine plan, the 
learning that comes through the suffering caused by failures of civilizations 
may be the sovereign means of progress.”8 He identifies 21 civilizations that 
appeared throughout world history. All are dead except five: the Sinic, the 
Hindu, the Christian Orthodox, the Islamic, and the most dominant of all, 
the Western civilization.
Civilizations have complex structures and formation processes, Toynbee 
asserts. They come to life and develop through the interaction of three ele-
ments: culture, religion, and the universal state.9 Out of the three elements, 
Toynbee identifies religion as the most significant in shaping civilizations,10 
while he credits culture for its expansion and growth. In examining Islamic 
civilization, for instance, he identifies the Syriac culture, the Islamic religion, 
and the Abbasid state as the three elements whose interaction produced the 
Islamic civilization.11 Islam, he points out, “was not alien from, but native 
to, the Syriac Society,” and “drew its inspiration primarily from Judaism, a 
purely Syriac religion, and secondarily from Nestorianism, a form of Chris-
tianity in which the Syriac element had recovered its preponderance over 
the Hellenic.”12 The dynamic of the formation of new civilizations and the 
deconstruction of old ones is fairly complex. It consists in the interaction of 
the “universal state,” “church,” and “barbarian heroic age.”13 The barbarians 
are the nomads, the property-less tribes, and the proletariat. The church, or 
religion in general, acts against old “universal states” as it helps shape new 
“universal states.” The Roman Empire was brought down with the internal 
proletariat made of the surviving Roman church and the external proletariat 
made of the Germanic tribes. The fall of Rome resulted from clashes between 
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these forces and the dominant minority that lost its ability to lead through its 
creative ideas and was hence reduced to an oppressive force against the larger 
population. Surprisingly, the new creative culture came out from these same 
proletariats, the Christian church that expanded the religious foundation of 
European society, and the Visigoths who appropriated the civilizing culture 
of Arab Spain. Toynbee suggests that the proletariat is formed as the result of 
popular migration (Volkerwanderung) of alienated “barbarians.” Toynbee re-
jects, however, the suggestion made by European historians who credited the 
invigoration of Western civilization to the “infusion of new blood” by the 
Germanic tribes into the collapsing Roman Empire, instead of crediting 
the rise of Western civilization to the religious values that reshaped European 
culture.14
As to the dead civilizations that disappeared, even though they are no 
more represented in any particular living society, they have not completely 
disappeared from the surface of the earth but have been assimilated by the 
living ones and in a sense have contributed to their structure and formation. 
World civilizations have succeeded each other in such a way that those who 
fade away into extinction, or step aside into the shadow, pass on their learn-
ings and technologies to the rising civilization, thereby contributing to a 
process of accumulation and progress. The accumulation process, undertaken 
by successive civilizations, is combined by another process of geographical 
expansion and convergence. This has been achieved in the most recent civili-
zation produced by the West or, as Toynbee prefers to identify it, by Western 
Christendom. Under Western civilization, the world has been unified into a 
singular world system, dominated by the West.
As a result of these successive expansions of particular civilizations, the 
whole habitable world has now been unified into a single great soci-
ety. The movement through which this process has been finally con-
summated is the modern expansion of Western Christendom. But we 
have to bear in mind, first, that this expansion of Western Christen-
dom has merely completed the unification of the world and has not been 
the agency that has produced more than the last stage of the process; 
and, second, that, though the unification of the world has been finally 
achieved within a Western framework, the present Western ascendency 
in the world is certain not to last.15
Yet, the unification of the world, accomplished under the auspices of Western 
civilization, is incomplete, as it has not brought into harmony the civiliza-
tional components that make up the global society that has been created. The 
“equilibrium” necessary for creating a stable world civilization has not been 
achieved so far. Such a stage is yet to come as it presupposes a restructuring of 
global values and institutions in such a way that the West give up its dominant 
position in the world and join other civilizational forces around the table, 
something the West is not evidently ready to do.
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In a unified world, the eighteen non-Western civilizations—five of them 
living, fourteen of them extinct—will assuredly reassert their inf luence. 
And as, in the course of generations and centuries, a unified world grad-
ually works its way toward an equilibrium between its diverse compo-
nent cultures, the Western component will gradually be relegated to the 
modest place which is all that it can expect to retain in virtue of its 
intrinsic worth by comparison with those other cultures—surviving and 
extinct—which the Western society, through its modern expansion, has 
brought into association with itself and with one another.16
Toynbee suggests that the desired equilibrium will be achieved not as a result 
of current inclinations by Western powers but as a direct consequence of the 
gradual decline of Western civilization. The decline itself results from inher-
ent contradictions in Western civilization, not the least of which is the failure 
of modern West to eliminate the two major sins that brought down earlier 
civilization—“War” and “Class.” The contradiction is quite evident when 
one considers that Western civilization that has promoted the tradition of 
universal human right is guilty of failing to translate its declared humanitar-
ian concerns into meaningful and effective policies and practices. Instead, it 
exacerbated the level of destruction in warfare and expanded the extent of ex-
clusivism, from economic inequality to national and racial discrimination.17
Toynbee’s indictment of modern civilization’s overreliance on power and 
overindulgence in war brings him closer to Oswald Spengler’s announcement 
of the imminent demise of Western civilization in his widely acclaimed work, 
The Decline of the West, first published in 1918. Spengler rejects the Eurocen-
tric and linear view of history expressed in the ancient-medieval-modern 
tripartite, advanced by most modern historians and philosophers of history, 
including Hegel. He instead advances a multicultural and cyclical view of hu-
man evolution in which various cultures successively contribute to the evolu-
tion of world history in perpetual drama of rise and fall, growth and decline.
I see, in place of that empty figment of one linear history ... the drama 
of a number of mighty Cultures, each springing with primitive strength 
from the soil of a mother-region to which it remains firmly bound 
through its whole life-cycle; each stamping its material, its mankind, in 
its own images; each having its own idea, its own passions, its own life, 
will and feeling, its own death. Here the Cultures, people, languages, 
truths, gods, landscapes bloom and age as the oaks and the stone pines, 
the blossoms, twigs and leaves.18
For Spengler, a rising culture is not an accident of history but the culmi-
nation of all previous cultures. The relationship of a culture to the civiliza-
tion in which the culture culminated is that of soul to the body. Culture is 
the locus of the inherited ideas that grow and materialize in a civilization.19 
Spengler concludes that it is culture, and not civilization, that shapes world 
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history—“Culture is the prime phenomenon of all past and future World 
history.”20 The journey of a culture from birth to demise is not, however, 
purely biological, limited to the growth of material strength of economic 
and technical nature; instead, it is rooted in the spiritual awakening and the 
actualization of a definitive spirituality that takes the form of ideational and 
normative ethos.
A culture is born in the moment when a great soul awakens out of the 
proto-spirituality of ever-childish humanity and detaches itself, a form 
from the formless, a bounded and mortal thing from the boundless and 
enduring. It blooms on the soil of an exactly definable landscape, to 
which plant-wise it remains bound. It dies when this soul has actualized 
the full sum of its possibilities in the shape of the peoples, languages, 
dogmas, arts, states, sciences and reverts into the proto-soul.21
All great cultures are rooted in spiritual awakening and religious experience 
that generate the energy necessary for their formation. Culture grows spirit-
ually and generates new and more advanced forms of human development 
and eventually culminates in a thriving civilization of great creative capacity, 
productivity, and power, with far-reaching impact beyond its birthplace. Sur-
prisingly, though, the most advanced state of material and artistic growth of 
a culture, comprising what Spengler calls “civilization,” also constitutes the 
last stage in its lifecycle that denotes its conclusion and demise.
For every Culture has its own Civilization. In this work, for the first 
time the two words ... are used in a periodic sense, to express a strict and 
necessary organic succession. The Civilization is the inevitable destiny of 
the Culture.... Civilizations are the most external and artificial states of 
which a species of developed humanity is capable. They are a conclusion, 
the thing-become succeeding the thing-becoming, death following life, 
rigidity following expansion, intellectual age and the stone-built, petri-
fying world-city following mother-earth and the spiritual childhood of 
the Doric and Gothic.22
The spiritual vibrancy of a culture comes from its inherent “idea … which is 
the sum total of its inner possibilities.”23 A great culture is distinguished by its 
religion, which forms its real essence. This essential element gradually disap-
pears as great cultures transform themselves into dominant civilizations. Civ-
ilizations manifest themselves in the city life, in the megalopolis that shuns 
religious life and embraces irreligiosity.24
The megalopolis itself, as against the old Culture towns—Alexandria as 
against Athens, Paris as against Bruges, Berlin as against Nürnberg—is 
irreligious down to the last detail, down to the look of the streets, the dry 
intelligence of the faces.25
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The above insight into Spengler’s world history sheds light not on the af-
finity between his insight and that of Toynbee but shows the inf luence that 
Spengler had on Toynbee’s perception of the interrelationship of culture and 
civilization. Toynbee replaces Spengler’s poetic and ecstatic portrayal of cul-
tures and the rise and fall of world civilizations with a socio-psychological 
and political explanation. We can also sense Toynbee’s more optimistic views 
with regard to the future and the possibilities of its survival. Despite the 
unprecedented destructiveness of military conf lict and economic disparity 
of Western civilization, Toynbee remains optimistic toward modern social 
transformation and future possibilities. His optimism is derived from the ex-
traordinary convergence in religious traditions. The convergence is not quite 
evident to most people, he admits, but it will become crystal clear to future 
humanity. “Historians of A.D. 5047,” he proclaims, will find “social unifi-
cation of mankind” not “in the field of war and politics, but in the field of 
religion.”26
The inability of the Westerners to see people outside their own civilization 
as partners in the emerging modern civilization is part of the failure of main-
stream Western scholarship to relate to members of other civilizations. The 
tendency to recognize members of other civilizations as exotic people, or as 
he puts it, “native,” is a problematic attitude stemming “from illusions due to 
the world-wide success of the Western Civilization in the material sphere.”27 
Thinking of other peoples as “native” is not only wrong; it also entails seri-
ous consequences, including an inclination to “terminate” and “domesticate” 
people who are perceived as “natives.”
So long as we think of them as “natives” we may exterminate them or, 
as is more likely to-day, domesticate them and honestly (perhaps not al-
together mistakenly) believe that we are improving the breed, but we do 
not begin to understand them.28
The illusion is not singular, but multifaceted as it includes, along with the 
“egotistic illusion,” the illusion of “the unchanging East” and that of “pro-
gress as something that proceeds in a straight line.”29
Toynbee concludes his examination of the cyclical theories of history that 
identify the conditions that led to the breakdown of earlier civilizations, in-
cluding the organic life of a culture advanced by Spengler, and the spiritual 
and moral degeneration of the culture advanced by Ibn Khaldun, on a pos-
itive and optimistic note. There is no natural process or fate the necessitates 
the decline of modern civilization, and therefore we “are not compelled to 
submit the riddle of our fate to the blind arbitrament of statistics.” Staying 
alive and prospering is, however, subject to a subtle condition, as Toynbee 
suggests that modern civilization to march on as long as the “divine spark of 
creative power is still alive in us, and, if we have the grace to kindle it into 
f lame, then the stars in their courses cannot defeat our efforts to attain the 
goal of human endeavor.”30
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It would be useful here, before we conclude this section on culture and 
civilization, to zoom in on a concern that was raised by Toynbee in the 
context of examining world history in his A Study of History, as it becomes 
the focus of a short paper he published in 1956 under the title “A Study of 
 History—What  I Am Trying to Do.” During his examination of what he 
called the “egocentric illusion” of the West, that is often ref lected in the 
form of “chosenness” characteristic of all Abrahamic religions, Toynbee il-
lustrates the harmful nature of this illusion in the story of the Chinese Em-
peror Ch’ien Lung who received in 1793 a request from King George III 
to establish a British consulate to oversee trade between the two kingdoms. 
Emperor Lung was so insulted by King George’s request that he responded 
with an angry letter that revealed the emperor’s egocentrism. In one section 
of his letter, the emperor described with great pride the superiority of his 
“Celestial Court,” informing the King of England, with emphatic certainty, 
that he and his empire that possess “all things, set no value on objects strange 
or ingenious, and have no use for your country’s manufactures.”31
The egocentric illusion revealed in the emperor’s self-righteous expres-
sions, Toynbee noted, is equally apparent in the Europeans’ reference to other 
people as “native” is no different than what the ancient Israelites “called ‘gen-
tiles’, and the Greeks called ‘barbarians’.”32 He saw egocentrism as a f law and 
trap that causes those who hold it a great harm, forcing them to live and act 
through an illusion that often comes back to haunt those who entertain it, as 
did the Chinese experience in less than a century after Emperor Ch’ien Lung 
issued his self-exalting response. Toynbee expressed in the 1956 article his 
concerns for the increased presence of egocentric illusion in contemporary 
Western thought and action as part of a larger pattern. Up to the end of sev-
enteenth century, the pattern has been one of the Israelites,
which Christendom and Islam had taken over with modifications in their 
own favor. In this Jewish-Christian-Muslim view, history had appeared 
to be an act of God beginning at the Creation and destined to end in the 
Last Judgment, while Israel (or Christendom or Islam) had been singled 
out as being the people chosen by God for carrying out His purposes.33
However, by the end of the eighteenth century, the pattern took the form of 
eradicating the role of religion and religious reformation in the rise of mod-
ern civilization. Instead of looking to explain the current moment in light 
of the previous one, secularism repeated the same mistake “by cutting God 
out of the picture and dealing with the Christian Church as the Church had 
dealt with Israel.”34
In the end of his article, Toynbee called for a comparative study that thor-
oughly examines the five living civilizations to unlock their ideas and values, 
and he sensed the need to embrace a more inclusive approach, transcend the 
old ways of denying the other, and grow out from the adolescent attitude of 
‘I did it alone, and I do not need the cooperation and help of peoples beyond 
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my own culture and civilization.’ It is definitely a worthy invitation and one 
that can potentially save modern civilization from its self-destructive tenden-
cies. Given the fact that Toynbee is no more seen as relevant to the historical 
debate, one can only wonder if anyone is listening.
Dialectics of consciousness and possession
World history as outlined in the work of both Spengler and Toynbee does 
not fit into the unilinear view of human progress from the ancient through 
the Middle Ages to the modern that became widely embraced by European 
historians. The unilinear model of historical progress was popularized in the 
works of two German philosophers of history who made bold claims and pre-
dictions with regards to the meaning and direction of world history: G.W.F. 
Hegel and Karl Marx. Hegel argues that history f lows in particular patterns 
of progress in a singular direction from the East to the West. History begins 
in the Orient and gradually moves to the Occident where it ends. As the sun 
rises from the East and sets in the West so human civilization and progress 
pass through the same geographical trajectory across the globe. In the West, 
and particularly in the Germanic state, humanity has reached its ultimate 
perfection.35 “The History of the World is the discipline of the uncontrolled 
natural will,” Hegel contends,
bringing it into obedience to a Universal principle and conferring on it 
subjective freedom. The East knew and to the present day knows only 
that One is Free; the Greek and Roman world, that some are free; the 
German World knows that All are free.36
Hegel makes it abundantly clear in the Philosophy of History that human his-
tory is the history of the objectification of individual freedom. With the 
advent of Western civilization, the entire society is made of free individuals 
whose freedom is not only subjective, experienced internally, but also objec-
tively experienced out in the world. The reason that objective freedom took 
a long time to materialize is due to the time needed to develop the psycho-
logical and social conditions necessary for humanity to evolve and mature. At 
the dawn of human history in the Far East only the monarch was sovereign 
and free, even though moral discipline was then developed and objectively 
experienced in society. The arbitrary will of the individual has then achieved 
the discipline needed to form social order, but the moral discipline was out-
wardly located in the rules of an objective law, imposed on society by a king 
who enjoyed divine presence. The constitution was a theocracy and the or-
der imposed by the king was that of the Kingdom of God.37 In the Oriental 
world, “the Kingdom of God is to the same extent also a secular Kingdom as 
the secular Kingdom is also divine.”38 As history moved westwardly toward 
India, the complete unity of society with no distinction between its mem-
bers started to break down. We now observe distinction among members 
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of society in the form of the caste system that privileges one caste over the 
others. Yet for Hegel the distinction does not ref lect the development of in-
dividuality and individual consciousness, as the “different castes are indeed, 
fixed; but in view of the religious doctrine that established them, they wear 
the aspect of natural distinctions.”39 The distinction between the castes took 
a materialist rather than spiritual form. The freedom attained by the upper 
cast was not internalized and remained objective freedom without a subjec-
tive essence. The individuals within the distinction of the caste system are 
“still stripped of proper personality.”40
The later stages of human evolution as history moved further westward 
witnessed the development of subjective morality. Subjective morality now 
is shaping society and regulating social order, but “leaving the sovereign un-
restrained.”41 This is the situation we observe in Persia and later in Rome. 
Hegel struggles to separate Greek spirit from both of that of the Orient and 
Rome, but his work in this area was choppy and reductionist. He claims 
for instance that in Greece, “[d]emocracy was the fundamental condition of 
political life, as in the East, Despotism.”42 He could not spell out how the 
democratic spirit of Greece disappeared from the Romans who inherited the 
Greek culture and civilization and who themselves exhibited some affinity 
to the “democratic” spirit through their Republican phase. Hegel seems to 
suggest, in his own abstract and evasive writings that shun details and see 
them as obstructions, that the force that characterized the expansion of Rome 
has become the true spirit of Rome. “A State which had first to form itself, 
and which is based on force, must be held together by force.”43 For him, 
the Romans were not necessarily void of morality, but their moral behavior 
was socially conditioned.44 Roman virtus was not moral but valor. Yet, to 
claim Roman manliness as virtue is so broad and loose a concept to be able 
to explain Roman despotism. Manliness does not contain sufficient layers 
of meaning to explain the entire history of states that frequently resorted to 
violence to subdue its subjects. It would be a more sensical explanation to say 
that the Roman Republic used force as any imperial power does, including 
modern imperial powers that should have been familiar to him.
The most interesting turn in Hegel’s pursuit of the journey of subjective 
freedom lies in the discovery of the spiritual nature of the divine. This dis-
covery of triune nature of the spirit brings, he contends, a new meaning to 
the spirit’s journey in search of its objectification in the real world, as such 
understanding comes as he announces the arrival of Christianity in the Ro-
man age. For the spirit has a complex manifestation; it is revealed in both 
human and divine forms. Christianity illustrates that that not only the es-
sence of humans is spiritual, but God is now recognized as having a spiritual 
essence. Hegel, whose Christian faith is present throughout his philosophical 
work, sees the birth of Christianity in striking light, describing it as the 
moment “on which the History of the World turns. This is the goal and the 
starting point of History. ‘When the fulness of the time has come, God sent 
his Son,’ is the statement of the Bible.”45 Christianity, which f lows from 
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within the Jewish tradition, is now set to uplift the Jewish pain by affirming 
God and monotheism within the Roman body and to replace the Stoicism 
that counseled people to ignore the pain that kept growing as time went by. 
The new faith Christianity brings to the world is grounded in “the unity of 
Reality, of Subjectivity, with the substance of the One Essential Being.”46 
Evidently, Hegel sees in the coming of Christianity the “Axial Age” that 
holds the key to the modern world, or the Germanic world as he prefers to 
call it. But for Christianity to f lourish it had to wait until Islam reached its 
full fruition.
Hegel assigns a key place to the vocation of Islam in the unfolding of world 
history, for in Islam the unity of the human and the divine appears in its most 
unadulterated form, yet a form that appears to him to be too excessive as to 
qualify for the category of fanaticism. Hegel sees in Islam the first attempt 
to bring balance between the spiritual and the mundane, the universal and 
the particular, the divine and the natural, and eradicate the arbitrariness of 
the “political edifice of chance, entanglement and particularity, the very op-
posite direction necessarily made its appearance in the world, to produce the 
balance of the totality of spiritual manifestation.”47 Unlike the Roman world 
to which Christianity was coopted and unified into the central structure of 
the Roman Empire via the Roman church, Islam remains an intrinsic part of 
society as it refused to succumb to centralized structures, that even in its legal 
expression it defied all the efforts made to attach it to state power. Hegel, who 
was consumed with his pursuit of the freedom of the spirit, found the spirit 
exhibiting boundless freedom in the Islamic faith, as he called the revolt of 
Islam against all formal limitations by state structures the “Revolution of the 
East.” The revolution represented itself in Muslims’ complete devotion to the 
one God and in their refusal to be fully associated with any particular person 
or institution. For unlike Judaism that bound God with the holy land, Islam 
saw the entire reality the domain of the divine and all humans as creatures of 
God. It became the vocation of Muslims, completely devoted to the absolute 
unity of God and of humanity, as they moved out of their geographically 
limited region to reshape the world in relation to the One.48
Hegel sees the simple and free spirit of Islam as the force that propelled the 
world into the conditions of the modern civilization on several fronts. First, it 
rejected all limitations imposed historically on the human will and imagina-
tion. It rejected all constructivist limitations: national, caste, racial, political 
privilege, and socioeconomic status:
The leading features of Mahometanism [Islam] involve this—that in actual 
existence nothing can become fixed, but that everything is destined to 
expand itself in activity and life in the boundless amplitude of the world, 
so that the worship of the One remains the only bond by which the 
whole is capable of uniting. In this expansion, this active energy, all lim-
its, all national and caste distinctions vanish; no particular race, political 
claim of birth or possession is regarded—only man as a believer.”49
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The commitment of Islam to transcendental God, not objectified in any 
shape or form in the natural or social order, was termed by Hegel as “fanat-
icism.” Muslims were committed to abstraction; abstraction in worship, art, 
and thought. The enthusiasm for abstract thinking is of course not exclusive 
to the world of Islam but shared by many religious and cultural traditions. 
Yet, Muslim enthusiasm toward abstract thought and expression, Hegel con-
tends, is all-encompassing and, hence, fanatical. This could also be seen in the 
social and political structures and relations, as the most insignificant member 
in society would approach the ruler as his or her equal.50 Perhaps the most 
impotent aspect of Islam that attracts Hegel’s attention is its ability to rec-
oncile the religious and temporal worlds by subjecting the latter to ethical 
judgments of the former. This reconciliation, while beginning with early 
Christianity, accelerated and took a more advanced form, Hegel argues, in 
Islam. The Christian reconciliation of politics and ethics remained abstract 
before Islam, as it failed to grow into a political form. With the advent of 
Islam this relationship was transformed, and therefore Hegel called Islam, or 
the ‘Mohammedan Principle’, the enlightenment of the Oriental world.
the Reconciliation presented in Christianity, but only in the germ, with-
out national or political development. We must therefore regard it as 
commencing rather with the enormous contrast between the spiritual, 
religious principle, and the barbarian Real World. For Spirit as the con-
sciousness of an inner World is, at the commencement, itself still in an ab-
stract form. All that is secular is consequently given over to rudeness and 
capricious violence. The Mohammedan principle—the enlightenment of 
the Oriental World—is the first to contravene this barbarism and caprice. 
We find it developing itself later and more rapidly than Christianity; for 
the latter needed eight centuries to grow up into a political form.51
For Hegel, the real Enlightenment took place in the West, not in the East. 
For there, self-consciousness reached its more complete form both at the level 
of knowledge, by reaching Absolute Knowledge, and on the social and po-
litical forms in the Germanic state. The exposition of these aspects of the 
modern spirit, Hegel reserved to other works, particularly his Phenomenology 
of the Spirit and later in the Philosophy of Right. We will return brief ly to some 
aspects of his philosophy as we examine the Marxist conception of history, 
particularly the Hegelian dialects and the concept of civil society.
Marx provides us with the most profound critique of capitalism ever at-
tempted and then connects his analyzing of capitalism to a comprehensive 
theory of history which was later publicized by his intellectual partner Fre-
drick Angels under the rubric of “historical materialism.” Marx built his the-
ory of history by using the Hegelian phenomenology of history as a template, 
replacing the “means of production” as the alternative building blocks to the 
Hegelian “Idea.” The replacement is sophisticated but arbitrary and utopic 
and would hence completely fall apart when we take away the Hegelian 
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scaffolds that hold it together. Marx’s historical materialism is thoroughly 
dependent on Hegel’s philosophy of history and would completely disappear 
if there were no Hegelian thought. Indeed, the Marxian world history was 
the first element of his thought to fall apart, as European Marxian thinkers, 
from Gramsci to Althusser, have struggled to stay away from Marx’s “histor-
ical materialism.”
Marx adopted the Hegelian dialectic based on contradictions between 
ideas when they take social forms, resulting in new ideas embodied in new 
social forms. This process concludes in a creative synthesis between the idea 
and its opposite. Marx branded Hegel’s philosophy as an ideology that em-
anates from false consciousness and then endeavors to hide the real process 
of historical change. For him, the contradiction does not take place at the 
level of superstructure where ideas play out, but at the level of infrastruc-
ture between social forces that act out their real interests. In commenting on 
the role of civil society in the formation of the state, Hegel argues that the 
democratic state was the synthesis of the contradictions between civil society 
and the family that have taken under the feudal order a political role. Hegel 
concluded thus that the democratic state transcends both civil society and the 
family without negating them. Marx rejected this formulation in his Contri-
bution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1843). He takes issue with 
Hegel’s assigning subjectivity to family, civil society, and the state, accusing 
him of disregarding the fact that the state is made of the individuals who are 
once grouped under the “family” and then under “civil society.” He sees in 
the Hegelian “ideas” of society and family a clever attempt on the part of 
Hegel to assign objectivity to pure “ideas” rather than the people who are 
subsumed under those ideas.52 Marx sees the ideas of “property,” “family,” 
and “civil society” at the heart of the Hegelian philosophy as mythical no-
tions created from within religiously conscious individuals and have therefore 
been turned into instruments in the hands of the bourgeoisie to perpetuate 
its control over society and the economy. Marx insists that these are not true 
objects of consciousness, for they are consumed with the daily efforts that 
aim at procuring the necessary provisions for survival. For the consciousness 
of working people, property is experienced as the alienation of labor and as 
something that was produced through the laborer’s toil but controlled by the 
property owner and in general by the owners of the means of production, to 
perpetuate the workers misery. The real contradiction is not between illu-
sory ideas but between actual social forces, namely between the workers and 
the owners of the means of production.53 The emancipation that is urgently 
needed is that of the worker, and for that to happen, property, family, and 
society should be abolished, and religions that gave rise to them all must be 
negated and abolished.54
For Marx, the state is always controlled by those who owns the means of 
production, and world history is the history of the struggle between workers, 
whether they are peasants or laborers, and property owners. Under capi-
talism, the contradiction is between the workers and the bourgeoisie. The 
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Marxist theory of history is based on two main concepts—“socioeconomic 
formations” and “class struggle.” The “socioeconomic formation” relates to 
the nature of the social relations that correspond to the ownership structure 
of the means of the production in a particular historical stage of the human 
development. Marx identifies four stages based on the mode of production: 
tribal ownership by small families, the Roman private ownership by small 
minority, the feudal ownership by estate, and the bourgeois ownership by 
modern capitalists. Like Hegel, Marx envisaged the end of history, not in 
the Germanic state, but in communism, a utopian society organized in ac-
cordance with one principle: “From each according to his ability, to each 
according to his needs!”55 Marx’s analysis of the impact of free enterprise 
in imperfect market conditions was penetrating, particularly since he ex-
perienced firsthand the devastating shocks of the industrial revolution in 
England. His work shed light on the interrelationship between economic 
and political elites under capitalism. Similarly, Marx described the nature of 
accumulation of capital and its role in cheerleading political expansion that 
gave rise to neocolonialism and modern imperialism. His failure to appreciate 
the importance of ethical judgment, and its grounding in religious traditions, 
led him to place his faith in a communist utopia. His systematic critique of 
Hegelian thought and German idealism, which he describes as the German 
ideology, provides an important reality check and underscores the value of 
focusing on details that were left out by German idealism and to shed light 
on the need to bring philosophy in general, and the philosophy of history in 
particular, down to earth.
The account of world history we find in Hegel brings significant insight 
into the maturation of human consciousness as the accumulated experiences 
of various cultures and civilizations that shaped humanity. Hegel also affirms 
the importance of religion in general in shaping cultural experience and giv-
ing its main features. He evidently assigns higher significance to monotheistic 
traditions and presents the dialectical relationship between Christianity and 
Islam in a new, and more complementary, light. The apparent conf lict be-
tween the two monotheistic religions is not necessarily religious but one that 
involves the temporal energy and ambition of Arab and European dynasties. 
The Hegelian narrative highlights the importance of the pre- Enlightenment 
cultures and civilizations for understanding modern civilization and even 
suggests that the birth of Christianity marked an “Axial” moment in human 
history.
The role played by premodern society in shaping Western modernity was 
highlighted in Karl Jaspers’ “Axial Age” thesis which he announced in 1949 
in a book he published right after WWII. Jaspers’ thesis has generated since 
then considerable interest, particularly in the past decade, and different as-
pects of it have been embraced by inf luential contemporary philosophers and 
sociologists, including Robert Bellah, Charles Taylor, Karen Armstrong, and 
Shmuel Eisenstadt. We turn now to examine Jaspers’ thesis and engage the 
growing literature around it.
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The Axial Age and the monotheistic breakthrough
Karl Jaspers remarks, in The Origin and Goal of History, that Western histori-
ans often ground modern society in European history, and particularly in the 
Christian faith, from St. Augustine to Hegel, ignoring the impact of other re-
ligions and other cultures and civilizations on the formation of modern society 
and life.56 Our current understanding of history is colored by the standards and 
meanings borne out of modern experience. Yet world history is by definition 
“the history of mankind,” and its proper understanding requires that we engage 
premodern history in order to make the present intelligible.57 Jaspers suggests, 
early on in his seminal work, that the period of human history that exerted 
the greatest impact on modernity, which he calls the “Axial Period,” revolves 
around 500 BC and stretches roughly between 800 BC and 200 BCE. It was in 
this era that humanity as we know it today was shaped. Major religions, civili-
zations, and empires appeared in that age to make it an Axial period:
The most extraordinary events are concentrated in this period. Confu-
cius and Lao-tse were living China, all the schools of Chinese philosophy 
came into being, including Mo-ti, the Chuang-tse, Lieh-tsu and a host 
of others; India produced Upanishads and Buddha and, like China, ran 
the whole gamut of philosophical possibilities down to skepticism, ma-
terialism, a challenging sophism and nihilism; in Iran Zarathustra taught 
a challenging view of the world as a struggle between good and evil; in 
Palestine the prophets made their appearance, from Elijah, by way the 
Isaiah and witnessed Jeremiah to Deutero-Isaiah; Greece Witnessed the 
appearance of Homer, of the philosophers—Parmenides, Heraclitus, and 
Plato—of the tragedians, and Archimedes. Everything implied by these 
names developed during these few centuries almost simultaneously in 
China, India, and the West, without any one of these regions knowing 
of the others.58
The significance of the Axial Age relates to the fact that it was the time when 
Greek, Indian, and Chinese philosophers provided us the most lucid ideas 
that connect the transcendental to the social and during which the mythical 
world that shaped human imagination receded. It was also the age when 
religions took their ethical turn, and myth was replaced with spirituality. 
Moreover, it was during the Axial Age that ideas become mobile, traveling 
across geography and social distances; when academies were established and 
philosophers wandered from one place to another, seeking both knowledge 
and the spread of their ideas.59 We started to see human reason and human 
personality take their premodern forms in the Axial period, as the devotion 
to the sacred was translated to social solidarity, as the sacred was revealed to 
humanity in different parts of the world, so the essence of humanity and its 
relationship to the divine took its familiar structure.60 Jaspers attributes the 
acceleration of historical development and the formation of vibrant cultures 
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to the increase of exchange between cultures and societies, the improved 
transportation and commerce across the globe, and the establishment of 
centers of learning in China, India, Persia, and Greece.61 The transformation 
of humanity into more cultured and civilized societies was a reaction to the 
carnage and savagery during the heroic age. Human pain during the heroic 
age became unbearable, and the tragedy of history necessitated the historical 
transformation to a new age of higher culture and civilization. The heroic 
age that produced ancient civilizations was not peculiar to Greece. It was 
everywhere. It was experienced by the Indians, Celts, Slavs, and the Persians. 
The tragedies of the heroic age gave birth to the spirit of the ancient imperial 
states that united large regions of the earth and brought a semblance of peace 
to the world.62
For Jaspers, the obsession with declaring the independence of Western civ-
ilization from the inf luence of other civilizations was not simply an expres-
sion of the sentiments of proud peoples; rather, it was rooted in the rejection 
and non-acceptance of the claim of “exclusive truth by the various Biblical 
religions, including Islam.” Yet the West has displayed more thorough exclu-
sivity and a more profound need to set itself apart from the rest of humanity. 
“It was only in the West,” Jaspers exclaims, “that the totality of this claim ap-
peared as a principle that ran without the whole interruption through further 
course of history.”63 Jaspers warned that the West can ignore its formative 
past at its own peril. Jaspers felt the need to locate the West within world 
history so that a full narrative of the cultural and the religious context that 
led to the rise of modern society “might unify humanity and help us all to 
move forward together peaceably.”64 He saw in his efforts to shed light on 
the Axil Age not only the obligation to affirm quite relevant historical events 
but also an opportunity to display the interconnectedness of human cultures 
and civilizations. After all, our understanding of the past has profound impact 
on the decisions we make in the present and the future.65 Like Marx, Jaspers 
took aim at the German ideology, though the thrust of his criticism went into 
the opposite direction. He accused the German philosophers, from Fichte 
and Hegel to Schelling and Nietzsche, of undermining faith by turning reli-
gion into ideology. In the process, the depth of the spirit that brought about 
the modern transformation was lost.66 And like Marx, Jaspers took aim at 
Hegel, accusing him of reducing the understanding of world history into an 
ideology whose purpose is the exaltation of one’s own culture and religion. 
For Hegel has practically made world history revolving around Christ, as he 
made “the appearance of son of God … the axial of world history.”67 Un-
doubtedly, the efforts of Hegel to reduce human history to that of the West 
smacks the non-Western reader as an exercise in self-exaltation.
Jaspers particularly objected to the reduction of human history to the con-
sciousness of liberty, and for closing the historical horizons, limiting the his-
torical possibilities to the certainty of the moment. No human mind should 
be allowed to assume an Archimedean point without being challenged. He 
rests the case he strove to establish throughout his critical work by concluding:
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history is actually, and for my consciousness, unclosed. I hold myself 
open to the future. It is an attitude of waiting and of seeking the truth, 
of not yet knowing already is, but which will be fully understandable 
only from the vantage of the future. In this basic attitude even the past is 
unconcluded: it still lives, its decisions are not totally, but only relatively, 
final; they can be revised. That which was is still capable of reinterpre-
tation. That which seemed to have been decided become once more a 
query.68
By the end of his insightful work, The Origin and Goal of History, we do realize 
that the origin and goal of history is still unknown. All we can know is that 
the modern reality we are part of is shaped by ideas and social formations that 
first appeared in the Axial Age around 500 BCE. We obviously need to delve 
deeper into that history to identify the patterns of change that led to our cur-
rent moment and must do that systemically and with intellectual discipline 
and vigor. Jaspers’ work invites us to expand our horizons to be able to de-
velop a better understanding of the meaning and direction of the modern age. 
He also injects a word of caution into our intellectual pursuit of meaning, 
warning us from falling into the egocentric tendencies that aff licted earlier 
readings. His arguments help us understand the limitations of the philosopher 
and the historian, but we must not take it as a reason to undermine earlier 
intellectual and cultural contributions.
The Axial-Age thesis has been received with a mixture of reactions, vary-
ing from enthusiasm, to cautious reservations, to thorough dismissal as a “con-
venient myth.”69 Obviously, there is a considerable amount of speculation in 
the effort to construct the reality of the Axial Age out of scattered informa-
tion we have about a somewhat distant past. But given the archeological and 
discursive knowledge we have about the civilizations, religions, and personal-
ities of the Axial Age, no dismissal of that past is credible. What is less certain 
is the existence of a full account of that age, and the breakthrough that links 
that relatively distant age to our modern age. Lain Provan, who described 
the “Axial Age” as a “Convenient Myth” in a book with the same title, took 
an issue with Jaspers’ claims of the unity of history in the period 800 to 200 
BCE. Drawing on Eric Voegelin’s critique of Jaspers’ thesis, he questions the 
assertion that people were able to communicate from the same horizons of 
consciousness when in reality members of different ancient civilizations came 
from completely different systems of faith, built around markedly different 
views of the cosmos.70 This objection only underscores the limitation im-
posed on inter-civilizational communication, and the difficulties of seeing 
eye to eye on broad scope of issues, but cannot form the ground of an utter 
refutation of the claim, as the author of the Convenient Myth suggests.
Voegelin is equally suspicious of the claims made by Jaspers because the 
open communication across different religio-cultural systems assumes the 
presence of uniform categories of thinking, as it disregards the order of ranks 
that separate different civilizations.71 Yet such an objection is only valid with 
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regard to casual conversation among members of the nobility that represent 
competing sociopolitical orders. It would not be true among merchants in-
volved in ongoing trades or students of learning engaged in prolonged studies 
of ideas. For we know that despite the closed cultural spheres to which we 
confined the higher classes of ancient civilizations, exchange among traders 
and seekers of wisdom and learning persisted across time, even among the 
warring Christian and Muslim dynasties in the Iberian Peninsula and the 
Near East. Voegelin’s more penetrating critique of Jaspers, and also of Toyn-
bee, relates to the exclusion of “Judaism from the representative assembly of 
‘higher religions’,” and in eliminating it from “the earlier and later spiritual 
out-bursts of Moses and Christ, or of Mani and Mohammed.”72 This critique 
is quite valid, and I would add to this list of impactful spiritual personalities 
Abraham, the patriarch and the founder of the monotheistic traditions. These 
critical observations do not negate Jaspers’ thesis all together but only point 
to certain soft spots that no theory of history can escape. These f laws in 
the Axial-Age theory of world history should serve to refine the theory but 
cannot be the ground to rejecting it as a “convenient myth.” The f laws and 
insufficiencies in Jaspers’ account are not limited to identifying the spiritual 
force in the Axial Age that was at the core of the “breakthrough” that led to 
a historical path, culminating in what could be termed the global age. But in 
grounding modern science, he seems to jump from the Indian to Greek to 
modern civilization, ignoring the fundamental and profound contribution of 
Muslim worldview and civilization, a question we will return to discuss in 
some details in Chapters 4 and 5.
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of Jaspers’ theory of world history lies 
in the Axial-Age breakthrough. What is the nature of the revolution that led 
to the modern age? Jaspers seems to suggest that it is the scientific revolution, 
which he locates in the passage of science from China to the West via India. 
Charles Taylor raised the question of the “Axial Revolution” and suggested 
that it has to be found in the “new tension ‘between the transcendental and 
mundane orders’.”73 More specifically, it could be located in the desire to 
transcend social distortion of the Axial-Age religions within societies that 
claim to embrace those religious traditions. Taylor referenced the Hebrew 
prophets who lived in the Axial Age, beginning with Prophet Jeremiah, and 
found themselves in opposition to the practices of Israel in the name of God 
that they condemned as contrary to God.74 The critical stances taken by the 
Hebrew prophets are incidents of “transcendental” motive, both in the sense 
of appealing to the transcendent, from whom they acquire their motivation, 
and in the sense of moving beyond the conditions being condemned. Taylor 
seems to find the Axial-Age breakthrough in the “higher religions” of the 
Axial Age, particularly those that emphasized the values of “social order, 
cosmos, human good.” This emphasis could be found in its most unique 
and lucid form in Christianity as emerged in the Roman world, and later in 
Middle-Age Europe, with its emphasis on the absolute benevolence of God 
and on forgiveness. He even suggested that it could be the amalgamation of 
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Christianity with Stoicism that contributed to the founding of these values 
in the Western society.75 Taylor was eventually drawn toward the Enlighten-
ment with its emphasis on rational cosmology and saw in it the more likely 
locus of the Axial-Age revolution.76
Bjorn Wittrock contends that the Axial Age helped to affirm the boundless 
possibilities for future that transcends the constrains of any historical moment, 
thereby opening the door for transcending the bounds of any specific social 
formation and embracing new “cosmologies that made an explicit and sharp 
distinction between a mundane and a transcendental sphere.”77 The tension 
between the transcendental and the mundane is not uniform across the dif-
ferent Axial-Age religions and, hence, takes different forms in the cultural- 
cosmological formations of different religions. The variations open the door 
to different paths to modernity, as well as “multiple axialities.” He identifies 
five forms of modernity: the ancient Israel, Sinic, Indian, Persian, and Greek. 
Among the five, the transcendence-mundane tension is more dominant in 
ancient Israel.78 Other breakthroughs took different cultural-cosmological 
forms, including the philosophical-political of Greece, universal-inclusive of 
China, pluralistic-semantic of India, and dualistic-agential of Iran.79
While transcendence is embedded in all religions, it is evidently in ancient 
Israel, or the Abrahamic spirit, where transcendence was intensified, com-
bining the sense of both going beyond the moment and the transcendental 
sense of the divine as existing beyond the world. Could this be the motor of 
the breakthrough that we are searching for? We will examine monotheism 
and the Abrahamic traditions in some details to understand the sense of tran-
scendence that grew within one of the longest transcendental-interpretive 
religion in human history. The idea of transcendence is, therefore, central to 
the formation of the Axial Age, because it is instrumental in the development 
of human consciousness in its relationship to its total existence and to other 
human beings. The idea of transcendence pushed humanity beyond itself and 
forced it to recognize its own consciousness in the life of unfamiliar strangers, 
so much so that “It is impossible for man to lose transcendence, without ceas-
ing to be man.”80 The idea of transcendence has been, as such, a humanizing 
principle throughout human history.
Jaspers’ Axial-Age thesis represents a bolder step to broaden the discussion 
about the ground of the modern age than was once the focus of Weberian 
sociological patterns half a century earlier. Weber also wanted to look beyond 
the European Enlightenment, the Eurocentric focus of European histori-
ans and philosophers, particularly away from the Hegelian historicism. Still, 
Weber’s views remain Occidental to the core. In the process of examining 
various paths of rationalization, he presented modern European society in the 
familiar line of exceptionalism. Everything in European society was unique, 
from the distinctive features of Western society and its unique capacity to 
develop advanced science, for “Only in the Occident is there ‘science’ at the 
stage of development that we today recognize as ‘valid’.”81 Similarly, the sys-
tem of “legally trained civil servants” is unique in world history. Eventually, 
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the Weberian account of Western society is one of self-congratulation and 
exaltation. It goes without saying that the Enlightenment has produced im-
pressive philosophical and scientific advancement, but the obsession with af-
firming Western uniqueness and exceptionalism ref lects a sense of insecurity 
in presenting its own achievements. There was a deep need to declare the 
unprecedented and unmatched capacity of European achievements and an 
emphasis on the superiority of Occidental society and culture. Modernist 
theorists took this self-congratulatory spirit a bit further by declaring that 
Western modernism was the only possible way to modernity.
Our journey to trace the patterns of modern developments has taken us all 
the way to the Axial Age, where we discovered the significance of the idea 
of transcendence in achieving the Axial breakthrough that brought us to the 
modern age. The structure and nature of the idea of transcendence remains, 
however, blurred and unclear. To clarify it we will turn to study the mon-
otheistic traditions to find out if these traditions have advanced the type of 
transcendental ideas and social dynamics that gave rise to our modern world 
and how those traditions affect our world today and inf luence the possibilities 
of a global breakthrough.
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The structure of world history provides us with a better vantage point to 
identify the patterns of the historical evolution of humanity and exposes us to 
broader horizons to understand our current location within the global trajec-
tory than that of the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment is often perceived 
by modernist thinkers as the axial moment for understanding the entire hu-
man history. This vantage point, conveniently selected by modernists, only 
provides us with a partial view of world history, precisely because the En-
lightenment itself is grounded in the moment of the Protestant Reformation, 
which is similarly grounded in the monotheistic traditions that informed its 
moment of birth. The Enlightenment leaders themselves spoke the language 
and employed symbols rooted in Islamic rationalism, as will be illustrated be-
low, that constituted the unification of the Axial intellectual landscape. The 
language of transcendental rationalism that informed the epistemological ho-
rizons that shaped modernism belonged to earlier traditions that proceeded 
from the Axial Age to the modern age. We need, therefore, to explore further 
the inner workings of an extensive monotheistic tradition and to understand 
the dynamics that govern its journey from the ancient Israelites to the dawn 
of the Occident modernity. What is missing from the modernist explanation 
is the connection between the Axial Age and the Occidental world where 
modernity was born. The connection cannot be assumed to be the Roman 
Church, for we know very well that the church was hostile to any scientific 
expression that fell outside the church doctrine, so much so that it had al-
ready outlawed any inkling of thought that could revive the study of rational 
philosophy. We also know, albeit somewhat vaguely, that it was the Muslim 
Spain that provided the initial fuel that set the modern civilizational project 
going in the farthest corners of the then-inhabited world. As we argue in this 
and the next two chapters, the Arabic civilization that f lourished in Spain for 
six centuries was crucial for the rise of the modern age.
The focus of this chapter is on monotheism and its evolution from the 
Axial Age to the modern age. We will argue that as monotheism formed the 
axial breakthrough, via Protestantism, at the dawn of Western modernity, it 
also formed the axial breakthrough during the Axial Age via the Abrahamic 
faith. Monotheism itself went through three moments: the ancient Jewish, 
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the Latin Christian, and the Middle-Age Islamic. Monotheism has gone 
through a number of transformations, reaching its revolutionary moment in 
the Islamic transformation, or what Hegel referred to as the revolution and 
the enlightenment of the Orient. The nature and extent of this “revolution” 
and “enlightenment” is not clear in our collective perception of the trajec-
tory that led to the modern breakthrough. This is true not only because the 
European discourse about the birth of modernity dismisses the role of Islamic 
monotheism as marginal, confined to preserving Greek sciences and passing 
them on back to their true European owners, but also because the Islamic 
transformation of the monotheistic spirit is complex and protracted.
The monotheistic path in world history
Perhaps no sociologist has left a lasting impact on our understanding of the 
complex processes that culminated in modernity more than Max Weber. It is 
true that Weber’s sociology does not provide us with any full-f ledged theory 
of world history and that he never intended in his writings to present us with 
a particular structure of world history, but his work is nonetheless very cru-
cial for understanding the social and rational development of humanity since 
the Axial Age. Karl Jaspers himself tried unsuccessfully to draw on Weber’s 
sociological work to identify the structure of history. He interestingly drew 
the wrong conclusions from his readings of Weber, as the picture he painted 
was one of utter chaos. Summarizing Weber’s views, Jaspers concluded,
history has no unity and hence structure, and no other meaning than 
that contained in the incalculably numerous causal concatenations and 
constructions, such as also occur in the processes of nature, save that in 
history they are much more inexact.1
For sure, Weber was not at all interested in showing a structured unity of 
world history, but he nonetheless saw patterns running across religious tradi-
tions and cultures. His writings also emphasized the importance of religion 
for the development of world civilizations, as he placed the prophetic visions 
at the beginning of the rationalization process that created advanced cultures. 
In discussing religious esthetic, he points out, in The Sociology of Religion, 
some obvious patterns of religious expressions that suggest certain consisten-
cies in world history:
Orgiastic religion leads most readily to song and music; ritualistic re-
ligion inclines toward the pictorial arts; mystic religions of love favor 
poetry and music. All experience over the world history shows this re-
lationship: Hindu literature and art, the joyous lyricism of the Sufis, so 
utterly receptive to the world; the canticles of Francis of Assisi; and the 
immeasurable inf luences of religious symbolism, particularly in mysti-
cally conditioned mood.2
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While it is not easy to draw an intelligible structure of world history in the 
work of Weber, aside from the patterns that traverse any particular religious 
and cultural experience, he evidently identified historical paths through 
which the semblance of world history can be detected. Of particular interest 
is Weber’s identification of the roots of universalism in the “prophetic advo-
cates of the cult and ethic of Yahweh.”3 His attribution of universalism to the 
Hebrew prophets appears initially to be out of place, given the self-perception 
of the Israelites as the chosen people, beholden to a territorially bound deity. 
For Weber, it was the instinctive urgency of survival against existential threats 
from aggressive neighbors that necessitated the historical shift in the identity 
of Yahweh among the Israelites. As soon as the tribal confederacy turned to 
a kingdom, he noted, “the ancient warrior god of the confederacy, who had 
become the local god of the city of Jerusalem, took on the prophetic and 
universalistic traits of transcendently sacred omnipotence and sovereign.”4
Weber focuses in his voluminous work, Economy and Society, and later in 
the Sociology of Religion, on the charismatic leaders of the Axial Age, such 
as Buddha, Confucius, and the Hebrew prophets, but never recognized the 
Axial Age as an important sphere for shaping the modern world. One can 
hardly find in Weber’s writings any obvious connection among the founders 
of the great religions, let alone a framework of unity. He could nonetheless 
see paths of rationalization f lowing in different geographies down the stream 
of history. Only one of these rationalization streams appears to speak with a 
“universalistic” tone, namely the Abrahamic monotheism—“the universalis-
tic monotheism of Christianity and Islam must be regarded as derivative of 
Judaism, while the relative monotheism of Zoroastrianism was in all likeli-
hood determined at least in part by Near Eastern rather than within Iranian 
inf luences.”5
The universalistic ethos of monotheism was not quite clear in Judaism, but 
one still could identify some facets of outward looking in the kingdoms of 
David and Solomon. What is clear in Judaism, though, is its ethical character 
as manifested in the assertions and positions taken by a long line of the He-
brew prophets. Out of all the transcendent religions that Weber examined 
in world history, he concluded that only in Judaism, Islam, and Protestant 
Christianity that one can find “consistent monotheism.” Weber attributed 
this failure to “the powerful material and ideological interests vested in the 
priests.”6 Not all priests formed, though, an appendment to the full and con-
sistent development of monotheism but only those who resided close to the 
center of power did. To the contrary, Weber assigned an important role for 
the “independent and professionally trained priesthood” in the development 
of both “metaphysical rationalization” and a “religious ethic” that were es-
sential for equipping the community with the necessary tools to “cure the 
souls.”7
The ability of the monotheistic priestly class to undertake spiritual renewal 
is due to a long line of prophets, who were the true bearers of the transcen-
dental ideals and who returned periodically to renew the divine revelation 
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and develop their monotheistic communities.8 The prophetic spirit with its 
clear passion and devotion toward transcendence and its desire to replicate 
itself inwardly and outwardly did not only serve as a restorative power to 
prevent the corruption of the faith but also helped in connecting popula-
tions across the Near East and beyond. Weber speculated without any clear 
evidence that the power of monotheistic revelation reached a new height 
during the time of Elijah, and pushed across geography to Greece, even to 
the great world empires in Asia, and hence served in “the intensification of 
international commerce after a long interruption.”9 This observation bears 
directly on the “Axial Age” theory advanced by Jaspers, though, unlike Jas-
pers, Weber surprisingly sees prophecy as the catalyst for enhancing greater 
commercial exchange, not simply a vehicle for greater cultural and religious 
exchange.
Gradually though, it was the intellectual, rather than the prophet or the 
priest, that began to shape human consciousness as well as social meaning and 
structure. The intellectual role stems from religious concerns over individual 
salvation, Weber contends, as much as concerns over human development. 
The intellectual’s contributions to the formation of modern consciousness in 
particular has to be found, he points out, in their drive to bring meaning and 
unity to social order plagued with conf licts and in the struggle to overcome 
“inner distress” that stems from the constant turbulence of social reality. The 
intellectual assumed in the post-prophetic times the responsibility to find 
meaning and unity among human beings and between them and the cos-
mos.10 While acknowledging the birth of the intellectual in the Hellenic and 
Islamic societies, he makes passing reference to both, focusing on the role of 
intellectual in post-Reformation Europe. He does not, in fact, see any sig-
nificant role for the intellectual in early Christianity and characterizes Latin 
Christianity as anti-intellectual.11
Weber seems to have mixed feelings about post-Enlightenment intellec-
tualism, dismissing it as rising out of the “need of literary, academic, or cafe- 
society intellectuals to include ‘religious’ feelings in the inventory of their 
sources of impressions and sensations, and among their topics for discussion, 
has never yet given rise to a new religion.”12 Yet, in his Protestant Ethic, he 
shows that modern capitalism is rooted in the ascetic spirit of Protestantism, 
particularly in the Lutheran notion of “calling” and the doctrine of “predes-
tination.” The idea of calling is unique in that it is the result of the Lutheran 
translation of the Bible, using the German word beruf to translate the word 
“vocation.”13 The Lutheran doctrine of predestination was, similarly, unique 
in the history of monotheism. The doctrine of predestination can be found in 
both Islam and Calvinism, but in completely different forms. The doctrine’s 
significance lies in its ability to greatly energize in Islam and Protestantism 
the faithful’s “rational and religious power.” The doctrine of predestination 
in Islam is understood as “grace” or “fate” and is intended to anchor the 
faithful’s well-being in the hands of the divine. But among the prophets and 
people of faith, predestination forcefully energized those who were seeking 
82 Monotheism and transcendental idealism
rational and religious power, as in the case of Calvin and Muhammad, each 
of whom was convinced that the certainty of one’s own mission in the world 
came not from any personal perfection but from his situation in the world 
and from God’s will. In other cases, for example of Augustine and Muham-
mad, faith in predestination may arise as a result of the necessity for bringing 
human passion under discipline and control and the conviction that such a 
task could only be accomplished through transcendental care, beyond the 
power available in the capacity of individual actors.14 In Protestantism, and 
particularly in Puritanism, the doctrine takes the form of what Weber calls 
the “double decree,” as it unites the destiny of the individual in the life to 
come with their destiny in the earthly life. The destiny of the persons of faith 
in the afterlife must be demonstrated in everyday life through good work.15
Weber credits, in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, the rise 
of capitalism as an economic system to the Protestant faith and ethical code. 
For the Protestant faith did not only provide the faithful with the energy to 
prove their individual worth and demonstrate their faith in this life; it also 
gave them the ethics needed to generate the capital young entrepreneurs need 
to pursue their calling and begin business enterprises. Weber linked the rise 
of capitalism to the work ethics of trustworthiness, keeping promise, and 
diligence and hard work, nurtured by Protestantism. These virtues assured 
young entrepreneurs the capital they need to raise from their neighbors and 
communities in order to start their business ventures. These practices, We-
ber asserts, were unique to the Protestant world and could not be found in 
Catholic communities, not even in communities that are made of mixed 
religions such as East Germany.16
Weber shares a short essay written by Benjamin Franklin, in which Frank-
lin underscores the importance of hard work, of keeping one’s words, of 
maintaining honest relationships, and in which people assert that “time is 
money,” “credit is money,” and “money begets money” and that the “good 
paymaster is lord of another man’s purse.” Weber warned the German reader 
of mistaking the virtues invoked by Franklin as fragments of utilitarianism. 
These are, Weber asserts, the very ethics that gave rise to modern capitalism 
that has been enshrined in the American spirit. For Weber, American’s ma-
terialism obscures for the casual observer the hidden secrets of its financial 
success, namely its own spirit and faith. The faith that harbors the virtues 
needed to create an economic miracle cannot be fully grasped from the out-
side in Franklin’s casual prescriptions but can be found in his deeply held faith 
and in his biography:
Benjamin Franklin himself, although he was a colourless deist, answers 
in his autobiography with a quotation from the Bible, which his strict 
Calvinistic father drummed into him again and again in his youth: 
“Seest thou a man diligent in his business? He shall stand before kings” 
(Prov. xxii. 29). The earning of money within the modern economic or-
der is, so long as it is done legally, the result and the expression of virtue 
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and proficiency in a calling; and this virtue and proficiency are, as it is 
now not difficult to see, the real Alpha and Omega of Franklin’s ethic, 
as expressed in the passages we have quoted, as well as in all his works 
without exception.17
Capitalist materialism, and its obsessions with growing money and increasing 
capital, is grounded, Weber would argue, in the Puritan faith. The secret of 
the growth of capitalism in the past two centuries is buried deep in Puritan 
asceticism. The implication of the Weberian account of the rise of capitalism 
in the United States, and modern European society in general, is that the ero-
sion of ascetic foundation of capitalism poses the greatest danger of all for its 
future. This question is becoming more relevant to us today, as one may ask 
whether the ever-increasing personal greed by corporate leaders is connected 
to the erosion of work ethics and of religious morality at the foundation of 
modern economic prosperity. We will return to examine this question in 
subsequent chapters. For now, we need to explore further the role played by 
monotheism in achieving the breakthrough that led to the rise of modernity 
and to develop a greater understanding of the structure and inner workings 
of the monotheistic tradition.
Transcendental idealism and the spirit of 
monotheism: the Kant-Ghazali connection
Transcendental idealism as a concept is associated today with the Kantian 
philosophy, particularly with Kant’s efforts to establish the conditions for the 
human understanding. Yet this very effort exemplifies the spirit of specific 
tradition borne within the monotheistic religions long before Kant. Respond-
ing to the urgency of the moment, Kant struggled to work out a solution that 
could preserve the horizons of monotheistic rationalism in its thinnest-ever 
form. For monotheism has always rejected, since the moment of its birth, 
naturalism with all its materialist and positivist tendencies, embracing instead 
the path of transcendental idealism and, occasionally during its weakest mo-
ments, the path of transcendental realism. Being a rational idealist, who was 
evidently committed to transcendence, Kant was concerned about the rise of 
deism and positivism and wanted to make sure that rational idealism, which 
defined his inner spirit and deepest instincts, would not suffocate under these 
two benign forms of naturalism. Deism was introduced first in Leibniz phi-
losophy and later expounded in the work of Christian Wolff, a highly prolific 
and inf luential philosopher in the Holy Roman Empire and a contemporary 
of Kant. Logical positivism found home in the ideas of Auguste Comte and 
David Hume. Hume built his positivist philosophy on John Locke’s epis-
temology and the assertion that the human mind is empty at birth of any 
innate knowledge and that people acquire all their thinking qualities from 
experience. Locke was, however, an idealist who had grounded his idealism 
in revelation rather than epistemology, and his notion of the mind as a blank 
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sheet did not have any practical implications on his commitment to the ideals 
of freedom, justice, and equality. Kant, on the other hand, could not ignore 
the theoretical implications of accepting a consciousness devoid of transcen-
dental capacity. The impact of Wolff in the Germanic world during the time 
Kant contemplated his philosophy was so immense that his ideas, expanded 
in more than 50 voluminous books, were taught in most German universities 
in the first half of the eighteenth century. His inf luence reached out far be-
yond Germany, as he could count among his prominent adherents and admir-
ers, such personalities as “Voltaire, Emilie du Chatelet, Moses Mendelssohn, 
Frederick the Great (who had a hand in translating one of his works), and 
Catherine the Great (who offered him a pension).”18
Given the weight of the intellectual arguments advanced by the “Leibnizian- 
Wolffian philosophy,” Kant succeeded in rescuing, in The Critique of Pure 
Reason, the categories of time and space from being lost to positivism, as he 
successfully claimed them as categories of transcendence. He started the book 
by making a reference to Wolff as “the greatest of all dogmatic philosophers,” 
not the nicest reference from a Kantian point of view by any stretch of the 
imagination. Kant persistently shunned throughout his philosophical work 
all dogmas, preferring to establish the notion of God on pure faith. He kept 
time and space within the world of transcendence, perhaps because these 
were the only categories that could be broadly accepted by a German culture 
that has by then became beholden to the “Leibnizian-Wolffian” philosophi-
cal system. Given the nature of his practical reason, one could argue that he 
could have also posited human inclination to “goodness” and repulsiveness to 
“evil” as transcendental categories that exist in the mind prior to experience. 
These were the categories that Islamic rationalists, as we will discuss later in 
more details, claimed in the eighth century of being innate to the human 
understanding, despite the complaints of Islam’s transcendental realists of the 
Hanbalite school. The strength of the postulation of the categories of good 
and evil as a priori, in the Islamic rational idealism, is evident in the fact that 
they continued to be embraced by the Asharite school, even after its founder 
made several important theoretical concessions to meet the Hanbalite schol-
ars half way and to end the age-long conf lict between the two schools of 
thought. Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, who we will engage shortly, was among 
those who were committed to pre-experience the presence of the values of 
“good” and “evil” even as he deconstructed, in a manner similar to that of 
Kant, all dogmatic arguments asserting that theoretical reasoning is incapable 
of ascertaining metaphysical knowledge.
Kant defines the word “transcendental” as a “cognitive faculty” and a con-
dition that precedes human understanding. What is transcendental about hu-
man reason is not the substance of the understanding, but the form of human 
reasoning and “cognition that deals not so much with objects but rather with 
our way of cognizing objects in general insofar as that way of cognizing is 
to be possible a prior.”19 The transcendental is used by Kant to describe the 
structure of human consciousness as being independent of the physical world 
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of objects. This state of consciousness was further clarified by subsuming 
human cognition under the category of transcendental idealism, to be distin-
guished from transcendental realism.
By transcendental idealism of all appearances mean the doctrinal system 
whereby we regard them, one and all, as mere presentations and not as 
things in themselves, and according to which space and time are only 
sensible forms of our intuition, but not determinations given on their 
own or conditions of objects taken as things in themselves. This idealism 
is opposed to a transcendental realism, which regards both time and space 
as something given in itself (independently of our sensibility).20
What Kant wanted to prove is that our experience of the objects around us is 
not an experience of the things as they are in reality but only appearances and 
presentations of the real thing. That our reason does not capture the essence 
of reality, or the numina, but only its presentation, or phenomena. Kant’s 
demonstration was then, and still now, quite revolutionary and consequential, 
as it makes transcendence the ground of human experience. Equally impor-
tant is the conclusion that our consciousness is grounded in a transcendental 
self, and so it is free from the control of the natural order. Human beings are 
not defined by the natural order. The natural order is the object and not the 
subject of their experience, and as such they control it, or attempt to control 
it, but are not controlled by it. The human subject remains free even when 
it is surrounded by the natural order arranged in accordance with laws of 
necessity. This we encounter in the ethical system Kant elaborates first in the 
Critique of Practical Reason and further expands in the Critique of Judgment. In 
both books he builds an ethical system on the free agency of people, guided 
by their sense of duty to promote universally ethical principles.
Kant’s work provides an important alternative to realism, deism, and pos-
itivism. It could not for sure stop the naturalistic thrust of these systems, as 
realism and positivism continued to f lourish as important treads within mo-
dernity, but it provided the foundation for both ethical and political claims 
grounded in the idealism of classical liberalism. Phenomenology became the 
alternative philosophical ground to discussing the metaphysical foundation 
of reality, and the Kantian system of rationality provided a solid sub-terrain 
for promoting notions of ethics and defending human rights. Kantian tran-
scendental philosophy continues to serve as an antidote to the claim that 
ethics are a social construct and habitual norms and has therefore inspired 
contemporary neo-Kantians like John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. Rawls, 
as we discuss in subsequent chapters, built his rational moral theory on Kan-
tian transcendental idealism, and on Kantian ethics of duty, informed by 
the ideals of “ justice,” “goodness,” and “rightness.”21 Kant also grounded 
his universalistic ethics in the notion of humanity, giving his moral phi-
losophy the character of rational idealism. Rawls, unlike Kant, grounded 
ethics in pure rational arguments, and like Islamic rationalists, asserted the 
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natural disposition of human being toward moral values, insisting that “our 
awareness of these dispositions is not of empirical origin, but is known to us 
only from a knowledge of the moral law and its effect on our sensibility.”22 
Kant’s efforts to ground moral law in the concept of humanity, however, 
brings his ethical thoughts in line with the transcendental monotheism of 
the Abrahamic faith. Kant developed his fundamental law of moral conduct 
in the Critique of Practical Reason, where he associates moral conduct with 
universally constituted rules that have the form of a maxim he calls the cat-
egorical imperative: “Act only on that maxim by which you can at the same 
time will that it should become a universal law.” Kant saw the categorical 
imperative as the ground for moral law conceived as law independent from 
morality formed through social interactions, thereby forming the essence of 
what early rational thinkers called laws of nature. In the Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, he asserts that the universal maxim forms the essence of 
natural law and proposes another formula of the categorical imperative: “act 
in accordance with maxims that can at the same time have as their object 
themselves as universal laws of nature.”23 This new formulation of the law is 
achieved by establishing the conditions for objective application of the uni-
versal maxim. These conditions relate to ensuring that the good the maxim 
aspires to achieve is identified with humanity and not only a good that satis-
fies personal inclinations of the lawgiver. As Kant put it,
The ground of this principle is: rational nature exists as an end in itself. 
The human being necessarily represents his own existence in this way; 
so far it is thus a subjective principle of human actions. But every other 
rational being also represents his existence in this way consequent on 
just the same rational ground that also holds for me; thus it is at the same 
time an objective principle from which, as a supreme practical ground, 
it must be possible to derive all laws of the will. The practical imperative 
will therefore be the following: So act that you use humanity, whether in 
your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time 
as an end, never merely as a means.24
The new formulation of the principle of categorical imperative was intended 
to move from the universal as something the individual can posit based on 
a personal understanding of the general good to the universal as represent-
ative of the notion of the common good identified through an intersub-
jectively recognized good. Kant is silent on the mechanism by which this 
intersubjectivity is ascertained; hence, intersubjectivity as the best method for 
its discovery must be revisited periodically to make sure that the identified 
general good continues to be intersubjectively valid. Yet, by bringing the 
notion of humanity into the finding of the general good, Kant falls squarely 
into the tradition of rational idealism whose roots, as will be argued shortly, 
could be found in the Mutazilite school that historically grew within Islamic 
rationalism.
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Kant successfully denies, in Critique of Pure Reason, the possibility of the 
knowledge of supersensible matters and, hence, the possibility of the con-
struction of metaphysical world out of the figments of human imagination. 
Since reason as the faculty of understanding cannot perceive metaphysical 
objects, its proper use must be confined to the sensible physical order. But 
since the human rational faculty is transcending time and space, it could lay 
the claim that spatiotemporality is ideal and, hence, affirms the human ca-
pacity to determine its practical freedom in accordance to rules whose aim is 
the highest good.25 In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues 
that while the ethical order is grounded in the practical reason of free human 
agency and rational consistency, the motive for ethics is dependent on faith. 
For “without a God and a world that is now not visible to us but is hoped 
for, the majestic ideas of morality are, to be sure, objects of approbation and 
admiration but not incentives for resolve and realization.”26
Kant’s philosophy of transcendence falls within the traditions of mono-
theism and within a particular transcendental tradition that grew historically 
within monotheism, first in Islam and was latter embraced by the scholastic 
philosophers of Middle-Age Europe. Kant’s commitment to transcendence, 
humanism, and moral agency can only be understood when it is located 
within the monotheistic tradition. His refusal to allow a metaphysical sys-
tem based on pure reason can only be understood when it is viewed from a 
standpoint that insists on grounding knowledge of the metaphysical reality 
in monotheistic rationalism and scriptural interpretations. Kant is not unique 
for doing so in the history of monotheism, for a similar philosophical critique 
was undertaken six centuries earlier by the Islamic philosopher, Abu Hamid 
al-Ghazali (1059–1111). Like Kant, Ghazali wrote The Incoherence of the Philos-
ophers (Tahāfut al-Falasifa) to show that human reason cannot be the ground 
for understanding the metaphysical world. And like Kant, Ghazali was con-
cerned about the uncritical acceptance of the Greek naturalistic metaphysics 
by Muslim philosophers, particularly Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina (Avicenna).
Ghazali is perhaps the most inf luential intellectual in the history of Islamic 
thought and occupies a commanding intellectual position comparable to that 
of Kant within modern liberal thought. He was a philosopher, theologian, 
and jurist with original contributions in all these branches of knowledge. 
One of his most impactful works is the Incoherence of the Philosophers which he 
wrote during his tenure as professor of law at the Nizamiyyah University in 
Baghdad, one of the most prestigious universities in premodern Islam. The 
book, written around the year 1095 CE, was intended to refute the claims put 
forward by Al-Farabi and Avicenna that denied the spirituality of the divine, 
reducing Him to a being that could only be described as “objective reason.” 
The two philosophers made these assertions in compliance with the Greek 
depiction of the supreme being, in the system of divinity that involved a 
multiplicity of divine figures, who share different aspects of the metaphysical 
world. Ghazali took issue with the philosopher’s claims that their approach to 
understanding the divine is more superior to that advanced by the scholars of 
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Kalam (Mutakalimum), a branch of Muslim scholarship devoted to the ration-
alization of Islamic metaphysics in conjunction with hermeneutical analysis 
of the revealed text. Not only did Ghazali disagree with the philosophers’ 
claims, but he also set out to show that the foundation of Greek metaphysics 
was questionable and that it produced questionable conclusions.27 Ghazali 
also objected that Muslim philosophers’ endeavor to substitute the authority 
of Islamic scriptures with the authority of Aristotle and Plato and therefore 
insisted that a thorough examination of the Greek metaphysics would show 
that it does not stand on apodictic proofs (burhan) as its advocates contend.28 
Ghazali accepted the validity of Greek philosophy in the area of logic and 
physics, but set out, empowered by the instruments of Greek logic, to decon-
struct the logically constructed metaphysical assertions of the philosophers.
Ghazali endeavored throughout the book to meticulously demonstrate that 
the philosophers’ metaphysical arguments do not fulfill the standards of proof 
they agreed to and that “they are unable to fulfill demonstration (burhan) as 
they have set it out as a condition in logic. This is why most of the disagree-
ments amongst them is in (the field of ) metaphysics.”29 By refuting Greek 
metaphysics, Ghazali reoriented Islamic philosophy back on a monotheistic 
trajectory, as it became evident in the arguments advanced by Averroes. The 
ability of Ghazali to reorient philosophy away from Greek metaphysics to a 
metaphysics that favors the monotheistic view of the cosmos had had a real 
impact on ending the schism between philosophy and Kalam, compelling 
Kalam scholars to adopt methods and terminology that were exclusively used 
earlier by Muslim philosophers. In fact, the impact was felt far away from 
Baghdad where Ghazali lived and taught, as his work was translated into 
Latin by Dominicus Gundissalinus of Toledo (d. 1190) in collaboration with 
an Arabized Christian (Mozarab) with the name Johannes Haspanus, who 
served as the dean of the cathedral of Toledo in the late twelfth century.30 The 
book, translated into Latin under the title Summa theoricae philosophiae [The 
sum of theoretical philosophy], “became a principal source on the teachings 
of the Arabic philosophers in books by authors like Albert the Great (d. 1280) 
and Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) that were essential to the development of the 
Latin philosophical tradition.”31
To understand metaphysical and ethical concerns that united Kant and 
Ghazali, despite the great distances that separate them, we need to exam-
ine the transcendental tradition that united them within monotheism. The 
tradition is complex and multifaceted, as it stretches out from the Axial Age 
to our own time, as we evidently continue to undergo sociohistorical trans-
formation, possibly toward a global age. An elaborate account of the mono-
theistic transformations that brought us to the modern age will be provided 
in the next two chapters. We will confine our discussion in the remainder 
of this chapter to identifying the foundations of monotheism and provide 
insights into key moments in the trajectory of the development of a particu-
lar tradition within monotheism—namely, the tradition of transcendental 
idealism.
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The Abrahamic journey and transcendental ideals
Theologians and historians may not agree on much of what constitutes the 
three monotheistic traditions but will all agree that monotheism is grounded 
in the Abrahamic faith and in the actions Abraham took to vindicate his 
faith at the greatest cost to himself and those who surrounded him. Histo-
rians disagree on his exact place and date of birth, and on the trajectory of 
his journey to the holy land, where he lived most of his reportedly long life. 
Theologians disagree on which of his two sons was the object of his aborted 
sacrifice, the reasons for splitting his family into two, and the nature of the 
law he honored. Yet all agree that he was a person through whom the mono-
theistic traditions are connected, so much so that we know them today as the 
Abrahamic traditions.
The fact is that Abraham was, and continues to be regarded as, a central 
figure in the sacred narratives that define Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. 
After centuries of bickering and fighting, when the three great religions 
reached out to one another in modern times they found their clearest con-
nection in Abraham, the Patriarch. In many ways, Abraham is not only the 
starting point of monotheism; he is also its point of convergence. In Abraham 
(or Ibrahim as he is known to Muslims) we find the beginning of monothe-
ism’s long historical journey in its clearest and lasting expressions. The story 
of Abraham starts in the Hebrew Bible, the Old Testament, and the Qur’an 
in his uncompromising stance against the idolatry of his people; in his utter 
rejection of the idols and unwavering embrace of the one God, the origin of 
all things. The idols, he notes in his conversation with his father, as stated 
in Genesis, are made by the very people who worship them, carry them 
around, and mold them in “dumb” forms. Abraham goes on to question his 
father as to why would he bow to them instead of worshipping the “God of 
heaven, who causes the rain and the dew to descend on the earth, and does 
everything upon the earth, and has created everything by His word, and all 
life is from before His face.”32 The same story is repeated in the Qur’an, in 
strikingly similar details. The Qur’an provides though some additional in-
formation, describing Abraham’s journey to faith as one of contemplation, 
reviewing different heavenly bodies in search for a deity worthy of worship. 
He contemplated the stars, the sun, and the moon before he came to the con-
clusion he announced to his community: “I am free of that you associate with 
God. I have truly turned my face towards Him who created the heavens and 
the earth: I have chosen sincerity and am not an idolater.”33
Abraham’s journey to faith reveals certain attitudes and beliefs that would 
become central to all monotheistic religions and pivotal to ethical expres-
sions associated with the three Abrahamic traditions: the quest for meaning 
beyond positive experience, a transcendental meaning of the transient state 
of human existence, and a profound sense of agency the individual has above 
and beyond being a member of society. It is true that the Abrahamic faith 
in its strongest and most obvious form is expressed in the community of the 
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faithful and continues to do so even today. But the faithful’s accountability 
resides outside the community, in the commitment to the Absolute and the 
Beyond. The search for meaning, and the rejection of meaningless worship 
of idols constructed by those who bow down to them, is evident in the ex-
change between Abraham and his father. Subtler is Abraham’s sense of moral 
agency, for the reader has first to understand how difficult it was for any 
individual in ancient society to challenge established customs and traditions, 
let alone traditions that are associated with the socially accepted sense of the 
sacred. Abraham was fully aware of the dangerous territories he was tread-
ing into, for the exchange referenced above concludes with Abraham’s father 
explaining the reasons that prevented him from rejecting idol worship, even 
though he was not convinced of the value of his act: “if I tell them the truth, 
they will slay me; for their soul cleaves.”34
There is another important element of the Abrahamic faith that illustrates 
its role in providing the intellectual and moral impetus that led to the Axial 
breakthrough and gradually set the globalization that brought religious and 
cultural communities into close contact. The Abrahamic faith asserted since 
its inception the duty the faithful has in effecting the salvation of humanity. 
The belief that humanity is made of brothers and sisters, who are the de-
scendants of a single pair of male and female created by a transcendent God, 
inspired the humanism and sense of equality unique to the monotheistic tra-
ditions. This aspect of monotheism was clearly present in the life of the first 
monotheist. We read in Genesis:
Go from your country, your people and your father’s household to the 
land I will show you. I will make you into a great nation, and I will bless 
you; will make your name great, and you will be a blessing. I will bless 
those who bless you, and whoever curses you I will curse; and all peoples 
on earth will be blessed through you.35
“All the people on earth [and in another rendition, ‘the nations of the earth’] 
will be blessed through you” is often interpreted by Christian exegetes of 
the Old Testament as a “theological-prophetic vision of the Yahwist him-
self” and an assertion of the universal nature of the Abrahamic mission.36 
The Qur’an adds more clarity to the Abrahamic mission, as it asserts that 
God informed Abraham of the significance of his mission: “I will make you 
a leader of the nations.”37 It looks though that at no time in the history of 
monotheism one could appreciate the importance of the “blessing” and the 
“leadership” of Abraham than with the dawn of the twentieth century. The 
beginning of modern appreciation of the unifying authority of Abraham may 
be found in the Second Vatican Council that took place in 1962, when the 
Catholic Church issued its “‘Decree of Ecumenism’ to restore unity among 
Christians.” The new doctrine also praised Jews as “the people most dear” to 
God because they received his covenant first. It hailed Muslims as those who 
“profess to hold the faith of Abraham and together with us adore the one, 
Monotheism and transcendental idealism 91
merciful God.”38 Granted that the expression that “all peoples on earth will 
be blessed through you” is open to many interpretations, the suggestion of in-
terconnectedness of humanity in the person of Abraham is a question worth 
exploring. All monotheistic traditions affirm at least that diverse humanity 
has a singular origin, and the Qur’an adds to this that this very diversity was 
intended to create the conditions of “mutual recognition” and “competition 
in pursuit of the good.”39
The significance of the Abrahamic faith lies in the formation of the inter-
nal attitudes and commitments that were unique to the monotheistic tradi-
tions. This meaning was not always immediately clear to the generations that 
followed him. The full meaning of the monotheistic vocation had to await 
several millennia and had to undergo a long journey of faith. The Israelites 
who descended from Abraham’s grandson Jacob (Israel) did not always share 
their father’s transcendental values. Little is known about the life of the chil-
dren of Israel between the time they joined Joseph, whom they miserably 
betrayed, in Egypt and the time of Moses, who grew up in the house of the 
Pharaoh against all odds and who was able to lead the Israelites out of slavery 
to a life of freedom. They moved out of the country of the “god-king” to 
form their own kingdom under King David and later under countless kings. 
What was remarkable in their story is that during their wandering in Sinai 
they entered into a covenant not with a human king but with God, as they 
became His loyal people and favored soldiers. Even after having kings of their 
own, the real king in their sight was always the King of heaven and earth.
The covenant that was set initially between God and Abraham became 
later a covenant between God and the people. In Sinai God did not make 
covenant with Moses, the prophet who was tasked with the mission of liber-
ating the Israelites from their bondage in Egypt, but with the people them-
selves. Everywhere in the Near East, the people pledged allegiance to, and 
have covenant with, their own kings. Not so with the Israelites. Everywhere 
around them, people obeyed a law that was made by the king. Not so with 
the Israelites. They had to obey a law that was ordained by the divine, a 
law that was supreme over everybody, including Jewish kings and prophets. 
This type of covenant was unheard of and was revolutionary in every sense 
of the word. It was, as the renowned German Egyptologist Jan Assmann 
noted, “unique and revolutionary in antiquity.”40 Henceforth and for centu-
ries, one prophet after another came to remind the Israelites of the covenant 
they upheld as the bearers of the monotheistic tradition. What was equally 
revolutionary for the Israelites was that their covenant with God became 
their identity-formation narrative. This was again unique to the faithful who 
followed the monotheistic tradition. Such identity-formation was in contrast 
to the neighboring nations. For the identity-formation stories of, say, the 
Greeks and the Egyptians “were not normative for people’s behavior nor did 
they create their identity as a people. In contrast, prophets constantly called 
Israel to remember the covenant with Yahweh as their identity- forming 
narrative.”41
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The Hebrew prophets are all part of a transcendental tradition whose aim 
is to bring the Jewish community back to its own ideals, as the community 
continues to move forward from a federation of tribes to a powerful king-
dom. All Hebrew prophets were reformers concerned with the deviation of 
their people from the ideals that defined the monotheistic tradition to which 
their community belonged. In a way, they constituted a tradition within a 
tradition, an idealist tradition within the monotheistic tradition. And because 
monotheism was transcendental, and seeking the transcendent, they consti-
tuted a particular tradition, one we may call transcendental idealism that was 
opposed to the transcendental realism of the aristocratic and priestly classes 
in their communities that emerged after David established a powerful king-
dom. The Hebrew aristocracy and priesthood that evolved around the high 
priest became soon obsessed with the increase and consolidation of power 
within the Hebrew community that was already transformed from simple 
life of tribal communities to a more sophisticated civilization. The Hebrew 
prophets were all possessed with the ethical foundation of monotheism, in 
the ideals that formed the ground on which the Israelites were taught how 
to live and conduct themselves. They were all committed to the ideals of the 
sanctity of human life and the right of people to live free and have title to 
their work and property. They were saturated with the ethic of respecting 
the elderly, caring for the meek, and honoring honesty and fidelity. These 
were the original teachings of the founders of monotheism, from Abraham 
to Jacob, and from Joseph to Moses. The founders themselves were prophets 
and lived in accordance with the prophetic tradition to which they belonged. 
The Hebrew prophets were also saturated with a deep sense of agency and 
historical mission, which colored their work and turned the communities 
to which they belonged into the spring of historical change that marked the 
essence of monotheism as transcendental idealism and set it apart from other 
forms of transcendentalism we find in Confucianism, Hinduism, or Taoism. 
The prophets, the reformers within the Abrahamic tradition, all have the 
sense of historical mission, for the God they honored and expressed loyalty to
was not a natural force to be manipulated by ritual, nor a nature god 
with whom intimate communion could be gained by the sacred dance 
or other ritual means; he was the Creator God, above nature, whose will 
was expressed in history and was to be obeyed.42
The belief in a transcendental god free from natural limitations, whose power 
can move and manipulate nature, and who is nonetheless portrayed in sacred 
scriptures in anthropomorphic terms, provided a unique worldview that had 
no equivalent in ancient times. Combining this worldview with the belief 
that the transcendent has entered into a covenant with a particular commu-
nity at Mt. Sinai created a powerful faith. It was energizing, transformative, 
and empowering. “I will be your God; ye shall be my people” cemented the 
relationship between a community that was “chosen” by the universal God, 
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the source of all being and life who was in turn chosen by the community 
that was struggling to live up to the divine demands and expectations. The 
covenant created a union not only between the divine plan and the commu-
nity aspirations but also cemented the interrelationship among the various 
Israelite tribes. The interrelationships, and the tensions, could also be seen in 
the dialectics of universalism and nationalism, of idealism and realism, and 
of transcendentalism and materialism. The fact that the covenant was con-
ditioned on moral choice privileged the elements of transcendence, univer-
salism, and idealism, whereas the elements of nationalism, materialism, and 
realism all stem from genealogical and naturalist choices.
The sacred text could, for sure, be selectively interpreted to favor one side of 
the dualism over the other, but, as a discursive tradition that requires a rational 
synthesis of its inner contradictions and dichotomies, nationalism would have 
to be reconciled with universalism, realism with idealism, and materialism 
with transcendence. However, in fallible human society characterized by di-
verse interests and limited rationality, the dualism could never be neatly sorted 
out and synthesized, as the history of monotheism has demonstrated in the four 
millennia that passed since the time of Abraham. So rather than maintaining a 
stable synthesis of the opposing forces, the history of monotheism has been one 
of push and pull between those forces, with times of balance and compromise 
and other times of internal divisions and open struggle. This dualism contin-
ues to plague members of the monotheistic tradition even today. For instance, 
we see this dualism symbolized today in the Biblical notion of the “promised 
land.” Was the promise a “national” moment in a “universal” trajectory in 
expanding the circle of faith? Should the prophecy be privileged over the pro-
phetic tradition that emphasizes justice and equality? Can Abraham and the 
promise given to him be exclusive to one monotheistic community, or is it a 
promise to all believers who believe in his moral and humanistic vision?
The oscillation between idealism and realism, with their constitutive ele-
ments we identified above, is evident throughout the history of monotheism 
and could also be seen in other non-monotheistic forms of transcendence 
rooted in the religions of the Axial Age. The greatest test came with the 
transformation of the Israelite from a tribal community to a great kingdom 
with tremendous aff luence. This transformation during the times of King 
David and King Solomon created a new reality and led gradually to the rise 
of nationalism, realism, and materialism and the creation of the cult of the 
priests who were empowered by the king and who devoted themselves to his 
empowerment. The Hebrew prophets rose to confront the cult of the king. 
Initially, the formation of a powerful kingdom under Solomon served as an 
important moment for the universalization of monotheism, as the power of 
the expanding kingdom was met with respect from its surrounding pagan 
neighbors. The universal outlook of monotheism was quite clear. King Solo-
mon was a devoted monotheist, with a clear commitment to establishing the 
glory of God by building a towering shrine for the glorification of the God 
of monotheistic Judaism. His outward-looking faith was manifested in the 
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tolerance displayed toward other faiths. He understood that faith is a matter 
of the heart that cannot be imposed from the outside, and so he allowed the 
many wives he took “in political unions from ruling families of neighboring 
lands: Egypt, Phoenicia, Moab, Ammon, etc.” to continue to practice their 
native religions in Jerusalem.43 Initially, monotheism was able to capture the 
admiration of many non-Hebrew communities, from Syria to Yemen and 
later to Ethiopia. But gradually, pagan materialism and ritualism found place 
among the Hebrew, and certain rituals linked to the Canaanite God, Baal, 
found way into the religious parties of Hebrew farmers, who sought blessing 
for their crops from the “religion of Baal,” a religion of farmers “concerned 
with the fertility of the soil and of beast and man.”44
The transformation of the Israelites into a nation of military and eco-
nomic power and the penetration of non-monotheistic beliefs and rituals into 
the growing Jewish communities reinvigorated the inner tensions between 
transcendental idealism and the materialism and transcendental realism that 
tainted the initial covenant. This recurring deviations from the original cov-
enant, sanctioned by the priestly class, provoked a long line of prophets who 
sounded as complete outsiders to the established priesthood, from Amos to 
Elijah, Hosea, Nathan, and down to the time of John the Baptist and Jesus 
Christ. They all stood against the “cult” of the king, as did Jehu ben Hanani 
who protested against the cult of Baasha, or Elijah who stood against the cult 
of Baal, Jezebel, and the House of Ahab, to prevent a “Baalized” Israel.45 
Throughout their long history, the Hebrew prophets have all emphasized and 
reemphasized one and the same message, demanding the practice of justice 
inherent in the covenant Israel made with God.46
The call to return to transcendental idealism, embedded in the monothe-
istic mission, did not end with the Hebrew prophets. John Bright, a biblical 
scholar and pioneer in the biblical criticism school founded by William F. 
Fulbright, saw the message and the spirit of the Hebrew prophets being man-
ifested in the work of religious reformers, including that of St. Paul and St. 
Augustine, as well as in the work of Martin Luther, the father of Protestant-
ism. For him, the Hebrew prophets constituted a reform movement within 
the Jewish history comparable to the Protestants reformation. “Let us assert, 
then,” he proclaimed,
that Protestantism—the Reformation—is not merely an event in history 
nor a body of doctrine developed in time; it is a state of mind, a view-
point, that expresses itself from time to time in history whenever men 
have tried to recover and act upon their heritage of faith.47
Rational idealism and the Mutazilite movement
The Mutazilites’ rational tradition rose in the first century of Islam (eighth 
century CE) not only in reaction to the excesses of the Umayyad dynasty 
who indulged themselves in lavish lifestyle but also against the growing 
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support of these excesses by Muslim jurists and intellectuals who provided 
interpretations and opinions that supported the Umayyad’s claims that their 
triumph against their political opponents was an evidence of divine approval 
of their rule. Initially, the Mutazilites were not organized in accordance to 
any particular doctrine or movement but were named after Ma'bad al-Juhani, 
an associate of Abu Dharr al-Ghifari, a companion of Prophet Muhammad 
and the first Muslim to openly advocate the obligation to speak against the 
misuse of political authority. Juhani was a precursor to the Mutazilites and 
was a critical voice against the Umayyad rules and against the scholars who 
justified the usurpation of power. The Mutazilites were viewed as members 
of a heterodoxy that included the Shiites who challenged the Umayyad rule 
as illegitimate and were quietly working to restore political authority to the 
Hashemites.
The Mutazilite doctrines revolved around five principles shared by their 
scholars, regardless of any other disagreements they have. These principles fo-
cused on the question of Tawhid (oneness of God), justice, moral agency, and 
promoting rightness and confronting corruption. They all agreed that God, 
being the creator of the world, transcend it in his being and attributes and 
that there is nothing like him. As transcendental, the divine is beyond hu-
man comprehension, even though he relates to humans through his spiritual 
qualities. These qualities are given in the Qur’an as the beautiful names of 
God and include such names as the peaceful, the just, the living, the loving, 
the sustaining, the knowing, the wise, and so on. They also agreed that hu-
mans are the authors of their actions and have been granted free will and are 
capable of actualizing it and should therefore take full responsibility for their 
actions. God bears no moral responsibility for human actions whether good 
or evil, but they do. They also agreed that those who commit major sin, such 
as killing innocent people, will be doomed in the next life. Furthermore, 
Mutazilite believed that God’s actions are moral, as he abides by the very 
moral ideals he prescribed to humans. He acts only for the good and does not 
intend evil, and for that reason they disagreed with the Sunni majority who 
argued that both evil and good come from God.48
The Mutazilite rational tradition grew in opposition to the scholarly tradi-
tion that was predominantly legalistic and textualistic that confined cosmic 
and theological understanding to the literal interpretations of the text. The 
textualistic tradition gradually acquired a dogmatic bend, insisting on the 
falsity and deviance of any inferential readings of the text and the applica-
tion of reason into the textual analysis of the sacred text of Islam—Qur’an. 
“Traditionalism” in Islam stands in opposition to “Islamic rationalism” and 
not just to modernism. This should be obvious because “modernism” as the 
term used today to describe the rational tradition grounded in the Enlight-
enment was intended to present that last stage in a particular conceptual-
ization of history, based on the triad of ancient-medieval-modern. If, on 
the other hand, we use the term “modern” to signify the rational essence of 
social life then Islamic rationalism should signify modernity of a sort. Trying 
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to locate Islamic rationalism in the continuum of ancient-modern compels 
us also to question the juxtaposition of the modern with the traditional, as 
both concepts constitute a particular tradition. If by “tradition” we refer to 
a set of beliefs, principles, or ways of thinking or acting by a group of peo-
ple, then traditionalism, rationalism, modernism, and postmodernism are all 
traditions. When we discuss the inner tensions among groups of people who 
share certain beliefs, understandings, or values, then we are discussing terms 
among different traditions, some of which privilege reason and its critical role 
in understanding the world over the uncritical reception of narratives and 
explications that relate to bequeathed knowledge. We use in this study the 
notion of rational tradition in the above signification, and we use “tradition-
alistic” to underscore a specific type of tradition that is obsessed with defend-
ing the status quo and inherited knowledge. This is not simply an attempt to 
free the term “tradition” from its use in modernist theories but also to shed 
light on the presence of traditions that stretch out over millennia that honor 
the place of critical thinking in the development of creative ideas and actions.
In Islamic thought, traditionalism, as a tradition obsessed with sticking 
to the surface meaning (ma‘na zahir) of the text, was borne in the prophetic 
narrations associated with the Salafi and hadith-confined tradition, and all 
forms of textualism that privileged the narrated text, no matter how weak 
and uncertain its relation to the Prophet of Islam, over the use of analogy 
and other forms of rational analysis. The dichotomy between the rational and 
textualist traditions was partially overcome in the Asharite tradition that was 
forged by an originally Mutazilite scholar with the name of Abu al-Hassan 
al-Ash'ari. The Asharite thought presents a creative synthesis of the rational 
tradition of the Mutazilites and the narrational tradition of the Hanbalites. 
Initially, this transformation created a new front for the Mutazilites to deal 
with, as the Asharites sided with the Hanbalite interpretations on key reli-
gious doctrines. Eventually, the Asharites drew closer toward the Mutazilite 
worldview, and by the time Ghazali wrote his transformative scholarly work, 
theological Muslim thought took a major turn toward a more philosophical 
approach to understanding metaphysics that was more in keeping with the 
monotheistic worldview. For what was significantly different about the Mu-
tazilite approach to understanding of how reason relates to divine revelation 
was their insistence on the capacity of reason to independently ascertain the 
truth in its essential and general forms.
For Mutazilites, human beings have the innate capacity to identify the 
truth that they encounter in the real world. Human reason, they maintain, 
has the categories of understanding and moral judgment prior to experience. 
Human intellect has the capacity to bring order to its surrounding by organ-
izing the things of the world through the categories. The principles of logic 
are born internally, and the mind applies them to the external world to make 
sense of it and to rationally organize its diverse substance into an ordered 
universe. This part of their epistemology was shared by their rivals in the 
Asharite school of kalam. And this is exactly what Kant asserted in his Critique 
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of Pure Reason, albeit in much more thorough and abstract presentation. What 
was unique to the Mutazilites is their assertion that the human mind is capa-
ble of distinguishing right from wrong a priori. They asserted, in other words, 
that the moral agency of people is not contingent on divine revelation, as 
human beings do instinctively know that killing the innocent and stealing 
are wrong. What divine revelation does is to affirm what is innately known 
to people, at least in its general form. For the Mutazilites, ethical principles 
were not norms born within social judgment, but universal principles equally 
valid for human being and God. God’s actions are subject to the same ethical 
principles, as they are constitutive of the universal truth.
The Mutazilite defense of the belief that God is bound by the same code 
of value as human beings was often conducted via a defense of the view 
that moral values are independent from revelation, since the contrary 
perspective, taken up by the Ash’arites, consisted of the belief that acts 
acquire their values when divine command or prohibition attaches to 
them, and that it was revelation that promulgated the values of certain 
acts. The universal human knowledge of such moral truths—even on the 
part of those who adhere.49
For the Mutazilites, the principle of justice describes both the human and di-
vine acts. Human knowledge of justice as a general category to guide human 
actions is therefore independent of revelation. Such knowledge is a neces-
sary knowledge and forms an intrinsic part of the constitution of the human 
mind. It is a knowledge that precedes experience and not acquired through 
social interaction. The distinction between necessary (daruri) and acquired 
(muktasab) knowledge became part of the argument accepted by the Asharite, 
as well as by the thirteenth-century Hanbalite scholars.50 What is a necessary 
knowledge is not the particular rules of ethics, but rather the universal moral 
propositions, such as “injustice is evil,” “thanking the benefactor is right,” and 
“it is obligatory to repay debts.”51 When challenged as to the ground of their 
assertion, the Mutazilite would direct their opponents to “turn inwardly” 
and examine the reality present in human consciousness. The evidence they 
claim is borne in one’s retrospectively examining one’s consciousness.52 The 
Mutazilites did not speak the language of “consciousness” but only “innate-
ness” ( fitra); such language appeared around the eighth century within the 
Sufi tradition as “wijdan.” But as Richard Martin put it, “if that is understood 
merely as a reification of one’s moral knowledge, then one might say that for 
the Mutazilites, ‘our conscience simply says so.’”53
In concluding this brief examination of the rise of rational idealism within 
monotheism, a rational foundation within the Islamic branch of discursive 
tradition that grew around the internal debates about how monotheistic val-
ues acquire their moral and legal forms, it is important to understand the 
notion of natural law as was presented in Islamic thought. The notion was 
expressed most lucidly in the ideas of the Mutazilite and, to lesser extent, in 
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the Asharites. At the heart of the Mutazilite tradition was the ever- present 
objective of demonstrating the “equivocity of moral values between the do-
main of the worldly or perceptible domain,” the everyday world, and the 
metaphysical world that humans could intuitively “feel” its presence though 
it is unseen and empirically inaccessible through the senses.54 So they did not 
limit the realm of the moral order to the human act in the natural world but 
insisted that the metaphysical world is governed by the same moral principles. 
For the Mutazilites, the law that must govern social behavior is a moral law 
and is grounded in human nature, i.e. in the innate qualities of conscious 
humans. People are born with a moral sense and can distinguish beauty from 
ugliness, good from evil, and right from wrong. Although they acknowledge 
the sacred text and were cognizant of the Qur’anic references to the innate 
goodness of people, they avoided bringing the revealed text to the discussion, 
knowing that their interlocutors are masters of textual manipulation and are 
equipped with an endless number of prophetic narrations that grew over the 
centuries that they could bring to back them up in any public debate.55 The 
Mutazilites’ insistence on privileging ethicality over power, even over om-
nipotence, was both remarkable and profound. They never wavered in their 
commitment to transcendental idealism, despite the tremendous pressure that 
was brought to bear on them by the traditionalists, even by Asharite ration-
alists. They did not have any unassailable response to their critics who them-
selves denied intuitive knowledge of right and wrong, apart from revelation, 
and demanded irrefutable proof. Their response was to refer to the intuitive 
capacity of human consciousness or a reference to the fact that “killing inno-
cent people” is considered a crime and sin by all religious and cultural com-
munities. This was not seen as irrefutable evidence, given the fact that people 
do entertain the possibility and the capacity to act against moral demands. 
Yet, the Mutazilite never claimed that all ethical statements and beliefs are 
innate but only general maxims that reason dictates appear, prima facie, as 
intuitively good (or beautiful) or intuitively evil (or ugly). Providing an irref-
utable proof of certain innate moral qualities of the human being seemed to 
always conf lict with the freedom of the human will and, hence, could only 
be ascertained subjectively or intersubjectively and affirmed through social 
consensus.
Natural law and the quest for equal rights
While Muslim jurists, both idealists or realists, had no quarrel over the equal-
ity of human beings or the need to recognize the equal dignity of people, as 
these values were explicitly presupposed by the Islamic law, their applications 
in a specific instance were subject to interpretation and debate. Furthermore, 
Islamic law was from the very beginning outside the preview of the Caliph 
and the Sultan and under the authority of the jurists’ consensus. The En-
lightenment thinkers, on the other hand, had to develop the social consen-
sus, or the social contract, that would free the legislative authority from the 
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monarch and effectively shift the sovereignty of the law to the people. The 
conceptualization of natural law as inherent values was instrumental for Is-
lamic rationalism, relating to the principles of jurisprudence, but natural law 
for Enlightenment thinkers was foundational and must be constructed com-
pletely through the power of rational arguments and must be based on social 
consensus. Enlightenment scholars differed over the source of natural law and 
its grounding, even though they acknowledged its importance for organiz-
ing human society. In fact, the philosopher whose name is often brought in 
any discussion on natural law and natural rights has denied completely any 
innate quality that one could assign to natural law or morality in general. 
John Locke expounded natural law and used it to establish human liberty 
and equality in his Two Treatises of Government, but still denied in his An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding the possibilities that people are born with 
innate qualities of any sort. In the latter work, Locke affirmed that reason is 
capable of knowing many truths, but this knowledge is not based on any a pri-
ori intellectual capacity.56 For him such knowledge undermines the need for a 
rational pursuit of truth, as such an assumption would deny people the ability 
to realize that truth is always the result of “the labour of our thoughts.”57 The 
bottom line for Locke for accepting the claims of innate knowledge is for it 
to be accepted universally. Since people could always deny innate morality, 
innate knowledge does not constitute a proper claim of natural law.58
Natural law arguments are, though, central to Locke’s endeavors to build 
society on the basis of the equal dignity of citizens. He sets out to establish 
the equality of all people and deny that God gave kings exclusive authority 
over society or that it was based on any preordained patriarchy.59 Locke ar-
gues that in a state of nature, prior to the formation of the state, people live 
as equals and are governed by natural law, more particularly the principle 
of reciprocity, whereby each person must treat others the way they want to 
be treated. In addition to equality and reciprocity (or fairness), natural law 
dictates that the life, liberty, and property of people be respected, so every 
person lives in the state of nature be treated fairly by others.60 The problem 
though is that in the state of nature, people have to punish the offenders who 
violate natural law themselves. This task involves a level of violence that 
people would find it difficult to handle individually and separately.61 While 
denying that natural law is rooted in human reason, Locke acknowledges in 
his analysis of the biblical story of Cain, that Cain realized upon murdering 
his brother that every other human being would now have the right, by na-
ture, to slay him. He examined the psychology of Cain in order to prove that 
people do spontaneously recognize the dictate of a natural law.62
The challenge of enforcing the law of nature in the state of nature moti-
vates people to enter society and establish civil government, whose aim must 
be to preserve their natural rights.63 The first item of business in political 
society is to establish “legislative power” capable of promulgating positive 
law that governs everyone, including the legislature, to promote the public 
good within the confines of natural law.64 Yet, for Locke, this equality that 
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empowers all members of society is not dependent on a fictitious society 
but is sanctioned by divine providence and empowerment, rooted in long 
history that stretches from Adam all the way to the Enlightenment time. It 
is not only natural right, borne out of an evident equality and the need to 
cooperate in a politically ordered union, that makes such a vision of society 
possible, but also
revelation, which gives us an account of those grants God made of the 
world to Adam, and to Noah, and his sons; it is very clear, that God, as 
king David says, Psal. cvx. 16, “has given the earth to the children of 
men; given it to mankind in common.”65
The biblical language is evident in the Lockean justification of society of the 
free and equal citizenry, despite the striking absence of equality in the early 
Enlightenment society that was made of lords, barons, warriors, and peasants. 
Social and political inequality was so pronounced around the time Locke 
presented his thesis that it must have sounded absurd, even irresponsible. 
Sir Robert Filmer, the mouthpiece of patriarchalism and the divine right of 
kings, could not imagine that anyone other the King would have the capacity 
to rule England, as he declared “that there cannot be any multitude of men 
whatsoever, either great or small … [but] one Man amongst them, that in 
Nature hath a Right to be King of all the rest.”66
As modern society gradually moved on, the work of Hobbes and Locke 
continues to be important as the authoritative ground of natural rights. Sev-
eral attempts have been made to transcend the metaphysical grounding of the 
principle of equality and justice, including the latest attempt made by John 
Rawls in his Theory of Justice. Yet these attempts are less than satisfactory as 
they tend to be exceedingly theoretical and complex. The challenge of found-
ing equality outside transcendental idealism remained extremely challenging. 
Jeremy Waldron points out “that Locke provides us with ‘as well-worked-out 
a theory of basic equality as we have in the canon of political philosophy.’ 
But for us it is a challenging theory because its foundations are unabashedly 
religious.”67 Waldron underscores the fact that the language of equality was 
substantiated with countless references to divine wisdom and providence: 
“God created all of us in what was, morally speaking, ‘[a] state … of equal-
ity, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more 
than another’ (2nd T: 4), all of us lords, all of us kings, each of us ‘equal to 
the greatest, and subject to no body’ (2nd T: 123).”68 Waldron contends that 
modern scholars who wrote extensively on social and political equality, such 
as Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls, took Locke’s justification for granted, as 
they distanced themselves from the history of the concept and its grounding 
in the monotheistic traditions.69 He points out that while Rawls’ system of 
justice to which he devoted a lifetime to develop does still require a premise 
of equality, “strong enough to structure the original position and substantial 
enough to provide a basis for mutual respect in a well-ordered society.”70 
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Sensing the difficulty of building equality on an abstract theory of justice, 
Rawls opted, in his theory of political liberalism, to build an overlapping 
consensus among social actors, including actors who derive their sense of 
justice from a religiously based justification. For sure, the ground need not be 
a direct reference to a sacred text, but it should also not intentionally exclude 
the history of political and rational thought and pretend that world history 
began in the twentieth century. Waldron, himself a legal positivist, sees the 
need to engage religious text if that is required for understanding its con-
crete context. To this we may add that its engagement become a must if the 
religious texts and sociohistorical movements are integral to the growth and 
evolution of modern society and its foundational institutions. Undoubtedly, 
liberalism founded its moment of birth in the European Enlightenment, but 
the moment came about within a transcendental tradition that grew within 
monotheism and was shaped by countless communities, and which, with a 
specific intellectual thrust, we term “rational idealism” and discuss it in detail 
in subsequent chapters. In the next two chapters, we delve deeper to identify 
trends that were shaped in the Islamic civilization that bear a direct impact on 
the shape of modern society and examine how those recurring patterns in-
f luence our modern world. Liberalism grew into a more complex movement 
in the twentieth century but never departed far from its founding ideas of 
liberty, equality, and government by consent. The fact that human rights are 
enshrined today in a universal declaration that has received a global consen-
sus through the formal attestation of every nation represented in the United 
Nations provides a great testimony to the universality of human rights and 
the possibility of founding those rights on universal consensus. This should 
give us more hope for humanity’s capacity for moving forward to ascertain 
globally, and through international law and organizations, the values of free-
dom, equality, and justice.
The debates concerning the values and ideas that should define the post-
modern world involve ever-increasing segments of the human race, with 
growing convergence and interaction, but still with some profound disagree-
ments about future directions, as we saw in Chapter 1. Yet, when we look 
at a longer stretch of world history, we see that those debates and disagree-
ments have always been part of human society. Debates, mutual learning, and 
exchanges of thoughts and experiences have been part of human historical 
interactions in broader ways than many people realize today. We identified 
in this section a debate about human nature and natural law that spread across 
history and geography with regard to innate knowledge and the source of 
natural law. Lockean conception of human understanding on the existence of 
a priori knowledge clashed with those of the Mutazilites. But these disagree-
ments have nothing to do with differences in historical epoch or religious 
diversity, as many contemporaries of Locke stand closer to the Mutazilite 
position than to Locke. Thomas Hobbes, for one, asserted in The Leviathan 
that natural law founded by reason consists of various maxims, including the 
maxim to preserve life, protect self against harm, seek peace, and so on.71 
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These are the self-evident truths that people of wisdom and integrity reach, 
despite their cultural, civilizational, and age differences. Natural law in the 
Hobbesian sense sounds much like that of the Islamic rationalist who lived 
eight centuries earlier.
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Prophet Muhammad established a community of believers in the monothe-
istic message he proclaimed in the tribal federation of Medina, after he was 
rejected in his hometown of Mecca by the tribal leaders of Quraysh. War 
erupted between the two towns shortly after Meccan Muslims migrated to 
their new home in the Hijaz region of Arabia’s west coast. After few skir-
mishes between the Muslims and Quraysh, a peace treaty was struck between 
the adversarial towns on the eighth anniversary of the prophet’s migration, 
and two years later Muhammad and 10,000 of his followers entered Mecca 
triumphant without a fight. By the time he passed away in the year 632 CE, 
the whole of Arabia pledged allegiance to the City of Medina. No one could 
have guessed, watching this seemingly fragile tribal unity being broken by 
dissenting tribes in the eastern region who refused to recognize the succes-
sor to the prophet, the first Caliph Abu Baker, that in the next century, this 
small city in a remote region in the Arabian desert would defeat two major 
empires and expand its territorial control from the Iberian Peninsula to the 
Indus River in Central Asia. Even then, no one would have guessed that the 
newly Arab-founded empire would transform the old world into a new uni-
fied civilization with intellectual, scientific, and artistic enterprises in which 
people from different religions, cultures, and ethnicities would collaborate to 
move humanity to a new height of moral and scientific achievements never 
experienced before. The achievements of the Islamic civilization, which did 
not reach its full vitality until the sixteenth century, could only be surpassed 
by nineteenth-century Europe with the rapid growth of modern sciences and 
the technological revolutions that continue to unfold unabated.
We examine in this chapter the rise of Islam and look closer at its founding 
values and beliefs, as they relate to monotheistic ideals. We also explore as-
pects of religious diversity in the late Axial Age, zooming in on the similari-
ties between the Arab Muslims and Syriac Christians in their understanding 
of the nature of Jesus. The combination of tolerance toward doctrinal diver-
sity and belief in the right of people to follow the faith closer to their hearts 
led to the reception of the Arab expansion into areas that were already home 
to monotheistic traditions. The Qur’anic injunctions that require Muslims to 
respect the religious freedom of the followers of monotheistic traditions and 
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the tradition set by Prophet Muhammad in Medina by entering into contrac-
tual relationships with confessional communities provided the background 
for establishing social contracts with the People of the Book, the term that 
the Qur’an uses to refer to the followers a revealed book. Contracts of social 
trust (‘Aqdu dhimma) bound confessional communities across the old world 
from Iberian Peninsula to the Oxus valley, allowing non-Muslims to main-
tain moral, legal, and administrative autonomies while joining each other 
and the Muslim body in education, cultural, and economic exchange.
More fundamental changes took place in Islamic monotheism that trans-
formed the intellectual into a central player in shaping society. While proph-
ets and priests played a complementary role in ancient Israelites for keeping 
order and undertaking reform, under Islam the intellectual performed these 
functions. Jurists emerged as the custodians of Islamic law (sharia) and as 
kalam scholars (theologians) occupied with the task of delineating the doc-
trines that set Muslim worldviews and the moral and political obligations of 
the Muslim community. The scholars and jurists under Islam have no spe-
cial sacred or divine qualities; instead, they derive their authority from their 
knowledge of the sacred text and from community respect and their ability 
to explicate the meaning of the text and then relate it to the ever-changing 
social order.
The birth of Islamic monotheism in the Arabian Desert
From its moment of inception, the self-image of Islam was located squarely 
within the monotheistic tradition, as it identified itself with the Abrahamic 
faith. The Qur’an declares that the followers of all prophets from Noah to 
Muhammad as one ummah; one monotheistic community.1 The Qur’an also 
commands Muslims to seek common grounds with the “people of the book,” 
or those who follow earlier monotheistic prophets.2 Islam did not, there-
fore, set itself against any of the monotheistic traditions that f lourished in the 
surrounding Axial civilizations, and the wars it fought with monotheistic 
communities, controlled by powerful dynasties and great empires, were es-
sentially political in nature. In fact, Islam was then the foremost monotheistic 
religion to establish a political order that recognized religious diversity and 
respected the religious freedom of the followers of other faiths. Prophet Mu-
hammad established in Medina a multi-religious community, based on a set 
of universal values that constituted the Medina Pact (Sahifat al- Madinah).3 The 
various rules enunciated in the pact were aimed at maintaining peace and 
cooperation, protecting the life and property of the inhabitants of Medina, 
confronting aggression and injustice regardless of tribal or religious affilia-
tions, and ensuring freedom of religion and movement. It is remarkable that 
the Medina Pact (or the constitution of Medina as W. Montgomery Watt 
would refer to it) placed the rules of justice over and above religious solidarity 
and affirmed the right of the victims of aggression and injustice to rectitude 
regardless of their tribal or religious affiliations.
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The constitution of Medina formed the foundation of the political commu-
nity established by Prophet Muhammad.4 It established a number of impor-
tant principles that defined the political rights and duties of the members of 
the newly established interreligious community, Muslims and non-Muslims 
alike. The Medina’s written constitution adopted the principle of religious 
tolerance based on freedom of belief that was extended to all the members 
of the society, regardless of their faith or tribal allegiance. It conceded to the 
Jews the right to act according to the values and beliefs they held: “The Jews 
of Banu Auf are one community with the believers. The Jews have their reli-
gion and the Muslims theirs.” The constitution emphasized the fundamental-
ity of cooperation among the members of the Medina Pact to maintain justice 
and defending Medina against foreign aggression. “The Jews must bear their 
expenses and the Muslims theirs. Each must help the other against anyone 
who attacks the people of this Pact. They must seek mutual advice and con-
sultation.” It prohibited Muslims to commit injustice or retaliate against the 
followers of the Jewish religion without adhering to the principles of equality 
and goodness. “To the Jew who follows us belongs help and equality. He shall 
not be wronged nor shall his enemies be aided.”5
The constitution, further, stipulated that the social and political activities 
in the new polity must be subject to a set of universal values and standards 
that treat all people equally. Sovereignty in the society would not rest with 
the rulers, or any particular group, but with the law founded on the basis of 
justice and goodness, maintaining the dignity of all. The constitution em-
phasized the fundamentality of justice, goodness, and righteousness and con-
demned in different expressions injustice and tyranny. “They would redeem 
their prisoners with kindness and justice common among the believers,” the 
constitution stated.
The God-conscious believers shall be against the rebellious, and against 
those who seek to spread injustice, sin, enmity, or corruption among the 
believers; the hand of every person shall be against him even if he be a 
son of one of them,
it proclaimed.6 The constitution introduced a number of political rights 
to be enjoyed by the citizens of the Medina city-state, Muslims and non- 
Muslims alike, including (1) the obligation to help the oppressed; (2) out-
lawing guilt by association which was commonly practiced by pre-Islamic 
Arab tribes: “A person is not liable for his ally’s misdeeds”; (3) freedom 
of belief: “The Jews have their religion and the Muslims theirs”; and (4) 
freedom of movement from and to Medina: “Whoever will go out is safe, 
and whoever will stay in Medina is safe except those who wronged (oth-
ers), or committed offense.”7 The constitution established in effect a system 
of rights provided to individual members of Medina, expressed in legally 
binding terms, and extended to members as human beings. Clearly, the no-
tion of providing legally sanctioned rights for members of a multi-religious 
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and multi-ethnic community on the basis of their humanity and with no 
regard to their creed or ethnicity was far removed from the dominant po-
litical culture that set the standards of the time and was far more inclusive 
than the one that prevailed in the Byzantine or Sassanian Empires. The set 
of rights and the collective protections were the rudimentary principles that 
grew over the centuries to the system of political rights that contributed to 
the modern idea of rule of law.
Islam expanded quickly into the territories controlled by two empires: the 
Christian Byzantium in Syria and Egypt in the North, and the Sassanian Em-
pire in Mesopotamia and Iran in the North East. The two civilizations were 
much more advanced in philosophy, science, art, and technology than the 
tribal Arabs who came to rule them. For Islam was born in a tribal Arabia that 
has never experienced any period of intellectualism. Most Arabs could not 
even read and write. Their main intellectual gift was that of poetry, as many 
of them committed popular poems to memories. Arab poems were the re-
pository of their wisdom, history, and down-to-earth hopes. The Arabic lan-
guage was fairly developed to express deep feelings, profound wisdom, and 
meticulous descriptions of life and nature. The Qur’an, with its remarkable 
eloquence and artistic expressions, became for the Muslim Arabs the words 
that were worthy to be committed to memory. Many Arabs carried the new 
sacred book and the new monotheistic religion without fully appreciating the 
message and comprehending the full meaning of the words they took with 
them into the Axial-Age civilizations.
Soon, the Nile-to-Oxus region became the hotbed where the Islamic 
civilization matured. Historians put out many theories to explain the rea-
sons behind this rapid expansion of Islam, f irst under the Umayyad dynasty, 
and later under the Abbasid. And while their theories are interesting, they 
put forward too many factors that might have played an important role sep-
arately or combined. An important part of the puzzle relates to the content 
of the transcendental values that formed the core of the Islamic revelation. 
Solving the puzzle might lie in the combination of the Arabs’ commitment 
to the monotheistic values that emphasized f idelity to covenants, sincerity 
of faith, moral responsibility, justice, equal dignity, and universal human-
ity. The world that came under the control of the Arab conquerors was 
ready for a new monotheistic message that emphasized society instead of 
the state. The journey between the moment of birth and the blossoming of 
a universal civilization was riddled with all types of monumental obstacles 
and tribulations, and at each of them one could legitimately argue that the 
newly founded city of Medina was coming to an end. Upon the death of 
Prophet Muhammad, many powerful Arab tribes in East Arabia challenged 
the Medina authority and were subdued with the help of the powerful 
tribe of Quraysh and its many allies. With the assassination of the third 
Caliph Uthman, a civil war broke out between the two powerful clans, 
the Umayyads and Hashemites, the latter being the clan of the prophet. 
The Umayyads, who historically maintained political leadership within 
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Quraysh before Islam, succeeded under Muawiyah in grabbing power from 
Ali, the cousin of the prophet, through military discipline and sheer acu-
men. Civil war broke once more when Muawiyah passed away, and his 
son Yazid could not maintain the state for long. Umayyad recovered their 
authority a decade later under the leadership of Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan 
in 683 CE, and the Umayyads remained in power until the Hashemites 
under the leadership of the Abbasid Abdullah bin Muhammad recaptured 
the Caliphate in 750 CE.
The Christian communities of Syria must have been surprised about 
the swift advance of the Bedouin Arabs against the Byzantine empire. Da-
mascus was then the major city in the Syrian province ruled from Con-
stantinople and was mainly a city run by merchants and landed aristocrats. 
The Arabs were not only f ierce f ighters but excellent negotiators, qualities 
that served them well before Islam in the then-conf lict-ridden Arabian 
Peninsula. The Syriac Christians themselves have been through unending 
conf licts relating to the nature of Christ and were divided over how to 
reconcile the claims of divinity with historicity of Jesus and his human 
qualities. This question created many variations that kept growing, and 
the disagreements led to the split of the Roman church into the Western 
church under the auspices of the emperor and eastern churches, divided 
along doctrinal lines over the true nature of Jesus after the Council of 
Chalcedon in 451 CE. The split revealed the extent to which Christianity 
was drawn to the Roman politics and culture. Emperors played a crucial 
role in pushing eastern churches to part with the Roman church. Roman 
culture played a decisive role in swaying the debate in favor of the divinity 
of Jesus because Rome needed to worship a god that it could behold. Never 
was there in the history of the Romans and Greeks a god that did not take a 
human form. While the biblical text, on which this controversy was built, 
uses both “son of God” and “son of man” in reference to Jesus, and hence 
permits different interpretations, the Roman church was adamant that Je-
sus was coeval with god. Considerable pressures were applied on successive 
church councils by emperors, particularly Emperor Justinian who hailed 
from a Roman tradition that bestowed, in its pre-Christian phase, divinity 
on emperors. It was unacceptable that the faithful would direct their loyalty 
and worship to a god that was transcendental through and through. The 
eastern churches with their sematic cultures and their demands for the wor-
ship of an abstract god were more than what the Greco-Roman churches 
could accept. Hegel expressed, over a millennium later, this agony in his 
comments on the Muslim “abstract worship,” and called it “fanaticism,” 
because he believed that the drive toward a thoroughly transcendental god 
would only create “abstract thought which sustains a negative position 
towards the established order of things.”8 Hegel saw nonetheless certain 
virtues in Islamic transcendence, particularly its commitment to universal 
values and uncompromising humanism, which makes it “capable of the 
greatest elevation—an elevation free from all petty interests, and united 
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with all the virtues that appertain to magnanimity and valor.”9 In fact, it 
was this very transcendental ethics of the Muslims that drew the Syriac 
Christian populations closer them.
The Arabs captured Damascus after defeating the Byzantine army in Yar-
mouk in 636 CE, just a decade after Emperor Heraclius promulgated that 
Christ possessed no human will but only a divine will, further alienating 
Eastern Christianity from Rome. Among the Christians who were already 
alienated from the efforts of Rome to impose its own culture on the Chris-
tian faith are the Nestorians, who formed the backbone of the “‘Church of 
the East’, which ‘became strong in Syria, the Sasanian empire, and across 
eastern Eurasia, even reaching Xi’an in China in the 630s’.”10 The church 
believed in “a single, human, nature (Greek physis).”11 The Nestorians found 
protection under the Sassanians, continued their pursuit of rational thoughts, 
and held onto Greek philosophical works, as Western Christianity was grow-
ing less tolerant of diversity of thought and became increasingly defined in 
doctrinal rather than ethical terms. Nestorians were among those who found 
more affinity with Islamic transcendentalism, and they were eager to engage 
Arab monotheist in theological dialogue.12
In addition to the Nestorians, two other groups found the new order set by 
the Arabs more acceptable than the Roman order, the Jews who maintained 
Jewish communities in southern Syria and in Persia, particularly Damascus 
and the villages surrounding it, and the Nazarene church that was declared 
heretic by the church fathers because of deep suspicion of maintaining link 
with Judaism. Nazarites rejected Jesus’ divinity and continued to adhere to 
the Old Testament along with the gospels of the New Testament. This led to 
the expulsion of its followers who evidently joined the Eastern Church which 
was formed of those who rejected the doctrine of Miaphysitism that become 
official doctrine of the Roman church. St. Jerome, a highly respected father 
of Catholicism, rejected Nazarites as a heresy group, complaining that they 
continued to observe the “old law.”13 He also faulted them for living along 
the Jews and believing that Jesus was born of Virgin Mary and that he “as-
cended to heaven, after suffering under Pontius Pilate.”14 As we know today, 
many Nazarites were Jews who accepted the mission of Christ as the Jewish 
messiah and found no reason in the Gospel to renounce their Jewish history 
or calendar and were evidently very comfortable to worship the completely 
transcendent god that was reaffirmed in the Islamic scripture. The Arab found 
no shortage of help, understanding, and support among monophysites like the 
Nazarenes who believed that Arabs were god-sent to rescue them from the 
Roman imperial oppression. This is how it was seen by the ninth-century 
Syrian Christian chronicler Dionysius of Tel Mahre.15 “Sebeos the Armenian 
had written as early as 661 that God had granted to Arabs the lands he had 
promised to Abraham and gave them victory over the impious Byzantines.”16 
Interestingly, followers of the Roman Church, like Anastasios who belonged 
to Saint Catherine’s monastery in Sinai, saw the Arab invasions as a punish-
ment sent by god to the monophysites in Syria for their blasphemy.17
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Ethos and characteristics of the Islamic civilization
Understanding the Axial Age, its culture and socio-religious dynamics, is 
crucial for comprehending the cultural environment to which Islam has 
stepped in to inf luence and be inf luenced by it. Marshall Hodgson lays in 
the Venture of Islam great emphasis on the role played by earlier monotheis-
tic traditions, particularly “Zarathushtra (Zoroaster) in Iran and the Biblical 
prophets among the Hebrews,” on the vocation of Islamic monotheism, and 
on its ability to transform the Axial world into a markedly more harmonious 
and productive civilization.18 They all called their people to the worship of 
the transcendent god and demanded that people individually lead a moral life. 
Zoroaster, and to a greater extent Hebrew prophets, gave the moral struggle 
a cosmic dimension, a “struggle between good and evil, justice and injustice, 
light and dark; a struggle in which finally light and truth must be victori-
ous.”19 Moral life demanded that the faithful should lead a life of sincerity and 
justice and make the good the aim of all actions.20
The Axial Age saw the emergence of four religious traditions in four sep-
arate regions at the four corners of what became later known as the “Greater 
Middle East,” a large stretch of land from the “Nile valley to the Oxus basin.” 
The Axial geography was centered in the “Fertile Crescent and the Iranian 
highlands” where the first alphabet was invented and “Cuneiform languages 
and Aramaic” were widely used.21 It was there that advanced institutions to 
organize society were invented, before they were replicated elsewhere. Each 
of the four regions has its own orientation and developed its own religious 
and cultural focus. While they were in many ways different, they all shared 
cultural habits and religious worldviews that emphasized self-ref lection, in-
dividual conscience, and rational responsibility. They all developed cultures 
that evolved around intellectual formulations and expressions. The Indic in-
tellectuals concerned themselves with developing deeper understanding of 
the inner dimensions of individual spirituality to transcend social injustices 
and moral limitations of human experience. The Hellenic intellectual fo-
cused on the natural order and sought justice in cosmic harmony as it is man-
ifested in the natural order. The Irano-Semitic monotheism that developed 
in the Axial Age took completely a different route as it pursued its moral 
understanding in history, in the struggle to bring social order in conformity 
with the divine command.22
The Islamic civilization did not simply bring these regions, religious out-
looks, and intellectual orientations into harmony, but attempted to creatively 
synthesize them into a comprehensive moral and intellectual experience, 
turning those orientations into facets of a unifying culture and channeling 
their energies to develop an inclusive civilization that was not willing to give 
up ethnic, lingual, and religious diversity, as well as the diversity of the rich 
traditions that grew out of various spiritual, moral, and intellectual pursuits. 
If anything, Islamic civilization could teach us that it is possible for diverse 
humanity to live in a global order that provides a core institutional unity 
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while allowing great autonomy and diversity to people who could freely 
interact to enrich their collective life. In the great synthesis that enriched 
human cultures, intellectually, morally, socially, and spiritually, the Islamic 
civilization consisted of many cultural expressions united around the “high 
culture” that runs through the urban centers of the old world, a sort of a cos-
mopolitan culture that has become the center of intellectual debates. What 
is of particular importance to contemplate, as we examine the Islamic civi-
lization and its contributions, is that what made it last for as long as it did is 
not the overall unity of its cultures, but the ability of the “high culture” to 
maintain a sense of unity among diverse ethnic and religious communities, 
as the center of civilization moved from one region to another. The high 
culture that permitted the global order of the Islamic civilization to remain 
intact was able to do so because it was defined not by ethnic and religious 
specificities, but universal claims embedded in rational and moral traditions 
that cut across all regional cultures.
The high culture that defined the Islamic civilizational experience was 
open to change and compromise, incorporating elements of various cultures, 
particularly those that enrich the collective human consciousness across vast 
regions. Those compromises, however, hampered the ability of Muslims to 
“implement the Qur’anic prophecy fully in all its implications,” as Hodgson 
noted in his voluminous work that examined the Muslim historical experi-
ence.23 This also created pushbacks and occasional revolts by those who deeply 
disagreed with certain transformation in the high culture that they could not, 
for whatever reasons, agree with. Very often the backlashes were generated 
by individuals and groups who felt the need to assert their faith whenever 
things seemed to drift far away from the center. Those revolts were the result 
of rising tensions between the rationalist and textualist traditions that run 
on different trajectories. This was not necessarily a negative experience as it 
forced the rationalists, who were keen on driving society toward whatever 
moral goals they envisaged, to slow down and consolidate or compromise to 
ensure that the cultures they represented are kept in harmony and that things 
are not driven to their extreme ends where no compromise or synthesis is ever 
possible. The Iraq province revolt against the third Caliph in 656 CE, the tex-
tualists’ revolt in 827 CE against the Mutazilites’ attempt to use the office of 
the Caliph to impose rational idealism during the reign of Caliph Al-Ma’mun 
(847–861 CE), and the Arminian revolt against the Abbasid in 850 CE during 
the reign of al-Mutawakkil are instances of such backlash.
Far from being an example of rigidity and backwardness, as modernist 
thinkers have understood it, tradition is presented here as a key to maintain-
ing long-term change. Tradition is indeed the guarantor of social change 
and civilizational continuity rather than being their antithesis. Many leading 
philosophers suspect that the term “tradition” as being defined by modernist 
theorists and area study specialists is a misnomer. The list is considerable, as 
it includes important philosophers and social scientists such as Eric Voegelin, 
Hans Gadamer, and most recently Alasdair MacIntyre and Jürgen Habermas. 
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Tradition should never be confused with traditionalism, as many modernist 
thinkers do. Tradition consists of a set of convictions, principles, and ways 
of thinking or acting by an intergenerational school or movement. Tradition 
can take different forms, including traditionalism, rationalism, modernism, 
postmodernism, and many other “isms.” When we discuss the inner tensions 
by groups of people who share certain beliefs, understandings, or values, we 
are discussing tensions among different traditions, some of which privilege 
reason and its critical role in understanding the world, over the uncritical re-
ception of narrations and explications of inherited knowledge. In this sense, 
rationalism may be one of the oldest traditions of all, as it stretches out over 
millennia and includes all schools and movements that date back to the Axial 
Age, that honor the place of critical thinking in the development of human 
understanding and action.
Change and progress are always the result of inner cultural tensions, and 
this makes tensions essential for the development of human life. Development 
and progress, as the Enlightenment scholars were to discover in due time, are 
rooted in the historical dialectics necessary for perfecting social life. They are 
rooted in the logic of opposition and transcendence. This logic stems from 
human limitations and from the cumulative nature of human knowledge 
and power. The tension often takes the form of struggle between two tradi-
tions: the tradition of shared historical identity and the tradition that seeks 
to transcend the moment and advance ideals that have not been reached and 
actualized. It takes place between those who see the need to defend cultural 
identity and the dominant forms of life and those who aspire to transform the 
moment and change the current rules and institutions. The struggle is be-
tween those who are instinctively inclined to cultural preservation and those 
who yearn for change, between the certainty of the moment and the desire 
for perfection and to take the risk of displacing the safe and familiar with the 
disruptive and inspiring.
For sure not every tradition inspires change, as some traditions are mainly 
interested in preserving cultural practices rooted in an established moral or 
political order. This for sure is one form of tradition and like all traditions 
must be subject to both rational and moral evaluations. Such a tradition, no 
matter how much we rationally disagree with it, serves social and historical 
purpose as long as it continues to be alive and effective; that is, as long as it 
does not degenerate into a culture whose only purpose is the mere trans-
mission of the past. A living tradition must be willing to engage in dia-
logue and justify itself though arguments and reason. Hodgson suggests that 
one may recognize three moments in the development of cultural traditions 
within Islamic civilizations: “a creative action, group commitment thereto, 
and cumulative interaction within the group.”24 Central to the formation 
of a tradition is an unceasing process of dialogue, both internal within the 
tradition and external with the other groups and traditions in the larger so-
ciety. This continuous dialogue is essential for both the tradition and society 
in which it continues to function, as this dialogue has both cumulative and 
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creative effects. The dynamic can explain many developments in the history 
of Islamic civilization, and, as we argue in later chapters, the dynamic is 
central for the evolution of modern civilization and its ongoing transforma-
tion to a global society. This dynamic led, for example, to the rise the Shi’i 
tradition within historical Muslim society in response to a sense of exclusion 
and oppression by the followers of Ali ibn Abu Talib. The tradition served as 
a protest and opposition movement to the successive dynasties that ignored 
the Islamic ideal for selecting the ruler, before it eventually undermined its 
claims by being itself transformed into a dynasty. The Shi’i tradition gave 
rise to the Sunni tradition that was later galvanized around the notion of the 
“ummah,” being the community that carries the monotheistic spirit to the 
world. The process could also be used to understand the dialectical relation-
ship between two powerful traditions within Islam, the textualist tradition of 
Ahl al-Hadith and the rational tradition of Mutazilites. We argue in the next 
section that the dialogue between these two traditions was crucial for the de-
velopment of Islamic law and society. But, before we do that, we need to say 
few words about another aspect of Islamic civilization, that is, the role played 
by populism within the Irano-Semitic monotheism.
Populism is an important recurring element of monotheistic traditions and 
is quite different from the parochial and tribal heritage one may find in the 
pre-Axial small communities, for it is rooted in the sense of moral and his-
torical responsibilities one finds in monotheistic worldviews. Hodgson ex-
amined populism in the Axial societies and found that it exists mainly in the 
Irano-Semitic traditions. Monotheism shifted the moral responsibility from 
society to the individual and made the doctrinal elements more accessible 
to ordinary folks. Populism is expected in all confessional cultures, but it is 
strongest in the Abrahamic traditions. For in those traditions, history always 
has moral meanings and implications, and when historical development gets 
stalled and social life becomes degraded, then populism would be expected 
to kick off in response to the failure of the “high-culture” and the political 
elites to maintain grace and dignity in society.25 So, no one should be sur-
prised to see the surge of populism in Europe and the United States when 
political leaders have become the conduit for an oligarchical class, nurtured 
and justified by neoliberal ideology. The failure of the political class made 
mainly by corporate leaders’ single-minded focus on enriching themselves, 
leaving the population that gives them the safe heaven to f lourish and prosper 
in an unenviable situation, partially explains the rising of national populism. 
We will return to examine further the rise of national populism in Chapter 9.
The idealism-realism dialectics and Islam’s 
discursive tradition
The Qur’an brought sober awareness to the people of faith, declaring that 
the value of individual life should never be measured by ease, luxury, and 
tranquility, but by the struggle and toil to advance the human condition and 
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uplift the human spirit. To improve the quality of human life, a struggle is 
essential, and adversity and challenges are to be expected. What the faithful 
should never compromise is their moral integrity and their willingness to 
employ the power and wealth they acquired to enhance collective life. The 
Qur’an, echoing an ancient monotheistic message, makes it clear that human 
beings are not perfect, and people will err or fall into sin, but they should 
repent and restore their moral integrity. They should keep their eyes on the 
ultimate good and should treasure the sacrifices they make for advancing the 
collective good. The true measure of good life lies in the individual’s ability 
to add to the collective well-being through action and example.26
Contemplating the Qur’anic message with its emphasis on reward in the 
hereafter for moral actions intended to enrich human experience, one is en-
couraged to promote practices and institutions that embody the monotheistic 
vision of life. This vision took under Islam the form of rational idealism we 
discussed at length in the previous chapter. When the people who partakes in 
monotheistic vision is content with the dominant conditions of their society 
and feel personal fulfillment, then the experience is more likely to take an 
alternative form we call in this book the transcendental realism, particu-
larly if the emphasis is placed on maintaining the legacy of the community’s 
founders or on equivocating religious sentiments with the cultural identity 
of a particular community. The internal diversion into idealism and realism 
generates the necessary tensions for bringing about creative change, as long 
as the community as a whole remains anchored in its foundational values. 
This dichotomy is not merely theological in monotheistic traditions but of-
ten takes the form of praxeology as it assumes the form of moral or political 
activism. In Islam, the dichotomy and the historical struggle were manifested 
in the tension between rationalist and textualist movements and occasionally 
in the clash between populism and high culture, as we observe in the clash 
between the Mutazilites and the Hanbalites in the ninth-century Baghdad. 
In the intellectual history of Islam, the conf lict was expressed in terms of 
the priority to be given to reason or the revealed text, with the rationalist 
Mutazilites favoring reason as the final arbiter and the textualist Hanbalites 
favoring the literal meaning of the text. For the rationalist, giving priority to 
reason over revelation meant that individual statements based on understand-
ing of the divine text must pass rational judgment to be accepted, since the 
text must be interpreted.
The rational tradition grew in early Islam in confrontation with efforts 
on the part of some jurists within the Sunni tradition to support the de 
facto Umayyad dynasty, declaring any opposition to the de facto Caliph il-
legitimate. Those who dared to challenge the authority of the Caliph were 
deemed as violating the Islamic law. Most jurists, including the founders of 
the four schools of law within the Sunni tradition, as well as the Hashemite 
Imams who descended from Ali, the son in-law of Prophet Muhammad, 
kept distance from the office of the Caliph, and declined to comment on 
the conduct of the Umayyad rulers, even when they grew more oppressive 
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in their rule and led a life of extravagance that was in stark contrast with the 
early wise Caliphs. Some jurists openly justified usurpation of power by the 
Sultan, relying mainly on the prophetic traditions (hadiths) in the form of 
statements that were collected through narrations over the first three cen-
turies of Islam by hadith specialists. One of those who were executed by 
the Umayyad Caliph Hisham ibn Abd al-Malik, the grandson of the second 
founder of the Umayyad dynasty, was Ghaylan al-Dimashqi who was critical 
of the extravagant life of the Umayyads. His execution was justified by Imam 
Uza’i, a respected jurist with significant following in Syria, and a trusted 
confidant of Hisham. Not all jurists, though, were quietists or realists. One 
of the highly respected jurists of the time was Abu al-Hassan al-Basri, a con-
temporary of Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan and his feared general al-Hajjaj. He 
took principled positions and spoke truth to power. He did not hold back his 
honest views regarding the excesses of the Caliph and his generals, but did 
not justify open rebellion against them, for he equally held the Shiite oppo-
sition responsible for the state of disorder in Iraq, and blamed the Muslim 
community, the ummah, for the chaotic state of affairs as it failed to practice 
and institutionalize Islamic ethics. To him injustice was not confined to the 
office of the Caliph but was linked to the practices of the larger community.
Basri’s teachings attracted two young intellectuals, Wasil ibn Ata and Amr 
bin Ubaydillah, who joined his study circle for a while before he asked them to 
leave as they began to openly criticize the Umayyad rule. They consequently 
parted with al-Basri and established their own study circle and founded the 
Mutazilite, the rationalist movement that became instrumental in advancing 
intellectualism in Muslim society. The Mutazilites were the most powerful 
proponents of rational idealism and took on themselves the responsibility of 
challenging the rational realism that dominated society under the Umayyad 
rule, as they were also committed to challenging the moral quietist positions 
taken by the jurist class, and set out to refute the theological foundations of 
the dominant Sunni morality. They played a crucial role, through both their 
intellectual work and activism, in the development of Islamic theological 
and philosophical thought, as well as in the development of the “modern” 
scientific tradition. Islamic rationalism grew later to include the Asharite 
and the philosophers. The Mutazilite were catalysts in setting the foundation 
for the development of both philosophy and science. As we will illustrate in 
Chapters 5 and 6, the scientific tradition nurtured under Islam formed the 
foundation of modern science as we know it today. To do that, the Mutazi-
lites had to confront a powerful textualist tradition championed by the hadith 
scholars and traditionalist jurists. The textualist tradition grew initially in 
the Hijaz region of Western Arabia, before it found a stronghold in Bagdad 
during the reign of the tenth Abbasid Caliph al-Mutawakkil (622–661). The 
textualist tradition grew around the work of the hadith scholars who insisted 
that the interpretation of the Qur’anic text and the elaboration of the Islamic 
law have to be grounded in the prophet’s practices and sayings as collected in 
the books of hadith. These books were compiled by the hadith scholars who 
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rejected the rational methods of both rational jurists and theologians. The 
textualists found, in the middle of the seventh century, a strong leader in 
the person of Ahmad bin Hanbal, the founder of the fourth school of law in 
the Sunni branch of Islam. Ibn Hanbal was a student of Muhammad bin Idris 
al-Shafi’i, during the latter teaching tenure in Baghdad, and built on one of 
the doctrines Shafi’i advanced that elevated the prophetic narrations (hadith) 
to the level of the Qur’anic authority. Shafi’i insisted that the prophetic tra-
dition (hadith) is divinely inspired on par with the Qur’an and as such could 
not be abrogated by the Qur’an. The community could not anymore regard 
the Sunnah as a secondary and additional source of Islamic norms but was 
obliged to abide by its injunctions.27 Consequently, the Sunnah and hadith 
were vested with superseding authority. Although the Qur’an continued, in 
theory, to be regarded as the primary source of law, the hadith for all practical 
purposes became predominant in formulating ethical and legal rulings. The 
hadith was used not only to interpret the Qur’an but also to limit its applica-
tions and occasionally abrogate its injunctions.28
The practice of giving the oral tradition of the community an elevated 
divine authority was not limited to Islam, as it was practiced by Jewish rabbis 
and Christian bishops and priests. In early Judaism, the prophetic traditions 
formed the main source of religious beliefs and practices for the commoners. 
The scripture was considered the foundation of sacred traditions, but only 
religious authorities were capable of outlining the divine message embedded 
in the scripture. Members of the religious community believed that their 
religious leaders acted on the authority of god and had access to divine com-
munication through revelation and inspiration. They were aware that divine 
communications between prophets and god were recorded in the scripture. 
They, however, did not concern themselves with exegetical work, leaving 
this task to the priests, rabbis, epistlers, and bishops. In Judaism, the foun-
dational text that formed the core of the scripture is the Jewish Bible, or 
the Tanakh, consisting of the Torah and eight books of the prophets. Other 
books were added later, most importantly the Mishnah. The compilation 
of the Mishnah was completed around 200 BC and later became the most 
authoritative religious book for Judaism along with its commentaries (Ge-
mara), which were completed in 500 BC. Its elevation to the level of divine 
authority was justified by asserting that “Mishnah words were given by God 
to Moses at Mount Sinai and faithfully transmitted through a process of oral 
formulation.”29
For most Muslim jurists, though, the Qur’an remained the major source of 
exegesis and rational speculation and the most important fountain to elabo-
rate Islamic law and doctrine.30 Shafi’i produced in the seventh century the 
first work expounding the principles of Islamic jurisprudence (usūl al-fiqh) ti-
tled Al-Risalah (The Message). Shafi’i identified four major principles of usūl 
al-fiqh: the Qur’an, the Sunnah (prophetic tradition),31 ijmā’ (consensus), and 
ijtihād ( juristic speculation). Early Muslim jurists, including the founders of 
the first two schools of law, Abu Hanifa and Malik, regarded the Sunnah as 
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the practical application of the Qur’anic injunctions as they were understood 
by the prophet and his companions. As such, the Sunnah was used by jurists 
to gain insight into the meanings and practical applications of the Qur’anic 
principles. Sunnah was invoked then in the form of either the living tradition 
of the community or the hadith, that is, individual narrations conveying the 
prophetic sayings and actions. Early jurists accepted a hadith only when it was 
supported by the Islamic principles established by the Qur’an, and they did 
not hesitate to reject it when it conf licted with generally accepted Qur’anic 
rules.32
Freeing early Muslim thoughts from historical specificity and the con-
fines of literal understanding of the text was not limited, however, to textual 
analysis. One of the most prominent schools of Muslim theology (kalam) 
asserted the autonomy of human reason and the ability of human rationality 
to identify the truth on its own. Early Muslims who contemplated the ra-
tional foundation of the transcendent and the structure of Being never called 
their intellectual exercise “theology” (Ilahiyat) but rather kalam, which may 
be literally translated as speech or discourse. Indeed, the scholars of kalam 
produced a discursive tradition that engaged both reason and revelation to 
elaborate Islam’s ethics and metaphysics, but the main purpose of kalam ex-
ercise was to underscore human responsibility and the ethical consequence 
of faith. The outcome of those contemplations and rational dialogues was a 
discursive tradition that brought the various schools of Islamic jurisprudence 
and theology into a rational exchange that became the binding intellectual 
tradition for delineating Islamic injunctions and doctrines. The Islamic dis-
cursive tradition involved the Mutazilites, Hanbalites, Asharites, and Shiites, 
the latter representing Shi’a traditions, particularly those associated with the 
Zaydi and Jafari schools.
At the helm of Islamic rationalism stood the Mutazilites, who recognized 
the Qur’an as the main source for ascertaining transcendental truth but in-
sisted that human reason is capable of discovering its own rightness and jus-
tice, which revelation came to affirm. Reason, they asserted, is capable of 
judging in the first place the truth of revealed text. This claim could easily 
be grounded in the revealed text, as many verses of the Qur’an affirm that 
human beings have the capacity of judging right from wrong and recognize 
the true religion (al-Deen al-Qayyim).33 The Mutazilites rejected the literalist 
understanding of the Qur’an and insisted on its historicity and the historical 
specificity of the early Muslim community (salaf ). This led to a protracted 
controversy over the question of the “creation” of the Qur’an, which the 
Mutazilite made it into a litmus test to distinguish the traditionalists (Ahl 
al-hadith) from the rationalists (Ahl al-Ra’y). The question of whether the 
Qur’an is created or eternal is indeed a question of whether the Qur’anic 
pronouncements were bound to the historical community that first received 
it or whether it was transcendental and, hence, relevant to the life of subse-
quent communities. The Mutazilites used the office of the Abbasid Caliphs 
to persecute those who responded to the question in the negative and hence 
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were identified as anti-rationalists. In the end, the community-based tradi-
tionalists triumphed over the state-based rationalists, as the Abbasid Cali-
phate eventually realized that they could continue supporting the Mutazilites 
at their peril, as the ranks of the supporters of the traditionalists began to 
swell. The office of the Caliph was placed, as a result, in conf lict with an 
increasing number of Muslims who thought the Caliph should not support 
any of the competing theological positions. The defeat of the Mutazilites did 
not immediately translate into the triumph of the traditionalists, who called 
themselves the people of Sunnah and community (Ahl as-Sunnah wa al- 
Jama’ah). Rationalists reconstituted themselves into the Asharite movement 
led by Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī. The Asharites took the middle position be-
tween the Mutazilites and the Hanbalites, insisting on the final authority of 
reason in religious matters while agreeing with their traditionalist rivals that 
reason is not completely autonomous from divine revelation and must hence 
be guided by it.
The debate over the best approach to reconciling the claims of the eternity 
of the Qur’anic teachings and the fact that the Qur’an was revealed to a his-
torically situated community continued after the demise of the Mutazilites. 
Eventually, the Asharites resolved the debate by differentiating between the 
universal, and hence transcendental, principles of revelation and the cultural 
practices relating to the particular social, economic, and political conditions 
of a historical community. One has to abstract the concrete experience of 
the early Muslim community and use the abstract and universal concepts and 
values to guide the experience of historical society.34 The failure to distin-
guish the intended meaning of the revealed text from the circumstances that 
prevailed in early Muslim society has led to the rise of literalist interpretations 
of the Qur’an. The literalist understanding of the Qur’an often confuses the 
Qur’anic pronouncements against specific actions of the followers of particu-
lar faith community with the Qur’an’s formal position regarding religious 
diversity. The Qur’an, for instance, condemned the unscrupulous behavior 
of several Jewish tribes in dealing with Muhammad and the newly founded 
Muslim community, in violation of their own religious oaths and teachings. 
Yet the Qur’an continued to urge the Muslims to respect the religious free-
dom of the Jews and the religious traditions of Judaism. Contextualizing the 
Qur’anic verses became, therefore, imperative to avoid literalist interpreta-
tions. Early Muslim exegetes developed an analytical technique known as 
the asbāb al-nuzūl (reasons of revelation) to understand the meaning of the 
revealed text in relation to the social circumstances of its revelation. This and 
other tools of textual analysis have helped avoid literalist interpretations of 
the text that often distort its intended meaning.35
Recognizing the imperative of rational mediation for understanding the 
rules of sharia, early jurists exerted a great deal of time and energy to define 
the grammar for interpreting the divine texts and the logic of explicating 
their implications. The differences in methodological approaches led to the 
differentiation of the various schools of jurisprudence. Because the Qur’anic 
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texts were given in a concrete form, providing commentaries on the actions 
and interactions of the early Muslim community, the jurists applied legal anal-
ogy (qiyās) to expand the application of the Qur’anic precepts to new cases. 
The desire of Hanafi and Maliki jurists to overcome the literalist approach 
that equates ijtihad with qiyās (à la shafi`i), or with the linguistic explication 
of the Qur’an by reference to hadith (à la Hanbalites), has inspired them to 
develop methods aimed at prioritizing sharia rules and principles. Methods 
such as al-qawà id al-fiqhiyyah ( juristic rules) or al-maqasid al-shari`iyyah (sharia 
purposes) aim at the systematization of the sharia rules by eliminating in-
ternal contradictions and constitute what is referred to today as the maqasid 
approach. Muslim scholars realized that the various rules (ahkām) purport to 
achieve general maxims (qawa’d) and purposes (maqāsid). The work of schol-
ars such as Juwayni and Ghazali led to the recognition of the five purposes 
of sharia (i.e., the protection of religion, intellect, life, property, and dignity) 
and was later developed into a more sophisticated system that organized the 
particular rules of sharia by subsuming them under universal maxims in a 
hierarchical structure by scholars such as Izz al-Din ibn ‘Abd a-Salam and 
al-Shatibi.
By its emphasis on meaning, reasoning, and purpose the maqasid approach 
provides a powerful tool for reformulating historical sharia, because it rejects 
the literal reading of statements apart from their rationales (purposes) and 
insists that those rationales cannot contradict basic Islamic values. The de-
finitive exposition of this approach can be found in the work of the Andalu-
sian jurist Ibrahim bin Ishaq al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat fi UsuI al-Shari‘ah [The 
Reconciliation of the Fundamentals of Islamic Law]. The maqasid approach 
expounded by Shatibi can be summarized in five points: (1) Sharia rules pur-
port to promote human interests; (2) sharia consists of a hierarchy of rules, 
whereby the particular rules (ahkam juz’iyyah) are subsumed under universal 
laws (qwanin kulliyyah); (3) general rules must be modified to accommodate—
whenever possible—particular rules; (4) particular rules that contradict gen-
eral rules should be rejected or ignored; and (5) the various rules and laws of 
sharia aim at advancing five general purposes: the protection of religion, life, 
reason, property, and dignity.36
The maqasid approach, with its emphasis on universal principles and rules, 
was crucial for preserving the universal message of the Qur’an and, therefore, 
for overcoming the inf luence of the advocates of Arab supremacy within the 
Muslim community who gained followers among textualist jurists during the 
Umayyad Dynasty. The Qur’anic language with its universalistic undertones 
constituted that metaphysical groundwork for rational idealism in Islam that 
informed the Mutazilite and Asharite approach to political leadership and 
authority. The fact that the Mutazilites insisted on human responsibility and 
political accountability did not fare well with those who wanted to maintain 
the status quo, particularly in the Umayyad period when non-Arabs were 
called mawali, a tribal term denoting outsiders who lived in the tribe under 
the protection of strong households. Textualists found plenty of narrations 
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within the tradition that they could use to justify their position. One of such 
statements was reported by Tabari in The History of Al-Tabari:
The Muslims were in Basra and its territories—and its territories at that 
time is the countryside and the Ahwaz region as we know it today. What 
they have conquered came under their control, and what they have ac-
quired through the peace agreement remained under the control of the 
original inhabitants, who agreed to pay tax as long as they are guaranteed 
of privacy, protection, and complete security. The peace agreement was 
signed under the auspices of Hormuzan [a Persian General]. Omar [the 
Caliph] said: Enough for the people of Basra are their countryside and 
Ahwaz, and I wished that between us and Persia a mountain of fire ex-
isted so they would not approach us and we would not approach them.37
This statement which has been attributed to Caliph Omar is most likely fab-
ricated during the Abbasid Caliphate by some Arabs who became nostalgic 
to Arab privilege during the Umayyad rule. The ethnic bias in the statement 
ref lects antagonistic views that are clearly contrary to Omar’s attitude and 
the statements he made during his tenure but was intended nonetheless to 
externalize Muslims of Persian origin from standing on equal footings with 
Arabs, thereby revealing ethnocentric sentiments, most likely provoked by 
ethnic tensions and frictions.
Transcendental ethics and the Abrahamic faith
It is important at this juncture to examine the nature of rational idealism as a 
tradition that grew within Islamic monotheism. Monotheism, as a worldview 
that aims to provide a sense of the complex human reality, has privileged since 
its inception in the Abrahamic faith certain notions and values. We exam-
ined in Chapter 3 the significance of Abraham’s rebellion against idolatry, his 
rational journey to faith in the transcendent, and the universal implications 
of his mission being enunciated as a blessing to humanity. We turn now to 
examine the inner values that constituted the Abrahamic faith. After all, the 
notion of a supreme being was not completely absent in ancient religions. Pa-
gans in ancient Greece and throughout the Levant believed that the world was 
created by one supreme being, while they worshiped idols that symbolized 
living deities that served as intermediaries between the human and the divine. 
This was the faith of the Egyptians, Canaanites, Greeks, and Romans, as well 
as the pre-Islamic Arab tribes. The faith of Abraham’s monotheism was dis-
tinguished since its inception by its commitment to transcendental ideals that 
constitute the essence of its moral system and by the emphasis it placed on the 
free agency and moral responsibility of human beings. This vigorous faith 
was presented in the Qur’an in a simple and thought- provoking form, and 
Muslims were told that they belonged to a historical community that began 
with Abraham and traversed though all biblical prophets, including Moses 
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and Jesus. The Qur’an urged Muslims to follow the millah of Abraham, that is, 
his tradition.38 Many Muslim exegetes interpret the term millah as din or reli-
gion, but this is not quite accurate rendering. Millah in Arabic means literally 
a “path” identified by walking in the footsteps of the people who traversed it 
before and has therefore a slightly different meaning than the term religion. 
Figuratively, millah is the path one takes in life by following the footsteps, 
or more accurately the ideals, of early travelers.39 Islam as a religion, like all 
other religions, is rich with rituals, that is, the symbolic acts performed to 
acknowledge one’s faith and to spiritually align one’s values with those of the 
divine. In life, however, faith must be borne by the attitudes and acts of the 
faithful, and for this reason Abraham’s attitude and actions remained through-
out the history of monotheism the model par excellence for the faithful.
Faith in transcendence within the Islamic revelation signifies a search for 
the overall meaning of life that can be pursued but never fully captured. The 
divine manifested not only in his creative acts in the natural order but also 
in his beautiful names or attributes that take andromorphic moral qualities of 
justice, compassion, wisdom, kindness, and overbearing. These are not sim-
ply moral ideals for the human being, but they form the very qualities of god 
as they define his will and actions. When this religious outlook is internal-
ized, it reveals itself in the moral dedication of its followers to transform the 
world into an ordered society that embodies these qualities. Of course, the 
deep commitment to transcendental ideals was not shared by a large number 
of Arab tribesmen, who could hardly take the new revelation beyond its basic 
teachings of prayer, charity, and avoiding major sins. Bedouin life was not 
given, after all, to deep thinking and contemplation, as most tribesmen were 
overwhelmed with questions relating to survival in harsh terrains, scarce re-
sources, and somewhat Hobbesian struggles. Indeed, the Qur’an makes it 
abundantly clear that the Bedouin life is not conducive to deep faith.40 Those 
who were deeply committed to the ideals of Islam were relatively few, but 
they enjoyed great authority to set the ground rules of public life.
The fights and skirmishes between the Byzantine and Arab armies and later 
the Turkic tribes in west Anatolia were not based on religious differences but 
on power struggle between two political orders vying for expansion and con-
trol. By the eighth century, Byzantium was pushed into Anatolia, and fight-
ing broke out every now and then, but never involved Christian communities 
that were scattered throughout the Levant. Muslim communities maintained 
a positive and friendly attitude toward the People of the Book, even before 
the autonomy of Jewish tribes was recognized by the constitution of the 
Medina. Prophet Muhammad encouraged early Muslims who were targeted 
by Quraysh for persecution to migrate to Abyssinia. “Why would you not 
travel to the land of Abyssinia? For it is ruled by a king who would not let 
anyone suffer injustice in his court.”41 Abyssinia maintained its Christian 
identity long before and after Islam become a universal state, and successive 
Muslim powers never engaged Abyssinia with hostility or demanded trib-
utes. Furthermore, Muslims continued to be part of the Abyssinian society 
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throughout history, without ever being invaded by Muslim armies.  From 
the beginning, Abyssinians showed good will toward the early Muslims 
who, escaping the persecution of Quraysh, had sought refuge in Abyssinia. 
The Muslim emigres were welcomed by the Abyssinians and were further 
protected from their persecutors who sent a delegation to bring them back 
home. Good relations between Abyssinia and numerous Islamic dynasties 
continued, the former being the only kingdom to acknowledge Islam since 
its early formation, long before it grew to a universal state.43 The relationship 
between the Muslim and Christian communities was never perfect, and one 
could always refer to frictions here and there over the long history of their co-
existence, including the monumental military clashes during the eight Cru-
sades between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries. The commitment of 
Muslim society to religious freedom and the rule of law remained, however, 
strong and firm. The early Muslim community was cognizant of the need to 
respect a plurality of religious law to ensure moral autonomy, while working 
diligently to maintain equal protection of the law as far as fundamental rights 
were concerned.
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Thus, early jurists recognized that non-Muslims who have entered into a 
peace covenant with Muslims are entitled to full religious freedom and equal 
protection of the law as far as their rights to personal safety and property are 
concerned. Muhammad bin al-Hasan al-Shaybani (749–802 CE) states in 
unequivocal terms that when non-Muslims enter into a peace covenant with 
Muslims,
Muslims should not appropriate any of the non-Muslims’ houses and 
lands, nor should they intrude into any of their dwellings, because they 
have become party to a covenant of peace, and because on the day of the 
Peace of Khaybar, the prophet’s spokesman announced that none of the 
property of the covenanters is permitted to the Muslim. Also, because 
the non-Muslims have accepted the peace covenant so as they may enjoy 
their properties and rights on par with Muslims.44
Similarly, early Muslim jurists recognized the right of non-Muslims to 
self-determination and awarded them full moral and legal autonomy in the 
villages and towns under their control. Therefore, Shaybani, the author of 
the most authoritative work on non-Muslim rights, insists that the Christians 
who have entered into a peace covenant have all the freedom to trade in 
wine and pork among themselves, even though such practices are considered 
unlawful by Muslims.45
The public space formed a political order that required moral evaluation of 
all public acts and insisted on safeguarding free exchange and debates about 
religious ideas and ethical principles. The open collective space provided a 
unique environment for the development of high culture that united numer-
ous religiously diverse communities. What was even more impressive was 
the extent to which the Persian world was ready to engage the new religion 
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and participate in its intellectual development. In the new society that was 
created across expansive geography from Andalusia to the Oxus, which was 
once occupied by the Sassanian and Roman empires, monotheistic religions 
had a true opportunity to create a new sense of humanity. Under Islamic 
civilization, the moral and creative authority shifted from the prophets and 
prophecy to the intellectual and intellectualism. The intellectual replaced the 
magicians, the priests, and the prophets as the visionaries and the experts to 
be listened to. It was the intellectual as scholar, scientist, philosopher, theo-
logian, and jurist who was charged with providing the moral, legal, and sci-
entific ground for productive and well-organized society. Some intellectuals 
excelled in several of the above branches of knowledge, and their inf luence 
traversed expansive geographies. Universal values and human dignity were 
highly praised in the Islamic traditions. The words “al-‘alamīn” (universal 
humanity) and “al-insān” (human being) are repeated in 315 Qur’anic verses. 
The Qur’an states that the ultimate reason for God to send His Prophet is for 
the Prophet to serve to show the God’s “mercy for humanity.”46
The transcendental values that were asserted by Islam were the contin-
uation of those already expressed in Judaic and Christian traditions. In all 
monotheistic traditions god is the highest value and the symbol of goodness. 
He is good and his will is good. What was remarkably different is the res-
toration of the emphasis on humanity as the goal of the divine goodness. 
The ethical system that was developed was informed by transcendental ethos 
and was expressed in universal values purporting to create a just social and 
political order. For this very reason Muslim intellectuals were not satisfied 
with the Greek ethical system and metaphysical order; at the same time, they 
endeavored to learn Greek’s natural philosophy. The Aristotelian ethics did 
not find ground in Muslim society because ordinary Muslims were more 
comfortable applying the Qur’anic injunctions to guide their actions. But 
even those who were given to philosophical reasoning and abstract thinking 
shunned Aristotelian ethics and developed ethics rooted in transcendental 
values and systematized through rational ref lections on the revealed text 
or based in intuitive contemplations and psychological analysis. The reason 
Aristotelian ethics lacked a persuasive moral appeal to the Islamic intellec-
tual tradition has to do with its grounding in moral realism. Such grounding 
had no appeal to Islamic rationalists committed to transcendental idealism. 
Muslim realists, on the other hand, were mostly committed to textualist 
morality and grounded their ethics in the prophetic tradition. Aristotelian 
ethics is grounded in virtues not values. It is grounded in individual honor 
instead of human dignity. For the rational idealists, ethical values were in-
nate to the human being. These were qualities of human spirit that emanate 
from the divine spirit, as the Qur’an defines Adam as the combination of the 
earthly material, clay formed in shape, and the divine spirit breathed into 
the completely formed human body to make the human being. These inner 
qualities of man were affirmed by divine revelation through injunctions and 
suggestive references. For Aristotle, the ultimate good that people seek is 
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happiness here and now, and ethical values are the virtues worthy of a person 
of honor who must maintain the happiness derived from peer respect and 
community honor. For the Muslim faithful, ethical practices are rooted in 
the ultimate truth and form the fundamental structure of the ultimate real-
ity. Ethical values are transcendental and must be pursued because they are 
the qualities of the divine and are embraced because they lead to god who is 
goodness par excellence. Happiness will be achieved as the result of seeking 
goodness and could never be pursued on its own. While happiness might 
seem the ultimate goal of both Greek and monotheistic morality, the path 
to it is traversed along different terrains as the systems of ethics of the two 
traditions are disjointed.
Islamic law and the contractual foundation 
of moral obligations
Islam did not bring order to the vast territories it claimed by spiritual and 
moral commitments alone. At the heart of the social order was Islamic law, 
better known as sharia. Until the sixteenth century, the area that was part of 
the Muslim world was so vast that by the sixteenth century it almost covered 
much of Africa and Asia and parts of the Caucasus and Eastern Europe. “In 
the sixteenth century of our era,” Marshall Hodgson noted,
a visitor from Mars might well have supposed that the human world was 
on the verge of becoming Muslim. He would have based his judgment 
partly on the strategic and political advantages of the Muslims, but partly 
also on the vitality of their general culture.47
The society that was established over this vast area was held together through 
the simple yet powerful legal instrument of “the contract.” The idea of le-
gally binding relationships based on voluntary contracts permeated the di-
verse scope of human interests and activities and was the hallmark of the legal 
structure that legitimized a host of social, commercial, and political activities. 
Not only were financial relations established and protected through contracts 
but also social and political ones. We take it for granted today that marriage is 
a contractual relationship entered into voluntarily and through the consent of 
the two spouses. And as people enter into the contractual relationship of the 
institution of marriage voluntarily, they could also get out of it voluntarily as 
long as they fulfill their legal obligations that define the terms of their union. 
As we will see in the remainder of this chapter and in the next chapter, the 
legitimacy of political authority in Islam was based on the notion of contract, 
otherwise known as bai’ah, a term derived from a consensual exchange of 
rights and objects. Hodgson termed the nature of the Muslim legal order 
“egalitarian contractualism.” “The Muslim sharia law represented the most 
radical of the old tendencies,” he contended. “It was highly egalitarian, and 
therefore, perhaps, what may be called contractualistic.”48
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The Qur’an makes frequent references to the covenant god made with the 
faithful, as the basis for the relationship between the human and the divine 
that goes back to the early history of monotheism.49 It also uses the notion 
of “contract” as an equivalent term to that of “covenant.” The latter concept 
is used in the Qur’an to describe the freely accepted agreement between the 
faithful and the divine. Faith in itself is a covenant with god, and it entails 
a binding agreement in which god promises the faithful salvation and great 
reward, and the faithful promises fidelity to the one god and commitment 
to the values of goodness, justice, compassion, and care for the oppressed 
and the downtrodden. The term “covenant” is also used to underscore an 
agreement between the Muslim community and other religious and political 
communities. Even though contracts are agreements among humans, they 
are equally important because honoring contracts and promises ref lects the 
faithful’s commitment to god.50
Long before the Enlightenment thinkers, such as Hobbes, Locke, or Rous-
seau, discussed the notion of social contract between the governed and gover-
nors, the concept of contractual relationship as the foundation of the political 
order was part of Muslim political thought and jurisprudence. We find it 
expressed with remarkable clarity in the work of Abu al-Hasan al-Mawardi 
(972–1058), in The Ordinances of Governorship (Al-Ahkam as-Sultaniyyah). 
Mawardi cites the consensus among Muslim jurists as the ground for basing 
the highest public office on
the contract of imamate and ummah.51 The imam [political leader] to be 
elected to the office must be intellectually competent himself, capable 
of making just decisions on his own, even when he is surrounded by 
competent advisors, so as to avoid mutual injustices and the breaking of 
social ties, and to fulfil the exigences of justice by dealing equitably with 
people and by maintaining social contacts: this he organizes by means of 
his own intellect and not someone else’s intellect.52
The process involved in the political contract consists of two stages. First, 
electors described as alh al-hal wa al-aqd (people who bind and loosen) meet to 
elect a qualified person for the office. The person who meets the conditions 
of imamate must first consent and agree to the terms of his responsibility 
without any coercion. For coercion invalidates the contract, as it does with 
any contractual agreement. If he agrees, then the second phase of the pro-
cess begins, in which the candidate for the imamate must receive the biy’ah, 
that is, the public affirmation of their acceptance of the candidates as their 
leaders.53
The process described by Mawardi is illustrative of the way the first four 
Caliphs were chosen to the political office, also known as the rightly guided 
Caliphs. The last of them was Ali bin Abitaleb who was deposed by Muawi-
yah and then assassinated by a band of his followers for agreeing to the terms 
of the reconciliation talks that allowed his rival to wrestle the office from him 
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after he was elected. Beginning with the Umayyad rule, and later under the 
Abbasid, the decision on political succession became an internal deliberation 
within the ruling clan and then a decision by the Caliph himself who was 
permitted to designate his successor, often from his own children. Mawardi 
who wrote his political treatise, expressed in ideal legal terms, as what jurists 
are supposed to do when outlining a theory of legitimate authority under 
the sharia law. He outlined a nomination process that required a legitimate 
election as defined in the consensus of Muslim jurists. But then, he goes on 
to introduce certain conditions that would compromise the legitimacy of the 
election process, even violate the spirit of the law. For instance, he argues 
that Caliphs could be nominated with a quorum as small as just one individ-
ual, but that individual must be competent and possess all the credentials to 
serve as a member of the nomination group and enjoy broad respect in the 
community. The number of electors was also compromised as was made con-
tingent on practical considerations. Not only that; even those who obtained 
the public office as regional governors through the use of sheer military force 
were deemed legitimate, provided they recognize the authority of the Caliph 
and implement the rules of sharia as enunciated through the consensus of the 
Islamic jurists. For the jurists, this was a reasonable compromise to maintain 
the integrity and efficacy of sharia, particularly when there was no other way 
to replace a corrupt governor who lost local support.
But regardless of how power is held, the imams must be obeyed and sup-
ported as long as they execute the duties of their offices. These duties include 
obligations to: guard the religion, execute the legal judgments and criminal 
code, protect the territory of Islam and engage in jihad against those who 
resist Islam, collect zakat taxes and use it in accordance to sharia rules, em-
ploy deputies and assistants, and delegate authority but remain vigilant about 
its exercise by deputies.54 Mawardi does not explain how the Caliph may be 
deposed if he does not fulfill his side of the contract. He provides, nonethe-
less, some clear details about how the provincial governors (amirs) could be 
deposed. Here, Mawardi distinguishes between two cases. If the amir was 
appointed by the Caliph, he will be automatically deposed upon the latter’s 
death, so the new Caliph could freely replace him. But if he was appointed by 
a minister, then he could carry on his duties since he did not report directly 
to the Caliph.55
The relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims was also subject to 
a legally binding contract, known as the contract of dhimma. The word 
dhimma means in Arabic a pledge, and the contract is based on a pledge 
made by two communities, represented by their legitimate authorities. The 
Muslim pledge is to protect the life, property, and freedom of religion of any 
member of a community that entered into such a contract with the Mus-
lim authorities. In return, non-Muslims pledge to stay loyal to the state and 
pay jizya tax in lieu of being relieved from serving in the military. The tax 
paid by non-Muslims was equivalent to the zakat tax paid by Muslims, as 
the non-Muslims are not obliged to pay zakat. The freedom of religion was 
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extended to all confessional communities with revealed scriptures that or-
ganize their religious affairs and internal relationships. The freedom was not 
limited to freedom of worship; it also included the freedom for non-Muslims 
to practice their canonical law in areas of marriage, inheritance, litigation, 
and transactions. As such, communities who lived among Muslims were le-
gally and administratively autonomous. They had their local authorities in 
charge of their internal affairs. This unique system led some of the contem-
porary scholars of Islamic studies to view sharia law with regard to intercom-
munity relationship that involved diverse confessional communities as a form 
of “international law.”56
By international law, Majid Khadduri refers to the branch of Islamic juris-
prudence that deals with issues of peace and war with the Byzantine Empire 
that maintained considerable power long after the Levant region came un-
der the rule of Muslim dynasties. “The jurist-theologians,” Khadduri writes, 
“developed a special branch of the shari’a, known as the siyar (based on the 
same sources as the sharia) which was the Law of Nations for the Muslims.”57 
He, however, cautions his readers not to confuse the historical laws that were 
grounded in the principles of sharia with modern international law, as Islamic 
law did not recognize any legitimate world order outside the boundaries of 
Islam, which was also called the land of Islam. Because the Byzantine Kings 
were conveniently considered as usurpers of power, the formal state of affairs 
with them was that of a state of war. That gave rise to a number of rules in 
the corpus of sharia that defined the conduct of war as well as rules for move-
ments between the territories of Islam and the land of war, as the territories 
under Byzantine rulers were identified.58 The rules of conduct were summed 
up in a speech made by the first Caliph Abu Baker (d. 634) before the first 
expedition sent to the Syrian borders:
Stop, O People, that I may give you ten rules to keep by heart. Do not 
commit treachery, nor depart from the right path. You must not muti-
late, neither kill a child or aged man or woman. Do not destroy a palm 
tree, nor burn it with fire and do not cut any fruitful tree. You must not 
slay any of the f lock or the herds or the camels, save for your subsistence. 
You are likely to pass by people who have devoted their lives to monastic 
services; leave them to that to which they devoted their lives. You are 
likely, likewise, to find people who will present to you meals of many 
kinds. You may eat; but do not forget to mention the name of Allah.59
The set of rules regarding dealing with war and with subjects of non-Muslim 
empires, also known as syiar, provides protection to any visitor who receive a 
guarantee of safe passage by either public officials or private Muslims. These 
visitors are usually given amān, which is a pledge of protection on an assur-
ance of safe conduct given by the issuing party. Amān is another example of 
the use of contract. Failure to honor the terms of the amān entails punitive 
measures defined by the law on the basis of the offense.
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Another example of the contractual relationship that was recognized as 
part of the Law of Nations is the signing of treaties. The first treaty in the 
history of Islam is known as Hudaybiyyah and was signed by Prophet Mu-
hammad with Quraysh and the chief negotiator of Quraysh. The treaty be-
came later a model of diplomatic gestures that aim at ending or avoiding 
hostilities. The purpose of the treaty was to avoid fighting between peaceful 
Muslim caravan that traveled to perform ‘Umrah (smaller pilgrimage) and a 
military contingency sent by Quraysh to prevent them from entering Mecca. 
The treaty stipulated the return of Muslims to Medina without performing 
‘Umrah for the year in exchange for a promise to be allowed to do so a year 
later.60 Muslims by and large were not happy with the conditions of the treaty 
and deemed it unreasonable, but the prophet agreed to them over his com-
panions’ objections. The treaty was crucial to prevent the shedding of blood 
and proved to be useful in paving the way for ending Quraysh resistance of 
Prophet Muhammad and Muslims.
Hudaybiyyah treaty became a model to be replicated later by Umayyad and 
Abbasid Caliphs to avoid war with the Byzantine, and some of these treaties 
were unfavorable to Muslims, entailing tribute payments to the Byzantine 
Emperors, as was the case with treaties ratified by Muawiyah and later by Ab-
dul Malik during the first and second civil wars. Because a treaty is covenant, 
it was strictly observed and could not be breached except when the other 
side of the treaty fails to uphold their side of the agreement.61 Observing the 
treaty faithfully was urged both by the Qur’an, as we noted earlier, and by the 
prophetic example and his traditions (hadiths).
Creating a political society that was based on universal values and con-
tractual rights provided a markedly advanced social and political order that 
brought human interaction to a new height. The experience was not uniform 
across time and space, as the ability of society to maintain the conditions of 
equal dignity was challenging. Yet it provided an important experience of 
social and religious pluralism, allowing unprecedented interaction and con-
vergence among peoples across the vast expanse of the old world, and allowed 
a high degree of cultural, religious, and economic exchange. We further 
examine aspects of religious and cultural pluralism under Islamic civilization 
in the next chapter, as we explore in more depth the structure of Islamic law 
and civil society.
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The political order that emerged under premodern Islamic rule was divided 
into two clear spheres: the state and the civil society. The state was controlled 
by strong families and clans who maintained political power as long as they 
could suppress potential challengers and who were granted legitimacy as long 
as they conceded the legislative authority to juristic communities and recog-
nized the symbolic authority of the office of the caliph. Society constituted, 
on the other hand, the sphere of freedom, where various confessional com-
munities enjoyed the freedom to develop the law that governs their conduct, 
practice their religious traditions without state interference, and gain access 
to commerce, science, and bureaucracy on competitive grounds. The divi-
sion was imperfect, and the greatest weakness of the political sphere lay in the 
difficulties people faced in holding political authorities accountable outside 
the confine of civil society, which was regulated by sharia rules that were 
enacted through the consensus of the juristic community. The lack of control 
over tax rates incentivized political leadership to engage in expansionist wars 
as these wars provided lucrative revenues. While Islamic law did not allow 
a war of aggression, Muslim jurists permitted jihad against unjust monarchs 
who refused to enter into peace treaty that would permit free movement for 
populations of the contracting powers.
European Orientalism that continues to be the main source of Western 
understanding of Islam and Muslims, albeit with a diminishing effect, drew 
a deceptive portrait of Islamic law, civil society, and polity. The literature on 
Islam often depicts Muslim rulers as despots, completely arbitrary in ruling 
Muslim societies and enjoying an absolute power with no one to check their 
authority. While it is true that rulers were not accountable in any procedural 
way to the populace, Muslim societies, as we illustrate below, enjoyed a leg-
islative authority and judiciary system that were fairly independent from the 
office of the caliph or the sultan. The legislative function remained until the 
end of the Ottoman Empire in the hands of the juristic community, and was 
never ceded to the caliph, despite efforts by the Abbasid Caliph Harun al-
Rashid to bring it under the control of the state. Members of the judiciary 
were trained under the supervision of community-based scholars, who were 
members of various schools of law and who enacted laws formulated through 
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juristic consensus. Muslim jurists developed the legal system, trained judges, 
and those who rose to the office of the chief justice were among the most 
competent and trusted among them. Muslim jurists have consequently the 
authority and tools to limit the power of the caliph and sultan, who could 
maneuver within the limits set by sharia, but could pass those limitations 
at their peril. The judicial independence of the jurists was assured by their 
financial independence, as they were able to always rely on the institution of 
the waqf (private trust) as an assured source for financing the education and 
salaries of their members. The waqf was a complex instrument devised to 
ensure its perpetual independence from interference by political or legal au-
thorities. Waqf also ensured the independence of civil society, as most social 
services were built through this institution.
We delve in this chapter a bit deeper into Islamic law to understand the 
important role played by the Muslim jurists to ensure the independence of 
both the legislative process under historical sharia and the institutions of civil 
society that remained autonomous until the turn of nineteenth century, in-
cluding civil society institutions that were part of multi-religious communi-
ties. We further explore religious pluralism under Islamic rule that is often 
overlooked and misunderstood by Orientalism, by examining the nature of 
the contract that made religious pluralism functional on the level of society, 
namely the dhimma contract which was more often than not portrayed as 
an instrument of oppression by those who apply the wrong framework and 
analogy to analyze it. We also examine the birth of the institution of sci-
ence that provided the foundation for modern scientific enterprise and made 
scientific development possible in modern society. As I hope will become 
more evident, modern science as a methodology and practice was born in 
the Islamic civilization rather than in Greek philosophy. The Greek philoso-
phers produced natural philosophy, but never understood or had a clue of the 
methods used in empirical research and scientific analysis. They had neither 
the mathematical tools nor the algorithmic modeling nor the detailed exper-
imentation experience and methods to be able to produce empirical science. 
Greek ingenuity lay in deductive and formal thinking and remained aloof 
to observation, experimentation, and modeling, which stand at the heart of 
scientific enterprise.
The formation of independent legislation and judiciary
Throughout history, up until the formation of the modern Middle Eastern 
states during the age of colonialism, Islamic law governed Muslim societies 
across the globe, providing both the moral and legal foundations of social 
and political actions. Regardless of the particular dynasty that held political 
sway, the state and society were regulated by legal systems that were based 
on Islamic law and developed independently of the executive authorities. 
Dynasties came and gone, but the law and the legal system maintained their 
integrity, with little inf luence of whatever dynasty happened to control the 
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office of the caliph. Modern experience of law-making and implementation 
makes any talk of a legal system independent from dynastic rule sounds in-
coherent and contradictory, as dynastic rule by definition underscores the 
type of government with unchecked powers. Monarchs and kings in the pre-
modern world have always gained political authority and exercised power 
through the legal system of the state with its various security apparatuses. 
Monarchs and rulers in premodern societies, and even today in societies un-
der military dictatorship, have always had a freehand to decide what law to 
enact, as long as they kept those who supported them in keeping the political 
order satisfied. Many historians and philosophers of history, including inf lu-
ential sociologists and philosophers with large following, such as Max Weber 
or Karl Marx, categorized historical Muslim rulers as despots and tyrants. 
This misconception was pointed out by Noah Freedman in a book published 
a decade ago in the context of examining the increased call by Muslims for 
the rule of sharia. “Western writers have for centuries gone to great lengths,” 
he stresses, “to describe the Muslim world as the home of Oriental despots 
who did what they would, free from the constraints supposedly imposed on 
Western rulers.”1
Failing to understand the inner dynamics of historical Muslim societies 
and projecting from their own experiences, many modern scholars misread 
Islam’s legal system and the scope of executive power by assuming that an 
unelected ruler would have to rule with absolute power, in the absence of 
state institutions that could act independently from his control. Rulers must 
be absolute, they assumed, in the absence of a counterforce to check their ex-
ecutive and legislative authorities. These observers were correct in assuming 
that rulers were not subject to any evaluation through periodic elections or 
through an independent political body that possesses the power of oversight; 
they would be able to rule at will, limited only by their own personal values 
and inclinations. Indeed, that was the case with Muslim rulers for the most 
part. But unlike the premodern Western societies where law was promulgated 
by the monarch, the law in Muslim societies was formulated and proclaimed 
by a class of intellectuals who were selected and financed by civil society in-
stitutions. The intellectuals in charge of the law-making function were sharia 
scholars and jurists, who were devoted to learn and expand a body of prin-
ciples and rules of law independently from the holders of executive power. 
The body of sharia law was elaborated and refined over generations since the 
time of Prophet Muhammad and the early Rightly-Guided Caliphs and was 
binding on power holders.
Islamic jurists developed from the time of the Prophet Muhammad, and 
over the centuries, elaborate procedures for enacting law. The law was devel-
oped by juristic schools (madhāhib) that have over the years adopted specific 
rules and procedures for law-finding and promulgation. There are four major 
schools of law in Sunni Islam—the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali—and 
at least three functioning schools in the Shiite tradition—the Zaidi, Isma‘ili, 
and the Ja‘fari (Twelvers). In these traditions, any scholar who has completed 
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his juristic training and has been licensed by a qualified jurist could engage in 
law-finding and could publish rules and injunctions as part of the process of 
ijtihad ( juristic speculation). Ijtihad could be followed by individual Muslims 
but would not be binding on the community until it receives the support 
of other jurists within the same school of law and then becomes part of the 
juristic consensus. The consensus is particularly required by the Sunni tradi-
tion, to which all caliphs and most governors belonged. The rules of law are 
binding on all Muslims, morally and legally, because they are sanctioned by 
the authoritative sources of Islam—the Qur’an and the Sunnah. The com-
munities of law (madhāhib) consist of the self-regulating jurists who have the 
knowledge of the law and of those who follow them and have complete trust 
in both their credentials and moral characters.
Islamic law as promulgated by the jurists empowered the caliphs and the 
governors with the authority to appoint judges who administer the law and 
who control the judiciary system that adjudicates its rules. The holders of 
executive power are nonetheless obliged to appoint judges from the body 
of qualified jurists who have been licensed in accordance with procedures 
established by the schools of law. This ingenious formula took away from 
the executive the ability to appoint judges at will, because the formula also 
created internal dynamics that tied judges to the intricate body of jurists 
and aligned their interests to the institutions charged with the responsibility 
to guard the law against outside interference. The risk of siding with the 
executive against the law-making institutions of jurists was high enough to 
create effective balance of power between the executive and the judiciary. 
The Abbasids sought to control the scholarly community by introducing the 
office of the Chief Justice (qādi al qudāh), and the office persisted throughout 
history under different names and was finally abolished with the collapse of 
the Ottoman Caliphate by the turn of the twentieth century. The Ottoman 
chief justice, known as Shaykh al-Islam, was the head of the important ju-
diciary branch of government and was seen as having power at par with the 
prime minister, otherwise known as Al-Sadr al-Azam, who was in charge 
of political institutions. Chief justice practically served as the voice of the 
institution of the sharia scholars in the sultan’s court, and the expectation was 
that the sultan would choose a highly respected scholar from the community 
of scholars.
In the second century of Islam (eighth century CE) Shafi’i elevated the 
authority of the Sunnah to the level of the Qur’an, as the second source of 
sharia, and that provided additional limitations on both the rulers and their 
challengers, as the Sunnah provided additional pieces that made it difficult 
for the rulers to challenge the jurist’s legal authority and made it difficult to 
the challengers to replace the caliph. One tradition, for instance, charges the 
scholars with the authority to deciding the rules of sharia: “Scholars are the 
heirs of the prophets.” Another tradition stipulated that only the descend-
ent of the tribe of Quraysh can lay claim to the office of the caliph, which 
practically reduced the contenders to that office to members of the House of 
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Umayyads and the House of Hashemites. Feldman succinctly summarizes the 
power of the legal institution developed by the scholars of Islam:
Legal institutions like the schools do not develop in a political vacuum. 
For law to be practically relevant, as opposed to purely abstract or the-
oretical, it must have some connection to the way power is deployed by 
those in authority. Although Islamic law was “jurists’ law” in that its 
content was determined by the jurist-scholars, and not the state, it was 
also state law in that it had a mechanism for being enforced by the state.2
The subtleties of the process of law-finding and adjudication and the intri-
cacies of the institution of sharia scholars have escaped the observation of 
many European scholars, as they were using categories that were borne in a 
completely different notion of law and scholarship than those they encoun-
tered in Muslim society. Modern scholars only gradually began to appreci-
ate these differences and provide deeper understanding of historical Muslim 
society that captured the cultural subtleties of Islamic society. The works of 
Middle Eastern experts, such as Lawrence Rose, John Esposito, Talal Asad, 
and Noah Feldman, shed new light on the inner workings of the Muslim so-
ciety and the Islamic law. The analysis of historical Muslim experiences was 
greatly enhanced by the recent studies of Western scholars of Middle Eastern 
background, such as Fazlur Rahman, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Ali Mazroui, Is-
lamil Faruqi, Khaled Abu al Fadl, Abdullahi An-Na’im, and countless others 
who provided in the past few decades new insights into the history of Islam 
and the Muslim societies. Perhaps, the earliest Western scholar who gained 
deep insight to the spirit of Islam was Hegel, who, as we noted in Chapter 
2, recognized that Islam was the first religion to effectively reconcile polit-
ical action to the dictates of ethics. This reconciliation, which he called the 
“Mohammedan principle,” made Islam “the enlightenment of the Oriental 
World,” he contends, and “the first to contravene this barbarism and caprice. 
We find it developing itself later and more rapidly than Christianity; for the 
latter needed eight centuries to grow up into a political form.”3 What Hegel 
is referring to, with his usual abstract and subtle language, is the ability of 
Muslim society to hold its rulers to ethical judgment by subjecting their ac-
tions to ethical judgment and the rule of law and becoming thereby able to 
“contravene” the arbitrary and whimsical rules of powerful rulers unchecked 
in the pre-Islamic civilizations.
The jurists who enacted the law were not acting in isolation from other 
intellectuals in the local community or in the scholarly community that 
claimed followers throughout the four concerns of the Islamic World. There 
were active debates among scholars and between the scholars and the com-
munities. These debates formed the public sphere that brought intercom-
munal understanding and consensus and served as a space for raising popular 
issues and public concerns about the quality of life in Muslim societies. The 
modern public sphere that grew in recent centuries in Europe and Western 
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democracy could be found as early as the seventh century in Muslim socie-
ties. The concept of the “public sphere” as an important sociopolitical activity 
in society, responsible for fomenting ideas and creating consensus necessary 
for sociopolitical harmony, was brought back to the fore in the writing of 
Habermas in the past two decades, and more recently by Rawls in his no-
tion of overlapping consensus. Like many modern scholars whose views were 
shaped by the spirit of the Enlightenment, the discussions have been confined 
to the public sphere in the modern West. Few modern scholars have ven-
tured to explore its beginning in earlier historical societies. Indeed, the task 
of uncovering any modern structures and institutions in Islamic civilization 
is very challenging to modern thinkers, as their views are shaped through 
Orientalism’s essentialist depictions of the Muslim world as the model of 
“traditionalism” par excellence. Islam is seen at best as the “exotic other,” a 
perception offered by early modernists, such as Montesquieu who endeavored 
in the eighteenth century to define rising French society by contrasting it 
with its Persian contemporary as the latter began to experience decline and 
disorder. But while the trajectory of the rise of the public sphere does not go 
back much earlier in the modernist mirror, Habermas showed recently more 
interest in exploring the role of religious reformation in opening the field 
for modern rationalism and critical thinking. Others, particularly those who 
have located the grounds for modern consciousness in the Axial Age, such as 
Charles Tylor and S. N. Eisenstadt, have tentatively considered Islam as an 
important link in the historical transformation from Axial to modern times. 
Yet others, like Armando Salvatore, took the time and efforts to examine 
Islam’s contribution to the rise of premodern political sphere.
Salvatore explored in a recent study the role played by the Abrahamic 
traditions, and the Hellenic political thought and culture, in shaping pub-
lic consciousness and the public sphere of modern society.4 He finds Islam, 
and “Islamic approach,” very relevant for “the construction of the symbolic- 
communicative link into the genealogy of the European Christian and 
post-Christian self-understanding that has shaped the bulk of the theoretical 
literature on the public sphere.”5 Salvatore identifies the grounds of the no-
tion of “public sphere” in the Christian notion of “respublica christiana” and in 
the Muslim notion of “maslaha ‘amma.” He finds that the concept of maslahah 
to be quite relevant for any discussion of the public sphere, as it “relates the 
pursuit and adjudication of specific goods to the definition of a more general 
good.”6 He also takes note of the notions that contradict the modernist nar-
rative that insists on juxtaposing the modern with all notions that could be 
found in the premodern traditions. We encountered such insistence in Hun-
tington’s claim that modernity and progress are the trademark of the Amer-
ican white culture, born in the Europe, rejecting non-European experiences 
as premodern and hence incapable of carrying on the values of a democratic 
and free society.
Salvatore notes that non-Western traditions, such as Islam, may lose 
their vitality and ability to renew their cultures and values and regenerate 
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themselves through new and more effective ideas, but that does not neces-
sary qualify them as traditions of the past. He agrees with Alasdair MacIn-
tyre’s characterization of the idea of tradition and sees it useful in evaluating 
the Islamic tradition. He supportively quotes MacIntyre’s views of the rele-
vance of past traditions to addressing modern challenges. Salvatore singles 
out Islamic thought as a good example of a tradition that inspired modern 
thought and supplied it with the vitality and spirit it acquired and may still 
be able to do so today. He points out that the vitality of Islamic tradition 
and its capacity to meet modern challenges make the juxtaposition of the 
categories of “modernity” and “tradition” futile and perplexedly counter-
productive. The advanced structure of law and law-finding and development 
that one encounters in the work of fourteenth-century Andalusian Islamic 
scholar Shatibi are as modern as the sixteenth-century DE Vitoria and the 
seventeenth- century Suarez, who produced a comparable work by drawing 
from Shatibi’s advanced categorization and methodology for the harmoni-
zation of legal structures.7 Drawing on the work of Johann Arnarson and 
Khalid Masud, Salvatore underscores the centrality of Islam to understand 
the modern age, as it provides “the last major instance of large-scale crystalli-
zation of a discursive tradition in the Euro-Mediterranean civilizational area, 
connecting it with the wider framework of ‘axial civilizations’.”8 Indeed, Ar-
nason sees in Islam and its intellectual and cultural heritage a significant body 
of evidence to deconstruct the “East-West” dichotomy.9 The same body of 
evidence could, if it is examined thoroughly, realign a long tradition upheld 
by the advocate of a unique modernity disjoined from all traditions and could 
force a new characterization of Islam as “a ‘Western’ civilization in the wider 
Axial framework.”10 The inclusion of Islamic civilization, he adds, enhances 
the efforts to finding the horizons for testing the hypothesis of communica-
tive action theory and its corollary notion of the public sphere.
Common good (maslahah) and intent of the law
The development of the notion of maslahah (common good) as the governing 
principle of law finding and as the ultimate purpose of political organization 
and action provides an interesting example of the vitality of the public sphere 
in the historical Islamic society. The notion was the culmination of centuries 
of debate in the public sphere about the structure of the law and the relation-
ship between the rules of law and their overall purposes. Early Muslim jurists 
realized that they needed to interpret the divine text in order to expand its 
injunction. This meant initially that the efficient cause (or ‘illa) of the various 
rulings embedded in the revealed text must be identified, so as to expand 
the applications of the initial rulings to new cases through analogy. Analogy 
(qiyās) became early on the tool for subsuming new cases under the rulings 
specified in the Qur’an and Sunnah. However, scholars were split into two 
groups as to whether jurists could resort to free reasoning or should stick with 
the efficient cause of the original text. As we saw earlier, Shafi’i insisted that 
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reasoning is only valid when it follows the principle of qiyās. Gradually, how-
ever, jurists began to realize that ijtihād as a process of free reasoning that aims 
at understanding the intent of the law could not be limited to analogy via the 
efficient cause and that the revealed text has some overriding purposes, in-
cluding the five purposes of sharia we outlined earlier: the protection of life, 
property, dignity, religion, and reason. Since all these purposes evolve around 
the well-being of the individual, it took few steps to figure out that the divine 
law as a comprehensive discourse aims at promoting human interests.
The term “maslahah” itself cannot be found in the Qur’an, and it was 
coined by Muslim jurists to denote a number of Qur’anic terms, including 
that of good, benefit, utility, and content, and hence aff irms individual and 
collective well-being. Maslahah in its general reference connotes “public 
interest” or “common good.” In the context of sharia and law-finding, it 
is often associated with the notion of purposes of sharia and is considered 
by Muslim jurists an essential procedural element for expanding the scope 
of the legal system to accommodate new cases that arise with social devel-
opments. As we saw earlier, the concept of maslahah was developed over 
several centuries, as it matured in the work of the Asharite scholars, most 
notably Juwayni and Ghazali. But the early formation of the concept could 
be found in the works of Abu Bakr al-Jassas (d. 980) and Abu al-Husayn 
al-Basri (d. 1044). The two scholars belong to the Mutazilite school which 
favored a rationalist approach to Islamic jurisprudence, as opposed to the 
textualists, who relied extensively on hadith of the prophet and the opin-
ions of his companions. The maturation of the concept later in the work of 
Ghazali, who linked it directly to the five purposes of sharia, represented 
an important moment in the struggle of the rationalist scholars to express 
sharia in universal terms and to free it from the constraints of the concrete 
expressions of the hadith. The tension between the rationalist and textualist 
traditions evolved around the drive of rational idealism to develop a more 
inclusive legal system that could cater to the diverse needs of a universal 
community and the textualists who were concerned with preserving the 
actual community of the faithful.
The concept of maslahah, introduced by Jassas in his book Al-Fusul fi al-
usul [Chapters in Jurisprudence], inaugurated a new chapter in the devel-
opment of Islamic law as it was crucial for the systematization of the law 
into a hierarchical structure of universal and particular rules. The hierarchi-
cal structure reached its more sophisticated elaboration in the work of Ibn 
Abdulsalam two centuries later.11 Jassas first equated in his work the good 
with the beneficial and the bad with the harmful.12 He further asserted that 
maslahah is not simply an ‘illa or efficient cause (ratione legis), in law-making 
or law-finding, but rather a maqasid or an intent and purpose (ratione legis) of 
the legal finding itself.13 The difference is quite significant, for in the case 
of ratione legis, the law is directly derived from a particular instance and re-
mained valid only as long as the instance continues to be efficient, so when 
the instance ceases the law ceases. In other words, the law remains concerned 
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with particular instances, as it remains tightly bonded to the text from which 
the instance was derived and would never develop to the point that it could 
stand on its own as a set of rules and principles founded on a rational basis. In 
the case of ratione legis, the situation is completely different and the dynamic 
of law-finding fundamentally changes. In practice, the difference is as signif-
icant as to say Medina residents who donate the rent of their prosperities to 
help the poor are exempted from property tax because the prophet allowed 
that (ratione legis) and to say all property owners who donate the rent of their 
properties to help the poor are exempted from property tax (ratio legis).
With the discovery of new approach to generalizing from a particular in-
stance, sharia could be expressed through a body of universal rules, and it 
therefore became possible to derive rules from a particular instance and use 
them to develop a body of legal system on the basis of rational rules and 
principles that stand apart from the text. The divine text from which the law 
derives is never rendered obsolete, for it can always be brought back to the 
discussion should later jurists find discrepancies in its derivation or applica-
tion. However, the jurists’ ability to develop a legal order that is internally 
cohesive facilitated the rational examination of the consistency of any par-
ticular rule pronounced by the jurists with the higher purposes of law, pre-
venting the selective application of the rules of law. From that moment on, 
analogy became the mechanism for extending the rule of law on the basis of 
the universal legal principles (ratio legis), rather than the particular efferent 
cause of the original rule. The scholar was able, through the instrument of 
maslahah, to truly exercise independent reasoning (ijtihād), beyond the lim-
itations of analogous reasoning. The profound change of juristic reasoning 
was even more consequential for issues of political and moral responsibilities. 
The introduction of maslahah as principle of law further enhanced the ar-
guments of the rational idealist in the Islamic tradition. It was a moment of 
maturation in the rise of transcendental idealism within the ongoing debate 
in the public sphere. The moment had profound implications on the moral 
and legal debates among Muslim scholars. The notion of sharia as a set of val-
ues and rules intended for the benefit of humanity is derived from both the 
language of the Qur’an and the Mutazilite belief that because God is good 
then his will and intentions toward human beings are necessarily concerned 
with promoting human goodness (salāḥ). While Jassas was the Mutazilite 
thinker in whose work the notion of maslahah originated, he did not develop 
it into a full-f ledged instrument for law-finding. Developing maslahah into a 
general theory of sharia had to wait until the Asharite school that succeeded 
the Mutazilites matured in the work of Juwayni, Ghazali, Razi, and Ibn 
Abdulsalam.14
The intellectual revolution caused by Islamic rationalism reached its ulti-
mate clarity in the works of Ibn Abdulsalam, who in The Great Rules identi-
fied maslahah as the primary purpose of law and argued that all edicts of sharia 
aim at advancing both public and private interests (maslahah ‘āma wa khāsa) 
and preventing public corruption and personal aggravation (mafsadah).”15 In 
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Ibn Abdulsalam we encounter the clearest exposition of rational idealism. 
The notion of good is expressed in his work in dialectical terms, rendering 
the main task of the jurist the reconciliation of the universal and the particu-
lar in the body of law and keeping particular rules within the general frame-
work that promote personal and collective good and avoiding personal and 
collective harm. The work of the jurist is simply the systematic integration 
of the rules of sharia into a framework set by dichotomies that limit lawful 
actions within the boundaries of maslahah and mafsadah as they manifest 
themselves as “good and corruption, benefits and harms, utility and loss, for 
all interests brings goods, benefits, and rewards, and all aggravations bring 
corruption, harm, and loss.”16
Ibn Abdulsalam’s significant contribution is in segregating the rules of sha-
ria that deal with religious injunctions per se from those relating to transac-
tions and exchanges in social settings and subjecting each of them to different 
logic of arguments. The logic for dealing with the religious and ritualistic 
elements of sharia is that of pure reference to the sacred text. Ritualistic 
elements of the sharia are formally irrational as they are not subject to any 
discoverable meaning by reason, and must therefore be located in the texts of 
sharia, as they relate to the symbolic acts whose meanings unfold through the 
performance of the acts. However, transactions and exchanges are social acts 
and hence belong to rational consideration. Maslahah questions that relate to 
advancing the human interest in the world are subject to rational discovery.17 
Because the maslahah rules are rational they are capable of universal formu-
lation and can be recognized by human beings regardless of their religious 
background, even by people who have not received any revelation at all. 
Philosophers generally agree to this fact.18 He continues:
Likewise, all systems of laws agree on the prohibition of harms aimed at 
life, the human body, property, and dignity, as they agree on seeking the 
good and the best, even when they disagree on some details as to how 
that could be achieved in relations to issues of inequality and equality.19
He then goes on to elaborate sharia rules in ways that bring the systematiza-
tion of the body of law, by applying the rational framework he proposes to 
the various rules of sharia, allowing the jurist to reject particular rules that 
contradict the universal principles of the law. By the twelfth century, rea-
son was declared as the instrument for identifying universal principles and 
systematizing them into a harmonious body of law, rather than relying on 
the surface and literal meaning of the text, and rational exposition has hence 
become the instrument of rule discovery in Islamic law.
Religious pluralism and non-Muslim autonomy
Despite the well-documented fact of religious pluralism in historical Mus-
lim society, contemporary far-right writers have been engaged in intellectual 
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distortion and dishonesty, confusing the public by blurring and mixing con-
temporary authoritarianism in Muslim countries with historical political 
structures. We will return to this alarmingly expanding practice in Chapter 
9 for a more elaborate examination. But let us for now brief ly bring up the 
case of Gisele Littman, who in 2001 published under the pen name of Bat 
Yo’er, which means in Hebrew “the daughter of the Nile,” a book titled Islam 
and Dhimmitude: Where Civilizations Collide. Littman coined the term “dhim-
mitude” to rhyme with the word “servitude,” as she claimed that the social 
conditions of non-Muslims in Muslim societies are characterized by “fear and 
insecurity.” While Littman was born in Egypt, and might have encountered 
the harsh reality of a military dictatorship that began in Egypt in 1952, her 
claims are not simply directed toward the current state of affairs in Muslim 
countries. Rather, her accusations and arguments provide an unsparing con-
demnation of Islam as a religion, asserting that Islam perpetuated intolerance 
against Christians and Jews throughout its history. She insisted that Islam 
provided no protection for non-Muslims who were humiliated and robbed 
of legal rights.20 Her thesis was later embraced by members of the far-right, 
who amplified her work and used it as an instrument to repudiate contem-
porary Muslims in general, and Western Muslims in particular, fomenting 
anti-Muslim rhetoric similar to the one Littman accused Muslim of doing.21
There is no denying that Muslim history involves instances of intoler-
ance, not only toward groups who belonged to different religious or ethnic 
communities but also toward Muslims who openly challenged sultans and 
political elites and Muslims who were critical of dominant groups. It is also 
clear that the level of intolerance varied over time and across the geograph-
ical space occupied by Muslims who followed the Islamic faith but varied 
in their commitment to the principles of justice and equal dignity. What is 
problematic in the above assertion is that Islam has historically promoted and 
encouraged intolerance toward non-Muslims and that it has never afforded 
protection to people of other faiths. We need therefore to examine this claim 
here by reviewing both the Islamic teachings and the historical records. Yet a 
systematic and thorough investigation of the conditions of non-Muslim un-
der the historical rules of sharia surprisingly reveals that Islam has developed 
a remarkably sophisticated system for allowing non-Muslim a private space 
to exercise their specific beliefs and values under institutions they run and 
command. The first point to be established in this regard is that Muslims’ 
experience with elected governments was short-lived and ended with the de-
mise of the fourth caliph, who, along with his two predecessors, was assassi-
nated while still in office. The fifth caliph belonged to the Umayyad dynasty, 
which abandoned the shura system followed by early caliphs that required 
broader consultation among community leaders. This prompted the jurists to 
connect political legitimacy of later caliphs to their willingness to recognize 
the autonomy of the legal system developed by the jurists themselves as the 
custodians of sharia. Furthermore, the political structure we encounter in 
Muslim history is a form of horizontal communalism, as the body politics of 
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the various Islamic empires consisted of autonomous communities living side 
by side under separate legal systems. As Marshall Hodgson put it,
At the time of the Arab conquest, the several religious groups which 
were to form protected dhimmi communities, gained equality of status 
among themselves and protection against each other’s interference; for 
instance, against proselytizing from one dhimmi community to another, 
which the Muslims discouraged. Jews found a much more favorable po-
sition than they had had under the Byzantines, at least; it was not only 
economic but political openness which permitted an increase in their 
commercial activity.22
This characterization of historical Muslim society is echoed by Malcom Yapp 
who portrays the pluralism of the Ottoman society by invoking the mosaic 
metaphor. Yapp reaffirms the view of the Near East as a region organized on 
the principle of horizontal pluralism as he describes, in The Making of the Near 
East, the Ottoman society as comprised of autonomous communities. In his 
words: “Near Eastern society is seen as a mosaic of autonomous corporations 
existing side by side and not arranged in any particular order of eminence, 
or at least not an order accepted throughout the society.”23 The government 
itself could be viewed, he argued, “as one such corporation and, like the oth-
ers, [is] defined partly by inheritance and partly by function, the provision of 
defense and some modest administrative services.”24 The protections estab-
lished by law did not mean that sentiments of the ruling elites or the populace 
toward different confessional communities were equal. There were always 
issues to be resolved, but the decentralized political structure left a great lee-
way for members of different communities to navigate. During the Umayyad 
dynasty, for instance, Arabs were more likely to be awarded governorship 
than Persians, but Umayyad rule did not last long, and the Abbasids changed 
this dynamic completely. Similarly, Nestorian Christians were apparently fa-
vored in the high culture around the ruling elites, as their monophysite faith 
brought them closer to Muslim elites, in comparison to the Zoroastrian aris-
tocracy. But this was soon to change as the latter embraced Islam and turned 
to become among its foremost advocates and leaders.25
Expansive historical Islamic society became even more diversified polit-
ically, beginning with 945 CE as the Buyid dynasty captured Baghdad, the 
seat of the Abbasid Caliph. This was the last time the Arab held any office of 
great power outside of Andalusia and North Africa. The successive dynasties 
that came to power could only control smaller regions until the fifteenth 
century when the Ottoman, and shortly after that the Safavids, assumed con-
trol over large regions, replicating the division that once existed between the 
Byzantine and Sassanian Empires. Between the tenth and fifteenth centu-
ries, the classical caliphate was reduced into a powerless symbol of Muslim 
unity, and the universal states disappeared as much of the Muslim world was 
ruled by small municipalities. By the close of the fifteenth century, universal 
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states reemerged to unify the countless municipalities and city-states that 
popped up after the collapse of the Abbasid Caliphate. Yet the sociopolitical 
order, with a f lourishing trade and growing intellectual and scientific vital-
ities never ceased, thanks to the strength of the legal order and the absence 
of any major challengers. It was the introduction of the external threats that 
took first the form of the Crusades, and later the Mongol invasion, that re-
newed the drive to rebuild large and powerful empires. Hodgson argued that 
the political unity of Muslim cities and regions was maintained for five cen-
turies by the sheer energy of Islamic intellectualism and its innovative spirit 
and the ability of Muslim leadership to draw on “Muslim idealism.”26
One of the remarkable political innovations for ensuring religious plural-
ism and protecting the rights of non-Muslim populations was the “dhimmi 
contract.” The contract was a modified instrument analogous to the Medina 
Pact we discussed in Chapter 4. The contract provided non-Muslims with 
moral and legal autonomy in their own towns and villages while receiving 
the legal protections Muslim themselves have. Yet many modern historians 
seem to be perplexed, as they review the ongoing debate between those who 
harshly reject the practice as an outright oppressive act against non-Muslims 
and those who saw it as a reasonable solution to a complex historical reality. 
The system critics fault it as discriminatory while those who approve of it 
find it protective of the rights of communities that may not want to be sub-
jected to a centralized legal system that would affect their ability to practice 
their unique law. Modern sensibilities naturally favor equal treatment for all 
people under one system of law. The division of society into autonomous 
confessional communities triggers pictures of inequality and difference and 
the distinction between citizens into first-class and second-class citizens. His-
torical societies should not, however, be evaluated on the basis of modern 
criteria, as the modern world has developed a national political order unlike 
any that were known to earlier civilizations. The fair question to ask relates 
to our ability to judge the extent to which early social system advanced the 
human conditions of the time. The question we need to ask is this: Did the 
dhimmi system ensure the religious and cultural freedom of non-Muslims, 
while offering them the protection of their properties and trades?
Anver Emon examines current academic debate on dhimmi arrangements 
and points out that the question is quite controversial as strong views could 
be found for and against. He acknowledges the difficulties in judging the 
system from a modern vantage point and concludes that the system does not 
ref lect the “Islamic ethos.”27 For him the dhimmi rules are “symptomatic 
of the messy business of ordering and regulating a diverse society.”28 So the 
dhimmi system would make sense only in the larger historical context in 
which it existed. The sympathetic views point out that the dhimmi system 
allowed those who accepted the dhimma contract to maintain their own faith 
and live in peace within the Islamic society. They also point to the fact that 
historical records show that Christian and Jews lived active life under Muslim 
rule both economically and politically and they participated fully in trade, 
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scholarship, and even rose to become ministers and advisors of caliphs and 
sultans. The freedom and private and public achievements of non-Muslims 
were quite evident, particularly in Andalusia.
In principle, all Islamic polities were (and are) required by Quranic in-
junction not to harm the dhimmi, to tolerate the Christians and Jews 
living in their midst. But beyond that fundamental prescribed posture, 
al-Andalus was … the site of memorable and distinctive interfaith rela-
tions. Here the Jewish community rose from the ashes of an abysmal ex-
istence under the Visigoths. … Fruitful intermarriage among the various 
cultures and the quality of cultural relations with the dhimmi were vital 
aspects of Andalusian identity.29
Much of the criticism that is leveled against the dhimmi pact is based on spec-
ulation and on projection from the present moment to the past, so the one who 
is engaged in criticism does not acknowledge the difference between the cen-
tralized political order of the modern state and the decentralized communal 
system of the premodern Muslim life. Yet on a close examination one could 
see that not only did the system provide protection for the followers of other 
religions from imposition of Muslim values on them but also that the system 
gave non-Muslims the options to use the Muslim system to litigate their cases 
if they so choose before Muslim courts. Najwa al-Qattan illustrated in a study 
published in 1999 that non-Muslims were able to use the Ottoman legal sys-
tem to successfully sue Muslims. The study also shows, utilizing Ottoman 
court records (sijil), that many non-Muslims “preferred the Shariʿa-based Ot-
toman courts over the tribunals of their own religious communities.”30 The 
study also illustrates, building on court records, that Christians and Jews were 
not limited to their own confessional courts but could freely use Ottoman 
courts, and many of them trusted the non-confessional Muslim courts, par-
ticularly in areas that involve registering inheritance, property ownership, 
and marriage. The study also reveals that members of confessional communi-
ties have opted in a host of cases to use “Ottoman courts instead of commu-
nal tribunals for various reasons, including the fact that they could get a fair 
hearing and prevail in an action, even against a Muslim party.”31
Some of the evidence used to fault the dhimmi system involves an alleged 
pact imposed by the second Muslim Caliph Umar, that forced a set of conditions 
allegedly intended to humiliate non-Muslims. The so-called Pact of Umar is 
frequently used in secondary literature, produced by people like Gisele Littman 
and Robert Spencer, and has become a convenient instrument to discredit the 
history of Islam and condemn its followers. The alleged pact has been circu-
lated in Arabic and European languages without any credible source or evi-
dence. Many Middle East specialists, such as A. S. Tritton, reject the document 
as unauthentic and fabricated. The assertion that the document is fabricated 
does not rest simply on the lack of supporting evidence, but most importantly 
on the fact that it was never applied. Tritton points out that if the document was 
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authentic, it would have surely been applied by some Muslim rulers.32 The fact 
that it was never applied, even in the most adversarial times when the Muslim 
communities in the Levant were under a long and vicious military campaign by 
the Crusaders, is enough a proof to establish its inauthenticity.
Waqf institution and the autonomy of civil society
Civil society in historical Muslim regions has been characterized by great 
vitality, thanks in large part to its commitment to the transcendental values 
of cooperation, solidarity, common good, excellence, and compassion. These 
values w ere manifested in civil institutions that enabled society to preserve 
its vitality away from dominant political powers, most notably the institution 
of waqf (public trust). Public trusts (endowments) played a large role in the 
growth of historical Islamic society and enabled its members to use their 
wealth, efforts, and skills to serve the various social strata and to provide 
public services, including building hospitals, providing medicine, supporting 
educational scholarships, spending on public facilities, fighting poverty, and 
other educational, economic, social, and urban services. Indeed, the Qur’an 
closely associates faith with action, as it makes good action the manifestation 
of good faith. Islam in general historically placed more emphasis on the law 
and its implementation and assigned to it greater practical importance than to 
dogma. Issues relating to dogma were often raised as political instruments to 
discredit established powers or to demonize the opposition and to justify oth-
erwise unacceptable action under the law. The main emphases and concerns 
were however more focused on praxis rather than ideology.
The institution of waqf was grounded in Islamic law, and scholars made 
sure that it was well protected from the misuse by the public and the abuse 
of political authority. For most of them, this was a matter of utmost impor-
tance, as the autonomy of the juristic class hinged on the very institution of 
waqf. The institution was essential for generating resources and funding for 
their livelihood and the education of new generations of jurists who received 
stipends and other funding essential for maintaining independent juristic tra-
dition. Scholars of the Hanafi school of law defined waqf as the retention of 
“the corpus from the ownership of any person and the gift of its income or 
usufruct either presently or in the future, to some charitable purpose.”33 The 
waqf was intended as an institution to perpetuate public services beyond the 
lifespan of the person or persons who provided the original funding. It could 
be refunded later, but no one would have the authority to dissolve it or use 
the funding for any other purpose than the one for which it was established. 
The waqf was administered by a trustee (mutawalli), who would be initially 
named by the trust’s founders and whose powers are limited by the terms 
of the founder’s will and whose rules of succession are decided by the legal 
instrument at the time of its initiation.34 The trustee is charged with the 
responsibility of administering the waqf and providing care and protection. 
The beneficiaries of waqf who are entitled to the services and benefits are 
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clearly spelled out.35 The incentives for setting the waqf are derived from the 
religious obligations and motives that can be found in many Qur’anic verses 
as well as in the sayings of the prophet. The Qur’an, for example, makes the 
act of giving an important path to forgiveness and reward, particularly when 
the giving relates to the things one values most.36
But beyond the immediate religious purpose of individual salvation, the 
waqf played an important social and political role, as it provided the funding 
for the setting up of civil society organizations outside the control of the 
government, whose protection is stipulated by the sacred law. It was through 
this institution that most scholars and students received financial support, 
without having to resort to state funding. Waqf was also a major source of 
fund for public services, and cities and municipalities depended on societal 
funding rather than on fiscal allocation by the caliph or the sultan. The his-
torical Muslim communities were able to ensure the autonomy of their civil 
institutions through independent public trusts. The trusts provided the finan-
cial base to finance civil institutions such as schools, hospitals, irrigation and 
drainage channels, road pavement, and many other public services up until 
the twentieth century, when postcolonial Muslim states confiscated these 
institutions and put them under the supervision of ministerial administra-
tion. Civil institutions in the Abbasid era assumed the main responsibilities in 
market regulation and organizing guilds. They formed an extensive network 
across the vast geography, from Tangier and Seville in the West to Delhi and 
Samarkand in the East. Three institutions, in particular, played an important 
role in organizing society to meet social needs:
1  Guilds and syndicates of crafts and professions in Arab and Islamic cities 
such as Damascus, Cairo, Aleppo, Isfahan, and Shiraz.
2  Networks of trade relations that accompanied f lourishing trade and the 
development of commercial centers and networks spanning wide geo-
graphical areas between East Asia and the Maghreb.
3  Networks of scholars and jurists who formed the social and cultural elite, 
had a great inf luence in directing society, and retained until the nine-
teenth century the legislative authority.
Guilds contributed to organizing crafts in market, nurtured a system of pro-
fessional training, and exercised an important political role, as they sought to 
inf luence public regulations relevant to professions and industries. Historical 
records of established procedures and the rules governing the craft and the 
market reveal “that within these organizations a certain and specific hier-
archy,” starting from the aspirant, and passing through the maker “to the 
teacher, to the sheikh of the craft, to the sheikh of the market.”37 They also 
reveal that the custom of electing
the sheikh of the market was the unanimity of merchants and craftsmen, 
and it is assumed that he possesses the characteristics of good morals, 
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rationality and wisdom. And there is no change in it [market regulation] 
except with his knowledge and opinion, and the sheikhs of all trades were 
elected in his presence and are obligated with his recommendations.38
The development of trade unions was accompanied by an evolution in com-
mercial and banking institutions that facilitated trade exchange between di-
vergent business centers.
The commercial movement f lourished through import and export with 
the outside world, and merchants became agents and commercial centers 
in the various countries that they trade with, and banking and other fi-
nancial institutions were established to facilitate commercial operations, 
and thus play an important role such as credit to merchants.39
Credit transactions played a large role in trade and import. “Financial in-
stitutions play the role of banks today, and among these are the homes of 
the ‘ jahabidha’ (commerce brokers) who facilitated trade and also supported 
the state’s economy in some periods.”40 The Moroccan traveler Ibn Battuta 
(1304–1368) gave us important insights into the organization of markets 
and cities in the many Muslim countries he visited during his extended 
journeys and revealed the remarkably sophisticated level of administration 
of civil society, independent of the state and the sultan’s direct inf luence. 
In describing life in Isfahan, Ibn Battuta conveyed a bright picture of the 
organization of industries inside the city, and the reliance of civil society 
institutions on a similar system that uses waqf to organize social life outside 
the inf luence of state institutions. “And the people of every industry form 
a guild,” Ibn Battuta writes, “and elect one of their members who they 
call ‘Kalu’, and the same structure exists in big city in non-commercial 
organizations.”41
The most important highlights on the role of the waqf foundation in 
organizing and supporting the historical Islamic communities and the di-
versity of social purposes that it achieved are found in the notes of Ibn Bat-
tuta; in his memoirs, published under the title Wonders of Sights in Strangest 
of Territories, he describes the diversity of endowments in Damascus as 
follows:
The endowments in Damascus are not limited to their types and re-
sources due to their abundance. They include endowments of those 
who are unable to perform the Hajj. Also, there are endowments for 
the release of prisoners. Including endowments for the wayfarers, they 
give them what they need to eat, dress, and provide for their return 
to their countries. And among them are the endowments of preparing 
the road and paving them, because the alleys of Damascus each have 
two sidewalks that the pedestrians pass through, and the riders pass 
between them.42
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He also describes the diversity and peculiarity of the waqf institutions in 
Damascus, as he asserts that one could hardly find individual or social needs 
that have been left unattended for. Even the accidently broken plates by boys 
dispatched by their masters to deliver food throughout the city have a twin-
kling of help in moments of adversity:
One day I passed some alleys of Damascus, and I saw a young boy, steer-
ing at debris of a Chinese pottery that just dropped, and they [dama-
scenes] call plate, and it was broken. People gathered around him, and 
some of them said: ‘collect the fragments and carry them with you to the 
administrator of the endowment of the pots.’ So he gathered them and 
the man went with him, so he showed them to [the administrator], who 
paid him what he needed to buy similar plate ... and that endowment was 
a remedy for the hearts. May God reward the one who has aspired to this 
level of sublime benevolence to do something like this.43
The vitality of historical Muslim society and its institutions could be ob-
served in the entire Nile-to-Oxus region, as the waqf foundations and their 
public service institutions could be found in many cities across the region. 
The city of Isfahan was one of the places Ibn Battuta visited in his famous 
journey and reported what he observed in connection with the free public 
services offered through waqf funding:
My stay at Isfahan was in a lodge built in honor of Sheikh Ali bin Sahl, a 
pupil of Junaid, which is a venerated place that people of the region travel 
to for blessings. The lodge provides food for all visitors. In it [Isfahan] 
is built a wonderful public bath, furnished with marble and its walls are 
made of ceramics, and it is given as a public trust so no one has to pay to 
enjoy its services.44
Furthermore, the reader of Ibn Battuta’s memoirs discovers that he was able 
to move through great expanses and territories from Morocco to India with 
little money, as he took advantage of a wide network of private educational 
institutions that relied on the waqf system to provide students with free hous-
ing. So Ibn Battuta was able to find shelter in these dorms whenever he went 
through periods of unemployment and was short on provisions, so he did not 
only observe the importance of waqf for services that looked to him as unu-
sual but he evidently depended occasionally on the waqf system to survive his 
lifelong journeys in the Middle-Age Muslim societies.45
Civil society and its organization displayed remarkable vitality unmatched 
today except in few Western democracies. In Muslim countries, however, 
social and financial organizations have come under the control of centralized 
bureaucracies that have assumed full monopoly over every social function, 
leaving Muslim populations in complete paralysis, and creating the condi-
tions for constant rebellion and anarchism.
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The birth of science and its institutions
The rise of Abbasid dynasty to power in 750 CE empowered rational idealism 
represented by the Mutazilite movement. For over half a century, the Muta-
zilites took upon themselves the task of providing the theoretical repudiation 
of the Umayyad rule, rejecting their deterministic doctrine that justified the 
usurpation of power and condemning their exclusivism and reliance on Arabs 
alone in high public offices. In less than a decade, the Abbasid Caliph Ma’mun 
provided major boosting to the House of Wisdom (Dar al-Hikmah) that was set 
as a center for the study of philosophy and translation of major works produced 
in different civilization centers. Not only did he expand spending on the House 
of Wisdom, he also appointed an accomplished Mutazilite, Abu Ishaq al-Kindi, 
to lead this institution. Kindi turned the translation center into repository of all 
great works and hired many accomplished philosophers and translators. When 
Baghdad came under traditionalist rulers by the time of Caliph Mustansir, the 
center of learning moved eastward, as scholarship and arts found a new home 
in the Buyid dynasty, particularly in the Court of ‘Aḍud al-Dawla (r. 949–983), 
“who transformed Shiraz into a center of culture and learning, famed for its 
grand library which won the admiration of the geographer al-Muqaddasi.”46 
The Buyid rulers were leaders with great appreciation for scholarship and sci-
ence and have selected to the office of first minister persons who combined po-
litical leadership and intellectual excellence, including Abu al-Fadl bin al-‘Amid 
and Al-Sahib bin ‘Abbad. Both have invited to Isfahan and the Ray province 
the most accomplished jurists, scientists, linguists, and literary figures. They 
also built huge libraries. Ibn Abbad was a committed Mutazilite, and his court 
become safe heaven to many rationalist scholars, such as the renowned Qadi 
Abdul Jabbar, who served as the chief judge of Isfahan.47
The towering center of leaning was by far the House of Wisdom which 
served as the foundation for the translation of all scientific works that could 
be discovered in the four corners of the vast Abbasid Empire. The rational 
idealism of the Mutazilite, for which both Kindi and Ma’mun were its lead-
ing advocates, was crucial for paving the way for the institutionalization of 
philosophical inquiries and, more importantly, for the development of the 
scientific tradition. The Mutazilites were the champions of the atomic theory 
of kalam, and al-Kindi himself was an accomplished mathematician, physi-
cist, and chemist, and left few treaties on the subject under his name. Caliph 
Ma’mun’s enthusiasm for philosophy and science was unmatched, and his 
passion for advancing rational thinking led him to commit a fatal mistake 
that eventually contributed to the demise of Mutazilite in Baghdad in less 
than a decade after he passed away. His decision to introduce a religious test 
(imtihān) was evidently intended to deny Muslim traditionalists access to the 
judiciary. The approach backfired, and the Mutazilites gradually lost support 
in Baghdad, prompting Ash’ari to come up with a creative synthesis between 
the Hanbalite traditionalists and the Mutazilite rationalists, ensuring thereby 
the survival of the rationalist tradition.
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The House of Wisdom (Bait al Hikma) employed the services of many 
leading scholars, including Muhammad ibn Musa al-Khwarizmi (780–850), 
the father of algebra, Mohammed Jafar ibn Musa, Ahmad ibn Musa, al-
Hasan ibn Musa, and Yaqub ibn Ishaq al-Kindi (801–873), to name just a 
few. The translation section was headed by a Christian scholar, Hunayn bin 
Ishaq (809–873), and employed the service of such illustrious philosophers 
and translators of science as the sabian Thabit ibn Qurra (826–901). Trans-
lations of this era were superior to earlier times. However, soon after the 
emphasis on translation work declined, the House of Wisdom became a place 
for generating new ideas and introducing the newly found scientific method. 
“Never before and never since, on such a scale,” observed Robert Briffault, 
“has the spectacle been witnessed of the ruling classes throughout the length 
and breadth of a vast empire given over entirely to a frenzied passion for the 
acquirement of knowledge.”48 Muslim scholars and scientists learned Persian, 
Indian, and Greek philosophies, taught them in their schools and universities, 
and then built on them new scientific theories and methods. Mathematics, 
astronomy, medicine, logic, philosophy were important subjects of education 
in the House of Hikmah and other centers of learning. The sooner scholars 
in the Islamic civilization mastered the knowledge of earlier civilizations, the 
sooner they began to advance these fields of learning, develop new theories, 
make new discoveries, invented new techniques, and added new fields of 
learning. Interest in knowledge in general and empirical learning in particu-
lar were cultivated by the message of the Qur’an. The first verse of Qur’anic 
revelation was not about the nature of God or His creation. Nor was it a call 
to the believers to pray or have strong faith in God. It was rather about read-
ing, learning, and knowledge. “Read in the name of your Lord who created; 
Created man out of a (mere) clot of congealed blood; read and your Lord is 
most Bountiful, he taught, through (the use of ) the pen, man that which he 
knew not” (Qur’an: 96-1-5). Caliphs, sultans, and emirs were highly ed-
ucated members of the Muslim society and placed high premium on pro-
moting philosophy and science. Poets, novelists, logicians, grammarians, and 
scientists were invited regularly to the court of Muslim rulers and supported 
generously by them.49
In mathematics, Muhammad bin Musa al Khwarizmi developed algebra 
and algorithms, while Sind bin Ali invented spherical trigonometry and the 
decimal point notation. Al-Kindi invented the trigonometric functions be-
sides the sine rule, the cryptanalysis and frequency analysis, and algebraic 
calculus. Omar Khayyam used algebraic geometry and solved the third- 
degree equation. Abu al Hasan al Qalasadi developed symbolic algebra.50 
In astronomy, Ja’far Muhammad bin Musa discovered that heavenly bodies 
and celestial spheres were subject to the same physical laws as the Earth51 and 
began the foundational work that became later known as astrophysics 
and celestial mechanics. He designed the first elaborate experiments related to 
astronomical research. Ibn al Haytham used exacting empirical observations 
and experimental techniques that led to the discovery that celestial spheres 
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are not solid but made of less dense matter than the air.52 Ibn al-Haytham 
and Mo’ayyeduddin Urdi rejected the Ptolemaic model on empirical rather 
than philosophical grounds and introduced the first non-Ptolemaic model. 
Nasir al Din al Tusi provided the first empirical observational evidence of 
the earth’s rotation, a few centuries before Copernicus made similar claims.53
In physics, Ibn al-Haytham (Alhazen) introduced experimental physics 
and used it to develop modern optics and transform our understanding of 
light and vision. His work, The Book of Optics, launched a scientific rev-
olution in optics and was the prelude for Isaac Newton’s Philosophiae Natu-
ralis Principia Mathematica.54 Ibn al Haytham also discovered the concept of 
momentum. Abu Rayhan al-Biruni introduced the experimental scientific 
into mechanics, and its essential principles and concepts were developed by 
several Muslim scientists, which were later synthesized by Isaac Newtown in 
his Laws of motion.55 Ibn al Haytham and Ibn Sina (Avicenna) discovered the 
law of inertia, which later became known as Newton’s first law of motion, 
56 and the concept of momentum. Abu Barakat al Baghdadi discovered the 
fundamental law of mathematics, the proportionality between force and ac-
celeration, which later became known as Newton’s second law of motion.57 
While Ibn Bajjah (Avempace) discovered what later became known as New-
ton’s third law of motion, the concept of reaction.58
Muslim contributions to the development of medicine were even more im-
pressive. Muslims set up the first hospitals, introduced experimental medicine, 
established medical schools, and introduced mathematics and measurements 
into medicine and pharmacology. They also made profound advancements 
in the field of anatomy, experimental medicine, ophthalmology, pathology, 
physiology, and surgery.59 Al-Razi (Rhazes) discovered measles and small-
pox, and Abu al-Qasim (Abulcasis) set modern surgery on a solid foundation 
by inventing numerous surgical instruments, including the surgical uses of 
catgut, the ligature, surgical needle, retractor, and surgical rod. These inven-
tions were described and their use was explained in his book, Kitab al-Tasrif. 
Ibn Sina (Avicenna) helped lay the foundations for modern medicine, with 
The Canon of Medicine, which was responsible for the discovery of contagious 
disease, introduction of quarantine to limit their spread, introduction of ex-
perimental medicine, evidence-based medicine, and clinical trials.60
Western history of science somehow overlooks the transformative role of 
Arabic science, jumping over a millennium from the modern age to the Ax-
ial Age of the Greek, making little or no mention of the translated works 
that were crucial for the introduction of modern science, rather than Greek 
natural philosophy, to Western Europe. The astronomy and mathematics 
of the Greeks were foreign importations never thoroughly acclimatized in 
Greek culture. The Greeks systematized, generalized, and theorized, but the 
detailed and meticulous ways of investigation, the accumulation of positive 
knowledge, the minute methods of observation and empirical inquiry, were 
altogether alien to the experience of Greece and its temperament. Only in 
Hellenistic Alexandria one can observe an approach close to what we call 
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today science, but it still retained a great deal of the ancient spirit of wis-
dom and magic. What we call science today f lourished in Europe as a result 
of a new spirit of inquiry and was shaped by new methods of investigation 
that emphasized observations, experiments, measurements, and the use of 
mathematics in ways that the Greeks never imagined. That spirit of modern 
science came to Europe through the translations of the scientific research 
developed by Arab and Muslim scientists.61 Indeed, any historian of science 
would be hard-pressed today to provide scientific experimentations rooted 
in the Greek philosophy of nature or to produce Greek literature that re-
sembles scientific methodology. The only methodology of knowledge the 
Greek ever developed was formal logic, which is completely consumed with 
deductive thinking. Nor was Greek mathematics suitable for conducting ad-
vanced scientific reasoning, for Greek mathematical knowledge lacked the 
key mathematical instruments: the ability to use the zero and algebraic equa-
tions, both were developed by Muslim mathematicians and were integrated 
to the study of physics. Nor did the Greek have any significant knowledge of 
chemistry, as it became a science with its own experimentational approach as 
it f lourished within the Arabic scientific revolution of the ninth century and 
became a separate branch of science through the work of the ninth-century 
chemist Jabir ibn Hayyan (Geber). Paul Kraus, who wrote extensively on 
ibn Hayyan’s contribution to the history of scientific ideas in Islam, has the 
following to say about the difference between Islamic and Greek work in the 
study of chemistry:
The study of the Greek alchemists is not very encouraging. An even sur-
face examination of the Greek texts shows that a very small part only was 
organized according to true experiments of laboratory: even the suppos-
edly technical writings, in the state where we find them today, are unin-
telligible nonsense which refuses any interpretation.... It is different with 
Jabir’s alchemy. The relatively clear description of the processes and the 
alchemical apparatuses, the methodical classification of the substances, 
mark an experimental spirit which is extremely far away from the weird 
and odd esotericism of the Greek texts. The theory on which Jabir sup-
ports his operations is one of clearness and of an impressive unity.62
Despite these impressive scientific theories and discoveries, most modern 
historians brush aside Islamic contributions to science, reducing the role of 
Muslim scientists to intermediaries who preserved Greek science and handed 
it over to the Occident. Henry Osborn Taylor published over a century ago 
a voluminous work on the history of Medieval thought, appropriately ti-
tled, The Mediaeval Mind, without hardly making any significant mention 
of Islamic contribution to science. The book came in four editions and is 
still available for distribution by Harvard University Press. The press web-
site introduces the book as thus: “The Medieval Mind is valued everywhere 
for its wise and comprehensive picture of the intellectual, emotional, and 
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spiritual attitudes of the Middle Ages.”63 I personally do not think that this 
description was intended to misrepresent the history of science. Rather, this 
sad presentation of a partial view of the Middle Ages as comprehensive is 
born today out of an honest misunderstanding by contemporary generations 
who are unaware of the role of the Islamic civilization in the making of the 
modern world. We turn therefore to examine European scholarship during 
the Middle Ages in the next chapter. But first a brief commentary on moral 
agency in relation to group dynamics associated with social limitations that 
often challenge the moral agency within a group dynamic that confines and 
pressures individual attitudes and choices.
Moral agency, rational idealism, and group dynamics
I would like, before we conclude this chapter, to underscore the importance 
of the rational idealism we encountered in this chapter and the previous two 
chapters for undertaking the difficult task of upholding the values of univer-
sal equality and human dignity and the push for a more globally inclusive 
order that celebrates humanity and human rights. The project of expanding 
the circles of human dignity is particularly difficult when we consider group 
dynamics and the need to balance out social unity and social reform. The ra-
tional agency at the heart of the monotheistic traditions highlights the moral 
predicament of historically determined individual life and reveals the predic-
ament individuals confront as they grow aware of their intimate connections 
to the social groups to which they historically belong. The predicament is 
born from the contradictions between moral agency and the multiplicity of 
imperfections sanctioned by dominant customs, traditions, and institutions. 
The challenge becomes one of finding the best path for negotiating the di-
vide between moral ideals and social reality. The tensions are deeply felt 
within individual consciousness, as the inner forces that motivate action of-
ten pull the human spirit in opposing directions. The choice ranges between 
two positions: living honestly while running the risk of social backlash or 
leading a cunning life so as to make self-interest the prime factor of thinking 
and acting. Between these two clear choices lies a spectrum of positions and 
choices. On a different level, the choice might be either embracing diversity 
with all its uncertainties and requirements for a higher moral discipline or 
taking the easier route of circling the wagon and othering the strange and 
unfamiliar. Human imperfections are real and are most severely experienced 
in societies where people claim to advance the good and attend to human 
suffering but, in actuality, privilege self-gratification and attend to those who 
enable them to achieve personal glories. Even when individuals could finally 
achieve higher moral discipline and become convinced of the false pretense 
of those who drive society in the wrong direction, they have to make tough 
decisions and prioritize their objectives if they want to avoid compromising 
the integrity of the social order. Moral choices are never easy and often are 
subject to arduous negotiations and compromises. One is often confronted 
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with the choice of whether to go it alone or support collective choices that 
may compromise one’s faith and values. Yet moments of open dissent against 
established traditions and ways of life are crucial as they are painful and have 
occasionally carried monumental implications for world history. Staying with 
the collectivity when its trajectory is clearly moving in the wrong direction 
is not without its own perils, as staying the course means choosing moving 
gradually to lower moral grounds.
Very few individuals dare to take that unusual stand of confronting social 
force with a truth that no one wants to hear. Those who dare to speak truth 
to power often do that at a tremendous cost for themselves and to those with 
whom they are in close proximity. And for that reason, these individuals are 
the stars and heroes of history that people usually hold them in high esteem, 
often long after they passed away, even when they do not share with them 
their identities. These are individuals whose names have a special ring so they 
could be recognized across cultures and throughout the globe: Abraham, 
Moses, Confucius, Buddha, Jesus, Muhammad, Luther, Gandhi, and a host 
of other remarkable personalities. These are exemplary moral agents who 
have often drawn the respect of numerous peoples throughout history. Along 
with them and walking a few steps behind stand the great reformers who 
echoed the transcendental meanings and values shared by all prophets and 
brought people back to the moral consciousness they seemed to have forgot-
ten. These are the voices of Socrates, Cicero, St. Paul, St. Augustine, Hillel, 
Umar, Ghazali, Maimonides, Averroes, Rousseau, Locke, Rumi, Kant, Vol-
taire, Jefferson, Malcom X, King Jr., and countless others.
Around, before, and behind these heroic individuals were many more peo-
ple who lived lives filled with the love for a higher moral reality that they 
knew in various names. They lived with love for that which transcends all 
limitations and imperfections but inspires the limited and imperfect to move 
onward and upward, despite all the challenges and tragedies of life. The sur-
prising element of human condition is that life is to be rejoiced, especially 
for those who dare to grab it with all the strengths they have, in pursuit of 
more prosperous and uplifting reality, which they have fully embraced in 
their dreams and hopes even when it seemed a far-fetched goal that only ren-
egades would dare to dream. It is through those idealists and dreamers that 
humanity has traversed from the Axial Age to the modern age, and it is to 
them that it owes its greatest debt. The rise of humanity throughout history 
is far from being a deterministic path, and humanity is greatly indebted to 
the rational idealism that stood at every juncture where society seemed to 
experience complete loss of morale and hope and despaired over problems 
with no resolution in sight in the foreseeable future. Rational idealism was 
not always asserted as such; it has occasionally acted out through those who 
upheld the ideals that uplift society at difficult junctures, as it did in the early 
years of Islam, when the realists gained the upper hand in pursuit of power 
and self-interests, or in the early modern age when the power hungry had for 
a while the upper hand. Islamic rationalists did so even when the realization 
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of the ideals of equality, freedom, and justice seemed quite distant and remote 
and still believed in these ideals so strongly to have the tenacity to push to 
a future that transcended existing obstacles and challenges. For it is through 
transcendental idealism, which Asharites insisted was located in the innate 
values that organize in human nature—and while the Kantians saw it as an 
innate structure necessary to maintain human rationality free from the law 
of causality—that humanity was able to recover itself from the tyranny of 
dogmatic traditions.
It is for these reasons that we need to keep our focus sharp on the elements 
of social and political orders that form the core of human development, both 
morally and socially. Our examination of the total experience may lead us 
to the wrong conclusions if we do not separate the bubbles and foams from 
the structures around which they grow and obscure our ability to see the real 
forces driving human history. The information we gathered so far should, I 
do hope, outline a picture of humanity moving gradually toward new orders 
with greater heights under the leadership of daring souls who were willing 
to challenge the status quo and real politics that perpetuated injustice in the 
name of justice. Undoubtedly, the picture is somewhat fussy and is, hence, 
open to contestations and disagreements. We talked so far of the driving 
force in the advancement of the human condition; namely, transcendental 
 idealism—born in the Abrahamic tradition and manifested itself in the re-
formist work of the Hebrew prophets and later in the rise of rational idealism 
in Islamic moment of monotheism. The picture of the role of Islamic mono-
theism in world history, which we focused on in the previous three chapters, 
is far from being crystal clear in its entirety and will surely require further 
critique, improvement, and refinement. Yet the picture as such cannot be 
dismissed because it is still of crucial help to understand the great leap of 
history that linked the Axial Age, where Greek philosophy was marginally 
located, to the rise of Western modernity. The monumental task placed on 
the Islamic moment of the monotheistic breakthrough cannot be ignored or 
overlooked, as it stiches together views constructed by many historians and 
philosophers of history. The account offers a view that illustrates the creative 
synthesis undertaken by the Islamic civilization to bring unity and order to 
the fragmented experiences of the Axial-Age civilizations. One clear limita-
tion of the picture we painted so far, of the evolution of human history from 
the Axial Age to the modern age, is that it is completely focused on the mon-
otheistic path to the modern world, leaving out specific contributions of both 
the Indic and Sinic civilizations. These omissions are due to the main task of 
this study of identifying the monotheistic path to the modern world. Con-
temporary research has provided studies that focused on understanding of the 
Sinic and Indic contributions, and I do personally appreciate the importance 
of having a more comprehensive understanding of the modern world as the 
collective project of culturally and religiously diverse humanity. I tried to 
show in this work that the Sinic and Indic contributions have been channeled 
through the Islamic synthesis of antiquity into the modern world.
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To conclude, the present chapter has discussed at some length the historical 
role played by Islamic monotheism with the full collaboration of peoples born 
into other religious traditions in shaping human consciousness and setting the 
social and intellectual foundations for the modern world. The next chapter 
will illustrate the impact of Islamic consciousness, with all its intellectual, sci-
entific, and social ideas and institutions, on the rise of modern society in the 
least expected regions of the premodern world—the Occident. For centuries 
the Occident refused to succumb to the powerful Muslim empires that tried 
relentlessly to penetrate deep into the heart of Europe from the West and East. 
This resistance was remarkable for many reasons, not the least of which is the 
role the Occident was destined to play in taking over from the exhausted Is-
lamic world and reenergizing the drive to perfect human learning, invention, 
and organization. The exhaustion and corruption of the Islamic civilization 
toward the end of the eighteenth century became quite obvious, even in its 
most vibrant region, the Ottoman Empire, as it increasingly showed signs of 
corruption and fatigue while Europe was going through a new phase of reju-
venation and excitement, as it grew ready to assume its historical role and to 
expend its newly founded energy in its bid to dominate the old world while 
building a new world in the then-recently-discovered continents of America 
and Oceania.
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Modern civilization as we know it today is rightly traced to the Enlighten-
ment movement, for that was where the rationalization of reformed Chris-
tianity began. The rationalization starting point was in the values and ideas 
that have formed the axiom of reformed Christianity and the rise of Prot-
estantism as the fountain of the new ethos that had to be institutionalized, 
systematized, and secularized. Secularization as a process was thought ini-
tially to involve the political sphere alone, as a necessary labor to ensure the 
separation of the state and the church. By the seventeenth century, Europeans 
were exhausted by endless religious wars instigated by the Roman church 
that was determined to keep the Protestant Reformation movement in check. 
It is not clear how much of the religious reform was inspired by the Islamic 
conception of religious responsibility, as Luther was clearly disturbed by the 
over-ritualistic form of religiosity taught by the Roman church that was thin 
on moral and spiritual teachings. Such critique of ritualized religiosity could 
be found in the work of Muslim jurists such as al-Muhasibi (781–857 CE) and 
al-Ghazali (1058–1111 CE). Like Islam, Protestantism rejected priesthood, 
emphasized the right of all people of faith to engage the sacred text, and 
expected considerable measures of equality and justice from the political sys-
tem. Yet there is no evidence for the connection between the Islamic jurists’ 
ideas and that of the fathers of Protestant Christianity. The ideas could also 
be derived from a critical reading of the biblical text. What is evident though 
is that ideas developed within the Islamic civilization were being integrated 
gradually into Western European culture and thought.
We will examine in this chapter the extent to which Western Europe 
has embraced cultural, intellectual, and scientific elements it encountered in 
the Islamic literary, philosophical, and scientific works translated over five 
centuries from the Arabic civilization in Andalusia. The Iberian Peninsula 
formed, we will argue in this chapter, the Western frontiers between Islam 
and Christendom that were vital for the transmission of science and technol-
ogy to the most isolated part of Europe that was completely cut off from the 
East. Andalusia as a frontier region was not simply a border line but a zone of 
contact where Christians interacted with one of the most advanced centers of 
leaning of the Middle Age. European Christians were able to visit, trade, live, 
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and study in Muslim cities. They became increasingly interested in Islamic 
learning, philosophy, and science as they saw the impact of that learning 
on the quality of life in Andalusia that was unmatched in any Middle-Age 
European town or city. With the fall of Cordoba, the seat of the Umayyad 
Dynasty in Andalusia, the Cordoba’s library was copied and shipped to differ-
ent regions in North West Europe, particularly British Isles, the Kingdom of 
France, and the Roman Holy Empire. Although little research has been done 
to shed light on the impact of Muslim scholarship on the rise of European, 
significant information has been uncovered to show that modern European 
philosophy and science represent a substantial break with Roman and Greek 
learning, as ample examples reveal that modern European scholarship and 
science depended extensively on the work of Muslim philosophers, scientists, 
and literary figures to set Europe in motion into modern times. The ingenu-
ity of Europe lay not only in bringing the sciences of mathematics, physics, 
chemistry, and astronomy into greater advancement and systematization but 
also in developing the technology that transformed the whole world, placing 
it on the verge of a new global age.
Christian-Muslim frontiers as zones of contact
Christian and Muslim empires were engaged for centuries in existential 
struggle, and the attacks and counterattacks created deep resentments par-
ticularly along the frontiers. The frontiers were not made of borderlines but 
of large zones that constituted “zones of contact.” In the zones of contact 
lived diverse communities of Abrahamic faiths. These communities were at 
times devastated by the ongoing bloody conf licts, but they were often living 
a prosperous and productive life. The frontier communities interacted among 
themselves through different forms, including negotiation, trade, and cul-
tural exchange. It is this state of confrontation and civilizational and cultural 
exchange that we need to explore and assess in this chapter. The encounters 
between diverse religious and ethnic communities took place throughout 
the Islamic civilization that developed with great vibrancy for over a mil-
lennium, and its vibrancy was especially visible along its frontiers. The idea 
of Christian-Muslim frontier was discussed in a recent book by Mario Ap-
ostolov. His research focused on the East-Mediterranean frontier, which was 
for him an area stretching from Mecca to Vienna.1 Along these frontiers the 
three Abrahamic traditions cooperated and learned from each other. The 
Mecca-Vienna axis was, however, not the only important frontier. Equally 
important exchanges between Muslims and Christians took place on a sec-
ond frontier along the Cordoba-Paris axis. The frontier areas served as zones 
of sustained interaction and exchange of products as well as of cultures and 
ideas.2 The frontier was a zone in which Muslims and Christians confronted 
each other and where antinomies were in constant dialogue: “localism ver-
sus imperial mentality; communal conf lict versus pluralism; and nationalism 
versus regionalism or globalization.”3
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The frontier was not considered by the rivaling powers that competed for 
its control to be a zone of contact but rather a border and frontline to keep 
the enemies at bay. The frontier was a zone of contact particularly due to the 
persistent communication and exchange among its residents and the recur-
ring tensions between the mixed populations that inhabited it. However, be-
cause of the role it played historically in regulating the relationship between 
the competing Christian and Muslim empires, it has served as a principle of 
order, in the same fashion that boundaries between modern states do.4 As 
boundaries are essential for regulating interactions and movements between 
two states, so did the frontier serve to regulate interaction and movement 
across empires and civilizations. The frontier as a zone of contact has long 
been recognized by members of the communities that inhabited it. Apos-
tolov reports that the expression can be found in an official Bulgarian his-
tory textbook that includes a chapter titled “The Bulgarians in the Zone of 
Contact between Christianity and Islam.”5 Life in the frontier was greatly 
inf luenced by the collective historical memories of the various communities, 
who seemed to be able to remember past grievances and pains more readily 
than they did of happy and positive moments. These historical memoires 
have been used as fragments of evidence by exclusivist movements within the 
three Abrahamic traditions and have been effectively employed to perpetuate 
mistrust and foment fear and resentment.
Five moments in particular have left a lasting impact on the social, cul-
tural, and demographic composition of the frontier—the Arab expansion in 
the seventh century into territories previously controlled by the Byzantine 
Empire in the Levant region, the brutal eradication of Islam and Judaism 
from the Iberian Peninsula by the Kingdom of Castile and Aragon, the coun-
terattacks by the Crusades in the East-Mediterranean frontier, the Ottoman 
push throughout the Balkans and against the walls of Vienna, and finally the 
colonial expansion of European powers in the past two centuries into Muslim 
countries. Human psychology and political expediency often combine these 
moments to paint completely negative pictures. The change of regimes in 
frontier regions often leaves bitter and negative memories of control, domi-
nation, and oppression, whereas memories of positive exchanges seem to fade 
away with time.
While these movements across geography and history were associated with 
considerable amount of external force and violence, the impetus of the ter-
ritorial push in one direction or the other was equally derived from politi-
cal ambitions as from religion. The strategies for dealing with the external 
threats changed considerably over time, and the dynamics of expansion and 
contraction were not always the same. The Muslims’ drive to conquer Per-
sia and Byzantium was mainly political, motivated by the desire to end the 
imperial gridlock against the growing power of the Medina state and later 
by the desire to create a new order rooted in the egalitarian values of Islam. 
With the success of the military campaigns against the main empires of the 
time, the Sassanian and the Byzantine, the dynamics of conquest started to 
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change. The caliphate in Damascus and then in Baghdad became interested 
in creating a new world order ruled by Islamic centers and governed by the 
new norms that permitted more local autonomy and unconstrained trade. 
Muslim empires did not see religious, ethnical, or tribal diversity as a threat 
to peace and cooperation, but as a natural feature of expansive empires. The 
challenge, therefore, was not how to rid the territories of Islam (Dar al Islam) 
of non-Muslim congregations or non-Arab communities. The challenge was 
rather the institutionalization of difference. The solution was to recognize 
the legal and administrative autonomy of the various confessional communi-
ties that formed the Abode of Islam (territory of Islam). This solution allowed 
individuals to live in communities of shared identities, shaped by religious 
and ethnic similarities. They were also subject to legal, administrative, and 
ethical judgments made by public officials who shared the community reli-
gious affiliation and moral commitments, as each confessional community 
enjoyed full autonomy. This form of political organization markedly reduced 
social alienation, often experienced by members of minority communities 
who lived in societies where their cultural and religious specificities were 
not recognized. This explains why Jewish communities under Muslim rule 
had no significant instances of discrimination, stigmatization, or forced exile.
The Christian response to the expansion of Muslim empires took naturally 
a defensive character. To fend the religious inf luence into historically Chris-
tian communities, Latin Christianity treated religious diversity as a greater 
threat than ever before and pushed toward religious purity. With the collapse 
of the Roman Empire, the Roman church became the only institution ca-
pable of promoting collective life in Europe. Christianity was decisive for 
reuniting the diverse ethnic communities of Europe and relied initially on 
the temporal powers of the Franks and Visigoths, but later assumed power 
directly through the unchallenged authority of the office of the Pope. The 
Catholic Church singlehandedly promoted education and even dealt with 
matter of administration, dispensation of justice, and mobilization of armies 
for common defense as well as for expansion. In the area of religious edu-
cation, the church focused primarily on educating clergymen, giving little 
attention to public education. The church became more focused on religious 
piety and discipline and geared its teaching toward the creation of saintly rul-
ing elites. Christian priesthood became completely devoted to the promotion 
of the mission of the church, as rules for marriage of priests were made more 
stringent and the demands for celibacy were greatly elevated.6
Islam’s rising power and gradual expansion into Christian territories and 
communities gave Muslims greater confidence in their ability to prevail and 
triumph. Islam’s religious teachings that stipulated complete religious free-
dom for Christianity combined with Muslim self-confidence allowed Mus-
lim societies to display unprecedented degree of tolerance toward religious 
and ethnic diversity. Medieval Christianity and church authorities became, 
on the other hand, more defensive and stringent in dealing with religious 
diversity. The opposition between the two worlds was driven as much by 
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politics as by religion. The opposition between the two was not primarily 
theological but political. Apart from the political and military conf licts, there 
were tremendous opportunities for cultural and scientific learning and ex-
change between the two civilizations. As we discuss below, the civilizational 
exchange did not only lead to improvement in skills and technologies but has 
also contributed to philosophical, theological, and normative convergence 
among the followers of the three Abrahamic traditions.
Scientific and cultural exchange on the Western frontiers
The Christian-Muslim frontiers in the Iberian Peninsula (711–1492) and 
southern Italy (830–1382) provided the milieu for centuries-long experimen-
tation with religious pluralism. There is substantial evidence to show that 
the pluralist society continued for a while even after political power changed 
hands between Muslims and Christians, and Christian monarchs soon came 
under increased pressure from the Pope to abandon the multi- religious 
openness, created by Arab culture, in favor of religious homogeneity. The 
transition from the Muslim Kalbid Dynasty to the Christian Hohenstaufen 
Dynasty in southern Italy is a case in point. The Emirate of Sicily was ruled 
by the Kalbid Dynasty for over two centuries (830–1091).7 The Muslim pres-
ence in Sicily and Malta continued till the late thirteenth century, and many 
Muslim scientists and scholars were employed by Roger II, Fredrick II, and 
Charles I during that period.8 The mixed population in the frontier lived 
in reasonable harmony, practiced their religions in peace, intermarried, and 
engaged in trade. There are indications that some Christian monarchs, most 
notably Fredrick, were interested in maintaining the pluralist society that was 
created in Sicily by the Muslims, but the intense pressure from Rome led ul-
timately to adopting a hostile stance against the Muslim population that was 
eventually forced out of Sicily, Malta, and Pantelleria Island.
The church was a major force in the drive to end religious pluralism and 
was bent on stopping the cultural openness and exchange that were in full 
force throughout the Christian-Muslim frontiers. Fredrick II, who was 
crowned by Pope Innocent III as the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, 
came under increased pressure by Pope Gregory IX who accused him of 
neglecting churches, while constructing Muslim buildings, in Lucera. The 
churches were evidently dilapidated as many of them stopped functioning in 
the predominantly Muslim city of Lucera. When Fredrick did not respond to 
the pressure of the church, he was excommunicated in 1227 by Pope Greg-
ory IX.9 Pope Gregory wanted Fredrick to allow Christian missionaries into 
Lucera and protested the establishment of Agarenorum Gymnasia (Hagrites 
Schools), a reference to the establishment of Qur’anic schools in Lucera.10 
The Papacy at Rome was suspicious of him because of his close relations with 
Muslims and was not invited to the fifth Crusade. He organized in 1227 a 
maritime expedition to the city of Acre, which is considered the sixth Cru-
sade. His was the only peaceful Crusade resulting in the signing of a treaty 
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with Sultan al-Kamil of the Ayyubid Dynasty. The treaty allowed him to 
enter Jerusalem, and he was given by al-Kamil the honorary title of the King 
of Jerusalem.11 Neither Fredrick’s crusading efforts nor his title were, how-
ever, recognized by the church. Two years after Pope Gregory IX ended his 
excommunication, Fredrick permitted Christian missionaries in 1232 into 
Lucera but continued to maintain positive relations with Muslims. Fredrick’s 
diplomatic relationship with al-Kamil developed into deeper cooperation, 
and the “sultan further indulged Fredrick by sending him the mathematician 
Al-‘Alim Qaysar, known as the Hanafi, to him.”12
Yet it was this open culture shaped for centuries by the Muslim kingdoms 
in Spain that permitted the cultural exchange and intellectual borrowing 
across the religious divide between the Christian and Muslim communities. 
The military confrontations were not necessarily between Christianity and 
Islam but rather between two expansionist empires and intolerant Roman 
church that rejected then the idea of religious pluralism. There is no denying 
that religion often provided the moral impetus and spiritual motivation for 
such wars. However, the fighting was often triggered by the sense of threat 
and the perception that the other has a bad faith and sinister design. Occa-
sionally, expansion was triggered by internal disturbances caused by oppres-
sive and unjust rulers, giving the other the justification or pretense to expand 
into the enemy’s territories. It has been argued that the “dazzling rapidity” 
with which Muslim armies moved through Christian territories in the Le-
vant, North Africa, and the Iberian Peninsula was “chief ly due, not to Mus-
lim prowess or Byzantine inefficiency, but to the assistance and friendliness 
of the Christian populations of Syria and Egypt, sick to death of theocratic 
oppression and of theology.”13 Muslims’ appetite for learning and support of 
sciences was also welcomed by the mainly Christian Nestorian population. 
Mosques became not only centers of worship and devotion but also centers of 
learning with a school attached to every mosque.14
The literature describing the contributions of the Islamic civilization to 
European Renaissance has expanded in recent decades, and so I would not 
attempt to produce in this chapter a full account of the depth and breadth 
of the Arabic civilization’s contributions to the rise of modern Europe. I 
intend instead to deconstruct the notion that Arabs did nothing more than 
passing the Greek sciences to Europe and show that science as the meticulous 
and systematic investigation of nature, undertaken with the use of advanced 
mathematics and experimentation in physics, chemistry, and biology, was a 
new invention of the Muslim civilization, that the Greek had no clue as how 
to conduct. I would like also to illustrate the role played by rational ideal-
ism, with its unique humanistic and egalitarian spirit, in shaping modern 
philosophy and ethics. To begin with, we should point out that the scientific 
method, erroneously attributed to Francis Bacon, was developed, perfected, 
and used by Muslim scientists long before European scientists embraced the 
new scientific spirit. Arab contributions to science are often downplayed as 
early European historians ignored Muslim contributions, rooting the modern 
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scientific spirit in the Greek natural philosophy. This is obviously a mischar-
acterization and blatant distortion of historical records. Briffault protested, 
around the turn of the twentieth century, what he called “the general con-
spiracy of silence of our histories,” reminding his readers that the importance 
of the Arab contributions to science was not limited to “startling discoveries 
or revolutionary theories.” Rather, “science owes a great deal more to Arab 
culture, it owes its existence.” He goes on to argue that the Greek, Roman, 
and Hellenic worlds were essentially prescientific. While Greece in particu-
lar was the center of natural philosophy, it was interested more in creating 
theories of general nature, than in scientific investigation and experimenta-
tion.15 It was in Muslim Spain and southern Italy, between the eleventh and 
sixteenth centuries, that Christian students of science, philosophy, and arts 
acquired and internalized the modern sciences and culture.
Roger Bacon (1220–1290), the twelfth-century philosopher, was himself 
a student of Muslim science and one of its apostles to Christian Europe. He 
reportedly encouraged his European contemporaries to learn the language 
and sciences of the Arabs, “declaring that knowledge of Arabic and Arabian 
science was for his contemporaries the only way to true knowledge.”16 His 
closet friend, Raymond Lully (1232–1315), studied in Cordoba in Muslim 
Spain and taught at Montpellier.17 Similarly, Daniel of Morley (1140–1210) 
learned mathematics and astronomy in Cordoba before he returned to Eng-
land to lecture at Oxford University. In the same century, Leonardo Fibo-
nacci, a young merchant of Pisa traveled to Algeria and Spain and “became 
enamored of the new mathematical sciences of the Arabs, and after several 
new journeys issued a translation of Al-Khwarizmi’s great work on alge-
bra.”18 Gerard of Cremona (1114–1187) of north Italy spent 50 years in To-
ledo, during the Caliphate of Cordoba, and returned late in his life to his 
birthplace with over 60 translations, including the Book of Astronomy by 
Ibn al-Haytham (965–1040).19 The Caliphate of Cordoba of southern Spain 
was the mecca of young Christian scholars throughout the twelfth and thir-
teenth centuries that Alvaro, the Bishop of Cordoba under the Muslim rule, 
declared that
[a]ll the young Christians who distinguished themselves by their talent, 
know the language and literature of the Arabs, read and study passion-
ately the Arab books, gather at great expense great libraries of these, and 
everywhere proclaim with a loud voice how admirable is that literature.20
There are many examples that we became aware of in the last century of the 
direct borrowing of European scientists from the body of scientific knowledge 
that was extensively translated to Latin, and was used without attribution by 
the pioneers of European science. Suffice it here to consider the first scientific 
discovery made in Europe was credited to Copernicus (1473–1543), concern-
ing the movement of the earth around the sun. Recent documents retrieved 
from translated work from Arabic sources showed the total indebtedness of 
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the Copernicus discovery to Arabic astronomy. First, Victor Roberts showed 
in 1957 that Copernicus lunar model was identical to that produced by Ibn 
al-Shatir (d. 1375) over a century earlier.21 Then E.S. Kennedy found in 
1966 another document with a detailed diagram that summarizes alternative 
models to Ptolemaic movements of the upper planets in relation to the earth, 
which were developed by the fourteenth-century Muslim astronomers, in-
cluding Qutb al-Din al-Shirazi and Mu'ayyad al-Din al-Urdi. George Saliba 
discussed in an article, published in 1987 in Revue de Synthèse, the above and 
other recent findings, including a detailed paper written in fifteenth century 
by several Muslim astronomers at Maragha. Saliba illustrated in his paper that 
“Copernicus's models are identical with those of the earlier Maragha astron-
omers.”22 For him “The question therefore is not whether, but when, where, 
and in what form he [i.e. Copernicus] learned of Maragha theory.”23
Yet despite these significant interactions and the expositions of European 
scholars to Islamic science and learning, today’s graduates of Western schools 
and universities are hardly, even remotely, aware of this common heritage of 
Western and Islamic civilizations. It is unclear why, over the centuries, the Is-
lamic origin of modern philosophy and science has been gradually obscured, 
until it almost completely disappeared around the turn of the nineteenth 
century. It is true that science and philosophy are part of the human heritage, 
and no civilization can claim exclusive ownership of it. Still, the original 
philosophers and scientists responsible for important contributions to the col-
lective heritage of the human race deserve to be remembered and credited 
with their inventions and contributions. Muslim philosophers attributed the 
origin of their philosophy to the Greek, continued to call Aristotle the first 
teacher, and attributed to him the ideas originated in his work. Briffault 
recognizes the dismissive European attitude that claimed “Arab sciences pro-
duced no surpassing genius and no transcending discovery; that it was derived 
from extraneous sources.”24 He objects to this blatant “misrepresentation,” 
stressing that it
is highly probable that but for the Arabs modern European civilization 
would never have risen at all; it is absolutely certain that but for them, it 
would not have assumed that character which has enabled it to transcend 
all previous phases of evolution.25
Evidently, the Arabs passed to Europe their own scientific theories and dis-
coveries and not that of the Greek science. Europe did not build its scientific 
enterprise on Greek sciences, for the Greek simply developed a philosophy of 
nature but never science as an enterprise based on observation, mathematical 
formulations, and experimentation.
What we call science arose in Europe as a result of a new spirit of in-
quiry, of new methods of investigation, of the method of experiment, 
observation, measurement, of the development of mathematics in a form 
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unknown to the Greeks. That spirit and those methods were introduced 
into the European world by the Arabs.26
But despite irrefutable evidence that Arabic sciences have already taken their 
modern forms, and of the heavy European borrowing (even copying) from 
Arabic sciences up until the seventeenth century, modern historians of sci-
ence continue to dismiss the profound contributions made by Arabic and 
Muslim scientists to modern science. The sociologist Toby Huff provides 
interesting arguments in order to completely dismiss the relevance of Arabic 
sciences, rather than incorporate them as foundational to modern scientific 
revolution. In his work, The Rise of Early Modern Science: Islam, China, and 
the West, he identifies two problems with Arabic science that prevented it 
from developing into modern science. First, Islam’s alleged anti-rational ten-
dencies, and as a proof of that Huff cites Ghazali’s critical views of Greek 
metaphysics as evidence. Second, the increased conversion of new popula-
tions, leading to “apparent decline and retrogression of scientific thought 
and practice in Arabic-Islamic civilization after the thirteenth century.”27 
His arguments ignore completely established evidence that problematizes 
his assertions, as he selectively picks examples convenient to his thesis. Jon-
athan Lyons provides a thorough examination of this relentless campaign 
to discredit Arabic civilization and mystify its essential role in the rise of 
modern civilization, in his recent work, Islam through Western Eyes. Lyons at-
tributes, what he calls the “strategy is to downplay or ignore outright Islamic 
achievements in science and philosophy,”28 to an obsession with establish-
ing monopoly over science, including perpetuating “mythlike events” that 
“have enshrined the birth and subsequent history of modern science” within 
Western civilization.29
Intellectual convergence and the seduction 
of rational idealism
The inf luence of Islamic civilization on shaping the modern West was not 
limited to the area of natural science and technology but was as profound 
on the development of modern philosophy, theology, and ethics. There are 
numerous examples scattered through the annals of the Renaissance, Refor-
mation, and Enlightenment of the modern West that started to surface only 
recently. The impact of Islam on Christian Europe can be traced through 
many moments, and the convergence of ideas between the two civilizations 
is very striking. Thomas Aquinas, whose inf luence on the rise of modern 
philosophical thought is hardly in dispute, was an astute student of Islamic 
philosophy. His writings were inf luenced by several Muslim scholars, par-
ticularly that of Averroes and al-Farabi (872–951 CE). Robert Hammond 
demonstrated in his work, The Philosophy of Alfarabi, that while Aquinas does 
not cite Farabi as the source of his ideas, he borrowed heavily and sometimes 
literally from al-Farabi’s writings. Hammond provides examples to illustrate 
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that not only did Aquinas paraphrase Farabi’s arguments, but his writings 
were occasionally direct translations of Farabi’s works. He shows that Aqui-
nas’s arguments paralleled those of Farabi on the proofs of divine existence, 
divine qualities, and psychology.
Al-Farabi insisted that human beings cannot comprehend God because of 
the limitations of human rationality.30 The more humans try to comprehend 
the essence of God the more they would be led astray. Human imperfections 
prevent us of apprehending the perfect being, in the same manner human 
vision cannot see a perfect light. Al-Farabi, however, contended that God’s 
essence is in his existence. Hammond compares Al-Farabi’s Gems of Wisdom 
with Aquinas’s Summa Theologica and finds total correspondence in thought 
and arguments, and occasionally correspondence with the way these ideas are 
expressed. For example, in comparing the first proof of God’s existence, one 
can see clearly that Aquinas’s argument follows closely that of Farabi, almost 
to the letter. Here is how Farabi presented the proof of motion:
In this world there are things which are moved. Now, every object which 
is moved receives its motion from a mover. If the mover is itself moved, 
there must be another mover moving it, and after that still another and 
so on. But it is impossible to go onto infinity in the series of movers and 
things moved. Therefore, there must be an immovable mover, and this 
is God.31
Three centuries later, Aquinas makes the same argument, using the same 
terms:
It is certain and evident to our senses that in the world some things are 
in motion. Now, whatever is in motion is put in motion by another … 
If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also 
must need be put in motion by anther, and that by another again. But 
this cannot go on to infinity. Therefore, it is necessary to arrive at a first 
mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be 
God.32
Similar inf luence can be seen in the impact of Ghazali on the French philos-
opher and scientist Blaise Pascal (1623–1662). Ghazali, like all the followers 
of Islamic rationalism, insisted that a true faith is an informed faith and that 
doubts are the only way for a person to arrive at a situation of informed faith. 
Throughout his writings Ghazali expounded the notion of limited rational-
ity and believed in the futility of reducing faith to doctrine, for doctrine is 
an effort to render something that is so profound and transcendental to the 
concrete reality of infallible humans. One aspect of the Ghazali’s thought 
that relates to the notion of limited rationality that has left a profound impact 
on Pascal and other Western philosophers, such as Hume and Kant, can be 
found in the argument of the “betting.” As we noted earlier, Ghazali wrote 
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The Refutation of Philosophers to demonstrate the inability of human rationality 
to ascertain metaphysical questions. He concluded therefore that faith is not 
grounded by a theoretical or intellectual foundation but in human passion and 
is seen through the “eye of the heart.” This theory became the foundation of 
Pascal’s argument for the “logic of the heart.” Both Ghazali and Pascal agree 
that faith is not arrived at through deductive reasoning but through direct or 
“intuitive” reasoning.33 M. Asin Palacios who traces the impact of Ghazali 
on Pascal assesses their arguments on the notion of “betting” and finds that 
Ghazali was more comprehensive while Pascal more lucid. “Pascal’s Pensees 
does not seem to be a completed work as Ghazali’s books are,” he contends. 
“Though, the mathematical clarity of Pascal and results of his calculations of 
probability cannot be found in Ghazali.”34
Ghazali’s critique of Greek metaphysics was echoed in Kant’s extensive 
critique of metaphysics. Like Ghazali he makes a clear distinction between 
transcendental knowledge and sensuous knowledge. In the Refutation of Phi-
losophers, Ghazali identified three areas in which Muslim rationalist argu-
ments (kalam) come into conf lict with Greek philosophy: semantics, physics, 
and metaphysics (or divinity). He warned Muslim scholars against a hasty 
rejection of philosophical knowledge on the basis of semantic disagreement 
over the usage of certain terms, or on the basis of apparent disagreement 
between Qur'anic statements and physical knowledge. The main area of con-
tention with Greek philosophy, he insisted, was with the rational study of 
Divinity (ilahiyat).35 Divinity, he insisted, is made of assertions that cannot 
be confirmed by reason because they address matter beyond the reach of the 
empirical experience of people. The notion that metaphysical reality can-
not be ascertained through deductive reasoning was picked up and further 
elaborated by anther Muslim scholar, who himself made a lasting impact on 
modern thought: Ibn Khaldun. Ibn Khaldun argued that the deductive rea-
soning expounded by the Greek philosophers was inadequate, particularly 
when used to verify the existence of metaphysical beings and understand 
their essence. This, he contended, is due to the lack of connection between 
thought and being at the level of simple comprehension. For in the case of 
metaphysical arguments, the categories the mind uses to contemplate the 
metaphysical are derived from the empirical reality. Therefore, using Greek 
logic to understand the metaphysical world is problematic, for here not only 
are we unable to establish the correspondence between propositions and re-
ality, but we lack even the means for verifying the existence of metaphysical 
objects themselves. As he put it,
As to the existents which lie beyond our senses, i.e. the spiritual or what 
is known as the science of divinity and the science of metaphysics, these 
are completely unknown. Nor can we have access to them or prove their 
existence because the derivation of the mental from the concrete beings, 
that have objective reality, is only possible in the case of what we can 
comprehend; but since we do not comprehend spiritual beings, we cannot 
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abstract concepts of things we do not sense; nor can we prove or establish 
their existence, except perhaps by introspective knowledge of our own 
human spirit. But even then, a great deal of ambiguity regarding the es-
sence and properties [of the spirit] remains.36
The Khaldunian language anticipates the work of Kant, as the latter argues 
that the truth of transcendental ideas (or the reality of ostensible objects) 
cannot be affirmed in the absence of any formal conditions that permit us to 
subsume transcendental objects under concepts.37 “The pure categories, apart 
from formal conditions of sensibility,” he writes,
have only transcendental meaning; nevertheless they may not be em-
ployed transcendentally, such an employment being in itself impossible, 
inasmuch as all conditions of any employment in judgments are lacking 
to them, namely, the formal conditions of the subsumption of any osten-
sible object under these concepts.38
As to the truth of the formal conditions of the subsumption of sensible ob-
jects, Kant invokes the principle of necessity whereby the rules regulating the 
subsumption of objects (identity, difference, and non-contradiction) acquire 
their universality and objective validity by being borne concomitantly in 
the minds of rational beings in general and substantiated through general 
consensus. “The union of representations in the consciousness is judgment,” 
Kant asserts.
Thinking, therefore, is the same as judging or referring representations 
to judgments in general. Hence judgments are either merely subjective 
when representations are referred to a consciousness in one subject only 
and united in it, or object, when they are united in consciousness in gen-
eral, that is, necessarily.39
While Kant succeeded in grounding reasoning in empirical experience and 
forcefully defended the autonomy of human reason and its sufficiency for 
guiding human action, he clearly failed to ground ethics in practical reason. 
Modern scholarship continued the quest to ground value judgments in em-
pirically defined rationality, with little success. English philosophers from 
Bentham to Mill tried to build ethics on economic reasoning of cost-benefit 
analysis, by devising utilitarian ethics, but the project reduced ethical rea-
soning to public policy instrumentalism. Ultimately, the dominant positivist 
school gradually gave up its efforts to build ethical reasoning on a purely 
empirical basis. The failure of empiricism and positivism to develop a purely 
empirical foundation of knowledge has undermined rationality and has em-
boldened postmodern writers and encouraged them to deny the possibil-
ity of pursuing truth. Postmodernism places rationalism on equal footing 
with irrationalism and equates morality and immorality. This puts modern 
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scholarship in serious predicament, as it has neither been able to ground ethics 
in empiricist epistemology nor seems to have the will to revert to a transcen-
dentally grounded ethical system.
Enlightenment and echoes of idealism-realism tensions
Rational idealism grew gradually though the increasingly vibrant Latiniza-
tion of Islamic scholarship and science, before it began to develop a more Eu-
ropean f lavor. The Dutch Republic of the United Netherlands (1581–1795) 
became in the sixteenth century the center of the new increasingly confi-
dent rationalist ideas that defined the European Enlightenment and reshaped 
Europe. Amsterdam was then the home of the French Philosopher Rene 
Descartes whose philosophical meditations established the modern rationalist 
tradition. Descartes uses the metaphor of tree to describe the structure of 
philosophy, which for him encompassed the entire field of human knowl-
edge. Metaphysics formed, then, the roots of the tree and physics the trunk, 
from which branched out three spheres of learning: medicine, mechanics, 
and ethics. Descartes attempted to develop the elements of a system of ethics 
in his work, Passions of the Soul, but he did that with limited success. The 
task of providing a new grounding for ethical thinking was left to his most 
eminent student, Benedict de Spinoza. Spinoza provided in his work, Ethics, 
a carefully built system of ethics, with astonishing similarities to the one we 
encountered in the rational idealism of the Mutazilite and Asharite traditions. 
Spinoza, whose father immigrated from Andalusia to France in his youth 
before settling in Amsterdam, grounded his conceptualization of the social 
order in the sphere of ontology and ethics. He built his new ethical system 
on five pillars: (1) reason as the foundation of both understanding and ethics; 
(2) nature and natural law as the highest order for the individual and society; 
(3) freedom to be attained by following reason and its dictates, not human 
emotions and desires; (4) the desirability of replacing the state of nature with 
civil state, by surrendering natural rights to achieve civil order, or “mutual 
confidence,” that protects citizens against harm caused by others and protect 
property; and (5) the “civil state” grounded in the “common agreement” 
that takes the form of an enacted law defines “good and bad” and obeyed by 
citizens of the state.40
Spinoza, a talented and recognized mathematician of his time, wrote his 
Ethics in a style borrowed from the science of mathematics, presenting his 
work through a series of axioms, propositions, and proofs. He contended that 
the only way for human beings to live a good life was to live in accordance 
to virtue. A virtuous life is one guided by deep concern for personal good, 
or pleasure, and the good of other fellow human beings. A life in pursuit of 
good and pleasure could be attained by following reason, for reason requires 
that individuals simultaneously desire good for themselves and to others. Spi-
noza explains this quality of reason by reference to the “knowledge of God,” 
a knowledge he sees as innate to human nature. He further links the ethical 
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quality of human life to the substance humans share with the divine spirit, 
a concept rooted in Islamic thought and Islamic text. The metaphor of the 
“divine substance” is a direct Qur’anic description of the origin of human 
life. The Qur’an posits the creation of Adam, the first human being, as the 
outcome of the breathing of the divine spirit into the earthly clay molded into 
the human shape. Spinoza employs the same concept by replacing the notion 
of “spirit” with that of “substance,” which at the level of metaphysical specu-
lation means the same thing. He presents his theory of the knowledge of God 
as partaking in the divine substance in Part IV of Ethics, under proposition 36:
Insofar as men live by the guidance of reason, they are most useful to 
man (Cor 1. Pr. 35, IV), and so (Pr. 19, IV) by the guidance of reason we 
shall necessarily endeavor to bring it about that men should live by the 
guidance of reason. But the good that every man who lives according to 
the dictates of reason, that is (Pr. 24, IV), who pursues virtue, seeks for 
himself is to understand (Pr. 26, IV). Therefore the good which every 
man who pursues virtue seeks for himself will also desire for the rest of 
mankind. Again, desire, insofar as it is related to mind, is the very es-
sence of mind (Def. of Emotions 1). Now the essence of mind consists 
in knowledge (Pr. 11, II) which involves the knowledge of God (Pr. 47, 
II), without which (Pr. 15, I) It can neither be nor be conceived. So the 
more the essence of the mind involves knowledge of God, the greater 
the desire with which he who pursues virtue desires for another the good 
which he seeks for himself.41
The phrase “the knowledge of God” does not necessarily exclude knowledge 
borne in religious experience but refers mainly to the knowledge relevant to 
the idea of God, which is intrinsic to human nature, being a finite substance 
derived from the same “infinite” substance of God. Virtue, though being 
an individual quality, has a social function, as it sets the stage for found-
ing a society based on the common good. It is important to distinguish the 
idea of virtue that was presented in Spinoza’s philosophy from its meaning 
in the Greek philosophy. For while the Greeks grounded virtue in honor 
and self-pride, Spinoza grounded virtue in the monotheistic worldview of 
human nature and its connection with the divine substance, or spirit. This 
understanding of ethics as an innate quality of the human beings, constituted 
of certain qualities or values that characterize the human spirit and which 
are in turn derived from the divine spirit, was first articulated by Islamic 
rationalism that understood the transcendent as a moral being characterized 
by beautiful names, spelled out in the Qur’anic revelation.42 Spinoza stresses 
the need for establishing a civil state based on common agreement to protect 
the “natural rights” that people hold in common in the “state of nature.” 
This need is borne out of two factors. First, people in the state of nature 
have to pursue virtuous life in accordance with their individual judgments, 
increasing thereby the possibility of conf lict. Second, human action is always 
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led by virtue and reason, as human emotions are much stronger than rea-
son. Actions based on emotions pull people in opposite directions and make 
mutual help, which they all need for their common good, impossible.43 For 
all practical purposes, Spinoza declares that reason, and reason alone, is suffi-
cient guide for the modern person, in both the scientific search for truth and 
moral judgment. As we will argue below, this hopeful vision would prove 
to be much more challenging than it seemed at the moment of the European 
Enlightenment.
It was through Spinoza, who appeared in the late Middle Age saturated 
with his father’s Andalusian “background,” that the idealist-realist tension 
emerges in European thought. We find his ideas bifurcate to the idealism we 
encounter in Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel; the positivism of Leibniz, Hume, 
and Comte; and the materialism of Marx, Benjamin, and Adorno.44 Spi-
noza’s ideas were later on picked and expanded by both the English school 
that adopted an empiricist approach to understanding reality through the 
work of David Hume, Jeremy Bentham, and James Mill, and the Continental 
school that embraced a rationalist approach through the writings of Gottfried 
Leibniz, Immanuel Kant, and Georg Hegel.45 However, what all of these 
Enlightenment philosophers shared in common was their commitment to 
the rational tradition, combined with an increased sense of secular and lib-
eral ethos that shifted the focus from metaphysics to individual dignity and 
natural rights. The three modern traditions, idealism, positivism, and mate-
rialism, were all committed to individual freedom and critical rationalism. 
They all formed the emancipatory project to free the European society from 
the ancient regime that held it back for ages and kept it under the yoke of the 
arbitrary will of the powerful. They all contributed, each in its own way, to 
the rise of modern society with all the possibilities it offers to free individuals 
with heightened personal capacities to contribute to the collective good. But 
beyond individual and social emancipation, they pushed modern humanity in 
all possible directions, as the clarity of life’s meaning and individual’s purpose 
gradually faded away.
The European Enlightenment represented a moment of meaning and 
unity of purpose, even though the notion of God as a caring and spiritual 
being was maintained only by the rational idealist project. Positivism and 
materialism emerged during the Enlightenment to reduce the concept of 
God to its pre-monotheistic conceptions embraced by the Greek religion 
and philosophy. God became either the first mover who created the uni-
verse and then left it to its own mechanism and fate or the eternal matter 
that is at the same time a self-ordered nature. Only in Kant’s rational ide-
alism we could encounter God as a central element of moral subjectivity; 
God as the hope of the moral individual. While Kant was clearly aware 
that his philosophy has abandoned God as an objective reality, retaining his 
presence vaguely in the transcendental human subjectivism, he continued 
to believe that the concept will survive in the popular culture and through 
the intellectual work of the clergy. Kant never envisaged for a moment that 
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the subjectivation of the belief in God would lead to the demise of religion 
or morality the way it has. Like all rational idealists who preceded him, he 
maintained a deep faith in human rationality and moral agency. He also 
strongly believed that the Enlightenment moment he was experiencing was 
part of a greater historical transformation of humanity and would lead to 
further emancipation and rational maturation of future generations. Kant’s 
deep faith in humanity and its future is evident in his answer to the question 
“What is Enlightenment?” He posed the question in the form of an essay he 
published in 1784 CE, in which he problematized the position of his gener-
ation in the trajectory of the Enlightenment: “If it is now asked whether we 
at present live in an enlightened age, the answer is: No, but we do live in an 
age of enlightenment.”46 The enlightened age was still a hope to be realized 
in the future, but it was for him as real as his innate and personal faith in 
God and the hope for life to come, when one’s ethical life would realize its 
ultimate reward.
The emancipation of humans from dogmatic religion and affirmation of 
the inherent natural capacity of human beings to act rationally and morally 
were the essence of the European Enlightenment. “I have portrayed matters 
of religion as the focal point of enlightenment, i.e. of man's emergence from 
his self-incurred immaturity,” he writes.
This is firstly because our rulers have no interest in assuming the role of 
guardians over their subjects so far as the arts and sciences are concerned, 
and secondly, because religious immaturity is the most pernicious and 
dishonorable variety of all.47
The emancipation of society that began, following the Protestant Refor-
mation supported by powerful rulers to regain control despite centuries of 
sustained violence against the Protestant heretics, led him to conclude that 
the religious emancipation was both irrevocable and irreversible. The future 
can only be brighter and would inevitably lead to a true “enlightened age.” 
Kant distinguished between public and private freedom; the former should 
be unabashedly free and must be exercised within both governmental and 
civil institutions. That is, public obligations contracted via the social contract 
that binds all citizens through public law, and private contracts stemming 
from joining civil bodies, such as a church, must be all observed. Individual 
freedom must be restrained by individual obligations, so that societal insti-
tutions could function properly as individuals pursue diverse purposes. Kant 
did not see any contradictions between individual freedom and institutional 
discipline, as the individual members of both political and religious institu-
tions, having been emancipated, will contribute to the rational development 
of politics and religion in the direction of the enlightened age toward which 
humanity is moving. He rejects as impossible the development of authoritar-
ian powers out of a social contract through which people would not agree 
to be ruled by arbitrary power. Neither is it possible in civil institutions, not 
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even a church, as long as the clergyman are “given a free hand as a scholar 
to comment publicly, i.e. in his writings, on the inadequacies of current 
institutions.”48
Kant’s faith in humanity, its rational and moral capacities as intrinsic hu-
man qualities, guiding history into ever-more enlightened age, yet unable to 
objectively affirm the absolutely rational and moral divine, forced another 
German idealist inspired by Kantian philosophy to seek transcendental ob-
jectivism by abandoning the Greek philosophy of the noumena (metaphys-
ics) and introducing a new philosophy of the phenomena (phenomenology). 
Hegel read world history as the evolution and gradual emancipation of the 
individual and society, that began in the East and moved consistently to the 
West. It is ironic that in Hegel the Western moment of emancipation de-
scribed by Kant forecloses the horizons of history and results in historical de-
terminism. The Hegelian concept of world history misappropriates freedom 
and reduces rationality and morality into a philosophy of realism. “What is 
rational is real and what is real is rational,” declares Hegel.49 Hegel is often 
located within the tradition of German idealism, as he has fully embraced the 
Kantian philosophy and worked throughout his life to make it the “science” 
of phenomenology. But he has simultaneously undermined human freedom 
and turned ethics into a strategic act in the service of historical determinism. 
His philosophy belongs to rational idealism only insofar as he was committed 
to the “Idea” as the real force behind human history. But doing so he turned 
philosophy into a form of rational theology, where “Reason” rules the world 
in predetermined ways and where the “Absolute Idea” is determined to real-
ize itself through human rationality. For sure, a monotheist who believes in 
divine wisdom and in the presence of God in history would be seduced by 
Hegelianism. But his philosophy would only inspire the realists in traditional 
monotheism, those who are obsessed with religion as a set of rules and who 
associate society with positive order and the exercise of power. The idea of 
transcendence is preserved in Hegel but mainly in its realist form rather than 
the idealist form. His is a sort of transcendental realism that suffocates the 
ethical impetus of the idealists and forces them to rebel against what appears 
to them as rational dogmatism. Nowhere else was this dogmatism more ap-
parent than in the declaration of the “end of history” in the Germanic state. 
This arbitrary closing of human horizons and the claim of the arrival of the 
“Absolut Idea” can only be understood as a new form of pantheism, in which 
the “idea” can easily be substituted for “nature,” as Marx did with extreme 
ease. The Hegelian phenomenology, with its rich concept of consciousness, 
survived, but only after it was purged from its pantheist and deterministic 
f lavors in the various strands of existentialism.
Secularism and the loss of the transcendental roots
The Protestant Reformation embraced the notion of secular state as the 
separation of political and religious authorities, but it took a step further in 
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ensuring that the two are completely independent at the institutional level. 
The impetus for the separation of religious and political authorities and di-
vorcing the church from the state may be found in the desire to undermine 
the political domination of the Catholic Church of Medieval Europe. The 
call for secularization of political authority came loud and clear from the 
leaders of the Protestant movement. Martin Luther authored an essay titled 
“Secular Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed” (1523), in which 
he argued that the secular authority of the state derives from God and that 
it should be obeyed in all matters relating to law. Citing passages from the 
scripture (Roman XIII and I Peter II), he urged fellow Christians to submit 
to political authority and to offer no resistance to secular powers as long as 
they command the obedience of secular law. The only time a Christian is 
justified in resisting secular authority is when the command relates to matter 
of faith and belief. Secular authority ends with matter relating to freedom of 
conscience and any attempt by secular powers to force people into accept-
ing doctrine can and should be resisted because such enforcement represents 
“spiritual tyranny.”50
In the same spirit, John Calvin distinguished in his work, Institutes of the 
Christian Religion (1536), between secular and religious authorities and called 
for the separation of the church and the state.51 Calvin argued that obedience 
to Christ, the “King of kings,” and to the Church should be done only in 
matters relating to spirituality and religion. When it comes to issues of po-
litical life and organization, the civil government must be obeyed to ensure 
“discipline” and prevent disorder.52 Calvin outlines the duties of the rulers 
and the subjects, stressing that Christian princes must show deference to re-
ligion and encourage piety, ensure justice, and advance peace and security. 
Subjects must obey the prince, even when he rules unjustly in matter of pol-
itics. However, when the prince is involved in “transgression against God,” 
then the Christian subjects have a duty to resist him.53 Luther’s and Calvin’s 
ideas in support of secular authority and government greatly undermined 
the authority of the church over secular rulers but did not immediately re-
duce the inf luence of religion on cultural practices and social institutions. 
The more thorough secularization of Western culture, which was described 
extensively by Max Weber as part of the “rationalization” of the West, had 
to wait until the turn of the nineteenth century. Secularization of Western 
society was intellectually inspired by the Enlightenment scholars and by the 
political authorities of the secular nation-states.
The rationalization of European cultures took the interesting path of sec-
ularization, a path that could hardly be anticipated by early Enlightenment 
scholars, most of whom exhibited deep commitment to religion. Rational 
positivists and materialists played a significant role, and the French revolu-
tionaries of the eighteenth century, who harbored profound distain to church 
power and clergy inf luence, took the lead to roll back the inf luence of reli-
gion in society. The doctrine that was designed for doing that is the famous 
French laïcité, and the doctrinaires were a new breed of intellectuals better 
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known as the ideologues, who emerged in post-revolutionary France under 
the leadership of Count Antoine Destutt de Tracy. The term “ideology” was 
coined by de Tracy himself and provided an alternative to religious doctrines 
and a powerful tool in the struggle against priestly authority.54 Ideology was 
initially perceived as a “science of ideas, and was conceived as a secular foun-
dation to replace religion in providing the ethical justification for public pol-
icy.”55 The French secularization project provides the best example of what 
Charles Taylor calls secularism as “subtraction story.” As we will see in the 
next chapter, this hardcore secularization was embraced by modernization 
theory and was pushed in the 1960s and 1970s by scholars like Huntington as 
the only path to modernity.
By the time Nietzsche wrote The Gay Science, God disappeared from Euro-
pean public life and from the private lives of intellectual elites of France and 
Germany, that he saw fit to speak of the “death of God,” albeit with a startling 
and alarming tone. Interestingly, only Nietzsche dared to say it out loud, using 
the parable of the madman. Nietzsche announced the disappearance of God 
from public life in his literary style to deconstruct the spirit of his secular age. 
The drama unfolds as the madman laments the demise of the divine and articu-
lates the meaning and the magnitude of this earth-shaking event. He rushes one 
morning to the marketplace with a lantern lit in his hand, shouting “I seek God! 
I seek God!” The pubic around him received his pursuit of the divine with 
laughter, as they inquire whether God was hiding or lost his way. The madman 
at this point jumps into their midst and give them a little sermon. “‘Whither is 
God?’ he cried: ‘I will tell you. We have killed him—you and I. All of us are 
his murderers.” At this point the madman pose a series of penetrating questions 
about the meaning and consequence of an act with immense impact.
But how did we do that? How could we drink up the sea? Who gave 
us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What were we doing 
when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? 
Whither are we moving? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? 
Is there still any up and down? Are we not straying as though on infinite 
nothing?56
In a very Nietzschean way, the questions are left unanswered to elicit indi-
vidual and private answers.
Nietzsche saw with perfect clarity, around the end of the nineteenth 
century, what Weber identified as the disenchantment of the world, and 
anticipated, in his unfailing deconstructionist and cynical approach, the post-
modernist critique of modern rationalism as a project that lost both its foun-
dation and direction. Weber expounded earlier, in sociological terms, the loss 
of meaning expressed above in the stylistic presentation favored by Nietzsche, 
describing the set of events leading to the utter negation of the supernatural 
as an inevitable outcome of the process of “intellectualization.” The process 
of intellectual rationalization, Weber tells us, led to the rise of the modern 
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intellectual, as he acquired a new capacity of explaining reality by means of 
“calculation.” Modern intellectuals, unlike the premodern savages who be-
lieve in “mysterious incalculable forces,” are distinguished by their ability to 
“calculate” everything.57 Religion is no more needed to give meaning to the 
world, since Europe has now a new and more superior tool to use in its search 
for the truth. What is sticking about Weber’s explanation of the disenchant-
ment of the world is not simply the arrogance he displays toward those who 
believe that life is full of mysteries that no science, not even religion, could 
explain or calculate. Rather it is his claim that the intellectual rationalization 
ended all mysteries that is really disturbing.
The only way to make sense of this and other general statements involving 
religion and the sacred is to understand them not as statements of fact but as 
political positions that aim at freeing the public space from religious authority. 
Weber feels the urge to contrast science with religion because of the religious 
heritage of Latin Christianity and the scope of intellectual and political power 
assumed by the European priestly class. Weber offers, in his essay “Science as a 
Vocation,” the final solution for what he presents as science-religion solution: 
the eviction of religious and revelation-inspired claims from the public space 
into the loneliness of private life. This separation is not a matter of choice or 
debate but rather a matter of fate. “The fate of our times,” he proclaims,
is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, 
by the “disenchantment of the world.” Precisely the ultimate and most 
sublime values have receded from public life either into the transcenden-
tal realm of mystic life or into the brotherliness of direct and personal 
human relations.58
The fate of the modern man is to take full responsibility of the new reality by 
choosing either the side of science or that of religion. No middle ground, no 
compromise, could be entertained.
To the person who cannot bear the fate of the times like a man, one must 
say: may he rather return silently, without the usual publicity build-up 
of renegades, but simply and plainly. The arms of the old churches are 
opened widely and compassionately for him. After all, they do not make 
it hard for him.59
Weber’s final solution is not only harsh and one-sided but dogmatic and radi-
cal, unwilling to cede any ground to public religious discourse outside of the 
“old churches.” The dogmatic positivism conveyed by Weber must be recog-
nized for what it is: an exploitation of the success of science to impose positiv-
ist ideology on society and its higher-learning institutions.60 The dogmatism 
of positivist thought is evident in the confusion between science and truth, 
as if these are one and the same thing. The facts of science are no substitute 
for humanity’s eternal pursuit of truth and meaning. Positivism as an exercise 
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in philosophy and meaning has not even tried to ground its principles in sci-
ence, for science as a vocation whose aim is to study physics has no capacity 
to answer the most important questions relating to the purpose and meaning 
of human life. Positivist principles are mere assumptions born in the intui-
tion, and to elevate them to the level of truth is preposterous, for the priests 
of science do not have anything to offer other than intuition. Science itself 
has been institutionalized, fragmented, and atomized and has lost its ability 
to contemplate human existence as a whole. The delusions and naivete of the 
claim promoted by positivism and materialism that science is the alternative to 
meaning and truth and that the search for truth can be reduced to the study of 
physics might have had a great lure in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
but became as absurd as reducing the world of freedom that gives dignity to 
humanity to the world of necessity that characterizes the study of nature.
The suffocating positivist mind which could be found in its naked expres-
sion in the public discourse of the French republic, and the French ideologues, 
could be seen today in militant secularism, in the French response to violent 
Islamism rejected by most Muslims with the allegation of the “Islamization” 
of Europe. It could equally, and perhaps more alarmingly, be observed in 
the European, and to a lesser extent American, governments’ support for 
Arab dictators, charged with the task of using the most brutal force to effect 
secular change in Muslim societies. Instead, the brutal dictators keep gen-
erating outbursts of violent fundamentalism while eliminating all forms of 
free expression and public debate. We will return to examine the impact of 
secularism in its most dogmatic and militant form in the Middle Eastern and 
Arab societies, as we concern ourselves in the remainder of the chapter with 
regaining more insight into the phenomenon of secularism, which is often 
associated with the Westphalia peace. As an important landmark in the for-
mation of the modern international order, Westphalia agreements did not set 
Europe on a secular-state path leading to neutral governments with regard 
to religion, but rather “established the principle of cuius regio eius religio (‘who 
rules, his religion’).”61 The secular state was established outside Europe, in 
the settlements built by the truly religious Europeans who took religious eth-
ics deep into their souls and built much more engaging societies in the new 
colonies of America and Oceana. These were the early settlements that were 
destined to grow into the United States and to return to Europe twice dur-
ing two consecutive world wars in the twentieth century to save it from the 
dogmatic doctrines and ideologies that were nurtured into a fully secularized 
European society.
The drive to rescue the religious grounds 
of political ideals
The process of secularization hit a wall of bricks in the second half of the 
twentieth century. Many factors contributed to a new reexamination of 
what Weber and other modernist scholars thought to be irreversible process. 
182 Reformation and the rise of modern West
The overconfidence in the ability of secularist society to ground its world-
view and morality on the presumably solid foundation of scientific truth, 
discoverable by the study of physics, had to be revisited in the light of two 
world wars, as it became fraught with challenges of providing grounds for 
its rational claims. The “discovery” of the illusionary hopes claimed by pos-
itivism occupied the debate after WWII, led by the Frankfurt School, as 
new questions about the proper grounding of moral rationalism were raised. 
There were also additional questions about the capacity of the proletariat to 
achieve an earthly paradise promised by Marx, as the constant deteriora-
tion of the quality of life in Marxist societies became obvious. Horkheimer 
and Adorno provided the critical framework to evaluate modern thought in 
post-Marxist and post-positivist world, but a deeper critique was initiated in 
the birthplace of modern positivism through the work of Michel Foucault 
and Jacques Derrida. Most recently, Jürgen Habermas attempted a creative 
synthesis of the three main traditions that spun out of the Enlightenment, in 
a new framework he discussed in his voluminous work, The Communicative 
Action. Habermas’ writings have been received with great enthusiasm, as 
they opened new horizons for uniting an increasingly diversified global so-
ciety. We will return to discuss his ideas in details later, but for now I would 
like to shed light on two thrusts that have driven his intellectual work. The 
first thrust relates to what has become known as the Weberian paradox. The 
paradox stems out from two trends in modernist thought, which directly 
emanate from intellectual and social rationalization: the loss of meaning 
and the loss of freedom. It is paradoxical that the civilization that prizes 
freedom is threatened by the loss of freedom as a result of the sustained 
efforts to organize its sphere of freedom. But according to Weber, the loss 
of freedom is inevitable as the rationalization of the legal and bureaucratic 
systems increases regulations and heightens state control, thereby turning 
social conditions to what Weber termed the “iron cage.”62 Similarly, with 
increased specialization in the field of science, the ever-growing technicality 
of the scientific field increasing the meaning of individual action, and the 
individual action becoming more purposive, the overall meaning of life is 
decreased. These disturbing processes are at the heart of disenchantment of 
the world, which Weber saw as the price to pay for becoming modern, so 
that the increase of control on the natural world result in the decrease of in-
dividual freedom. But is this inevitable and a fait accompli as Weber would 
like us to believe?
Habermas has introduced a possible reversal of the positivist-realist trap that 
set humanity on course to the “iron cage,” that is much more superior to the 
“instrumental rationality” alternative proposed by Adorno and Horkheimer, 
namely “the linguistification of the sacred.” The idea appears in the second 
volume of Communicative Action, in the context of examining the efforts made 
by Durkheim and Mead to advance the work started by Kant to develop a ra-
tionally defensible principle that can combine both the formal and substantive 
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conditions of rational action, that is, a principle that is both universal and 
inclusive. The process aims at incorporating values and norms honored by 
religious communities and can be summarized in its essential formulation in 
two steps. First, the norms protected by sacred text, or the collective con-
sciousness formed under sacred norms, are expressed discursively in textual 
form. This would satisfy the condition of rational subjectivity, as the discur-
sive statements are articulated so as to ref lect the collective consciousness. 
Second, the resulting discourse has to be formalized in universal terms so that 
it must be valid beyond the particular domain of a specific community. So the 
integration of religious groups can be achieved by incorporating their own 
values and legal requirements into the formalized state to which they belong, 
thereby cementing their attachment to the collectivity and avoiding the type 
of alienation imposed on them through the imposition of secular doctrines.
The process proposed by Habermas has the potential to maintain a sense 
of the secular, as the shared public space, without disenchanting those who 
define the meaning of their lives through reference to the sacred.
Against the background of this conversion of the state over to a secu-
lar basis of legitimation, the development of the contract from a ritual 
formalism into the most important instrument of bourgeois private law 
suggests the idea of a “linguistification” of a basic religious consensus that 
has been set communicatively af low.63
Most importantly, the “linguistification of the sacred” is an element of the 
communicative action framework, which necessitates proceeding through 
a dialogue that aims at recognizing the interests of various social groups in 
legislation and decision-making; that goes beyond the generalization, usually 
found in utilitarian ethics of “the most good to the most people”; that grew 
within European positivism and reengaged universalization based on rational 
consent suggested earlier by Kant.
From a generalizing compromise among fundamentally particular inter-
ests we do not get an interest outfitted with the authority of a general 
interest, that is, with the claim to be recognized by everyone involved as 
a shared interest. Thus, the utilitarian is unable to explain that moment 
of uncoerced, well-considered, rationally motivated consent that valid 
norms demand of everyone involved. Kant explains the validity of moral 
norms by reference to the meaning of the universality of laws of practi-
cal reason. He presents the categorical imperative as a maxim by which 
each individual can test whether a given or recommended norm deserves 
general assent, that is, counts as a law.64
The formulation we encounter in the communicative action framework 
brings us closer to engaging Muslim communities intellectually and 
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normatively, and, given the way Islamic law was shaped in the work of 
Islamic rational idealism, in the Mutazilite works, and later in the Ashar-
ite works, such approach changes the current dynamic and creates a new 
opportunity for broader consensus, which is very essential for the balance 
needed to enter the global age. While the approach may appear more suited 
to worldviews constituted through discursive formation, it is potentially 
inclusive of all worldviews that can be articulated rationally. This approach, 
it has been suggested, could in many ways lead to a process of resacrali-
zation of the society in the direction of the sacred linguistic worldviews, 
including the protestant ethic at the heart of unfettered capitalism.65 This 
could be true only if the discourse in confined to interlocutors who sub-
scribe to a protestant capitalist worldview, but in a global society of multiple 
orientations such a scenario is extremely unlikely but would nonetheless 
empower those voices that speak to the interests and concerns of the wider 
community.
The assumption of resacralization is misplaced because it fails to appreciate 
the profound progress in the differentiation of religious consciousness into 
public and private, a differentiation that was noted first, as we saw earlier, in 
the Islamic civilization in the work of Islamic rationalists before it was un-
dertaken by modern civilization through the process of secularization. The 
resacralization might be needed today to reconnect public life to the values 
that are already embedded in the institutions of democracy and pluralism. 
Restoring the ethical foundation of the rational public discourse should gen-
erate more inclusive consensus over the organization of the public space. The 
idea seems to attract more intellectuals, who are concerned over the erosion 
of moral integrity in secular space, to join the debate about the formation 
of inclusive public space in a globalizing world. Charles Taylor has made 
important contributions to the subject in several publications, including in 
his book, A Secular Age. He contends that secularity is often defined by con-
trasting it with religion and its symbolic discursive expression in the public 
space. According to this sense of secularity, the fewer references to God in 
public life the more the society is secularized.66 This is one meaning of sec-
ularity in which the relationship between the secular and the religious is one 
of subtraction in a zero-sum game, whereby the increase of secularization 
leads to the decrease of religion. This meaning suggests that religion is in 
decline and the belief in God is increasingly in retreat. This is particularly 
the case in post-Christian societies, which moved away from the premodern 
religious societies, where belief in God was axiomatic and unchallenged and 
the world was divided into believers and nonbelievers. In the second sense, 
religion is an option, and the sense of religion is neither greatly increasing 
nor seriously decreasing, as is the case of contemporary Muslim societies like 
Jordan of Morocco. The third and final sense is that religion is a possibil-
ity for the individual to experience, but religious practices cannot be easily 
maintained, as religious beliefs are constantly challenged. This is a situation 
where religion is losing in the public debate and seems less convincing to an 
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increasing proportion of the public.67 Taylor summarizes the three senses of 
secularity as thus:
But all three modes of secularity make reference to “religion”: as that 
which is retreating in public space (1), or as a type of belief and practice 
which is or is not in regression (2), and as a certain kind of belief or com-
mitment whose conditions in this age are being examined (3).68
Taylor rejects the assumption that the retreat of religion is caused by the ad-
vance of science. As we saw above, this was the assumption favored by Weber. 
Instead of focusing on religious beliefs themselves to understand causes of 
the apparent regression of religion, Taylor proposes to shift our focus to the 
conditions of religiosity and to the religious experience itself. At this level it 
is intuitively evident that the conditions of religion relate to the inner sense of 
meaning and the emotional states that correspond to what provides meaning 
to our live or what Taylor refers to as a sense of “fullness.” He identifies the 
fullness with a set of inner conditions, including peace, wholeness, integrity, 
joy, and fulfillment. It is in those states of consciousness that a person may 
experience the presence of God, in the manner Bede Griffiths described in 
his autobiography. In this account, Taylor seems to reduce religion to the 
subjective personal experience of the religious person. His justification seems 
to rest on the assertion that religion ultimately is realized in the search for 
God, which is ultimately an individual search that culminates in the spiritual 
experience of the presence of God. On the other hand, the unbeliever, Tay-
lor argues, experiences meaning in the pursuit of rationality, looking to find 
fullness within, in the subjective rational experience itself, in the manner 
Kant experienced fulfillment in the “awesome power” that lies inside us but 
which “we mistakenly locate outside.”69
Taylor’s exploration of the meaning of religion seems to dismiss as “naïve” 
the collective assertion of religion as a community of the faithful, of the type 
one encounters in the monotheistic traditions, preferring instead a purely 
spiritual form similar to the mystical path that one may find in the Yoga 
strand of Hinduism or the Sufi type that sprang within Islam. Taylor evi-
dently believes that to save secularism, modern intellectualism must redefine 
religion. In The Secular Age, Taylor recognizes the importance of spirituality 
but does not seem to value the need to engage community-based religions, 
such as Islam or Christianity, and seems to regard them as part of the premod-
ern world. He further regards the belief in the transcendent as more suitable 
to premodern:
The main feature of this new context is that it puts an end to the naïve 
acknowledgment of the transcendent, or of goals or claims which go 
beyond human flourishing. But this is quite unlike religious turnovers in 
the past, where one naïve horizon ends up replacing another, or the two 
fuse syncretistically—as with, say, the conversion of Asia Minor from 
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Christianity to Islam in the wake of the Turkish conquest. Naïveté is 
now unavailable to anyone, believer or unbeliever alike.70
Taylor’s distinction between the three senses of secularization would have 
been more useful, had he tried to provide a solution that does not split in-
dividual choices between the categories of immanence and transcendence. 
This kind of presentation does not grasp the richness of religion and religious 
experience. For many followers of the monotheistic traditions the sacred is 
both transcendent and immanent. Furthermore, while faith is a subjective ex-
perience, religion itself aims at creating communities of the faithful. Taylor, 
evidently, is not comfortable with the communal aspects of religion, as he 
shows great apprehension with regard to the citizens’ religious identification. 
It seems that this thought in particular pushed him to the conclusion that 
subjective spirituality is the only “mature” form of religiosity, suitable for the 
modern person who is moving gradually but steadily to a secular age. What 
is clearly missing in his account is not only the consideration of the value of 
religious expression as a tradition that keeps certain ideals and values alive 
and central to the identity of the faithful, allowing them to struggle together, 
and with people of other faiths who share with them those ideals. He also 
undervalues transcendence as a rich field of human consciousness that moti-
vates people to aspire to a state of consciousness and being that transcends the 
immediacy of individual spiritual concerns. The importance of experiencing 
spirituality in a community setting is overlooked and lost. The account of re-
ligiosity as subjective individual experience ignores completely an important 
social function of religion, that is, to create and sustain intersubjective soli-
darity to not only perpetuate collectively shared values and beliefs but also, 
more importantly, mobilize people to fight to eradicate political excesses and 
unseat authoritarian regimes.
Taylor’s apprehension of religious expression as social identity notwith-
standing, he sees the need to reevaluate secularism, particularly in the con-
text of an increased diversification of religiosity in Western society with the 
arrival of new religious expressions, including Hinduism, Buddhism, and 
Islam. He advocates equal access to the public sphere of various religious 
and nonreligious worldviews. This is the essence of the secular state that is 
best expressed in “the French Revolutionary trinity: liberty, equality, fra-
ternity.”71 In the context of Western society where the arrival of new reli-
gious traditions have unnerved the historically dominant Christianity, Taylor 
stresses on the need to reject a privileged status assigned to any religious con-
viction, while keeping all issues of contentions under consideration for public 
debate, including issues of political identity as well as the “exact regime of 
rights and privileges”:
There must be equality between people of different faiths or basic be-
lief; no religious outlook or (religious or areligious) Weltanschauung 
can enjoy a privileged status, let alone be adopted as the official view of 
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the state … all spiritual families must be heard, included in the ongoing 
process of determining what the society is about (its political identity), 
and how it is going to realize these goals (the exact regime of rights 
and privileges). We need to alter the way in which we proceed when 
the range of religions or basic philosophies expands: e.g., contempo-
rary Europe or America with the arrival of substantive communities of 
Muslims.72
What is important is that diverse religious and secular worldviews engage one 
another within a framework of public ethics and values, including the princi-
ples of human rights, equality, the rule of law, and democracy.73 These politi-
cal principles are globally shared by different peoples for different reasons and 
are grounded in different ethical systems. The diverse justifications of public 
values are essential for a free society. What matters is that the political prin-
ciples form the framework of public consensus and govern public discourse 
and debate and that public argument and position are given due importance 
in rational exchange and justified by universal rational arguments and not 
by particular religious positions in any formal governmental setting, such as 
a parliamentarian debate.74 Taylor agrees with Rawls’ requirement that the 
state does not adopt any comprehensive doctrine, whether its religious or 
secular, and stresses that the “state can be neither Christian nor Muslim nor 
Jewish, but, by the same token, it should also be neither Marxist, nor Kan-
tian, nor utilitarian.”75
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Ever since Muslim societies came under the control of European powers in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they remained in their orbit even after 
fighting hard to gain independence. The capacity of colonial powers to main-
tain control even without having to use military force is a testament for the 
sophistication of modern imperialism that has been developed to perfection. 
It is also a testimony to the degree of decline experienced by Muslim societies 
and cultures since the Islamic civilization peaked in the fifteenth century. Two 
instruments have been effectively used by former colonial powers to achieve 
indirect control over Muslim societies, particularly over the Middle East: fos-
tering military institutions and exploiting internal ethnic, religious, and sec-
tarian diversities. The military institutions predate the independent states in 
the Middle East. They were all created in their modern form by European 
powers and continue to receive training from the West. Middle Eastern mil-
itary institutions are charged with internal security, and many of the security 
organizations are led by current or former military officers. Their constant in-
teraction with Western power centers allowed them to develop working rela-
tionships with their counterparts in Western military and security agencies and 
made them more appreciative of the advanced organization skills and power of 
the former masters, which at the same time rendered them more vulnerable to 
manipulation, particularly when personal ambitions of military officers coin-
cide with the geopolitical interests of European and American powers.
The other instrument of control is the internal political and social dynam-
ics of Middle Eastern countries. The great ethnic and religious diversity has 
raised the potential for friction and internal conf lict in the absence of strong 
and effective state and civil institutions. Social diversity that enriched the 
traditional Middle East society has become now a convenient instrument of 
world powers for perpetuating their control by privileging segments of the 
population in exchange for political and military favors. The sectarian di-
vision in Iraq into Sunni and Shiite, coupled with the nationalist division of 
Arabs and Kurds, has been effectively used to align social grouping in ways 
that perpetuate divisions and benefit political elites. In Syria, Hafiz Assad has 
effectively used the Alawite underclass to perpetuate his rule and to create a 
“hereditary republic.” In Saudi Arabia, the Saud family used its tribal allies 
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in East Arabia to conquer the Arabian Peninsula and to keep its population in 
check. Yemen has been similarly controlled by the Zaydis, Jordan by the tribal 
allies of the Hashemites, and so on. The problem is not only that political 
elites are in control, but also that this control takes the form of internal colo-
nial rule, whereby the current political regimes in Arab countries use the co-
lonial model of divide and rule. Of course, the internal struggle should not be 
completely blamed on outside powers, and evidently the internal forces and 
an authoritarian political culture should be faulted as well. The reality though 
is that imperial powers are not sitting on the sideline and allowing Middle 
Eastern societies to work out their differences and develop the skills they 
need to compromise and negotiate. As we see in this chapter, imperial powers 
constantly manage the internal affairs of the region, and they are always ready 
to intervene whenever their local proxies fail in keeping the required political 
formations that maximize outside geopolitical interests. The military inter-
ventions in Lebanon in the 1970s and in Syria and Afghanistan most recently 
are good examples of what happens when the local agents of world powers fail 
in their efforts to manage the chaos perpetuated by ill-conceived foreign pol-
icies. This is of course a risky and costly game and, as we see in the Iranian1 
and, currently, Syrian cases, it could always backfire, creating an unhealthy 
global environment. The rise of global terrorism is a case in point. While we 
address terrorism in more depth in subsequent chapters, this chapter provides 
a glimpse into the inner working of the Middle East, under the inf luence of 
outside interests that contribute to the radicalization of the region.
Yet, despite the outside support for a system of tyranny and repression, the 
Middle East is developing its own dynamics, and it is far from succumbing to 
outside designs. The Arab Spring provides us with an example of the struggle 
for democratic rule. The struggle is led by diverse social forces with different 
political agendas, from the far right to the far left, and with some powerful 
reactionary forces. Current dynamics of the Arab state system is counter-
productive as it drives the sociopolitical change in the opposite direction of 
what is intended, as we see clearly in the case of violent extremist groups like 
ISIS. At the heart of Western resistance to change in the Middle East is the 
fear of the “return of Islam” and the tendency to lump all social movements 
inspired by the Islamic faith together. I argue that the obsession of local actors 
in affirming their Islamic identity should be viewed in relation to the effort 
to push a European sense of secularism down the throat of the Middle East-
ern people. The confusion between secularism as separation of religious and 
political authority and secularism as a Eurocentric social experience is at fault. 
While the former is a legitimate and necessary tool for developing a true de-
mocracy, the latter is a blunt case of imperialism disguised as modernization.
Colonialism and protracted reforms
Muslim empires were already in shambles when rejuvenated Europe was 
probing into North Africa, India, and Southeast Asia. European colonialism 
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began as commercial ventures in South and Southeast Asia undertaken by 
three trade companies promoting the interests of three countries: the Por-
tuguese, the Dutch, and the British. While late into the competition, the 
British East India Company surpassed its competitors, thanks to the excel-
lent relationships it initially cultivated in the Indian subcontinent with local 
rulers. In few decades, the company combined its commercial interests with 
political ambitions, and, utilizing a private army at its disposal, was able to 
defeat the Mughal dynasty and the Nawab rulers of Bengal and Bihar, to 
become the de facto power in India, by mid-eighteenth century.2 Between 
1757 and 1858, the company enacted laws and appointed administrators and 
local governors, as it ran a private army that claimed over 260,000 soldiers, 
twice the size of the British army. The company was finally dissolved by the 
British Crown in 1858, following the Indian Rebellion of 1857 which led 
to great loss of life and property.3 By the first half of the twentieth century, 
most of Africa and Asia was under the colonial rule of European powers, 
most notably that of Britain and France. Every Muslim territory, with the 
exception of Turkey and Iran, came under either the British or French direct 
colonial rule. By 1945, the two colonial powers began to withdraw from 
their colonies, partly because the urgency of rebuilding their own devastated 
countries as a result of WWII, and partly because of the increased resistance 
by the colonized populations.
The European colonial intrusion into Muslim spaces was so vast and pro-
found that it penetrated deep into the Muslim consciousness, reshaping and 
redefining the Muslim self-image and pushing many Muslims to reevaluate 
and recalibrate their place in the new modern order shaped for the first time 
in their collective memories by someone other than themselves. The pro-
cess of reassessment was done a bit too late in the European intrusion into 
fragmented Muslim societies that have long lost their intellectual and scien-
tific zeal. The transformation of Muslim societies and experiences during 
the colonial period and its continuation in the postcolonial Muslim societies 
were total and thorough, affecting all key areas of their life and society— 
education, culture, economy, and politics. The rise of Western Europe in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was felt by Muslim societies from 
the Balkans through Jakarta and Malaga in Southeast Asia, and from Nigeria 
in West Africa through Samarkand in Central Asia. But it was in India that 
the first internal debate among Muslim intellectuals, regarding the nature 
of European expansion and the best way to deal with it, took place. The 
debate engaged two intellectuals that left a lasting impact on contemporary 
Islamic thought and political action, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–1879), 
an Afghan-Iranian scholar, and Sayyid Ahmed Khan (1817–1889), a leading 
Indian reformer.
Afghani, schooled in Shi’i Islam, was among the first to sound the alarm 
about the pending colonization of the Middle East by European colonial 
powers. His main fears were the intellectual and political weaknesses of Mus-
lim societies and the failure of Muslim scholars to develop their ideas to meet 
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the challenge of Western modernity. He spent his productive life between 
India, Egypt, and Paris, before he retired in Istanbul where he spent the last 
few years of his life. Afghani, like all Shiite scholars, was well trained in Is-
lamic philosophy and was alarmed that the modernization programs adopted 
by the Ottoman Sultans in Istanbul and the Khedive rulers in Cairo were 
insufficient for the rejuvenation of Muslim societies. He was particularly crit-
ical about Ottoman obsession with reforming the military and training engi-
neers and specialists to counter the advanced military machinery of European 
states, while neglecting social and cultural reforms. “The Ottoman govern-
ment and the Khedives of Egypt have been,” he lamented, “opening schools 
for the teaching of the new sciences for a period of 60 years, and they are yet 
to receive any benefit from those sciences.”4 Afghani recognized that spe-
cialized technical training was not sufficient to produce the needed reforms. 
Equally important was the development of a new philosophical approach 
that nurtured critical thinking so as to help address the social ills plaguing 
the then-stagnant Muslim society and bring about a more just society. “If a 
community did not have a philosophy,” he pointed out, “and all the individ-
uals of the community were learned in the sciences with particular subjects, 
those sciences could not last in that community for a century.”5 Afghani was 
trained in Islamic rationalism that was rooted in the Mutazilite idealism. 
Rational idealism was embraced by the Sunni majority after it was recon-
ciled with the Sunni beliefs by the Asharites intellectuals. Islamic rationalism 
disappeared from the Sunni Islam and was kept alive by the Shiite scholars.6 
Afghani used his philosophical knowledge and analytical skills to critique 
European imperialism and to locate it within the broader philosophical tra-
ditions of materialism and naturalism.7
It was within the framework of opposing British imperialism, driven by 
materialist vision and impulse, that Afghani expressed dismay with Sayyad 
Ahmad Khan, and his perception that Khan was advancing the interests of an 
imperialist power in India. In an article, published during his second visit to 
India in 1880 after he was forced out from Egypt by Khedive Tawfiq in 1879 
for his criticism of his government’s policies, Afghani cautioned of a pending 
British takeover of Egypt. Three years after Afghani warned of an impending 
project advanced by British to colonialize the Middle East, Britain occupied 
Egypt in 1882. Afghani attacked Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s reform project and 
disapproved his effort to steer Indian Muslims away from the confrontation 
with the British occupation. Afghani was not critical of Khan’s efforts to 
reform Islamic education and the political and social organizations of Indian 
Muslims, as he himself shared with the latter his rationalism and reformist 
ideas. He mainly objected to Khan’s call for cooperation with the British as a 
necessary step for reforming the Muslim society.8
Khan moved gradually from his early traditionalist positions, adopting a 
rational critique rooted in both Islamic rationalism and modern rational-
ism. That put him at odds with the advocates of traditionalism who were 
attached to the textualist narratives of Islam, such as Emad al-Ali and Hajj 
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Ali Bakhsh Khan, who stood against any educational reform. For Khan, the 
reform of education was imperative for rejuvenating Muslim societies and 
motivating them to defend themselves against outside intrusions. After the 
1857 failed rebellion that practically ended the Muslim rule in India, Khan 
became convinced that old politics was not acceptable and had to be replaced 
by new forward thinking. The collision between the two Muslim reformers 
ref lects the difficulty of coming up with an effective alternative to stay ahead 
of the ongoing restructuring of Muslim societies from India to Egypt, where 
Afghani tried to counter the British penetration of Muslim societies, relying 
mainly on its far advanced military strength and much superior strategic and 
organizational capacities.
The collision was also between two visions and approaches to addressing 
the decline of Muslim society and power—nationalism versus pan-Islamism. 
While Afghani was hopeful that Muslim unity could be restored to prevent a 
complete collapse of Islamic culture and way of life, Khan became convinced 
that the best approach was to encourage the political engagement of Muslims in 
Indian politics by participating in the Viceroy's legislative council set up by the 
British Crown in 1861. The establishment of a new legislature provided Khan 
with an opportunity to further advance his reform agenda, as political partic-
ipation would require a new, modern education and awareness. After 1861, 
Khan became a leading advocate of nationalism, taking every opportunity to 
advance his vision of national power for the Indian Muslim community. When 
he was invited in 1872 by the Muslim Literary Society to deliver a lecture in 
Calcutta on the question of patriotism, he focused on outlining his views of 
nationalism, emphasizing the role it played in advancing collective well-being.9 
He became later convinced, after studying British democracy, of the need for 
cultural homogeneity for its success, thereby pushing for the type of national 
democracy that led later into the separation of Pakistan from India.10
Afghani spent five years in Egypt and succeeded in revitalizing Islamic ra-
tionalism in collaboration with Muhammad Abdu, a graduate of the famous 
Azhar University and the foremost rational reformer of Islamic thought in 
modern times. Both became concerned about the lack of sense of responsibil-
ity among Muslim scholars and its impact on the decline in Islamic knowl-
edge and education. Abdu went on the offensive against the juristic-scholarly 
community to which he himself belonged, accusing them of promoting fa-
talism in the place of individual responsibility.11 Afghani’s diagnosis of the 
nature of the problem was grounded in a deep appreciation of the importance 
of knowledge and science to overcome the deteriorating conditions of the 
Muslim community (the ummah) and the urgency of political unity to con-
front military invasions of territories under Muslim control. Yet what was 
missing from the analysis was the extent to which Muslim culture had de-
parted from its founding principles of science, justice, and moral responsibil-
ity. The Mughal Empire lost power, but this was not only due to the military 
prowess of the British East India company; it was mostly due to inner fighting 
among Muslim rulers and the corruption and abuse of the peasantry by the 
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ruling class.12 As we noted earlier, the East India Company was able to raise 
an army of 260,000 from the Indian population to crush the Mughal Empire. 
On the Western front, the Ottoman Empire was in a slightly better position 
than the Mughal, but it had already lost great deal of its early moral and legal 
disciplines, and its rulers had lost the interests in science and critical thinking 
that characterized the Caliphs and Sultans during Abbasid rule. Ottoman sul-
tans showed interest in arts and law but not in science. The Ottoman Empire 
that lasted for six centuries produced no scientists, philosophers, chemists, or 
physicists of note. Rather, it produced a taste for poetry, music, and dance 
as part of the Sufi tradition it inherited from the late Abbasid society, and a 
highly disciplined military force and elaborate legal system. The Ottomans 
were powerful and disciplined warriors and produced one of the most effi-
cient and bizarre military force in human history—the Janissaries.
By the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was in decline, while its 
European rivals were on the way to build the most expansive education sys-
tem in world history, with its new emphasis on individual responsibility and 
social participation. By the eighteenth century, science became highly prized, 
and Europe was ready to take over the world by storm. Ironically, the undoing 
of the Ottoman Empire was the result of its efforts to undertake an ambitious 
project of political and legal reforms during the nineteenth century—called 
the Tanzimat program—which started under Sultan Mahmud II (reign 1808–
1839( and accelerated under Sultan Abdulmejid I (reign 1839–1861). The plan 
involved three key reforms: (1) setting a representative system consisting of 
two chambers—the Chamber of Deputies and the Chamber of Notables, 
(2) centralizing legislative and executive power, and (3) creating a modern 
Ottoman citizenship. In 1869, the new government enacted the Ottoman 
Nationality Law, guaranteeing the equality of all Ottoman citizens, irrespec-
tive of religious or ethnic affiliation. Ironically, the new measures faced great 
opposition, mainly from non-Muslim populations who feared that such new 
measures would no longer protect their cultural and religious traditions un-
like earlier times; that the establishment of a centralized system was destined 
to privilege the Turkish language, culture, and religious traditions; and the 
system would certainly undermine the autonomy of confessional communi-
ties recognized under the Ottoman Millet system. The broad opposition by 
non-Turkish populations empowered Sultan Abdul Hamid II, who ascended 
the throne on August 31, 1876, and soon after severe acrimony developed 
between Sultan and his Prime Minister Midhat Pasha. Two years later, Sultan 
Abdul Hamid II suspended the constitution on February 13, 1878, and sent 
his former prime minister to prison far away in western Arabia.
Nationalism and the modern autocratic state
The ambitious reform was the brainchild of a reform movement led by intellec-
tuals and politicians exposed to liberal European thought, known as the Young 
Ottomans. The Young Ottomans were inspired by European nationalism and 
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the nation-state system established in the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). The 
system was uniquely European, as it was designed to end the religious wars 
that devastated Europe and to recognize the sovereignty of the state and its in-
dependence from the papal authority. Up until the nineteenth century, Europe 
rarely had political divisions predicated on national identity. People’s resistance 
and acquiescence to political orders had always been predicated on loyalty to 
local leaders who could inspire them to support or oppose one dynastic rule 
or another. The nation-state system was not initially predicated on the racial 
or ethnic cohesiveness of the populations but on the sovereignty of the secular 
authority and its independence from religious authority. The nationalist ide-
ology was founded in the works of eighteenth-century Prussian philosophers, 
particularly those of Herder and Fichte. Prussian nationalists found in the new 
ideology a powerful tool to unite the German people and justify Prussia’s 
expansion at the expense of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.13 At the turn of 
the nineteenth century, the Austro-Hungarian Empire was the largest state in 
Europe, its rule extending over vast territories in Central and Eastern Europe. 
This empire was composed of many different nations and peoples who spoke 
German as their native language and represented a significant portion of the 
empire’s subjects. The empire itself was ruled by the House of Hapsburg, a 
German dynasty dating back to the twelfth century, and was the main rival to 
the Prussian monarchy. It was also the major obstacle hindering the ambitious 
Prussia state bent on expanding beyond its borders.
The nationalist ideology advanced by Prussian political philosophers was 
almost completely alien to the majority of Europeans living around the turn 
of the nineteenth century. Of course, these people were aware of their ethnic 
and linguistic differences, but only a tiny minority of them would go so far 
as to equate ethnic and linguistic differences with political divisions. “A na-
tion, to the French revolutionaries,” meant a number of individuals who have 
signified their will as to the manner of their government. A nation, accord-
ing to the nationalist theory, becomes a natural division of the human race, 
endowed by God with its own character, which its citizens must, as a duty, 
preserve as pure and inviolable. Since God has separated the nations, they 
should not be amalgamated. “Every nationality,” proclaims Schleiermacher, 
“is destined through its peculiar organization and its place in the world to 
represent a certain side of the divine image.”14 Despite the great hope that 
Westphalia Treaty would end all wars, two world wars came to pass, forcing 
many Europeans to question the nationalist ideology. Europe was eventually 
saved from its own self-destruction by three nations who never embraced the 
nationalist fever, the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union. Turkish 
nationalism was born along German nationalism and the latter’s intellectual 
inf luence predated WWI. Soon the Ottoman military was drawn into the 
business of building democracy, and a series of coup d'états led eventually 
to the imposition of military rule under the disguise of Republican gov-
ernment, with the single-minded drive to force Turkish nationalism on the 
Ottoman Empire.
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Arab nationalism emerged in response to Turkish nationalism with the 
aim to develop an Arab state and to gain independence from the Ottoman 
Empire. Turkish nationalists responded by using the military to impose na-
tionalist policies that aimed at the Turkification of the Arab populations. The 
defeat of the Ottomans in WWI emboldened Arab revolutionaries to cre-
ate an independent Arab commonwealth, and in 1919 an army composed of 
Arab warriors supported by British forces entered Damascus. Three days later, 
Emir Faisal, the son of Sharif Hussain, was declared the King of Syria, thereby 
ending the Turkish rule of Arab lands. Arab independence was encouraged 
by the Allies, especially England, which were in a state of war with the Ot-
toman Empire. Under the banner of self-determination, the Allies pledged 
to support the aspirations of all nations struggling for independence.15 A year 
later, Britain and France, armed with a mandate issued by the newly formed 
League of Nations, took over the newly independent Ottoman territories, 
redrawn the political map of the region, and set up a new homeland for the 
world Jewry in Palestine. A new system of nation-states was created in an area 
in which religious, linguistic, and ethnic groups lived for millennia under a 
communal system that culminated in the Ottoman Millet system. The Arab 
nation-state system stood on its head from day one. While Europeans were 
able to shape their reality through new sets of ideas, Arabs had to bring their 
ideas to fit their new reality and justify the new political order that did not 
fit the Levant reality. Arab nationalism and other nationalist ideologies were 
introduced to provide a new foundation for political unity among culturally, 
religiously, and linguistically diverse groups, in order to replace the semi- 
autonomous system run by the Ottomans. Arab and Turkish brands of nation-
alism left the Kurdish population in the cold, as the Kurds were now scattered 
among the three nationalist countries. Even worse, under the conditions of 
modern politics, Greece and Turkey engaged in a form of ethnic cleansing 
disguised as repatriation. Turkish nationalists went as far as to force Armeni-
ans out of their Turkish cities and villages, leading to untold suffering.16
Secular Europe encouraged Arab governments to privatize religion, but 
was also comfortable politicizing religious affiliations in secular Arab states. 
This took the form of “minority protection” rules that required the state to 
treat non-Muslims as protected minorities. The patterns started even prior 
to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, as various European nations ex-
tended protection over Christian communities under the Ottomans, requir-
ing that the Ottomans do not enact any law that affects minorities without 
getting first clearance from the Catholic and Orthodox papacies. This trend 
continued with French claiming protection over Lebanese Christians. France 
even carved Lebanon out of Syria to ensure that Lebanese Christians formed 
the majority and created a sectarian government with the Lebanese constitu-
tion giving the presidency and the military leadership to Christians. Britain 
tried to do the same with the Egyptian Christians, or the Coptic community, 
but the Copts resisted the British plan. Indeed, the Egyptian Coptic commu-
nity was angered by the British proposal that they should be designated as 
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“national minority.” In 1919, both Copts and Muslims revolted against the 
British colonial presence in Egypt, after the British high commissioner forced 
Saad Zaghloul and members of the Wafd Party into exile, demanding inde-
pendence and an end to colonial rule. “Joining the Muslims, the Copts re-
jected the British offer as an unacceptable intervention in the internal affairs 
of Egypt, and further demanded annulment of the British prerogative to pro-
tect Egypt’s resident foreign nationals (Greeks, Armenians, and Italians).”17 
The pride of the Coptic community of being Egyptian first was highlighted 
in an interview Saba Mahmood conducted with Samer Soliman, an Egyptian 
activist and scholar, who objected to the presentation of Egyptian Copts as a 
religious minority in Egypt:
You know the Copts have a long and prominent history in the making 
of modern Egypt. When people say that we had a revolution in 1952, I 
say no, that was the result of the revolution in 1919. Copts were leading 
figures in this revolution. It is not like the Maronites in Lebanon. They 
colluded with French colonialism. Copts did not collude with British 
colonialism because we have always thought of ourselves as Egyptians 
first. Maronites think of themselves as Europeans, not Lebanese. In fact, 
when the Russian Czar tried to extend his protection to the Copts as a 
faction of the Orthodox Church, like the Catholics were extending to 
the Maronites, the Copts refused! This has to do with the fact that our 
history as a nation goes much farther back.18
The transformation of Europe into secular societies did not erase old reli-
gious prejudices, nor did it dissolve Europe’s deep Christian identity. Wilfred 
Blunt, the British poet and writer, was clear in as early as 1882 of the Euro-
pean design for the Ottoman Caliphate as he anticipated in his book, The Fu-
ture of Islam—namely, the coming European invasion of the Muslim land. As 
an astute political observer and frequent traveler in Europe and the Muslim 
land, Blunt had a deep understanding of the history of the Christian-Muslim 
rivalry and keen awareness of the lingering onslaught on Muslim countries 
in North Africa and the Middle East. In his book, which was published four 
years after the Council of Berlin and one year before France occupied Tu-
nisia, Blunt was certain of the French move into Tunisia, and he anticipated 
that the Italians will soon make their move into Libya and the Spaniards will 
move into Morocco. He believed that occupying the Ottoman territories by 
the “Crusading States of Europe” was inevitable and imminent. Because of 
the strong presence of the Ottomans in Libya, he rightly anticipated that Italy 
will await the fall of the Ottomans before they made their move.19 Blunt be-
lieved that the looming attacks against the Ottoman Caliphate and the Arab 
states in North Africa would be fully supported by the European public and 
that “the national conscience,” especially of France, Spain, Italy, or Austria, 
would not repudiate an aggression, however unprovoked, upon any of the 
“Independent Mussulman states of the Mediterranean.”20 Blunt blamed the 
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aggressive policies of Europe toward Muslims to a long-held prejudice by 
the European public against Islam that persisted despite the liberalization of 
European society and its increased openness to religious diversity. “In spite 
of all the changes which have affected religious thought in Catholic Europe, 
and of the modern doctrine of tolerance in matters of opinion,” he wrote,
none of the nations by which Islam is immediately confronted to the 
north and west have really changed anything of their policy towards her, 
since the days when they first resolved on the recovery of “Christian 
lands lost to the infidel.”21
Clearly, not everybody in Europe was willing to start a new page in the 
relations with the Muslim world, based on a secular and inclusive political 
system and the new liberal ideals that inspired Europeans to fight autocracy 
and imposition.
Blunt notices, however, an important difference between the old and new 
crusading spirits of Europe. While the old spirit was motivated by religious 
zeal, the new one was more driven by advancing the civilization of the West 
and restoring Europe’s “political control in the whole of the provinces once 
forming the Roman Empire.”22 Interestingly, he saw the new crusading 
spirit becoming more evident in continental Europe, particularly among 
the French, Italian, and Spaniards, than in England. England’s position, he 
insisted, “is absolutely distinct from that of any of them, and her interests 
find no parallel among Christian nations, except perhaps the Dutch.”23 The 
distinction in the position of England, he pointed out, is evident in the ad-
mission of “a vast body of Mohammedans into her social community, and 
contracted engagements from which she can hardly recede towards others 
among them….”24 England’s distinct attitude toward Islam and Muslims was 
bound, Blunt anticipated, to put her at odds with continental Europe and 
deepen her predicament. “As Christians,” blunt observed, “Englishmen may 
regret this; but as practical men, they would surely be wise to recognize the 
fact, and to accept the duties entails.”25 Blunt seems to have mixed feelings 
about what he saw as an inevitable recapture of territories that the Roman 
Empire lost to the Islamic civilization and saw at least one positive develop-
ment in the wake of the imminent collapse of the Ottomans. Blunt antici-
pated that the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the “Christianization” of 
the Muslim land throughout the Ottoman regions, most notably Constan-
tinople, will free Islam from its temporal concerns and for Muslims to pay 
more attention to spiritual matters and thus regain its essential character as a 
religious and spiritual force and not simply as a temporal one.26
Over the next 80 years that followed, Wilfred Blunt’s predictions of the 
European expansion into the Middle East and North Africa were proven 
true as shown in the efforts of the European powers to rebuild the Arab and 
Muslim societies and cultures in the image of modern Europe. Although 
Christian missionaries who came with the European armies had a lot of hope 
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to spread Christianity in Muslim societies, the secular leadership was more 
interested in introducing modern European institutions and practices, in-
cluding secular culture and national politics. To do that, colonial powers 
introduced new curricula of civic education, reduced religious content, es-
tablished new secular law borrowed from European code, and so on. Muslim 
modernizers, such as Mustafa Kemal of Turkey, even went further and forced 
Latin alphabet, chastised religious authorities, and forced non-Turkish mi-
norities to speak the Turkish language only, and threatened those who resort 
to speaking native languages with long-term imprisonment.
Despite the intensive campaign led by secularist and nationalist leaders in 
Muslim societies that lasted for almost a century, neither secularism nor na-
tionalism took hold in Muslim cultures. The reasons for resisting these two 
important features of modernization are numerous and complex, including 
the misapplication and misuse of the principles of secularism and national-
ism. Yet the most important reasons can be found in the markedly different 
historical experience Muslim society had in institutionalizing religion and 
law. While Christianity developed early on a church with a fairly centralized 
authority, which soon took the form of a hierarchical ecclesiastical structure, 
Islam never had a central religious authority. Even those who possessed a 
semblance of religious authority could not lay claim to any special status in 
relation to the divine. Their authority was not derived from any sacred status 
but from their scholarship. Religious leaders in Islam are considered scholars, 
or learned members, of the Muslim community. The only exception was 
given to the members of the family of the Prophet by their followers, who 
become known as the party of the Prophet’s family (Shiite). With the disap-
pearance of the twelfth grandson of the Prophet, the twelfth Imam, religious 
authority was once again reduced to the same status claimed by Sunni reli-
gious scholars.
The reliance on coercion to effect social change is counterproductive, and 
overcoming centuries of conf lict and mistrust requires more creative solu-
tions. It requires more fundamental engagement in dialogues that aim at 
generating a common understanding of the relevance of Islam to the public- 
private dichotomy and the development of channels for such interaction away 
from political collaborations with authoritarian regimes. The goal should not 
be one of forcing one religious interpretation or another but to arrive at the 
rules of participation of all ideological groups in public space, regardless of 
whether the groups are secular or religious. The goal should also be one of 
ensuring that the critical interaction is fair and civilized. After all, the three 
monotheistic traditions that have been caught for long in power struggle 
have almost identical ethical positions, and their main differences are purely 
metaphysical in nature. Richard Bulliet calls Christianity and Islam sibling 
religions and identifies Islam’s rejection of hierarchical ecclesiastical structure 
as the key feature that distinguishes the two religions.27 He refers to modern 
civilization as an Islamo-Christian civilization because it is rooted in both the 
Christian and Muslim traditions. Bulliet argues that formalized ecclesiastical 
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structures in Christianity single-handedly explain the stable relationship that 
was developed between religion and politics in Christian societies and its ab-
sence in Islam.28 Not only did the formalized and hierarchical church prevent 
religious rivalry among Christians,29 it also ensured the development of an 
“ideology of peaceful (and sometime not so peaceful) separation” between 
the religion and the state.30 In the absence of centralized religious organ-
ization in Islam, the role of mediating differences among religious groups 
was assumed by the religious authority, and the state became the center of 
interreligious dynamics. This role of providing a structure for the competing 
religious communities was assumed by “the caliphate and then a plethora of 
successor states, each with its judges, jurisconsults, and market inspectors as 
prescribed by the shari’a.”31
The crucial role played by the rise of centralized church in setting Chris-
tianity and Islam in markedly different social and political dynamics cannot 
be disputed. What can be questioned is the claim that the presence of church 
hierarchy played a positive role in separating religious authority from political 
authority. It is a matter of historical record that the Catholic church did get 
involved in political agitation, mobilization, and control of European society 
between the tenth and thirteenth centuries. Protestantism, which rejected 
hierarchical church, articulated vigorously the complete separation of the 
spiritual and political authority, as it emerged to play a vital role in the rise of 
modern secular state. It can also be argued that the absence of a centralized 
religious authority tremendously reduces the ability of political authorities to 
manipulate religion through inducement or coercion. Undoubtedly, the lack 
of centralized authority in Islam has led to fragmentation and rivalry among 
various religious groups, but at the same time, the very same lack of central 
authority gave Islam tremendous f lexibility and vigor, allowing it, as Bulliet 
himself observed, to expand greatly even when the Muslim Empires were 
shrinking. During the centuries of political decline of Muslim powers, Islam 
experienced a new “proselytizing surge.” Despite the fact that the period 
from 1500 to 1900 CE was a period of Western expansion and imperialism, 
Islam was more successful than Christianity in gaining more converts. Dur-
ing this period, both Islam and Christianity gained considerable following 
in new regions and populations. However, while one of every two Muslims 
today hail from regions that joined the Islamic faith in the last five centuries, 
only one of five of today’s Christian originate from regions that became 
Christian during the same period.32 What was interesting about Muslim ex-
pansion in the last 500 years was that it was done by ordinary Muslims and 
not by missionaries as was the case with Christian expansion. For a long time, 
knowledge of Islam was historically commonplace among Muslims, unlike 
Christianity which limited access to religious knowledge to clergy.33 Equally 
interesting is the fact that Islam was not introduced by Muslims to pagan 
and animist communities, as proselytization was, in the Middle Age, dis-
proportionately the work of Christian missionaries devoted to bringing the 
population of Northern Europe and Britain into monotheism. Later during 
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the colonial age, the missionaries made great success in Africa and Southeast 
Asia among pagan animist tribes. In contract, Islam spread mainly in religious 
communities that came in daily contact with it, such as Christians in the Le-
vant, North Africa, and the Balkans, as well as the Zoroastrians in Persia, the 
Buddhists in Central and East Asia, and the Hindus in India and Southeast 
Asia. If Islam and Christianity were judged from a religious, rather than a 
political perspective, then the two religions played complementary roles in 
bringing the majority of people living today into the fold of monotheism. 
From that vantage point they look more as partners rather than adversaries. 
Add to this that the two religions differ in very subtle ways, and have over 
centuries of exchange and learning converged into parallel sets of doctrines, 
with the only exception being their depiction of the divine nature of Jesus.
The continuous doctrinal and ethical convergence between Christianity 
and Islam has not ended rivalry and antagonism, as tensions continued to 
characterize their interaction down to the twentieth century. The histori-
cal antagonisms between Islam and Christianity has often been translated 
into clashes between Islam and the West. It is important that we understand 
the antagonism for what it truly is—a rivalry between sibling societies with 
twined relationship deeply rooted in history. “Their confrontation today 
arises not from essential differences,” asserts Bulliet, “but from a long and 
willful determination to deny their kinship.”34 From the prism of the un-
ceasing convergence, the hostile encounters that continue to f lare between 
Islam and the West are not instances of the “clash of civilizations” alleged 
by Samuel Huntington, but an internal rivalry between two branches of a 
single civilization, who have more in common to share and celebrate than 
differences to fear and fight. More importantly, Western culture and society 
are locked intricately in a historical movement and gradual convergence that 
makes it impossible for any self-critical ref lection and assessment of Western 
past and future without considering the forces that bind it tightly to Islamic 
civilizational experience. “The past and future of the West cannot be fully 
comprehended,” Bulliet observes, “without appreciation of the twined rela-
tionship it has had with Islam over some fourteen centuries. The same is true 
for the Islamic world.”35
Post-reformation Christianity and Judaism share a great deal with Islam, 
yet powerful voices and interests in all three communities instrumentally use 
religious identities as grounds to provoke suspicion and animosity among the 
three Abrahamic traditions. In the last 100 years since the colonial invasion 
of the Greater Middle East, little has been done to end historical animosity 
and transform relations. This has not only created great miseries in Muslim 
countries but has also increased the economic burdens on Western democra-
cies. A central question for the puzzle lies in the old question about evaluat-
ing political structures and relations: Who benefits? Who benefits from the 
continuation of animosity? If Blunt is correct that the European public would 
welcome European aggression against unprovoked action by Muslims, then 
is this approval born out of greed or fear? And what would it take to make 
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the relationship across the Mediterranean mutually beneficial? What would 
it take to engage the other in dialogue and in interaction based on mutual-
ity, instead of invoking historical stereotypes and collective guilt? Is making 
enemies essential for social grouping, or can we come to a point where we 
undertake, as societies, morally courageous and rationally based stances in 
dealing with matters the pertain to competition among groups and societies?
Modernization through national secularism
European publics were not prepared to give up what seemed a historic op-
portunity of immense proportion for the ideal of engaging the old enemy 
in just practices, for the Ottomans themselves were not historically unguilty 
of using military means to penetrate European empires. Some Europeans 
must have felt that they were fighting for universal peace as they struggled 
to bring down old tyrannical regimes. Colonialism was sold as the “white 
man’s burden” to civilize and modernize a premodern world. Indeed, the 
democratic structure based on popular sovereignty and assent appeared much 
more refined than the autocratic regime of the Ottoman. More importantly, 
Europe that had superior science, education, and organization was in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries still economically poorer than its col-
onies. Colonialism played an important role in stimulating the European 
national economies, through the instrument of trade conducted under the 
political terms of European colonial powers and made respectable by the use 
of superior military firepower. It is true that the newly established European 
democracies introduced parliamentarian system in all their colonies, but this 
was a central element to bring about an international order grounded in the 
system of nation-states and cooked under pressure and in haste to only create 
the semblance of democracy; an electoral system that has the same parliamen-
tarian structure, but with no democratic substance.
The vanguards of such transformation were young and highly ambitious 
nationalists, who were well versed in European education and culture, so 
much so that they often looked with colonialist eyes at their citizenry and 
were willing to use the most coercive and brutal force to create modern 
nations in societies that had little clue as to what their leaders were contem-
plating. The first fallout of the modern ideology of nationalism took place as 
Ottomans had already lost control of the state to Young-Turks nationalism, 
after the coup of 1912. The nationalists took the Ottoman Empire to WWI 
on the side of the German nationalists, and when they lost the war to the 
Western Allies they decided to create a more homogeneous national popu-
lation. When the Greek nationalists who invaded western Anatolia to claim 
the Turkish-speaking Christian regions during WWI failed and their with-
drawal required a settlement, they came to an agreement with their Turkish 
counterparts to “repatriate” 1.3 million Christian Turks and half-a-million 
Muslim Greeks. The irony was that the Christian Turks were considered 
Greek, even though they were culturally and linguistically Turks, and the 
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same for the Muslims of Greece who were for all practical purposes Greek 
but were pushed out of their homes in the name of nationalism. The situation 
was so outrageous that Carl Brown felt the need to describe what took place 
in politically correct terms, but with a grain of irony: “The resulting step in 
the direction of deChristianizing Anatolia and deIslamizing Greece left each 
side free (if that is the proper word) to pursue its nation-state aims in differ-
ent political worlds.”36 The victims of modern nationalism were innocent 
civilians caught in the middle of the tectonic movements of continents and 
civilizations colliding against each other, with the full force and intensity of 
a moment that encapsulated an epoch-long struggle.
The question concerning the space that was vacated by the vanished Ot-
toman Empire akin to the one raised by Huntington in his last intellectual 
attempt to understand the nature of current sociopolitical changes include: 
Who are we? Except that the question that was raised earlier was followed 
with a host of interrelated questions: What is the content of nationalism in 
the Middle East? What do we do with ethnic, national, and religious diver-
sity? Does nationalism require that the entire Arab world is brought under 
one political order? And how do we move from cultural identities defined 
throughout history in religious terms to one that speaks European languages? 
Is the category “Islamic nationalism” an acceptable category, and could it be 
used on par with “Jewish nationalism”? Indeed, some of those questions that 
were raised a century ago are still being debated today in Middle Eastern so-
cieties. It has been suggested that Islamism represents a form of reaffirmation 
of the historically constitutive self by Arab and Muslim cultures and might 
be a local response to the forces of globalization.37 While nationalism led to 
the unification of Germany, Arab nationalism has divided Arab countries 
into smaller political units that could only be sustained by their relationships 
with the modern West, through constant f low of trade, political advice, ed-
ucational support, and occasionally military interventions to save them from 
their Arab and Muslim neighbors or to serve as mediators to help in internal 
conf licts. In many ways, the modern forms of political organization and the 
terms of trade seem a step back from the old ways of doing things. Muslim 
collective memories point to times when they could roam around the entire 
space from India to Morocco, in search for education, employment, or trade, 
without being stopped by checkpoints that demand a visa that cannot be 
easily obtained. Such a space has shrunk to national boundaries of states that 
can hardly create enough work opportunities for local populations, while na-
tional leaders engage in political rivalry and conf licts and use populations and 
trade movements as political weapons to suffocate each other’s populations.
The name of the new game is “nation building” and the introduction of 
various strategies designed by research institutions and specialized depart-
ments of international relations and area studies whose job is to figure out 
how to transform Muslim cultures and societies to bring them out of the 
darkness of traditions to the light of modern liberal democracy, which, as 
Fukuyama told us (see Chapter 1), forms the end of history and the moment 
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in which the “last man” becomes visible. Modernization theorists, including 
Walt Rostow, Daniel Lerner, Carl Carr, and Peter Berger, have advocated 
for decades for supporting autocratic regimes as a necessary evil for bringing 
about good societies in the Middle East. Half a century later, the Middle 
East is still governed by military dictators with rising poverty and rampant 
corruption that have turned the region into a tough place to live in, forcing 
many Middle Easterners to contemplate a life in the West, where modernity 
could be experienced away from the manipulation of its local agents. Here 
we have an interesting case of the modern free world backing dictators in 
the name of liberating the hearts and minds of people from the limitations of 
the Islamic tradition. The past two decades have presented us with a picture 
of the Middle East as the epicenter of the resistance of modernization and 
globalization. This resistance appears in the form of Islamism that turned 
quickly violent in the 1970s and produced by the turn of the twenty-first 
century a Hollywood-like drama that symbolically targeted the World Trade 
Center that once stood high in Lower Manhattan, New York. These hor-
rific attacks against civilian targets was evidently undertaken by European- 
educated Muslim extremists who had little respect for the Islamic notion of 
fair and just war taught by traditional Islam that prohibited in the strongest 
terms the targeting of civilians. In the midst of the grand entanglement of 
the “modern” and “traditional,” it is not clear for the moderately informed 
observers whether the backlash is against modernity that stands for individual 
rights, democratic accountability, and freedom of speech and conscience, or 
whether it is simply a backlash against the excesses of autocratic regimes sup-
ported by modern liberals.
The attacks on the World Trade Center was by any standards genocidal and 
was broadly condemned by Muslim leaders and rejected worldwide by every 
country, including Muslims. But as soon as the dust settled, neoconservative 
ideologues in control of decision-making in the Department of Defense and 
the White House during the Bush administration sprung to action, urging 
punitive attacks against Afghanistan and Iraq, and advocating the recreation 
of a New Middle East. The “war on terror” was inaugurated by George Bush 
Jr. and his Sectary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Six months later President 
Bush stood triumphant on the deck of USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier 
to declare “mission accomplished.” What was accomplished is the death of 
hundreds of thousands in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the beginning of a new 
round of fighting in Afghanistan, and the devastation of the Iraqi society and 
economy from which Iraq has not recovered almost two decades after the 
toppling of Saddam Hussain regime. My concern here is not to point out U.S. 
foreign policy mistakes, for this is a matter I and others have addressed else-
where. The concern is rather the mindset that insists on defining moderniza-
tion in a rigid and unilinear direction. If any modern people could have deep 
sense of modernity and its values, Muslims should be among those who can 
be ranked high on the scale, as the ground for modernity was set within their 
historical experience. Granted that the voices that articulate modern views 
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rooted in the Islamic experiences are not often heard, as they are frequently 
overcome by the noise generated by angry young Muslims who wear their 
religious identity on their sleeve as they commit heinous acts forbidden by 
the faith and the tradition they claim to defend. No doubt Muslim extremists 
use modern interpretations and justifications for their crimes by recalling 
verses of the Qur’an, but the use of Islamic sources as soundbites to sugarcoat 
self-serving ideologies has nothing to do with Islam as it is accepted by the 
vast majority of Muslims.
The facts are numerous and have accumulated over the last century that 
Western powers are intent on restructuring Muslim societies, not to ensure 
that they manifest the values of human rights, democracy, pluralism, and 
open society, but rather to create the Middle East that is responsive to the 
wisdom of Western politicians who know better how the world should be 
arranged. To borrow Brown’s “old game, dangerous rules” expression, West-
ern powers are playing the old game of control and manipulation to advance 
strategic interests, but they are using dangerous rules that have far-reaching 
consequences not only on the well-being of people in the Middle East but 
eventually on the well-being of people everywhere, as the cost of repression 
of a significant proportion of humanity would become enormous. What we 
need to be aware of here is the inner tensions and struggles among the leading 
traditions within the modern West as well. Western democracies are expe-
riencing internal ideological conf licts among liberalism, realism, neoliberal-
ism, socialism, nationalism, and fundamentalism, as each of these worldviews 
competes to inf luence foreign policy, with little input from the majority of 
the citizens who are naturally uninterested in international politics and have 
to figure out what is going on through the soundbites of national media. The 
most articulate commentators on international news are often individuals 
with strong commitments to narrow ideologies and religious views. These 
commentators can always rely on historical presentations of the Muslims as 
the Other to perpetuate old myths and stereotypes. This situation though be-
gan to change in the past two decades, as more Westerners, including West-
ern Muslims, began to join the debate, expose the myth, and make their 
voices heard.
Military guardians of the new secular order
While there is plenty of blame leveled against Western capitals, the West 
should not be held solely responsible for the bleak state of affairs Muslims and 
Arabs found themselves engulfed in. Some of the disorder experienced in 
Muslim societies is self-inf licted and results from the failure of contemporary 
Muslim societies to raise the right questions about the disorder they have 
created and to face the truth. Many of the challenges Muslim communities 
face today partly stem from the political culture they inherited from living in 
self-regulating communities, which was the hallmark of the Ottoman politi-
cal system. The modern states can function only with the full participation of 
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citizens, something that is yet to happen as the majority of the Arab popula-
tions have not fully embraced the public values necessary for creating demo-
cratic order and have not fully accepted their moral responsibility for the state 
of affairs they find themselves in. The lack of interest in public and collective 
life brings the postcolonial state under the control of the military institutions 
set up by the colonial powers and which by their very nature not amicable 
to democratic deliberation and rule. The problem is further complicated by 
the tendency of a system run by soldiers trained to follow hierarchical order 
rather than debate, to shut out all public debates necessary to generate a com-
mon understanding and a new consensus among diverse political actors. By 
closing the political space to any discussion and organization outside the con-
trol of the government, the new national state has effectively closed the pos-
sibility for the emergence of social movements. The current level of society’s 
ability is barely adequate to engage in public action and debate necessary for 
nurturing shared commitments to the universal values of justice, compassion, 
dignity, power sharing, and equality. What complicates things particularly is 
that the secular space, declared by modern governments as neutral, is indeed 
occupied with imported ideologies that neither speaks the language of the 
people nor addresses the real issues confronting the collective consciousness 
of Middle Eastern societies. What complicates things even more is that the 
external pressures that have been brought to bear on Muslim countries favor 
the imposition of Western secularism.
The postcolonial state in the Middle East follows closely in the footsteps of 
colonial powers. European colonial powers never doubted the superiority of 
their cultures and viewed with utter disdain the natives under their control, 
regarding them as unworthy of being engaged in formulating public poli-
cies in any shape or form. They developed unmistaken paternalistic attitudes 
toward the common person, which has been documented in the annals of 
colonial history. The examples are plenty, and suffice it here to point to a 
few, including relevant remarks made even as late in as the 1950s, by then 
the French governor general of Madagascar, Marcel Olivier. "[W]hen wor-
thy of its name,” Olivier asserted referring to the project of colonialization, 
it “establishes between the colonising country and the colonised peoples a 
relationship which can only be compared to that of mutual obligations and 
reciprocal services we find in a family between parent and children.”38 The 
“family” metaphor used by Olivier is deceiving, as it hides the nature of the 
violence imposed by the colonial powers to discipline their colonized “chil-
dren.” The discipline was, in one form or another, excessive and violent, 
as has been documented by Richard Price in an article, appropriately titled 
“The Psychology of Colonial Violence.”39 This condescending attitude and 
the desire to impose violent “discipline” were borrowed by military rulers 
of the postcolonial Arab states, who regularly used excessive force to stop 
peaceful rallies and even inf licted unspeakable torture to extract information 
from protesters taken into custody and to frighten the opposition. Violations 
of human dignity and essential rights of peaceful dissidents were ignored 
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by the leaders of Western democracies, despite the fact that it went on for 
decades, as rulers of Syria, Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria were allowed, and 
sometimes encouraged, to subvert democratic rule and free speech in the 
name of fighting religious fanatics and extremists.40 The despicable behav-
ior of military dictators and autocratic rulers was either condoned or lightly 
rebuked by the leaders of Western democracy, but the support always contin-
ued unabated. President Donald Trump bragged in public about his efforts 
to shelter the “Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman from 
congressional scrutiny after the brutal assassination of the Washington Post 
journalist Jamal Khashoggi.”41
Military dictators backed by Western powers have, since the independ-
ence from colonial rule, run a smock-and-mirrors type of elections, with 
interference by regime forces in every step of the election process. Egypt, 
for example, came under military dictatorship after decades of establish-
ing a parliamentarian system back in 1919. Nasser took over in 1952 and 
set up a suffocating military dictatorship in which a special security appa-
ratus, known as the Mukhabarat, controlled every element of the state and 
civil society. Four decades later, Mubarak was still using the same tactics to 
stay in power. He reigned for three decades unopposed and continued to 
get elected by ridiculous percentages, ranging between 90% to an incredible 
99.99%. Under pressure from the Bush administration, he finally permitted 
Ayman Nour, a member of the Egyptian parliament, to run against him in 
2005. This unprecedented challenge brought international attention, and the 
elections were followed closely by Western media and human rights groups. 
Mubarak still won with a slightly smaller majority of just 88% of the elec-
toral vote, but this time the regime tactics were exposed to the whole world. 
Human Rights Watch provided a troubling report, describing “plainclothes 
security agents beat demonstrators, and riot police allowed—and sometimes 
 encouraged—mobs of Mubarak supporters to beat and sexually assault pro-
testors and journalists.”42Joe Stork, deputy Middle East director of Human 
Rights Watch, objected to the egregious situation charging that “[t]he police 
and ruling-party assaults on pro-reform advocates yesterday shows just how 
hollow the Mubarak government’s rhetoric of reform really is.”43 Nour, who 
dared to challenge the dictator, was later charged by the Egyptian security 
apparatus with committing “forgery” for receiving 12% of the total vote. He 
received a five-year sentence, arguably for exposing the rigged elections con-
ducted under Mubarak regime that would otherwise pass unnoticed.
Egypt has been under military rule ever since Nasser led the coup of 1952 
against the government of King Faruq and replaced a constitutional mon-
archy with a republican government ruled with an iron fist. He was elected 
as president in 1956 and immediately advanced a number of popular poli-
cies, including the land reform act that restored land ownership to farmer 
and the nationalization of the Suez Canal. He also initiated a number of 
modernization and industrialization programs. His success came at the ex-
pense of stif ling political life and creating a police state. Military rule became 
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entrenched, and Egyptian politics and the parliamentarian system have never 
recovered ever since. During the Sadat rule, the state moved from socialism 
to neoliberalism, but the country continued to be ruled under one-party sys-
tem with limited opposition groups that had hardly any impact on policy for-
mation and decision-making. Mubarak, himself a military ex-officer, ruled 
at will, legitimizing certain parties and “political practices, such as vigor-
ous antiterror laws and violent repression of opponents of Mubarak’s regime, 
while disallowing others, such as full political participation by parties desig-
nated by that regime as religious.”44 The Bush administration was not pleased 
with the prosecution of Nour, and National Security Adviser Condoleezza 
Rice made the American views known to Mubarak during her visit in 2005. 
The Bush administration
further hardened this position after Rice’s visit. After Egypt’s 2005 par-
liamentary elections, in which the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) gained 
one-fifth of the seats in parliament, U.S. pressure on the Mubarak regime 
decreased and then ceased entirely after Hamas’s victory in 2006. Wash-
ington remained silent as the Mubarak regime arrested hundreds of MB 
members and transferred dozens to military courts.45
The tendencies by Western leaders to side with Arab opposition leaders who 
stay clear from any acknowledgment of Islam is quite puzzling and often in-
terpreted by Muslim intellectuals as a sign of hostility to Islam. This evident 
bias often speaks more to the European experience with religion than to 
Islam per se.
For over a century, developmentalism has been the favored practice of 
political elites in Muslim society, who took over the political leadership from 
the colonial masters and continued to receive support from former colonial 
powers. Developmentalism meant that the ruling elite may use authoritarian 
political structures and policies, in paternalistic manners fashioned after the 
colonial model, as we described earlier. The approach seemed more efficient 
as it eliminated negotiations among opposing social forces about the direction 
of public policy and hence accelerated the pace of reform. It was for these 
reasons Muslim masses were willing to put up with the autocratic approach 
of the ruling elites and thus provided the political legitimacy autocratic lead-
ers needed to stay in power. Early in this dangerous game, developmental-
ism paid off as early dictators presided over a population with big deficits in 
education and knowledge of modern tools. Corruption in early- and mid- 
twentieth century was still limited in scope to few individuals at the top of 
the political hierarchy. The early rapid development was made at the expense 
of developing social responsibilities and political skills badly needed in di-
verse populations who were experiencing a completely different political and 
social order. The autocracy created gradually a modernist class composed of 
military officers, technocrats, and bureaucrats who collaborated and tightly 
controlled the state to advance their collective interests at the expense of the 
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larger population. With the collapse of the Soviets, the socialist system they 
supported also collapsed by late 1980s, but that did not affect the supposedly 
socialist leaders, as they produced their own business class through the privat-
ization of public properties, encouraging rentier economy that helped those 
in charge to get rich, while impoverishing their population. Through their 
claims to secularism, Arab elites were able to gain a freehand to fight their 
critics, who were motivated by the moral responsibility to oppose corruption. 
Many in the opposition were motivated by the Islamic faith and used Islamic 
values and doctrines to mobilize others to stand with them in their fight 
against corruption. The ruling class, aware of the secular leaning of their 
Western supporters, used secularism as a tool, or disguise, to fight their reli-
giously motivated critics in the name of “liberalism” and “progress.” Adopt-
ing a modern façade, they claimed that their critics were working against 
secular values of freedom, democracy, and equality. The number of the po-
litical activists who showed interest in appealing to religion to gain popular 
support was limited, and the population was not behind them. The number 
of Muslim Brotherhood members of parliament in Syria and Egypt before the 
military coups in Egypt and Syria was small. Nor were communist groups 
able to garner any significant power, as communism never found a strong 
foothold in any Arab or Muslim country, primarily because of its reputation 
of promoting atheism and fighting religious traditions. The panic reaction 
by British and American foreign-policy makers that led them to supporting 
military dictatorship was an overkill that set the whole region on an authori-
tarian course that continues to this day, with no clear plan in sight to restore 
democracy in the region.
The rise of religious consciousness in the 1980s and 1990s strengthened 
Islamic movements throughout Muslim countries. The struggle intensified 
between the opposition, made of both socialist, liberal, and Islamists, and 
the autocratic elites who stif led public debate in the name of safeguarding 
modernism and secularism. The ruling class moved on to co-opt some of the 
opposition leaders, mainly with liberal and socialist leaning, and then duped 
those who joined hands with the Islamists as reactionaries. The “secular” 
elites made it illegal for anyone classified as “Islamist” from participating 
in elections or public office. Those who insisted on using their public voice 
were arrested and jailed again in the name of protecting the secular system 
from religious imposition. The boundaries between religious and secular par-
ties were arbitrary and superficial, relying on slogans and appearances while 
lacking any objective criteria. The Al-Wasat Party during the Mubarak re-
gime is a case in point. The party was founded by Abou Elela Mady and led 
by a council of 24 members that included 2 Christian Copts and 3 women. 
According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Al-Wasat’s 
goal then was to seek “to interpret Islamic sharia principles in a manner 
consistent with the values of a liberal democratic system. Although al-Wasat 
advocates a political system that is firmly anchored in Islamic law, it also 
views sharia principles as f lexible and wholly compatible with the principles 
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of pluralism and equal citizenship rights.”46 Party leaders applied three times 
for a permit to run in national elections, as required by law, in 1996, 1998, 
and 2004, and were rejected by a panel appointed by President Mubarak. It 
was not recognized as political party until 2011, after the Mubarak regime 
was toppled by the Egyptian uprising of 2010. Basically, the rejection of the 
Wasat party by Mubarak government rested on the claims that some of its 
founders are themselves religious, even though the party was secular, devoted 
to advancing the public interests with no bias toward any religion and with 
a multireligious leadership. This evidently is a clear case of autocratic lead-
ership that has no interests in the democratization of the political system or 
competing with an independent opposition capable of holding it to account.
Arab secularism and the imperative of inclusive debate
A key question in the context of contemporary Muslim societies relates to 
the nature of the secular: Is secularism a framework for pluralism? Is it a set 
of principles whose aim is to ensure that public space is not dominated by 
any particular religion or ideology? Or is it a new worldview with its own 
metaphysical and ethical underpinnings that were developed as a modern 
alternative to religion? The essential meaning of “the secular” in the liberal 
tradition involves freeing the public space from the control of established re-
ligions; for example, the post-Reformation Europe and the separation of the 
church from the state. The American Constitution articulated this meaning 
of a secular state in its clearest expression in the first amendment, stipulating 
that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”47 Secularism as the separation of the 
state and the church did not mean that citizens with a religious leaning and 
identity cannot participate freely in the public or political spheres. Through-
out the history of the United States, the separation between the church and 
the state has been vigorously debated and upheld, but that did not prevent 
ministers and pastors from running for, and occupying, public office. It rather 
meant that elected officials cannot appeal to religious doctrines to impose 
their faith on the public but had to articulate their political propositions in 
a political language and support them by a rational discourse that aims at 
the collective good. This rational discourse involves an appeal to shared val-
ues and universal human rights and should advance public interests and the 
common good without ignoring the special needs of the various segments of 
society. The particular good and interests do have place in the public debate, 
but they should be rationally justified and presented in a way that does not 
harm, or undermine, the interest of the general public encompassing diverse 
groups of population.
The problem arises when secularism is used as an ideology that ref lects the 
“beliefs” of a particular group in society. Secularism becomes problematic 
and a misnomer when it is transformed into a substantive doctrine to be used 
to evaluate the eligibility of religious communities to be part of the national 
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debate. We highlighted this problematic use of the notion of secularism in 
the previous chapter when discussing Charles Taylor’s work, The Secular Age. 
Talal Asad addressed the problem of using secularism as a doctrine:
Secularism is not simply an intellectual answer to a question about en-
during social peace and toleration. It is an enactment by which a political 
medium (representation of citizenship) redefines and transcends particu-
lar and differentiating practices of the self that are articulated through 
class, gender, and religion. In contrast, the process of mediation enacted 
in “premodern” societies includes ways in which the state mediates local 
identities without aiming at transcendence.48
Asad’s critique of secularism focuses on its substantive elements that exceed 
the demands for “social peace and tolerance,” by substituting the original 
meaning of the secular state, as an instrument for mediating collective inter-
ests and needs, for an evolving doctrine that encapsulates the accumulated 
values, interests, and beliefs of a dominant social group. Secularism resembles 
from this vantage point a type of universalism in which the universal that 
must be applied to the collectivity, or to humanity, represents the particular 
values of the dominant group. In such a situation, we are faced with an in-
stance of the generalization of a particular experience without any attempts 
to generate a common understanding through an open and inclusive debate 
and dialogue and away from any efforts to generate inclusive discourse. The 
solution for the current tendency to rationally generalize from a particular 
social and religious experience is, therefore, rational discourse similar to the 
one proposed by Leonard Binder, whose views we addressed in the context 
of our discussions on Taylor’s exposition of a more inclusive secular order:
1. Liberal government is the product of a continuous process of rational 
discourse. 2. Rational discourse is possible even among those who do not 
share the same culture nor the same consciousness. 3·Rational discourse 
can produce mutual understanding and cultural consensus, as well as 
agreement on particulars. 4·Consensus permits stable political arrange-
ments, and is the rational basis of the choice of coherent political strat-
egies. 5·Rational strategic choice is the basis of improving the human 
condition through collective action. 6. Political liberalism, in this sense, 
is indivisible. It will either prevail worldwide, or it will have to be de-
fended by nondiscursive action.49
The rational discursive approach to collective decision-making stands in 
contrast with the Kantian demand for reciprocity. Reciprocity, as an eth-
ical value of duty rooted in the monotheistic principle of equal dignity, 
works only in a society that embraces a higher moral code, in the absence of 
which reciprocity degenerates into the principle of revenge. The challenge 
of Arab, and generally Muslim, societies today is to find the inclusive public 
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space that would allow citizens to speak freely and to listen attentively to 
each other regardless of the moral authority of the different groups of the 
multilateral debate. This is not only a necessary step on the road to real 
democratic society, but more so for a society that upholds the principle of 
human dignity.
The secularism project that aims at presenting secularism as a field of sub-
stantive ideas and practices is part of the predicament of secularism presented 
as the essence of the modern, because this means that secularism takes the 
form of a culture with hidden transcendental claims. A culture that insists 
on its absolute universalism is wrong factually and oppressive politically and 
as such violates the essence of the modern, defined as emancipatory project 
whose aim is to free both reasoning and politics. While it is necessary to en-
sure that the people who are brought into the public space are committed to 
certain universal values, such as respecting the rights of the others to speak 
their minds freely without fear of being subjected to punitive measures for 
doing that, the value of free speech should not be reduced to specific cultural 
expressions. While the values of justice, equality, and freedom are central 
to any political society that recognizes the dignity of its members, no one 
has the right to insist that people engage in public debate should uphold the 
meaning acquired in a particular cultural setting. The confusion between the 
liberal values that underpin American democracy and their expression in a 
particular culture is evident in Huntington’s complaints that non-European 
cultures are endangering American democracy. He clearly sees Islam through 
the stereotypical lens produced by Orientalism and satirized by popular me-
dia. Huntington’s assumptions of the incongruence of democratic values with 
the religious values of populations that do not share the Western European 
heritage are both essentialist and prejudiced in dealing with members of mi-
nority cultural groups, including Muslims. Cross-national surveys carried 
out from 2000 to 2008 demonstrate that the “overwhelming majorities of 
the populations of both the Arab-speaking Islamic countries and the other 
Islamic countries rated a democratic system as either ‘very good’ or ‘good’.”50 
There was no significant difference between Muslim and non-Muslim so-
cieties on questions related to democracy and political rights. There was, 
however, significant difference on questions relating to gender relations and 
sexual liberalization. “The values separating the two cultures,” as Ronald F. 
Inglehart put it, “have more to do with eros than demos. As younger genera-
tions in the West have gradually become more liberal on these issues, Islamic 
societies have remained the most traditional ones in the world.”51 The survey 
showed, for instance, that 45% of the Muslim respondents thought that men 
make better political leaders than women and the university education is 
more important for men than women, in contrast to 18% in Western coun-
tries. The difference was even greater when it comes to questions concerning 
equal access to jobs when jobs are scarce, with 70% of Western respondents 
supported equal access, while only 21% did so from Arab societies. The dif-
ference was also noticeable with Confucian societies as only 30% supported 
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equal access when jobs are scares. The survey also showed that Muslim socie-
ties were also “much less tolerant of homosexuality, abortion, and divorce.”52
What is important to note here is that differences with regard to gender 
equality and sexual liberalization are subject to a complex set of culturally 
specific values and issues that cannot be reduced into universal criteria for 
judging democratic and human rights commitments. The relevant questions 
here involve the extent to which society is working toward ensuring free 
access to the market and the public space. Issues concerning gender roles and 
proclivities, and priorities within the family, continue to be reasonable ques-
tions for debate even in societies where feminist movements have achieved 
great success in advancing women’s rights. Such important questions require 
free space where competing positions are debated openly under real con-
ditions of freedom of expression and association and not through external 
imposition. Restricting democratic avenues to promote gender rights is the 
wrong approach and is often counterproductive as they tend to create negative 
dynamics that disrupts and delays actual development. Discussions rooted in 
substantive rationality across historically constituted cultural boundaries are 
meaningless and prone to misunderstanding and to the exchange of accusa-
tions and are often the route favored by those who want to deepen the divide 
and justify aggressive strategic actions. For meaning is not borne by the use 
of simple terms that are translated from different cultural zones. Words must 
be understood in the context they are spoken. The term “secular state,” for 
example, means a state that protects individual freedom in Western democ-
racies, but in Muslim societies it means a state ruled by dictators bent on 
imposing their ideologies on the larger population in the absence of any free 
debates or discussions, in the manner of Ataturk, Assad, or Mubarak.
Globalization and Islamic democracy
The Arab Spring, already declared by some as a failed attempt at democracy, 
have shown us two things: First, that Arab societies are eager to do away 
with “stable” dictatorships and embrace a democratic order and even pay the 
highest price for achieving it. Second, that Arab authoritarian regimes are 
well adept to suppress any popular objection to their inhuman governance 
and can rely on the outside world to keep their population in check. The 
Obama administration, despite an outward expression of disdain for brutal 
dictatorship and support for democracy and freedom, has collaborated with 
the Iranian anti-liberal regime and the Russian oligarchy to keep Syria under 
the control of a murderous dictator, willing to kill over half a million of his 
people to prevent political reforms. Arguably, Obama and his aides were not 
fans of Assad and would have preferred if he had stepped down to make room 
for perhaps to a less ruthless general in his army, yet he and John Kerry found 
it acceptable to overlook the Syrian tragedy to negotiate a slightly favorable 
treaty with the Iranians. For sure, Muslim extremist groups with outrageous 
religious doctrines became part of the scene, but their involvement is directly 
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linked to the fundamentalist groups who have been collaborating with the 
Assad and Iranian regimes to drive the Americans out of Iraq. No doubt Is-
lamism in its extremist forms, encountered after the 2002 invasion of Iraq, 
and in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, is dangerous and destructive, but it 
has only been a product and a tool of the brutal military and fundamentalist 
regimes in the Arab world. Arab dictators are ably supported by the ‘liberal’ 
powers of the West in the name of creating and sustaining a secular, liberal, 
and democratic form of government. The dictatorial regimes’ iron-fist ap-
proach to dealing with society is responsible for both manufacturing jihadist 
groups in their prisons, and using them effectively to maintain political con-
trol and to frustrate any attempt at reform in the name of fighting terrorism. 
This is exactly what the Syrian dictator did when he released violent Islamists 
on the eve of the Arab Spring to wreak havoc in the country and to make 
room for the human rights activists who loudly demanded democratic rule.53
The Arab Spring illustrates another point that was missed in the frenzy of 
accusations and counteraccusations often thrown across the West-East divide. 
Syrians in particular have become very versed in the nature of the globalizing 
order around them and are quite aware of the various regions where the global 
order f lourishes and the significance of those regions in the larger story of 
globalization. After appealing to the United Nations, Western democracies, 
and neighboring states for support in their struggle to reclaim their society 
and government, and finding that the world has made up its mind to keep the 
dictator and do away with the people, they rushed across the borders of many 
European states, aiming to find a new home in Western Europe. If they could 
not turn Syria, Iraq, or Egypt into democracies, they must seek democratic 
life in Germany, Sweden, Britain, Canada, or the United States. They knew 
enough about human rights and where to experience them, despite marked 
differences in cultures, religions, and languages. It is hard to argue today that 
human rights are purely a Western invention, for they are felt and understood 
by all humans, and they are definitely part of contemporary Muslim values. 
Contemporary Muslims could easily identify equality and justice in the ac-
tions of early Muslims, but they would be hard-pressed to derive them from 
their intellectual tradition.
Historically, Islamic rationalists had a clear sense of human rights, even 
though it is not articulated in the same terms used in modern discourse. Kat-
erina Dalacoura recently observed that the “religion of Islam is not inherently 
illiberal and that it can be reconciled, at an abstract level of ideas, with the 
principles of human rights.”54 This observation relocates the discussion about 
the significance of the Islamic reform project from the secular- religious dual-
ity to the political values that underline the reform. Is the purpose of human 
rights to liberate the individual and society or to dominate them and manip-
ulate their social conditions? Can one discern in the body of the Islamic text 
a clear conception of individual rights that resembles our modern notion of 
human rights? For if we really care about protecting the dignity of the indi-
vidual through a regime of human rights, it does not matter whether these 
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rights are grounded in a secular or religious framework. Dalacoura recog-
nizes that “the individual does have a central place in the Islamic worldview, 
as in the other monotheistic religions, and this can provide a foundation for 
the concept of human rights.”55 While the concept was not articulated in 
modern terms, Islam showed that it is capable of developing and transform-
ing over time, contrary to the efforts by Orientalism scholars to show it in 
an essentialist light.56 Dalacoura is unsure whether Muslims have been able 
to articulate a human rights tradition, grounded in Islamic values, but she 
nonetheless expressed confidence in the capacity of Islam to do so as a matter 
of course.
Yet Islamic thoughts and movements have already progressed ahead of the 
best wishes and hopes of those who recognize the capacity inherent in Islamic 
traditions, as the successful struggle against authoritarianism in the 1980s 
and 1990s, led by the Indonesian Islamic reformers, culminated in a modern 
democratic state. The peaceful and bloodless revolutions of 1998 transformed 
Indonesian politics into a vibrant democratic order, based on the principles 
of equal participation and civic rights of citizens. While liberal democracy 
served as a model for democratic change, Indonesian Islamic reformers devel-
oped their ideas of democracy grounded in Islamic values by expanding the 
historically evolving Islamic discourse in which many contemporary inter-
pretations were engaged.
Identified variously by different scholars as “Islamic neo-modernism”, 
“civil Islam”, “cultural Islam”, “liberal Islam” or “progressive Islam”, 
this new Islamic thinking consistently claims that “the modern ideals 
of equality, freedom, and democracy are not uniquely Western values, 
but modern necessities compatible with, and even required by, Muslim 
ideals”. This stream of Islamic thinking has spontaneously developed in 
both “traditionalist” circle and “modernist” camp.57
Many challenges still lie ahead for the Islamic liberal tradition of Indonesia, 
including the recurring backlash from traditionalists who resist the widely 
accepted Islamic transformation rooted in the Islamic rationalism. But the 
Indonesian reform movement has shown its ability to view Islamic normative 
sources from a modern vantage point and to undertake a fresh interpretation 
of the universal values of Islam. What is also important is to engage multiple 
traditions and perspectives to produce a creative synthesis that embodies the 
universal and transcends its particular interpretation across geography and 
history.
The diverse list of Indonesian Islamic movements and groups cited above, 
with the diversity of their Islamic arguments and perspectives, do not include 
the multitude of social and political movements in Indonesia that embrace 
Islamic values but do not wave the Islamic f lag. From a general Western 
perspective, they are all subsumed under the category of Islamism. The cat-
egory is so broad that it is in any actual discussion useless in conveying any 
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sense other than that they all maintain some proximity to the religion of 
Islam or, to be more precise, they all take Islam as their normative frame of 
reference. Yet this description piles together every Islamic social, religious, 
or political groups that think Islam is important for contemplating moral 
action, though they may stand at the opposite end in terms of what values 
and conclusions they derive from the Islamic source. Critics of Islam subsume 
under the category of Islamism a host of movements, including Islamic lib-
erals, conservatives, traditionalists, rationalists, mystics, and extremists. This 
use of Islamism in this manner is the equivalent of using secularism to group 
liberals, progressives, communists, and fascists. The point is that Islamists are 
diverse groups who differ among themselves on many issues in ways that set 
them far apart from each other and would make some of them stand closer to 
secular ideas than to those who share with them the “Islamism” label. While 
the use of “Islamism” as a category would make some sense in academic work 
when the real and nuanced differences within the field are kept intact, the use 
of this category in media and political speech is distortive and manipulative 
and can only create misunderstanding and confusion. The unqualified use of 
“Islamism” turns the concept into a political and ideological weapon to paint 
everyone that takes pride in Islam with the excesses of the few.
The picture of the modern assertiveness of Islam as a normative source 
and the ground for the values of equality, freedom, justice, compassion, and 
human dignity in general is a complex one and cannot be reduced to pure 
comparison of “the secular” as juxtaposed to “the religious.” Islam is a reli-
gion claimed by people across the globe and the source of meaning to one-
fifth of humanity. At the heart of the meaning derived from Islamic symbols 
and texts is a rational zone that takes the shape of rational discourse with a 
long historical lineage of countless participants. The Islamic discourse has 
been broadened by modern interpretations that stem from sources outside 
its historical zone and has increasingly brought in liberal, conservative, so-
cialist, and even progressive ideas. The discourse, f luid and amenable, has 
provided contemporary Muslim intellectuals an excellent platform to engage 
in rational discussion that aims at reconciling modern reality with moral and 
meaningful life. Islamic rationalism provided—early on during the time of 
Ahmad Khan, Afghani, and Abduh—the moral and intellectual impetus for 
reform but was later overwhelmed with the rise of Islamic populism that 
substituted aesthetic inspiration for rational discourse and privileged political 
activism over intellectualization.
A new chapter of the historical journey of Islam began outside the area 
where Islam historically manifested itself in the past four decades, as Europe 
and North America became home of the Islamic faith. Waves of Muslim 
immigrants, driven out from their ancestral home by the corruption and 
authoritarianism brought about by the postcolonial states, have made Europe 
and North America their new homes. This brings a new phase of the rec-
onciliation between Islam and modernity and provides an important thread 
in the globalization process. The full meaning and the consequences of this 
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move on the relationship of Islam and the West are not fully clear. What is 
clear though is that Muslims have made good adjustments in a new world that 
does not seem to be comfortable with a community deeply committed to its 
religious identity and seem to be even amused with the way Muslims could 
readily express their faith in public space. The new experimentation with a 
Western Islam is still in its initial stages, but it could bring the kind of interac-
tion that would transform both the understanding of religion and secularism 
and the way the two interact in the post-modern and pre-global world. We 
focus in the next chapter on the initial steps in the journey of Islam in the 
West and the significance of the journey for globalization.
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The return of Islam to Europe after it was purged out happened quietly, 
peacefully, and uneventfully. Europe this time around was a different place, 
and Muslims were a different people. Europe was a completely different con-
tinent, full of energy and creativity, and growing in confidence and charm. 
The continent had already survived two world wars and was able to rejuve-
nate itself against all odds. A continent that purged itself of nationalist prej-
udice that almost wiped it out and embraced fully democratic rule, human 
rights, and humanity in general. The Muslims who began to show up on the 
European shores were not invaders but rather refugees from broken Mus-
lim societies that lost much of their historical memories and old habits but 
still aware of better times when Muslims led in science, technology, art, and 
commerce. As the twentieth century drew to a close, more waves of Muslims 
moved westward in search of better life in the West, as they run away from 
Middle Eastern countries where opportunities for growth and for a life of 
dignity were dwindling. The majority of the Muslim immigrants to Europe 
were unskilled workers while those who found new home in North America 
were students who traveled the distance in pursuit of higher education but 
then decided to stay back in the place where they grew up intellectually and 
professionally. The lure of the West was enormous, and the dread of life in 
the East was on the rise.
Not all Western Muslims were migrants from the East, however. Mus-
lim populations remained in large numbers in the Balkans and other parts 
of Eastern Europe, and an increasing number of European Muslims were 
Christian or Jewish converts to Islam, who found in Islam an idealist and 
spiritual refuge from an increasingly positivist and materialist European cul-
ture. Many Christian and Jewish Europeans found themselves at home and 
in familiar terrains in the Islamic faith: same prophetic history; same bib-
lical stories; same moral values; same hopes of existential future; and same 
but more direct and intimate relationship with the one living and loving 
God. Many of the new converts were ordinary Europeans who stumbled 
into the Islamic faith by accident, as a result of meeting Muslims proud of 
their monotheistic faith at a time when having faith was seen as unfitting for 
the highly educated and the achievers. Religion and faith became enigma in 
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the twentieth-century Europe. Others were highly achieving individuals, 
including diplomats, scientists, scholars, artists, and even leading atheists. The 
long list includes names such as Leopold Weiss (Muhammad Asad), Murad 
Hoffman, Roger Garaudy, Maurice Bucaille, Sinead O’Connor, and Cat Ste-
vens (Yusuf Islam).
In the United States, Islam became the religion of a growing African 
American movement led by Elijah Muhammad that produced legendary fig-
ures in the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s that transformed the Amer-
ican society, including those of Malcom X and Muhammad Ali. The United 
States was more welcoming to Muslim immigrants as they have a higher per-
centage of achievers than the larger population and found themselves at home 
in a society that has a clear religious leaning and spoke a religious language 
that has a familiar tone. Little did they know that in less than few decades, 
the general environment surrounding them will become more toxic not be-
cause the American people became less tolerant but because Muslims began 
to assume a public role and speak against unfair foreign policy practices, 
including the fate of the Palestinians under Israeli occupation. Muslim Amer-
icans became particularly vocal about the right-wing Israeli government of 
Benjamin Netanyahu’s disavowal of Oslo Peace Agreement and its drive to 
deny Palestinians a homeland by populating the West Bank with illegal set-
tlements. All of the sudden hell broke loose, and neoconservative activists and 
organizations sprang to silence Muslim organizations. The campaign to deny 
Western Muslims equal place in liberal democracy is multifaceted and fought 
at the sociopolitical and intellectual levels. We will devote this chapter to the 
intellectual debate involving the issue of Islam and secularism and the ques-
tion of compatibility of Islamic beliefs and values with a liberal democratic 
order, leaving the sociopolitical dimension to the next chapter.
The distortions of the meaning and significance of the presence of Islam 
in Western society are rather subtle and very sophisticated and undertaken by 
intellectuals who have their own reasons to problematize a European brand 
of Islam and, on fewer occasions, dramatize it. These efforts often ref lect gen-
uine concerns, connected with real issues and problems, but often evaluated 
from a very narrow scope that fails to connect many of the dots that bring 
out the full picture. Take, for example, the claim that “Europe is committing 
suicide,” which is posited as the first sentence of a recent book written by 
Douglas Murray, a British neoconservative activist and writer. In his book, 
dramatically titled The Strange Death of Europe: Immigration, Identity, Islam, 
Murray decries the waves of immigrants, mainly Muslims, f looding British 
cities and towns, and turning London into a city of immigrants, where only 
44.9% of its “residents now identified themselves as ‘white British’.”1 He is 
alarmed by the marked increase in the immigrant population, particularly 
with the increase of the percentage of Muslim immigrants, who have been 
overcrowding certain localities, reducing “white Britons” into a minority. 
These newcomers from strange lands and cultures are literally out of place, 
as Murray eloquently describes to us how unfit they are in the new place: 
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“Streets in the cold and rainy northern towns of Europe filled with people 
dressed for the foothills of Pakistan or the sandstorms of Arabia.”2 So what 
is strange about the Muslim immigrants is not simply that they are born in a 
foreign land, but the fact that the land from where they hailed falls completely 
outside the European continent. Murray is aware that the people of Europe 
have changed over the centuries, so that the English, French, and Greek cul-
tures are no longer identical with the ones that occupied the same spaces over 
a millennium ago. Still, he tells us that “they are recognisably Greek, English 
and French and all are European. In these and other identities we recognise 
a degree of cultural succession: a tradition that remains with certain qualities 
(positive as well as negative), customs and behaviours.”3 Murray recognizes 
that he cannot reduce the “familiar” to fashions and appearances and, there-
fore, seems to agonize over the feeling of strangeness he has toward those 
who look different. This agony is best illustrated in the following paragraph 
as he searches for that which describes the intrinsic element of Europeanness:
While generally agreeing that it is possible for an individual to absorb a 
particular culture (given the right degree of enthusiasm both from the 
individual and the culture) whatever their skin colour, we know that we 
Europeans cannot become whatever we like. We cannot become Indian 
or Chinese, for instance. And yet we are expected to believe that anyone 
in the world can move to Europe and become European. If being “Euro-
pean” is not about race – as we hope it is not – then it is even more imper-
ative that it is about “values.” This is what makes the question “What are 
European values?” so important. Yet this is another debate about which 
we are wholly confused.4
Murray somehow thought that the best way to deny racial motives for reject-
ing non-white immigrants is to shift the blame to non-European cultures. 
The reason why certain people are European is because they are “forced’ to 
be so; because “we know that we Europeans cannot become whatever we 
want.” Granted that we all understand the state of bewilderment when people 
enter into an unfamiliar space and come in direct contact with new cultures, 
languages, or customs. But people’s reactions are not always the same. Some 
would welcome the new experience and find in it the possibilities of ex-
panding one’s experience and horizons, while others feel uncomfortable and 
out of place. However, what is interesting in the above quote, and Murray’s 
arguments in general, is his inability to discuss the epoch-shacking event he 
casually calls “the strange death of Europe” within its proper historical ho-
rizons: world history. Although he seems to define the European culture on 
the basis of “European values” and not “the color of the skin,” his immedi-
ate and spontaneous reactions toward “the stranger” privilege genealogy and 
race more than ethics and values. Otherwise, why would anyone rule out the 
possibility of a European becoming a Chinese or an Indian if they moved to 
China or India, learned the local language of these societies, fell in love with 
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a Chinese or Indian, and established a family. For sure, a British who does 
that would be fully absorbed in those cultures and societies in one generation 
or two. Being absorbed in non-Western societies does not necessarily mean 
that a British national would have to lose their religion or values. Christianity 
is today part of both the Indian and Chinese cultures, so is Islam and Juda-
ism. Large numbers of Europeans have been integrated into Muslim cultures 
throughout history. What is of interest to us in this study is Murray’s inability 
to appreciate the extent to which world cultures and religions, and particu-
larly Islam, have contributed to the rise of European modernity. European 
values are not exclusively European, not only because Europe internalized 
many values and beliefs that could not be traced back to Europe proper but 
also because Europe has been working for centuries to recreate the world in 
its own image. This is why the above paragraph is loaded with many layers of 
meaning that need to be unpacked, and such an effort would require broader 
historical and cultural horizons that would naturally take us beyond Euro-
pean history and culture.
There are relevant questions that we must ask, which Murray completely 
overlooks, concerning the steady increase in migration to Europe. Why are 
Muslims coming to Europe in droves, particularly in the past decade or two? 
And why would Murray never engage the new Muslim immigrants who are 
the object of his study with meaningful conversations to find out why they 
have come to Europe? Why does he not engage in his book even European 
Muslims with deep genealogical roots in the continent and listen to what 
they have to say about his anxieties? Should we presume that he is not aware 
of the turmoil that plagues the Middle East and African societies or the role 
Europe plays in shaping a region that produces consecutive waves of immi-
grants? Or is he indeed aware of the plight of Middle Easterners and Africans 
under tyrannical regimes supported by European governments, but then as 
an unapologetic neoconservative, he thinks imperialism is a necessary and 
inevitable evil for a better Europe? Perhaps he never contemplated that impe-
rialism has serious consequences for everyone caught in its brutal and brutal-
izing dynamics. Many of the immigrants who made the unusual and uneasy 
journey away from their first homes were indeed forced out by autocratic 
and corrupt regimes that stif le economic growth and use iron-fist policies to 
silence opposition and crack down on any citizen who dares to criticize their 
corrupt rule. No doubt these communities have a responsibility to put their 
own house in order, but European and American interventions are making 
it exceedingly difficult by their constant intrusions in the name of the na-
tional interests of the invading powers. The role of the policies advocated 
by neoconservatives on non-Western communities must therefore be part of 
the debate to address the rising waves of immigrants to Europe and North 
America. The most recent waves of immigrants came from Syria, where the 
Assad regime has so far killed over half a million by the most conservative 
estimates and drove over 7 million out of their homes, mainly to neighbor-
ing countries. Many Syrians crossed the Aegean Sea to Greece on makeshift 
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and inf latable boats, and then walked thousands of miles, with their little 
children, to reach Western Europe. Close to half a million took refuge in 
Germany, while others continued to Scandinavia and Britain. These new 
waves of immigrants unnerved the Britons, and the British government chose 
to break out of the European Union rather than taking in its fair share of ref-
ugees. Britain’s disagreement with the immigration policies of its European 
partners was a main factor in the Brexit.5
Murray is neither a disinterested observer nor a causal commentator on 
European politics, but rather a political activist and an avowed neoconserv-
ative who places the current transformation of Europe at the feet of the Eu-
ropean left, who he blames for facilitating the “death of Europe.” He singles 
out Angela Merkel for his criticism, rebuking her for her open invitation to 
Syrian refugees displaced by the war-torn Syria to move to Germany, after 
France and other European nations refused to grant them asylum. Although 
Merkel’s principled stance should be celebrated as an excellent example of 
both European and Christian values, Murray who early in his book mourns 
the decline of Christianity in Britain chose instead to express sympathy with 
Thilo Sarrazin, a xenophobic critic of Merkel’s multiculturalism. Sarrazin 
was forced to resign his public office after attacking German Muslims in a 
book he published in 2010 under an equally alarmist title, Germany Abolishes 
Itself. Concocting out of thin air a picture of Germany with a Muslim popu-
lation of 35 million by the end of the century, he goes on the offensive stating 
“I don’t want the country of my grandchildren and great grandchildren to be 
largely Muslim, or that Turkish or Arabic will be spoken in large areas, that 
women will wear headscarves and the daily rhythm is set by the call of the 
muezzin. If I want to experience that, I can just take a vacation in the Ori-
ent.”6 He did not stop there though, as he revealed an equally condescending 
and rigid attitude toward the German Jews, during an interview in 2010 with 
Welt am Sonntag, in which he claimed that “all Jews share a certain gene like 
all Basques share a certain gene that distinguishes these from other people.”7
The stereotypical arguments and condescending attitudes we encounter in 
the positions taken by Murray and Sarrazin are not isolated but are central 
to growing movements of global proportions that portray Muslims and their 
religion as the source of the troubles and advocate for policies and actions that 
have adversely affected the lives of millions of Muslims across the globe. The 
level of Islamophobia in the United States and Europe is noticeably high, and 
it is so because this Islam-focused xenophobia is the agenda of several social 
movements who take anti-Muslim stance for different reasons. Bigotry and 
racism are part of the motif of such large-scale mobilization against Western 
Muslims, but Islam is also being used as a proxy for attacks on liberalism, 
multiculturalism, and open society. At the same time, Muslims’ efforts to 
address some of the criticism fall far short of what is needed. Part of the 
challenge is the tendency to generalize from small samples of actions and 
reactions. There are many stories of cooperation and mutual help across the 
Islam-West divide that goes unreported and unnoticed. Yet the real problem 
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does not always lie at the fringe. Pope Francis f lew to the Island of Lampe-
dusa in southern Italy in 2013 and met with a large number of Syrian refugees 
f leeing a bloody conf lict at home. He knew very well that the solution of 
the refugees’ miseries lies far away from Syria, as he condemned the “world 
indifference” toward the plight of the Syrians and called for a “reawakening 
of consciences.”
Authoritarianism and migration
Murray’s efforts to fault liberalism for its failure to keep the stream of refugees 
out of Europe are both ironic and irresponsible and reveal the extent to which 
neoconservatives are willing to destroy the life and culture of non- Western 
people in the name of nation building; however, when interventions go 
wrong, they turn around and place the blame at the feet of the left. The liberal 
left is faulted for attending to the wounds of those who have become the vic-
tims of failed nation-building projects, even when they were the party who 
opposed Middle Eastern wars and cautioned against its dire consequences. 
Nationalists and neoconservatives are quick to place the blame squarely on 
the shoulders of liberal and progressive activists, and their critique is increas-
ingly becoming total and unsparing. The decline in cultural values and civic 
virtues is the fault of liberalism in all its shapes and forms, so the argument 
goes. There is hardly any distinction between classical liberalism and neolib-
eralism or between political liberalism and social liberalism. Social liberalism 
is viewed by conservatives as an out-of-bound ideology bent on destroying 
all traditional institutions, most importantly the family and free enterprise. 
The progressives who advance social justice and gender equality are seen 
by their opponents as advancing pure socialism, while those who promote 
less economic regulations and insist on self-regulation through professionally 
identified best practices and stakeholders’ accountability are now condemned 
as irresponsible internationalists and self-serving capitalists. Complicating the 
debate is the fact that democratic institutions have become less responsive to 
popular demands, and no mediating institutions or movements are able to 
bridge the growing gap. Adding to the confusion is a growing sense of loss 
of control felt by ordinary Westerners who are convinced that the West is 
doomed unless it maintains social hierarchy and ethnically defined cultures.
The conservative critique of liberalism is as unsparing in America as in 
Europe, a new development that stands in striking contrast with the image 
portrayed 65 years ago by Louis Hartz who complained in his famous work, 
The Liberal Tradition in America (1955), of the absence of conservativism in 
America. Hartz asserted then that conservative and liberal Americans share 
the tradition of classical liberalism, making any penetration by socialism and 
other political ideologies futile. There were hardly then any serious chal-
lenges to Hartz’ thesis, but today things have changed quite a bit. In 2018, 
Yale University Press published Why Liberalism Failed? by Patrick Deneen 
who unreservedly declared the end of liberalism. For Deneen, liberalism has 
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failed precisely “because it was true to itself. It has failed because it has suc-
ceeded.”8 So liberalism from this standpoint was set up for failure because of 
the built-in contradictions it has since its moment of inception, as its problems 
grew out from its own philosophy. The demise of the “old white working 
class and the lashing out of debt-burdened youth” are only symptoms of the 
problem.9 The problem can be located, Deneen proclaims, in the contradic-
tion between liberalism’s promise of limiting the power of the government 
and liberating the individual from arbitrary political control, and the current 
reality liberal societies confront: a political power and an economic system 
out of the control of ordinary citizens.10 At the heart of the rising anxiety is 
the trajectory of the sociopolitical dynamics that have become increasingly 
visible in the past three decades. The unceasing push toward economic in-
tegration and the development of global governance institutions with the 
power to set standards worldwide and demand more homogenization, as part 
of the process of globalization, seem increasingly inevitable.
Deneen is convinced that the new vision of a global order is driven by the 
education system itself, as liberal-minded professors and students push toward 
a more egalitarian world while setting the conditions for inequality. The con-
tradiction between the promise and the emerging reality is quite obvious, he 
insists, turning the goal into a utopic illusion and liberalism into an ideology 
out of touch with society. Deneen puts the matter in the following piercing 
terms:
Students are taught by most of their humanities and social science profes-
sors that the only remaining political matter at hand is to equalize respect 
and dignity accorded to all people, even as those institutions are mills 
for sifting the economically viable from those who will be mocked for 
their backward views on trade, immigration, nationhood, and religious 
beliefs. The near unanimity of political views represented on college 
campuses is echoed by the omnipresent belief that an education must be 
economically practical, culminating in a high-paying job in a city pop-
ulated by like-minded college graduates who will continue to reinforce 
their keen outrage over inequality while enjoying its bounteous fruits.11
The emerging economy requires highly specialized technical skills, putting a 
large proportion of the population, including “old white working class” pop-
ulation, at disadvantage. Deneen’s critique of liberalism, which echoes con-
servative critique in general, leading to declaration of its failure, is threefold:
1  It has persistently undermined “classical and Christian effort to foster 
virtue, which was rejected as both paternalistic and ineffectual, prone to 
abuse and unreliability.”12
2  It continues to push governance away from the individual and com-
munity, placing important decisions at the national/federal and global 
levels.13
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3  It increasingly relies on administrative state to impose the liberal order, 
developed away from the effective participation of ordinary citizens and 
hence exhibiting antidemocratic tendencies.14
What is interesting about the position taken by Deneen is that while he seems 
to stand on the conservative side of the political division, his condemnation is 
uncontained by the liberal-conservative or the Democrat-Republican dual-
ism but is directed to both. Indeed, he evidently does agree that liberalism is 
the American political tradition once pointed out by Hartz and as such both 
liberals and conservatives are doomed to failure:
Both “classical” and “progressive” liberalism ground the advance of lib-
eralism in individual liberation from the limitations of place, tradition, 
culture, and any unchosen relationship. Both traditions—for all their 
differences over means—can be counted as liberal because of this funda-
mental commitment to liberation of the individual and to the use of nat-
ural science, aided by the state, as a primary means for achieving practical 
liberation from nature’s limitations.15
The conclusion is shockingly fatalistic, and even borders on nihilism. Deneen 
identifies four postliberal possibilities; two possibilities, communism or fas-
cism, have already been tried and he therefore deems their return unlikely, 
while the other two he contemplates as plausible alternatives: “populist na-
tionalist authoritarianism” and “military autocracy.”16 Yet what is of interest 
to our discussion is the complete absence of appreciation of the most impor-
tant and relevant dimension of liberalism that is at the root of the current 
predicament of Western society, namely neoliberalism that lies at the heart of 
his critique. Equally important is the lack of political awareness of the work-
ing of liberalism outside the West since the turn of the nineteenth century. 
“Imposing the liberal order by fiat” has been the hallmark of European and 
American interventions in the Middle East that aims at producing liberalism 
by using autocratic regimes to transform the Middle Eastern society. Indeed, 
the process seems to have intensified lately in the wake of the Arab Spring 
and the fear of the broadening inf luence of Islamic movements.
Islamic movements have been rejected by liberalism as both undemocratic 
and incapable of engaging in true democratic order. The prevalent argu-
ments among political commentators and decision-makers who want to see 
liberal democracy prevail in the Middle East is that democratic elections are 
embraced by Islamists as an only one-time exercise to bring them to power. 
Democracy would then be abandoned and replaced by authoritarian rule that 
would take the form of theocracy. This was exactly the argument when the 
Salvation Front won the Algerian general elections in 1992. American and 
French commentators raised the specter of “one man, one vote, one time” to 
justify their support for the Algerian military that cancelled the elections to 
prevent a freely elected Islamist coalition from assuming power.17 The coa-
lition was made of many groups with varying commitments to freedom, as 
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some were considered to hold “moderate” Islamic views, while others were 
less tolerant of individual freedom. The efforts to suppress Islamist move-
ments in Algeria and other parts of the Middle East increased in popularity, 
as it became clear in the first parliamentary elections in Egypt when Islamists 
were allowed to run for office. Over 22% of the seats were won then by Isla-
mists, in controlled elections in which the United States pressured Mubarak 
to permit more open elections to gauge the Islamist strength. American and 
European leaders continued however to downplay the popularity of the Is-
lamist movements in Muslim countries. American and European leaders 
contemplated a policy of engagement with moderate Islamists, in the first 
decade of the twenty-first century, but the experimentation never took off. 
Western reluctance to engage the Islamists, even those who openly support 
a democratic order, is rooted in deep suspicions that even moderate Islamists 
have an instrumentalist approach to democracy. Yet the problem may not fall 
squarely in the lap of the Islamists, as the evidence also points to issues of self- 
perception of the advocates of liberal democracy. The problem is highlighted 
in Michelle Space’s study of the strategies used by Americans and Europeans 
to engage Islamists groups. The study problematizes the coupling of liber-
alism and democracy and echoes aspects of Deneen’s critique of American 
liberalism.
Critical voices of the nation-building project in the Middle East have 
pointed out certain aspects of that engagement that many people in the re-
gion suspected long time ago. They largely agree that the European Union is 
an internal actor in the Middle East and has been “caught in different webs 
of power struggles that continuously shape and deform its policies and [en-
gagement] programmes.”18 This is the new perspective with which the na-
ture of European involvement in the Middle East is reframed. The question 
from this perspective is “no longer one of whether the EU is doing enough 
to promote democracy, but whether it is acting in line with a democratic 
ethos or not.”19 The question that whether Europe’s engagement with the 
region is contributing to the democratization process itself became a question 
of whether enough is being done to create a public space for questioning 
and debating social and political challenges—a space indeed vital for any 
real democratization. Public debate and political participation are not, and 
should not be, limited to parliamentarian elections, but should also include 
other forms of engagements, such as “consultative forums,” “citizens’ juries,” 
“townhall meetings,” and other forms of open debate involving the citizens. 
The recently proposed forms of involvements and debates are crucial for de-
veloping a democratic environment, particularly if they are linked with local 
and municipal governance.
When liberalism undermines democracy
Examining recent reports by European agencies involved in the promotion 
of democracy in Egypt, such as European Instrument for Democracy and 
Human Rights (EIDHR), reveals a disturbing trend and shows that strategies 
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employed by European governments tend to justify, and at least ignore, the 
antidemocratic actions of the autocratic Egyptian regime. Rather than using 
human rights and local democratic governance as a means to effect change, 
European governments opted to provide support to civil society organiza-
tions. Even here, the model for encouraging public participation was done 
half-heartedly and as a public relations effort, as the method of its imple-
mentation was twisted and steered away from its original goals. To begin 
with, promoting civil society organizations was introduced as part of the 
Association Agreement signed between the Egyptian government and the 
EU in 2004. The agreement was intended to link improved trade relations 
with democratic steps and programs that advance the democratic process in 
Egypt. The agreement was needed by both European government and Egypt, 
as public pressure on EU members to demand greater liberalization of Egyp-
tian politics was mounting. The Association Agreement was operationalized 
in 2007 through a joint action plan under the name of European Neighbor-
hood Policy (ENP). The promotion of democracy was articulated “as a set of 
arrangements that will foster public participation in the reform process, the 
objectives of which are defined in advance as ‘catching up with globaliza-
tion’.”20 After spending years negotiating and planning, the EU democracy 
promotion project boiled down to providing financial support to NGOs that 
were involved in marginal work that made no contribution whatsoever to 
improving social and political conditions for democratic practices. Nor did 
the EU democracy promotion project help Egyptian civil society to assume 
a more constructive role in enhancing human rights and free debate. One 
example of the programs sponsored by EU focused on “combating the cul-
ture of police officers’ impunity in a context marked with four decades of 
entrenched authoritarianism.”21 The program consisted of training sessions 
conducted by El-Nadim for the rehabilitation of victims of violence. The 
project involved contestations of torture practices not revealed by its proper 
name, including
challenging of official reports about deaths in detention centres, the pub-
lic defaming of police officers accused of practicing torture, and using 
institutions like the office of the Prosecutor General to contest govern-
mental reports on the status of prisons and detention centres.22
In light of this meager approach to democracy promotion, one is tempted to 
take a cynical view of the exercise as an effort to appease the critics of trade 
relations with the antidemocratic regime of Mubarak. Yet the fiasco of pro-
moting democracy would be better explained by the priority European of-
ficials gave to the liberal component of the democratic process. At the heart 
of this meager policy outcome is a deep conviction, enforced by the limited 
historical horizons of the Enlightenment, that not only liberal values but Eu-
ropean liberalism itself—that is, the way liberal values manifest themselves 
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in European liberal society and culture—is the standard of any democratic 
order. Liberalism has increasingly taken to modern European culture—with 
its disdain for traditional religiosity and faith in  transcendence—as the uni-
versal truth of modernization. No avenue is allowed for different paths to 
modernity, particularly as the modern West continues to be the embodiment 
of science, technology, and progress. The overconfidence of liberalism as 
the embodiment of modern secularism makes it unable and unwilling to 
engage political movements whose mode of thinking is pre-secularist, which 
automatically translates in the secular liberal mind as premodern. This asso-
ciation of modernism with European culture has biased Western advocates 
of liberalism against even Islamic movements and parties committed to de-
mocracy and human rights, and strangely brought them closer to autocratic 
Arab “secularists,” as their lifestyle and discourse become the standards for 
separating the liberals from the authoritarians. Autocratic Arab elites, who 
use their “modern” and “secular” image to gain the trust and support of 
Western democrats, are very adept at providing a persuasive aura of sec-
ular modernism and use their modernist discourse to hide their autocracy 
and oppression and present their brutality as a necessary “toughness” em-
ployed for the secularization of Arab societies. Arab tyrants have succeeded 
in advancing their favorite narrative that all Islamic reformists are prone 
to terrorism, and so suppressing them is a necessary evil to fight terrorism. 
The narrative has been internalized by generations of Western policymakers, 
many of whom know little about the history of the struggle for democracy 
in the Arab world. Adding to the confusion is that the category “Islamist” 
contains different strands of movements from the most extremist and intol-
erant to many Muslim democrats who see the need to ground democracy in 
Islamic rationalism.
There is therefore an urgent need to replace the European cultural model 
with a value-based model of democracy by making commitment to pluralism 
and human rights the cornerstone for sorting out real from fraudulent claims 
of democracy. This new criterion is already part of the European Commis-
sion mandate, but somehow it has not been operationalized in the way it was 
intended when it comes to Muslim society. The Commission is tasked spe-
cifically to promote “activities relating to the EU guidelines on human rights 
issues and strengthening of civil society.”23 Fulfilling this role would require 
a shift from focusing on the procedural elements of democracy to paying 
attention to the process of governance as the relationship that channels the 
interactions among citizens and provides safe zone for free debates that define 
social priority. Democratic governance must grow around the protection of 
fundamental human rights. The tension between liberalism and democracy 
is observable today in Western society, and the attitude of “we know what is 
best for you” has creeped into Western governance, as neoliberals who now 
run both the economy and government seem dismissive of ideas that chal-
lenge their particular view of democracy and globalization. Pace identifies in 
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her study the prejudicial tendency that makes European observers overlook 
democratic processes at work in the Middle East and support “particular con-
ception of democracy.”24
There is another form of blind spot that leads some contemporary West-
ern liberal democrats to confuse conf lict at the early stage of the formation 
of democracy with polarization and breakdown in sociopolitical structures. 
The Islam-secularism polarity in Muslim societies is very healthy for devel-
oping a viable democratic order, provided that outside observers stay calm 
and allow the democratic process to work out differences and engage in 
compromises. The Tunisian, Moroccan, and Turkish experimentations in 
democracy are good examples. The democratic process is still rough, but 
democratic governance in those countries provides a better and more demo-
cratic alternative to secular authoritarianism that continues to generate failed 
states. Turkey has experienced setbacks lately in the area of human rights, 
but these were the results of external interferences aimed at overthrowing 
an elected government in a fashion not dissimilar to the coup that ended 
Egypt’s f lirtation with an elected form of government. The political dynam-
ics under Mohamed Morsi of Egypt was for sure worrisome, particularly in 
the domination of political institutions by Islamists. But democracies are 
better at balancing out forces and generating positive dynamics than author-
itarian rule. Waiting until the opposition is completely radicalized has always 
ended in the emergence of rogue states, ruled by elites that are not easy to 
reorient to democratic rule. Arab and Muslim dictators who lead corrupt 
governments in the name of secularism do not encourage an already skep-
tical population to embrace secular politics. Instead, they strengthen those 
who stand against the arbitrary rule of unaccountable generals, regardless of 
the type of ideology they have.
The advocates of secularism in Europe repeat the same mistakes of Mid-
dle Eastern rulers when they try to shame immigrant communities into ac-
cepting their wholesale rejection of Islamic practices as backward and hence 
unworthy of European citizens. While raising issues about the statements 
and actions harmful to social peace is important and necessary, rejection of 
Islam is often based on generalizations, misinterpretations, and unfounded 
assumptions and is not helpful because it completely ignores the larger con-
text in which the immigrant community is left unprotected, as for example 
in relation to “institutional racism” that generates rebellious attitudes among 
Muslim youth. This point has been brought to the fore by Maajid Nawaz, a 
British Muslim who sought the warmth of peer group by joining Hizb ut-
Tahrir after experiencing what was later condemned as institutional racism 
from the police department of his community. Nawaz’s reference to “in-
stitutional racism,” acknowledged by the Macpherson Report in 1999 that 
described metropolitan London police practices as such in the context of 
examining the conditions that led to his radicalization.25 Nawaz’s account of 
his radicalization was provided in a book he coauthored with Sam Harris and 
was published in 2017 under the title Islam and the Future of Tolerance. Nawaz 
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explained his state of mind, when he decided at the tender age of 17 to join 
the Islamist group. Interestingly, he located the process that led to his decision 
in a global context:
when we in the West failed to intervene in the Bosnian genocide, some 
Muslims became radicalized; when we did intervene in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, more Muslims became radicalized; when we failed to intervene in 
Syria, many more Muslims became radicalized.26
Harris, who is Nawaz’s interlocutor in the book, provides a concentric- circles 
imagery of the diversity of Muslim community, in which he places the Is-
lamic State, al-Qaeda, al-Shabab, Boko Haram at the center, then all kind of 
Islamists in the larger circle, and finally what Harris calls “so-called moderate 
Muslims” in the largest circle.27 Nawaz unhesitatingly agrees with the sketch 
drawn by Harris and provides a precise definition of the first two categories, 
“jihadism” and “Islamism,” leaving the “moderate Muslims” with no par-
ticular definition. By Islamism he subsumes all individuals and groups who 
have “the desire to impose any given interpretation of Islam on society,” 
and by jihadism he means those who believe in the “use of force to spread 
Islamism.”28
The book that documents the dialogue between Harris and Nawaz exam-
ines an important issue, captured by its title, Islam and the Future of Tolerance. 
The interlocutors are public intellectuals who are active in this particular 
debate across the North Atlantic and come from completely different back-
grounds, which makes the book more interesting. Harris is born into a Jew-
ish family but evidently has deep doubts in all religions, while Nawaz is a 
Muslim who comes from an immigrant family and who came of age in the 
years of Islamophobia and violent extremism. Both are trying to pin down 
the structure and causes of what appears to be an intractable conf lict. Yet 
the debate remained too narrow to make broader sense of whether the fu-
ture promises greater tolerance or intolerance. Nawaz tries in several parts 
of the book to broaden the context of the debate, but he had to return to 
questions that focused on European Muslim immigrants. Harris’s obvious 
lack of appreciation of the complexity of modern Muslim society did not 
help in setting the dialogue in the right direction. The concentric-circles 
sketch that we just talked about is a good example to illustrate this point. 
The sketch is so misleading to the general readers as to leave them with the 
impression that jihadist groups are at the center of contemporary Muslim 
experience. To understand the distortive effect of this schematic presentation 
of Islam to a general audience, made by two public intellectuals who spend 
their daily life speaking to curious audiences and who write to the general 
readers about the reality of contemporary Islam, one needs only to imagine 
someone trying to portray to Muslim audience the political expression of 
Christianity by placing the Ku Klux Klan at the center of society and the 
Christian right at the larger circle and “moderate” Christians at the largest 
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circle. Similarly, Nawaz’s definitions are not that helpful, although he tries 
elsewhere to push back against the reductionist attempts by Harris to portray 
Islam and Muslims. His use of Islamism, for instance, is problematic as the 
definition denotes a specific strand of this broader category. Only a small 
segment of Islamists call for the imposition of their interpretations of sha-
ria on society. These strands consist of politically exclusivist movements and 
regimes, such Hizb al-Tahrir and various fundamentalist groups. The term 
Islamist is repeatedly used by Western intellectuals to refer, in addition to the 
above groups, to political movements that appeal to Islamic values and con-
cepts to mobilize Muslims against authoritarian governments and to support 
political parties that call for pluralist and democratic governance. Yet, despite 
the limiting and distortive schematic of the concentric circles, Nawaz makes 
sure to dispel the confusion between Islamism and traditional Islam. “Islam is 
a traditional religion like any other,” Nawaz stresses, “replete with sects, de-
nominations, and variant readings. But Islamism is the desire to impose any 
of those readings on society. It is commonly expressed as the desire to enforce 
a version of shari’ah as law.”29
The secular as the framework for pluralism
Although the structure and the direction of the arguments remain overtly 
restrictive as Harris contemplates the possibility of toleration and the future 
of Islam, Nawaz manages to bring serval insights that highlight the source 
of intolerance as being manifested in several radical movements that speak in 
the name of Islam. While some Islamist groups reject democracy and advo-
cate an archaic form of government that once prevailed under the dynastic 
rule, Islamic reformers have appealed to the shura30 principle which calls for 
grounding political legitimacy on the community consent and have there-
fore embraced democratic governance. Nawaz challenges Harris’s general-
izations about Muslim beliefs and practices, affirming the prevalence of “a 
strong reform strand within US Muslim discourse, and it may be that most 
American Muslims support it.”31 He also acknowledged the development of 
strong democratic and liberal voices among Islamist movements in the Arab 
world, citing al-Nahda as an example for an Islam-inspired movement that 
has adopted a more mature approach to post-Islamist politics.32 Nawaz is 
fully aware of damage that can be done when secular approach is divorced 
from commitment to democracy, and like many who want to see democ-
racy prevail in Muslim societies, he is disturbed by British secularists’ call 
to sidestep democracy in order to impose the type of secularism that is pe-
culiarly European. He is disturbed by liberals, whom he mockingly calls 
“fellow-travelers,” who are bent on bringing the colonial divide-and-rule 
approach to British politics. “secular people may still reject a human rights 
discourse to a degree—a state of affairs that I would not be satisfied with,” he 
exclaims. He then goes on to express his hope “that people will arrive not just 
at secularism, but also at democratic and human rights values.”33
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As a European Muslim, Nawaz is deeply challenged by the situation he 
finds himself in, as he and many young European Muslims have to fight on 
many fronts to overcome misunderstanding of Islam and Muslims and coun-
ter the campaigns of misinformation sponsored by different European groups, 
particularly far-right groups who seem intent on generating fear to provoke 
a backlash against Muslim immigrants. On the one hand, he feels the need 
to counter the narrative of British Muslim extremists who have become the 
mouthpiece of violent extremists in the Middle East, while he has to respond 
to white nationalists’ attacks against Muslims. The latter present Muslims as 
uniform community with essentialized characteristics, never changing over 
time. He equally dreads the heavy burden of having to repeatedly distinguish 
his attitudes and beliefs from the fanatical expressions by overseas Muslims 
who lash out against the secularism they associated with the behavior of the 
autocratic regimes in the Middle Eastern societies. As a European Muslim 
who sees the importance of protecting the secular structure of government, 
he feels helpless when the dynamics in the Middle East seems to conspire 
against the drive to secular order:
What you have raised is a real challenge. If I argue that the solution 
to Islamism and Muslim fundamentalism lies in encouraging pluralism, 
which leads to secularism, which leads to liberalism, then how do we 
de-stigmatize secularism when it has been so abused by Arab Ba’thist 
dictators? The stigma is so bad that there is not even an accurate word for 
secularism in Urdu. The word used is la deeniyat, which is derived from 
an Arabic term which means: “anti-religion.” I’ve often suggested intro-
ducing ‘almaaniyyah into Urdu, which is a more neutral Arabic equivalent 
for the word secularism. The situation has deteriorated even more since 
the Arab Uprisings because democracy led to Islamists gaining a majority 
in Egypt, and this led to another secular Arab coup taking matters back 
to square one.34
Undoubtedly, Arab secularists have given secularism a bad name in the Arab 
world, but this has not ended the struggle to resuscitate a form of secular 
tradition in which the Islamically grounded values of justice, equality, diver-
sity, and religious freedom are interwoven to approximate a post-Islamist and 
post-secular space.
Nawaz is not alone in facing the predicament of being Muslim in Europe, 
as Muslim presence in Europe is seen as problematic by many Europeans 
who, for centuries, regarded Islam as the perfect “other.” Europeans who 
are fazed by encountering Islam close to home come from all walks of life, 
as they include politicians like Sarrazin who would rather send Muslims to 
their exotic places outside Europe, where people could travel to see them as 
tourists as he cannot fathom encountering them in his neighborhood. They 
include journalists like the editors of Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten who 
strongly believes everything is a fair game in a democracy and that insulting 
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the badgered Danish Muslim minority and trashing their religious symbols 
is how one can celebrate free speech. They occasionally include religious 
authorities, like the late Pope Benedict XVI, whose speech at the University 
of Regensburg has provoked a wide range of reactions and broad debate 
about the responsibility of the head of the Catholic church. Those contro-
versies elicited intellectual debate about issues of pluralism, tolerance, free 
speech, and globalization. The scholarly debates on these and similar issues 
were often framed in terms of the question of pluralism and the right to free 
speech, as they raised concerns about the presence of Islam in Europe and 
the ability of European Muslims to fit in a secular society. The discussions 
soon galvanized around questions as to how to transform the beliefs of Eu-
ropean Muslims and later escalated to discussions about how to transform 
Islam and whether the Qur’an is an appropriate text for the modern age.35 
Although these experiences remain at the margin and are not indicative of 
the European society in general, they raise serious concerns in the absence of 
sufficient exposure to the experience of mainstream Western Muslims. The 
recent presence of Islam in the West is yet to be seen as an opportunity to 
overcome the rising tensions and contradictions between Muslim and West-
ern understanding of one another. In a globalizing world that seems in a dire 
need to transcend historically founded antagonism, Western Muslims could 
play a vital and productive role in bridging the divide and enriching both 
Muslim and Western self-perception and understanding.
Migration from Muslim societies to the West is not new, as Muslim immi-
grants began to show up in Europe, and particularly the Americas, as early as 
the turn of the twentieth century. Early Muslim immigrants blended in very 
easily, as they arrived prior the rise of Islamic consciousness in the second half 
of the twentieth century. Muslim migration escalated in the past three dec-
ades around the time Muslim secularists provoked a backlash from Muslims 
who felt that their religious identity is being challenged by Western liberal 
and socialist ideologies. While immigrants were already familiar with secu-
larism, and were hoping to find respite in their new homes, a disenchanted 
Europe that has already announced the “death of god” was caught by surprise 
by the European Muslims’ affirmation of their deep attachment to the God of 
Abraham that every secularist hardliner thought belonged to the premodern 
Europe. Adding to the confusion was the diversity of the views expressed 
by the new immigrants and the militancy of some of the loudest voices that 
openly condemned European secularism and called for the implementation of 
Islamic law in Europe. Muslim radicals, who were the recipients of Wahhabi 
Salafism’s literalist interpretations of Islam, verbally attacked British society 
as racist and imperialist and were placed under the spotlight by British media. 
Anjem Choudary, a British born and educated Muslim of Indian origin, pub-
licly attacked every political value that was sacred to modern Europe, includ-
ing secularism, democracy, tolerance, and human rights. Responding with a 
reconciliatory statement that he made in February 2008, the Archbishop of 
Canterbury, Rowan Williams, acknowledged in this statement the sensitivity 
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of the public to the religious traditions of British Muslims by pointing out 
that “as a matter of fact certain provisions of sharia are already recognised 
in our society and under our law.”36 Rather than engaging in constructive 
debate that recognizes individuals and groups who genuinely reach out to 
Muslims, Choudary responded provocatively and aggressively insisting that 
sharia “has to be adopted wholesale” and insinuating that “it will come either 
by embracing Islam because it is the fastest growing religion in the coun-
try, or by an Islamic country conquering Britain or by elements embracing 
Islam and imposing it.”37 It was against this kind of rhetoric and bravado 
that Nawaz and other British Muslims set out to counter Muslim extrem-
ism. Choudary’s insinuations, while remaining within the realm of legal free 
speech, added to the public confusion, and provided the far-right the material 
they need to “prove” that Islam is a threat to social peace and is contrary to 
the spirit of open societies. There was definitely a need for Muslim voices to 
counter this extremism and present the values and beliefs embraced by main 
stream Muslim communities.
The migration of Muslims who took their religion seriously added to the 
urgency to reexamine European secularism that began to gain currency as 
secularization penetrated deep into the social and religious zones that were 
once considered the private spaces where religion maintained some auton-
omy. The debate over the secular-religious boundaries gradually developed 
between the notion of the “secular” as a political principle to promote plural-
ism and the notion of “secularism” as a social ideology. Secularism is no more 
the principle of separation of the state and the church, as initially intended, 
but rather a political doctrine that “enforces a specific worldview, which can 
be considered a form of political authority in its own right.”38 The analysis 
of statements and actions by state authorities, particularly in France, revealed 
the true nature of modern secularism as the new religion with a distinctive set 
of doctrines used to make concrete judgments about appropriate beliefs and 
religious practices, with the secular elites claiming the authority to reinforce 
judgments loaded with moral and metaphysical claims. Muslim intellectuals’ 
religious experiences were shaped by a discursive tradition that remained 
alive, even after it has lost a great deal of its early vigor. Intellectuals like Talal 
Asad, Mehdi Hasan, and Tariq Ramadan in Europe, or Abdullahi An-Na’im, 
Reza Aslan, Azizah al-Hibri, and Khaled Abou El Fadel in the United States, 
have problematized the notion of secularism as a purely political doctrine. 
The debate over what constitutes secularism has broadened in the past two 
decades to include other European and American intellectuals, including em-
inent philosophers such as Charles Taylor, John Rawls, and Jürgen Habermas. 
The radical voices, on the other hand, presented by those who are critical of 
Islam and Muslims show that a
fundamental gap exists between “secular” Europeans and “religious” 
Muslims, and the depiction of Muslims as “defective” Europeans, with 
Muslims portrayed as less rational, less capable of separating knowledge 
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from belief and religion from politics, and less capable of valuing democ-
racy, freedom of expression and gender equality.39
The French went even farther in the name of secularism to ban the wearing 
of scarf in schools and to push toward the integration of Muslim religious in-
stitutions into the French republic through the formation of religious boards, 
with little success.
There is today a robust debate about the need to redefine the “secular” and 
“secularism.” Muslim intellectuals are not opposed to the secular nature of 
the state, as they appreciate its necessity for maintaining spheres of freedom in 
society and are already aware of its presence in the premodern Islamic society 
in the dynamics of voluntary communities of law (madhab) and the autono-
mous confessional communities (millet or dhimmi contracts). The “secular” 
was envisaged as a principle of tolerance that is necessary for maintaining 
religious and political pluralism, and it hence requires consensus based in 
rational discourse. Perhaps, it is in this understanding of the secular that Is-
lamic and Western epistemes can engage in meaningful dialogue. Secularism 
as an ideology constructed by political elites and imposed on society without 
public discussion and consent is antidemocratic and should not be allowed to 
stand and take roots in intellectual discourse because its legitimation would 
culminate in the imposition of state-constructed doctrines on society and the 
rise of totalitarianism legitimatized by the majoritarian form of democracy.
The response of the French state to the Muslim affirmation of their reli-
gious practices was disingenuous and haphazard, lacking the seriousness of 
rational solutions that are true to the spirit of the liberal democratic tradition 
at the foundation of the modern French society. The response was to treat 
the religious edicts as an expression of “Islam in France” rather than a reli-
gious practice of French Muslims. It is true that some of the recent Muslim 
immigrants are not aware of French history that arouses that type of fear and 
anxiety among the French public. Many of the Muslim youth developed a 
rebellious attitude toward that state, as their families were marginalized and 
lacked good education and job opportunities. Combine this with the experi-
ence of racism and racial superiority expressed by public officials and police 
practices, and you have the ingredients for fueling the next disaster. The first 
clear outburst of youth anger took place in 2005 French riots that lasted for 
three weeks in the suburbs of Paris and in several French cities. A paper, au-
thored by three French intellectuals in 2008, and was later published in 2009, 
identified the root of the problem in the following terms:
[T]he urban riots of November 2005 paradoxically reveal on the one 
hand the success of the French republican model when it comes to teach-
ing shared values and history, but on the other hand the failure of both 
the State, which has failed to translate into public policies the values it 
officially preaches, and the politico-administrative elites who are always 
keen to stress the benefits of “republican” principles while delivering 
little when it comes to opening up access to key positions of power.40
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Muslim youth were not in this case rejecting the French values, but were only 
expressing their resentment over their state of marginalization. This willful 
neglect of an “alien” population is most vivid in France, but it could also be 
found in many European states. There is close proximation between the way 
events unfolded in France and notion of “political hysteria” introduced by the 
Hungarian historian Terry István Bibo. Bibo argues that when a community 
faced with issues that challenge its self-understanding it creates a “fictional 
problem” and endows it with meaning and symbols at the core of its sense 
of being and then restores its self-confidence by attempting to solve the fic-
tional problem.41 The political hysteria appears in France in the response 
of the state institutions to what is conceived as a failure to integrate French 
Muslims into French secularism. Rather than dealing with the “problem” 
through a rational approach grounded in the French values of free choice and 
moral autonomy, it created the fiction that the scarf is a symbol of women’s 
oppression by male Muslims and proceeded to solve the problem as one of 
liberating Muslim women rather than imposing on them a lifestyle not of 
their choosing. The political hysteria here is the public act that for all practical 
purposes leads to denying the moral agency to women. This fiction is not dif-
ficult to refute when one finds that among the most powerful Muslim voices 
in the West today have been those of Muslim women asserting their reli-
gious values and providing excellent examples of leadership in protecting the 
liberal values of democracy, equality, and human rights. One could hardly 
describe Congresswomen Ilhan Omar, the progressive member of Congress, 
as oppressed. Omar, who wears a scarf, is an assertive political leader who is 
not shy to take bold positions as she fights for equality and human dignity 
on behalf of working-class Americans. The U.S. Congress had to change its 
standing rules to accommodate Omar’s religious practice, as she was elected 
by her constituents in Minnesota to be their House representative. Nor can 
one call Ibtihaj Muhammad an oppressed Muslim woman, while she rose to 
represent the United States in the 2016 Olympic as member of the American 
fencing team. She helped her team win the Olympic brown medal wearing 
her scarf during competitions. There are of course plenty of cases of oppres-
sion within the Muslim communities across the world. But it is important to 
point out that the problems often stem from the conditions of poverty, the 
lack of proper education, and cultural traditions that have been misused from 
within. Islam and Islamic values have been a source of inspiration more often 
than not, and Muslim women in particular find in the sacred text a powerful 
resource to fight against cultural limitations.42
Political agendas and fearmongering
No one has contributed more to deepening the divide between the Muslim 
and Western communities than Bernard Lewis, who has frequently used 
his authority as public intellectual to advance a narrow political agenda. He 
is the darling of neoconservative intellectuals who are out to persuade the 
Western society that Islam and Western Muslims have one purpose in life, 
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namely to undermine Western achievements and facilitate Muslim invasion 
of Western society. And nobody has been more successful in fanning the 
fear against European and American Muslims than he did, because of the 
skills he cultivated as the last important figure in the classical European 
tradition of Orientalism. Unlike many who have been shouting in recent 
year “Muslims are at the gates,” he is dispassionate and capable of presenting 
his ideas in seemingly balanced fashion. The balance though is not between 
various interpretations, or debates about certain facts, but rather a balance 
between facts and fictions and between what may count as reasonable inter-
pretations and what is outrageous exaggerations. In an article he published 
in The Atlantic in 1990, titled “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” he concocted 
the metaphor of “God is the head of the Islamic state” out of the figments 
of his imagination, asserting that Muslims believe that “God is in principle 
the sovereign, the supreme head of the Islamic state—and the Prophet and, 
after the Prophet, the caliphs are his vicegerents—then God as sovereign 
commands the army.”43 He then went on to explain the roots of the Mus-
lim rage by citing the historical wars between Islam and Christendom, in 
which Muslims won some and lost some. The current rage however stems, 
he argues, from the fact that the “Muslim has suffered successive stages of 
defeat.” From losing the competition to dominate the world, to losing con-
trol over national sovereignty, and finally losing the “mastery in his own 
house, from emancipated women and rebellious children.” “The Muslim” 
that Lewis imagines is an ossif ied character incapable of developing over 
time, as he is f ixated on fighting an eternal war with the Christian West, and 
feeling a constant pain ever since he received the final stroke from Western 
people who “emancipated women and rebellious children,” in Muslim soci-
eties. The Muslim is so essentialized in this century-old story Lewis uses to 
explain the “roots of Muslim rage.” He is so caught up in his fable that he 
could not even contemplate that the Muslim he is describing today might 
be the very emancipated child who rebelled against his father with Euro-
pean help, given the fact that this emancipation is supposedly a century old. 
This should be a sufficient time for the rebellious child to have grown and 
assumed leadership, then brought up a generation or two under the condi-
tions of emancipation. The time must have come, even if you accept Lewis’s 
story, that the angry father and husband has passed away and the rebellious 
children have grown up and are now in charge of their societies. The story 
is so unreal and shallow, and has many cracks and holes in it, but Lewis has 
told it perhaps too many times that he now believes it and does not have any 
more the urge to reexamine it.
Could there be any other factor that might explain the roots of the Muslim 
rage? Could Western imperialism be the root cause that may help explain 
the rage? Lewis considers this possibility only to dismiss it as an instance of 
Muslims’ unrealistic expectations and as a sign of their refusal to play the game 
of imperialism. “Some Western powers, and in a sense Western civilization as 
a whole, have certainly been guilty of imperialism,” Lewis conceded.44 But 
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then he dismisses imperialism as a legitimate ground for justifying grievance, 
for this has always been the case with those who possessed power—Arab, 
Mongols, and Ottomans did it, and so why to stop it now? So what we have 
here is a clear case of “a clash of civilizations,” between the Muslim civi-
lization, eager to impose its religion as a superior form of religiosity, and 
Western civilization, represented by the United States. The rage Lewis pre-
supposes comes from the naiveté of the followers of the Islamic civilization 
who accorded Christians and Jews a “degree of practical as well as theoretical 
tolerance rarely paralleled in the Christian world until the West adopted a 
measure of secularism in the late-seventeenth and eighteenth centuries” but 
now reject Western civilization because it stands for secularism. The Muslims 
have themselves to blame, because “Islam was never prepared, either in the-
ory or in practice, to accord full equality to those who held other beliefs and 
practiced other forms of worship.” Never mind that the comparison is faulty, 
as it suggests that Muslims do not appreciate Western democracy and are not 
themselves interested in adopting effective democratic rule where all citizens 
are treated equally. Lewis’s narrative evidently suggests that there is no moral 
equivalency between historical Islamic and modern Western tolerance. Yet 
this depiction is at odds with his acknowledgment of the moral and political 
autonomy the Ottoman afforded to Christian and Jewish communities that 
were part of their empire. Not only did non-Muslim communities enjoyed 
the freedom of religion, but he also points out in the same article that Chris-
tians and Jews “had separate organizations and ran their own affairs. They 
collected their own taxes and enforced their own laws.”45 The religious ac-
commodation of non-Muslims was quite prioritized under the Ottoman rule 
that a question of placing a ban on alcohol in mixed gatherings raised a seri-
ous concern before the Ottoman judiciary as to “how to prevent the drinking 
of wine by Muslim guests at Christian and Jewish weddings. The simple and 
obvious solution—to impose the ban on alcohol on everyone—was appar-
ently not considered.”46
Bernard Lewis’s writings in relation to Muslim society and history are both 
ahistorical and marked by sweeping generalizations and obvious contradic-
tions, and his three main lines of thinking about the Middle East and foreign 
policy have been wholeheartedly embraced by neoconservatives: (1) Muslims 
hate the West because of their Islamic faith, (2) imperialism is necessary and 
inevitable, and (3) the tensions with Islam is the prelude to clash of civiliza-
tions. Being an academic who writes to inform the public and to provide a 
“balanced” understanding of an important region, he has gained great trust 
among a large section of politicians and political pundits. Aside from few 
public intellectuals like Edward Said, he had a relatively easy sailing in West-
ern capitals, as he could always rely on the fact that most Westerners see no 
moral, intellectual, or historical connection with the mysterious and exotic 
Islamic culture. If anything, the most frightening metaphor, “the enemies are 
at the gate,” is associated in the collective memories of Europeans with the 
Ottoman Empire’s two attempts to penetrate Europe as its armies stood at 
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the gates of Vienna. When he told the German newspaper Die Welt in 2004 
that projections of current population growth show that “Europe will have 
a Moslem majority by the end of the twenty-first century at the latest” and 
that “Europe will be part of the Arab west—the Maghreb,”47 he made quite 
an impact on Europeans. And when a year later the French youth of Arab and 
African background rioted in protest of racist police practices, “the British 
Spectator portrayed a giant crescent looming over a map of western Europe, 
under the headline “Eurabian Nightmare.”48 Lewis of course was grounding 
his arguments on the fact that the low European birthrates made Europe de-
pendent on migrations to ensure that its economies and living standards do 
not suffer similar decline. But the integration of Arab and African migrants 
into Europe since the end of WWII did not change the European demogra-
phy to an alarming level that requires putting everyone in a panic mode and 
raising the specter of “Eurabia.” After all European Muslims constitute less 
than 4.9% after half a century of high migrations.
Lewis’s insinuation that Europe is soon to be overwhelmed by Muslims, or 
that Arabs are bound to remain in the state of paralysis for the next century, 
were music to the ears of members of the far-right and ultranationalists, who 
found in the talk of “Eurabia” an excellent moment to rebuke a “Godless” 
Europe for opening the door to Muslims and to condemn the liberals for 
taking the Enlightenment route to modernity. George Weigel, for instance, 
chastised Europeans for being tolerant and nonjudgmental, reminding them 
that these moral values are not sufficient without the help of the Christian 
faith which they need to sustain the population growth and stem out Muslim 
migration. He was not simply speaking to Europeans but sending a warning 
shot across the Atlantic to his religious base.49 Weigel was not the first con-
servative thinker to use Islam to take Europe back to its Christian faith, as 
if faith is the result of a competition with the religious other. Another lead-
ing French intellectual, Hilaire Belloc, expressed the same idea with harsher 
words. Not only did he regret the European rational tradition rooted in the 
Enlightenment, he also regretted that the Crusaders did not take over Da-
mascus after they wiped out Muslims from Jerusalem. “The story must not 
be neglected by any modern,” he proclaims in 1937, “who may think in error 
that the East has finally fallen before the West, that Islam is now enslaved—to 
our political and economic power at any rate if not to our philosophy.”50 He 
then goes on to state: “Islam essentially survives, and Islam would not have 
survived had the Crusade made good its hold upon the essential point of Da-
mascus.”51 Other conservatives used Islam to denounce the liberals and the 
left, as did G. K. Chesterton in his novel The Flying Inn or has more recently 
been done by Douglas Murray in his work, The Strange Death of Europe. It 
is quite interesting that Chesterton was worried, as early as the turn of the 
twentieth century, that England’s secular elites might “delude themselves 
into seeing Islam as progressive: they see it as intellectual and rational rather 
than ritualistic, and (appealing to their own prohibitionist creed) it is mil-
itantly anti-alcohol.”52 Chesterton made sure that his novel concludes with 
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Britain’s succumbing to Islam and the banning of alcohol under the rule of 
Islamic law. He, like many who willfully use Islam to push their own agen-
das, believed strongly in the power of fear.
Undoubtedly, the introduction of Islam into Western cultures has stirred a 
powerful debate that could potentially liberate Western society of its fear, as 
it could also help Muslim societies to come into good terms with the West. 
The violence that defined the Islam-West relations need not be perpetuated. 
The debate does not even take place between Muslims and non-Muslims, but 
it is part of larger debates that involve individuals and groups who take mul-
tiple positions on issues of individual rights, privileges, racism, governance, 
social justice, democracy, secularism, and globalization. These are important 
issues not only about the future of Western democracy but also about the 
world that continues to shrink, forcing various cultures and religions to face 
each other in an increasingly smaller moral, intellectual, and political spaces. 
What is at stake in the debate is the exercise of power in the new brave world 
in which decisions taken in Washington, London, Moscow, and Beijing have 
far-reaching consequences worldwide. What is troubling though about some 
of the questions raised is the lack of imagination and intellectual depth in 
the way they are framed. The coldness and cruelty of Bello’s expression of 
the problem, for example, is more than shocking. Granted that the Muslim 
world has many issues that deserve attention, but a critical analysis of the 
way some Muslims understand and live their faith is necessary as much as 
their actions are of consequence to their society and the world at large. Yet 
the way by which Bello addresses Muslim issues is troubling. He is obviously 
aware of the dire conditions in Muslim societies as he does not shy away 
from expressing them in the most egregious terms as he acknowledges “that 
the East has finally fallen before the West, that Islam is now enslaved to our 
political and economic power at any rate if not to our philosophy.” Bello 
knew very well that as he complained to his audience about the mischiefs 
of Islam, most Muslim societies were under the colonial rule of European 
powers. He did not see this as an opportunity to transcend the past, as many 
Muslim leaders and intellectuals have opened up to Western democracies and 
were busy transforming their societies by embracing the democratic form of 
government and by introducing modern sciences and philosophies to their 
schools and universities. Yet neither Bello nor Chesterton seemed to have a 
good understanding of Islam or Muslim societies and history. The latter is 
dead wrong in his assumption that Islam outlawed alcohol purely by resorting 
to law enforcement. The low consumption of alcohol in Muslim societies was 
religiously inspired, and the ban on its sale was limited to areas with Muslim 
majority. But there were always spaces where people could buy and consume 
alcohol if they chose to, as Islamic law respected the choice of communities 
where alcohol was not prohibited, such as Christian villages and neighbor-
hoods. We saw earlier how Ottoman courts rejected government sugges-
tions of extending prohibition of alcohol into Christian and Jewish spaces to 
prevent Muslims from gaining access to it. We also saw in Chapter 3 how 
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Shaybani, the renowned Hanafi judge of the eighth century, refused to honor 
the demands by Muslim zealots that their Christian neighbors be banned 
from producing alcohol or raising pigs, placing the rights of non-Muslims 
ahead of Muslim sensibilities.
Neoconservatism and the specter of 
American imperialism
No political group has in the past four decades promoted American imperi-
alism and fanned the f lames of clash of civilizations like the neoconservative 
pundits and actors did. There are very few American political leaders and 
elected officials who espouse neoconservatism, as the hardcore values of this 
political ideology are at odds with core American values. Promoting imperi-
alism and bashing people for their religious beliefs are not natural to a society 
that has defined itself in religious idealism and in opposition to European im-
perialism and was founded by religious migrants who came to the new world 
in order to escape religious persecution and intolerance of the old world. 
After all, the United States was founded by settlers whose political unity was 
forged in the struggle against British imperialism. There were stretches of 
times when both conservatives and liberals could make the case for “good” 
imperialism, in eighteenth-century Europe. Despite their ideological differ-
ences, both Edmund Burke and James Mill agreed that imperialism was a 
noble enterprise forged to promote the best interests of both the colonized 
and colonizers. Such self-delusion has become nonsensical after the Amer-
ican revolution, so that every American leader has to justify any imperial 
adventure by provoking liberalism and liberal values. Neoconservatives could 
downplay the evil of imperialism when talking to social elites with realist 
language, but they always made sure to sugarcoat their imperialist adventures 
with allusions to national interests, human rights, and the best interests of 
the conquered populations. Yet the fact that a political movement such as 
the neoconservatives could be judged as un-American when stripped down 
to its basic tenets but could still f lourish in the highest echelons of power is a 
testament to its sophistication and cunningness. Neoconservatives skillfully 
built on the narrative advanced by Bernard Lewis, as they started to promote 
their militaristic vision during the Reagan administration and then perfected 
their narrative during G. W. Bush administration, as he drew closer to the 
White House. The rise of militant Islamic groups served them well, as they 
enhanced Lewis’s interpretations of Islamic history and doctrines that gave 
them more ammunition to upgrade the verbal attacks against Muslims. The 
militant Muslims whose understanding was shaped in the Saudi social and 
cultural environment, which was hostile to any religious forms that do not 
fit with its cultural traditions, provided the “proof” they needed to showcase 
their plan for remaking of the Middle East and for producing what Condo-
leezza Rice called “The New Middle East.” The framework upon which 
neoconservatism stood was complete: the doctrine of good imperialism that 
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benefitted both the conquered and the conqueror, the Islamic world await-
ing transformation, and the return of the Muslim warriors threatening with 
a new round of invasions to control Western countries and the world and, 
therefore, the urgent need to preempt this dreadful scenario.
The moment for implementing the plan came in an opportune moment, 
as the terrorists attacked the United States on September 9, 2011. The neo-
conservatives now have the ears of George Bush, who was reluctant to agree 
to their plan for the invasion of Iraq prior to 9/11. Lacking popular support, 
they could now depend on the support of “prominent Christian evangelicals 
like Gary Bauer, Jerry Falwell, Ralph Reed, and Pat Robertson, as well as 
Dick Armey and Tom DeLay, former majority leaders in the House of Rep-
resentatives.”53 The neoconservatives could now rely on the backing of the 
evangelical leaders, with whom they shared the commitment to support Is-
rael, and they well knew that the latter “believe Israel’s rebirth is part of Bib-
lical prophecy, support its expansionist agenda, and think pressuring Israel is 
contrary to God’s will.”54 The combination of these two groups formed what 
two leading political scientists at Harvard’s Kennedy School, John J. Mear-
sheimer and Stephen M. Walt, called the Israel Lobby. Mearsheimer and Walt 
startled their academic community and the Washington establishment with 
their unprecedented critical review of the impact of the “Israel Lobby on US 
Foreign Policy.” The critical paper was published as part of Kennedy School 
of Government’s Faculty Research Working Paper Series in 2006 after the 
invasion of Iraq was already turning very messy. The invasion reshaped the 
Middle East in the opposite direction of its intended goals, as Iraq was reduced 
to a failed state, creating a power vacuum that could only be filled by Iran and 
violent extremist forces. Yet despite the detailed critique of the Israel lobby, 
a great opportunity was missed to have a public debate on a question of vital 
interest for global peace, which received a powerful testimony in the paper’s 
claims. The paper highlighted many examples of the Israel Lobby’s inf luence, 
showing how well-placed members of the neoconservatives in the govern-
ment, media, and key think-tanks that cooperated to produce the promised 
success that turned into a fiasco. To intimidate professors not willing to toe 
the line, Martin Kramer and Daniel Pipes, two passionately pro-Israel neo-
conservatives, “established a website (Campus Watch) that posted dossiers on 
suspect academics and encouraged students to report comments or events that 
might be considered hostile to Israel.”55 Secretary of Defense Collins Powell 
came under intense pressure from neoconservative pundits, namely Robert 
Kagan and William Kristol, to ensure his cooperation. Both neoconserv-
ative pundits censured Powell and claimed that he “virtually obliterated the 
distinction between terrorists and those fighting terrorists.”56 Bush himself 
came under pressure from evangelical leaders in Congress, including Tom 
DeLay, Dick Armey, and Trent Lott, who stressed the need to support Is-
rael. Mearsheimer and Walt rejected as false claim that the work of the Israel 
Lobby ref lects the support of the American Jewish community, citing a Pew 
research report that revealed that close to 60% of American Jews were against 
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the Iraq war.57 Bernard Lewis jumped in to offer both his knowledge of the 
region and his creative imagination and predictive power to persuade any 
reluctant decision-maker, as he visited the president and vice president, along 
with two other neoconservatives who have direct access to both—Scooter 
Libby and Paul Wolfowitz—to “urge them to undertake a preventive war to 
topple Saddam.”58 The rest is history, as Iraq war adventure and the painful 
reality it fostered is for all of us to see. The neoconservative dream to change 
the Middle East region to a pro-American democratic area has become a 
nightmare that will haunt both the region and all those who aided in pursu-
ing a faulty dream grounded in deception and the lust for power.
Meanwhile, the neoconservative adventure moves far away from the Mid-
dle East, as it carries on in the United States and Europe. In the name of lib-
erating the Jews and fighting anti-Semitism, pro-Israel organizations advance 
anti-Muslim propaganda based on innuendo and generalization, confusing 
the American public about their fellow American Muslims. Omid Safi, a 
progressive Muslim and an American professor of Asian and Middle Eastern 
Studies at Duke University, shares his personal experience with the neocon-
servative attacks on American Muslims in a new book titled Muslims and Jews 
in America.59 The attack took the form of a hateful propaganda that arrived 
in his mail box in the form of a free DVD titled “Obsession: Radical Islam’s 
War against the West,” and distributed in September 2008 as part of the New 
York Times’ Sunday edition.60 The DVD featured well-known anti-Muslim 
voices in the United States, such as Caroline Glick, a member of the Israel On 
Campus Coalition, and Daniel Pipes, the director of the pro-Israel Middle 
East Forum and the founder of the Campus Watch program. The propaganda 
DVD was based on generalizations, half-truths, and insinuations, including 
the claim that the violence that takes place “in Iraq, Palestine, Chechnya, and 
Iran present a global Muslim conspiracy against Israel and ‘The West’” and 
that “Radical Islam is intricately linked to destroying the state of Israel.”61 
Among the key experts paraded as an eyewitness to the subversive nature of 
Islam and of those who are faithful to the Islamic tradition is Walid Shoebat, 
whose expertise stemmed from his claims of being a repentant Islamic ter-
rorist, who under instruction from Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
bombed an Israeli bank. His claims were dismissed by the CNN investiga-
tive report and the Jerusalem Post.62 Among the claims made by Shoebat was 
that “Obama is a Muslim.… The Arabic speaking communities in America, 
however, do indeed support Osama bin Laden and Hamas.… Islam is not the 
religion of God—Islam is the devil.”63 In responding to question about the 
solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conf lict, he provided a preposterous solu-
tion: “Tear down the Dome of the Rock, and re-establish Solomon’s Temple 
on the Temple Mount.”64 What is disturbing in the presence of someone like 
Shoebat in such hateful propaganda is not only the level of hate that he spews 
but also the fabrication of stories with the intention to harm. The DVD was 
produced by the Clarion Fund, an organization headed by Raphael Shore, a 
member of a Jewish Israeli missionary group called Aish HaTorah.65 When 
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the Clarion Fund failed to find distributors for its hatful DVD, as no distribu-
tor was willing to publicize a hate-filled propaganda, it turned to the Endow-
ment for Middle East Truth (EMET), which through its close connections 
with the powerful Republican Policy Committee, facilitated the distribution 
of the DVD through The New York Times.66
Muslim migrants came to the West escaping poverty and oppression, as 
the postcolonial Muslim governments established tyrannical rule under the 
guise of republicanism. They came to stand on their feet but found themselves 
marching in support of the human rights of their fellow Muslims suffering un-
der the colonial rule and oppressive regimes throughout the Muslim-majority 
countries, drawn either by their Islamic values or by their identity. In the West 
they found the freedom they lost under forced secularization strategies and 
rediscovered their voices and their true ideals and values. Palestinian rights 
become their rallying cry, and their courageous voices and familiar narratives 
awakened the transcendental values of young Jews who gradually became the 
voice of Palestinian sufferings under occupation, including American Jews 
who grew up in a country that never persecuted them but rather reinforced 
the transcendental idealism that has been deeply ingrained in them. Equality 
of people is a self-evident truth for many young Americans; they feel it deep 
in their heart and see it affirmed in the founding documents of their country. 
The American founding values of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” 
are deeply rooted in the transcendental idealism of Jews, Christians, and Mus-
lims and well-grounded in the monotheistic metanarrative they all learned as 
they read the same stories about the prophetic struggles and sacrifices to assert 
human dignity and equality. The Manifesto of If-Not-Now, a leading Jewish 
organization fighting for Palestinian rights, makes this point clear:
Just as Moses was commanded to return to Egypt and fight for the liber-
ation of his people, we too feel called to take responsibility for the future 
of our community. We know the liberation of our Jewish community is 
bound up in the liberation of all people, particularly those in Israel and 
Palestine.67
Such powerful voices that rose in defense of shared human dignity began to 
counter the pro-occupation propaganda machinery that still sees the world 
through the lens of nineteenth-century Europe and in the fever of national 
exclusivism that mistakenly aligned its security policies with national power 
and not with human rights and international cooperation.
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Globalization is a long process of convergence among different cultures and 
societies, not only in the areas of trade and technology but also in the areas of 
politics and cultural expectations. Globalization as a modernization process is 
rooted in the Enlightenment, but as a purposive rational process it is rooted 
in intellectualism and the growth of moral autonomy and enhanced scientific 
capacity that predate the modern West. Global trade, cultural pluralism, and 
institutionalized science are not new experiences in world history; what is 
new is the degree of systematization and institutionalization of the transcen-
dental ideals that characterized human civilization for the last millennium. 
This progress went through several moments of convergence and divergence, 
and the world once again faces a moment of uncertainty as both the forces of 
cooperation and clash are at work since the turn of the twenty-first century. 
There are powerful sociopolitical forces at work who have serious doubts 
about the capacity of diverse peoples to cooperate beyond immediate reli-
gious affiliations or national identities. As we saw over the previous eight 
chapters, religion and national identities are powerful factors in shaping hu-
man society, but more powerful are social movements that transcend the 
limits of geography and history. In this chapter we begin by examining 
the inner transformations of the liberal tradition in the United States under 
the inf luence of post-WWII political realism that has contributed to trans-
forming classical liberalism that was once the hallmark of the American po-
litical culture to neorealism and neoliberalism. We then examine the two 
major responses to market globalism and assess their issues and purposes, 
focusing particularly on three movements: neo-fundamentalism, ethnic na-
tionalism, and liberal progressivism.
Managing history and manipulating modernization
Globalization is a historical process that aims at achieving worldwide coop-
eration among societies of diverse cultures and religions. This cooperation is 
becoming increasingly necessary for interdependent humanity. The only way 
to ensure that an interconnected global society remains an ordered place is 
to make sure that people have positive attitudes toward such an eventuality 
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and that they recognize the elements of global governance as reasonably fair 
and beneficial. The challenge for the political liberal order lies in its ability to 
both advance shared interests of those who engage in it and maintain respect 
of the religious and cultural choices of those who come under its inf luence. 
As we saw in previous chapters, liberalism has been guilty of anti-liberal 
and anti-democratic practices both outside and within Western society. Most 
recently the discontent with liberalism grew in Western society for reasons 
that relate to both the ideological and practical aspects of liberalism. Under-
standing those aspects that have produced an ever-increasing discontent is the 
purpose of this chapter. We focus on exploring the sources and dynamics of 
the growing discontent, which initially took the form of an Islamically self- 
referenced violent extremism, but has since assumed other forms, including 
the rise of white nationalism in Western societies and the increased opposi-
tion to neoliberal market globalization by several global justice movements. 
This anti-liberalism discontent has generated a lively and promising debate 
that aims at reorienting liberal economic thinking to precisely address its 
tendencies to create social hierarchy and political imposition. We will return 
to discuss various ideas that aim at the institutionalization of a more inclusive 
pluralist order that can accommodate religious and ideological diversity in 
the next chapter, but for now we examine the roots of global discontent and 
its sociopolitical forces.
One may argue that the increased failing of liberalism lies in the human 
folly and the imperfect nature of human society. This argument is not with-
out merit, as corruption and degradation have always been an intrinsic part 
of social organization, making sociopolitical reform and renewal an ever- 
present demand. Yet we can still point out some of the f laws that are either 
causing or accelerating the level of discontent, most notably the long-held 
conviction that political leaders of advanced societies can engineer and build 
societies and nations by imposing a liberal order from without. The idea that 
nations can be effectively managed from the outside and that liberal soci-
eties can be developed by supporting dictators is at the core of the current 
challenge. People can be inspired to be free, but they can never be forced 
to be free. Freedom is a spontaneous act that stems from human nature and 
conditions, and the natural reaction of people is to reject and rebel against 
any external imposition or to succumb to it and to lose confidence in their 
personal worth and abilities. Both of these reactions are contrary to devel-
oping liberal experiences and societies. Societies are living entities that are 
so complex and intricate to be managed in accordance with a blueprint put 
together by outsiders no matter how smart and well-intending they may be. 
No nation or confederation of nations can be managed by outsiders, particu-
larly if these outsiders have no faith in the capacity of the managed people 
to rise to the challenge. If the past has taught us anything it should be that 
a sustained effort to manage other nations through imposition and manipu-
lation will corrupt the political leaders in charge of such manipulation, and 
they will soon use the same repressive and manipulative strategy at home 
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against their own liberal societies. This point has come time and again in 
earlier chapters, but we turn in this chapter to further examine the impact 
of the “managing history” approach on the liberal West. The argument, of 
course, is not that we must helplessly watch things unfold around us without 
any action or plan on our part. Neither does it mean that those who have 
institutionalized knowledge and power should not intervene to help others 
to develop their societies and realize a higher political and social order. That 
would be neither rational nor moral, but rather a cynical self-centeredness. 
However, in order to intervene in support of a social order characterized as 
“liberal” and “democratic,” we could only engage and support social groups 
in pursuit of the underlying values that allow a liberally democratic society 
to f lourish. The argument is rather that we have to realize that a good society 
that nurtures rational, ethical, and humane order is in a state of becoming 
and that such process must be generated from within. The argument is that 
liberal and democratic values require significant time for their realization 
and that the democratic processes rely mainly on the inner tensions of soci-
ety. To support the social outcome of the rational pursuits of liberty, equality, 
and democracy, we must nurture those values and support those who practice 
them. And if those values that are supported by nonreligious activists in one 
society and religious activists in another then we should support those activ-
ists who uphold liberal and democratic values regardless of their religious and 
metaphysical orientation.
The West has for long time, but more intensely in the past century, tried 
to shape Muslim societies in general, and Middle Eastern societies in par-
ticular, not by promoting a set of political values that guarantee democracy 
and protect human rights but by superimposing the European moderniza-
tion experience on developing societies along the lines proposed by mod-
ernization theory, even if that meant empowering dictators to do the job. 
The century- long efforts to manage the Middle East has created the most 
oppressive, undemocratic, and inhumane political conditions anywhere in 
the world. As we noted in Chapter 1, the first coup in the Middle East that 
took place in 1957 in Syria was orchestrated by the U.S. Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) to bring down the first democratically elected government in 
the Near East. Six years later, the United Kingdom’s MI16 in collaboration 
with the CIA toppled another Middle Eastern government in 1953, again a 
government that was also freely elected. This time the coup d’état took place 
in Iran, and the target was the duly elected Prime Minister Mohammad 
Mosaddegh, who was a popular leader and strong believer in secular dem-
ocratic governance. The coup details became known through documents 
that were declassif ied in 2013, and the CIA acknowledged its role in the 
coup as part of its “foreign policy initiative.”1 Mosaddegh was a progressive 
Iranian leader who led a secular democratic government that was commit-
ted to land reform in the then primarily agrarian society. His government 
initiated social security system, increased tax on the upper class, and under-
taken the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry. This industry was built 
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in 1913 by the Anglo- Persian Oil Company (APOC), a British company 
we know it today as the British Petroleum (BP). These interventions were 
done in the imperial spirit of Europe and in pursuit of the national interests 
of the two North Atlantic nations without regard to the interests and the 
future of the Iranian people. Even more disturbing, the U.S. government 
brought Mohammad Reza Shah to power after the coup, and he governed 
as an absolute monarch until he was deposed by the Iranian revolution, that 
empowered Iranian clerical class rather than the Iranian people. Although 
Western liberal democracy always justified its foreign policy in reference to 
liberal values and goals, the approach was grounded in political realism that 
justified the most unethical practices in the name of realpolitik. American 
realists have convinced themselves and the public at large of the legitimacy of 
their anti-liberal foreign policy by using sophisticated theories that rejected 
liberal and democratic values as irrelevant to foreign policy and international 
relations.
Regardless of ideology, theory, and intentions, the reality of the Middle 
East is increasingly shaped by contradictory aims and goals that have led to 
the deterioration of the sociopolitical conditions of the region, thereby ar-
resting the declared efforts of pursuing liberal democracy. Secularism and 
liberalism have become synonymous with imposition and corruption at the 
popular level of Middle Eastern society, as every authoritarian and tyran-
nical regime in the region is associated with these labels and supported by 
world powers. Secularism is no more associated in the popular imaginary 
with liberty, equality, and human rights but is often equated with the police 
states that rule Arab society and the aloof and disengaging political elites 
and with political and administrative corruption. Even modernization theory 
proponents, who evidently were very much interested in the modernization 
of Arab and Middle Eastern societies, justified supporting Arab Junta and 
autocrats, thereby favoring order over democratization in the name of creat-
ing an Arab culture that is a carbon copy of that of the West. This, however, 
changed with the advent of neoconservative politics, with new emphasis on 
nation-building and social engineering. With the rise of terrorism commit-
ted by violent extremists who hijacked Islam and used it to justify violence 
against their adversaries. By the turn of the twenty-first century, it became 
very obvious that the policy of keeping Middle Easterners in check by em-
powering autocrats had imposed a terrible cost not only for Muslim societies 
but the entire globe. This realization was interestingly announced by George 
W. Bush in his remarks at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment 
for Democracy in 2002, few months after the invasion of Iraq.
Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack 
of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe—because in 
the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty. As 
long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not f lour-
ish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment, and violence ready 
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for export. And with the spread of weapons that can bring catastrophic 
harm to our country and to our friends, it would be reckless to accept 
the status quo.2
He went on to emphasize the need to support the new strategy with the 
“same persistence, energy, and idealism we have shown before.” Yet, a dec-
ade later, the Obama administration decided to end its support of the first 
democratically elected government of Mohamed Morsi, and the Egyptian 
military that has been trained and financed by the United States moved 
quickly to abort the new experimentation in democracy. Undoubtedly, the 
election did not bring liberal democrats to power, as Islamists dominated 
the parliament. Yet hardly a year lapsed before the Obama administration 
run out of patience and gave up on advancing democracy in Egypt. There 
was plenty of room to maneuver and apply pressures to allow the system to 
balance itself out. For while the Islamists maintained control over the parlia-
ment and the presidency, the state was still under the control of the military. 
The military government, despite promises of holding new free and fair 
elections, invoked more tyrannical rules and clamped down hard on free-
dom of speech, rolling back the little achievements made during Mubarak 
regime who controlled the state up until the Arab Spring. The return of 
military rule under a new military strongman underscores the moral hazard 
of managing the world by a committee, and it will be as harmful and coun-
terproductive over time as were the efforts of the Soviet to run the Soviet 
Empire by politburo.
Global jihadism and its tyrannical roots
Radical Islamic groups emerged in the past four decades as a force to be reck-
oned with on a global scale. The early manifestations of jihadist movements 
took place in military-style attacks that took the life of Anwar Sadat who 
signed the first peace treaty with Israel in 1979. The assassination operation 
was run by a young military officer who was member of a radical group that 
later came to be known as the Islamic Group (al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya), a 
shadowy organization that drew membership from radical civilian and mil-
itary Islamists. The Islamic Group was an off-shoot of another radical group 
known as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), which was formed by Ayman 
Zawahiri, the Egyptian medical doctor who was radicalized during his im-
prisonment under Nasser regime.3 Jamal Abdul Nasser, who ruled Egypt 
with iron fist from 1952 to 1970, dissolved all political parties and reigned in 
the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) that opposed his dictatorial rule. Zawahiri 
was rounded up during a crackdown on the MB following a failed attempt to 
assassinate Nasser. The MB was implicated in the assassination, and thousands 
of MB members, many of whom were in their early 20s, were sent to prison. 
Inf luenced by the ideas of Said Qutb, who was himself imprisoned and later 
executed, radicalized MB members split with the mother organization upon 
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their release from prison and quickly adopted a radical strategy that called for 
the complete rejection of all social groups associated with what they depicted 
as corrupt secularism and with the political structure that sustained it.4 The 
Muslim Group that led the assassination was established in the early 1970s by 
Shukri Mustafa, an MB veteran who served several years in prison during 
Nasser’s regime.5 The group was responsible for the kidnaping and murder of 
Shaikh Husayn al-Dhahabi, then Egypt’s Minister of Awqaf (religious affairs). 
The group’s leadership as well as 400 of its members were arrested after a 
bloody confrontation with government forces. On March 19, 1979, Shukri 
Mustafa, along with other members, was executed.6 The best insight into the 
extremist ideology was articulated by Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj (1954–
1982), the chief ideologue of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, in a pamphlet titled 
The Neglected Duty (al-Faridah al-Gha’ibah). In this pamphlet, Faraj dismissed 
missionary work (da‘wa) as an ineffective means for the transformation of the 
current Egyptian society into one governed by Islam and insisted that armed 
struggle should be the paramount method for this transformation:
Some say that the right road to establishing an [Islamic] state is (nonvio-
lent) preaching (da‘wa) only, and the creation of a broad base. This does 
not bring about the foundation of an [Islamic] state. Those who make 
such argument use it as a basis for withdrawal from jihad. The truth is 
that an (Islamic) state can only be founded by a believing minority... 
Those who follow the straight path that is in accordance with the com-
mand of God and the example of the Apostle of God—may God’s peace 
be upon him—are always the minority.7
Zawahiri left the EIJ in 1981 and moved to Afghanistan to join the Mujahi-
din Service Office that was established by Abdullah Azzam and became ac-
quainted with Osama Bin Laden. Both founded the al-Qaeda, the notorious 
jihadi group that was supported then by the United States and Saudi Arabia. 
After two decades of collaboration with the U.S. and Saudi officials in a suc-
cessful bid to dislodge the Soviet Union from Afghanistan and after spending 
few years in Sudan plotting against the Mubarak regime, Bin Laden and 
Zawahiri declared jihad against the West in 1998.8 Shortly afterward, Osama 
bin Laden issued a fatwa that was published in the London-based Arabic 
newspaper al-Quds al-Arabi on February 23, 1998. The message of the fatwa 
was ominous and menacing as it provided a justification for killing civilians 
with no evident provocation or culpability.
The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and 
military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any 
country where it is possible to do it, in order to liberate al-Aqsa Mosque 
and the holy mosques from their grip, and in order for their armies to 
move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any 
Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of almighty God, “And 
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fights the pagans all together as they fight you all together,” and “Fight 
them until there is no more oppression [or tumult] and there prevails 
justice and faith in God.”9
Bin Laden’s statement that explicitly called for targeting civilians and justified 
their killing is unprecedented in the history of Islamic theology and ethics. 
For traditionally, jurists understood that the term “pagan” in the Qur’an was 
made in relation to the Bedouin Arab pagans at the time of the Prophet who 
never honored any treaty they entered into or a promise they made with the 
Muslims. He of course was not a jurist and has no exposure to the scholarly 
works that a jurist must have. This model of dealing with perceived or real 
enemies is the hallmark of al-Qaeda and its affiliates. The new model would 
be extended later by al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia to all adversaries— Christian, 
Muslim, or otherwise—creating one of the most vicious religious organiza-
tion worldwide. The same model was used in Algeria by the GIA extremists 
in the 1980s, though no formal fatwa was announced, but many suspected 
that militant Islamic organizations that split up from al-Qaeda have acquired 
a license to kill civilians by their own extremist religious leaders.
In August 1998, in the same year the fatwa was issued, al-Qaeda carried 
out the bombing attacks on August 7 at the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, 
and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing more than 200 people and injuring 
more than 5,000 others. Three years later, terrorists struck the Twin Towers 
in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC. Nineteen young Arabs 
committed the largest, most startling and horrific terrorist attacks, prompting 
the largest coordinated and expansive campaign against Bin Laden’s brain-
child brand of terrorism. This did not stop terrorism operations by Islamic 
extremists against civilians. On December 22, 2001, passengers on American 
Airlines Flight 63 from Paris to Miami foiled a terrorist attempt to detonate 
explosives packed into the shoes of Richard Reid, a British national. A year 
later, terrorist bombings took place in a tourist district in Bali, Indonesia, on 
October 12, 2002, and in Mombasa, Kenya, on November 28. Al-Qaeda 
claimed responsibility for Mombasa attacks while the Associated Press re-
ported on October 13, 2003 that the attackers confessed of receiving support 
from al-Qaeda to cover the cost of the operation. On March 11, 2004, al- 
Qaeda affiliates carried another devastating attack on train in Madrid, Spain, 
that claimed the lives of 191 passengers.10
Al-Qaeda attacks did not exclusively target Westerners. A series of ter-
rorist operations were carried out in 2003, targeting civilians in Riyadh, 
Saudi Arabia (May 12 and November 8), Casablanca (May 16), and Istanbul 
(November 20). These attacks killed 136 civilians and injured close to 1,000. 
The Mesopotamia branch of al-Qaeda established by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, 
which became known later as the Islamic State in Iraq, started an open of-
fensive on the Shiite community, claiming the lives of tens of thousands in 
random car bombs and suicide operations that did not even spare children, 
women, and elderly. Terrorist attacks have declined in Western countries 
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after years of intensive campaign at a great financial cost, but terrorism and 
the call for revenge have not. Al-Qaeda and its ideology have gathered more 
power in the past two decades in many countries, including Pakistan, Ni-
geria, Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Jordan. The cost of maintaining 
international security is staggering. Between 2002 and 2020, the war on 
terrorism cost the United States alone around two-and-a-half trillion ($2,407 
billion), and the U.S. national debt more than quadrupled since 9/11. Still, 
violent extremist individuals and groups increased over the same period and 
the threat of terrorism has not been eliminated. At the core of the failure to 
effectively combat terrorism is a f lawed strategy that relied excessively on the 
use of military force, while neglecting to deal with the root causes behind the 
spike in terrorism in the past three decades.
The root causes of terrorism are several and complex, but the most serious 
of them relates to the increase in repression and violence of autocratic regimes 
in the Middle East. These corrupt regimes that could only survive by the 
support of Western democracies manipulate and suppress their populations 
in the name of promoting secular liberalism. The paradox becomes evident 
and striking as soon as we realize that the anti-democratic and anti- liberal 
conditions that continue to breed extremist ideologies are perpetuated by 
the greatest liberal democracies of Europe and the United States, which un-
ashamedly support Arab and Muslim authoritarian regimes. The failure of 
Western intelligentsia and policymakers to recognize this liberal paradox is 
tragic, because it overlooks the very strategic actions at work in undermining 
the liberal democratic order. As a result, Western powers have not devel-
oped any comprehensive strategy but continue to treat terrorism primarily 
as a security issue, even though there is a general awareness that terrorism 
originates within marginalized, oppressed, and alienated communities. Take 
for instance Philippe Errera of the French Foreign Ministry, who identifies 
three categories, or “circles,” of individuals and groups who pose threat to 
Europe: (1) Al-Qaeda and its affiliates; (2) Islamist groups involved in na-
tionalist struggle in Kashmir, Chechnya, or Lebanon; and (3) “freelance ji-
hadists.” Errera claims that the last group is the biggest and most dangerous. 
The “freelance jihadists” can be either, according to Errera, Islamist terrorist 
groups or individuals, based anywhere in the world, including various West-
ern societies, who may or may not be inspired by Bin Laden and may have 
no direct connection with the al-Qaeda network. While no one knows for 
sure how many “freelance jihadists” are here in Europe, Errera argues that 
they have become radicalized in a relatively short span of time and then act 
without orders and explicit training.11 Robert S. Leiken, director of the Im-
migration and National Security Program at the Nixon Center, offers a dif-
ferent categorization by dividing terrorists into “insiders,” made of alienated 
citizens, second- or third-generation immigrants, “who were born and bred 
under European liberalism,” and aliens, who “gained refuge in liberal Europe 
from crackdowns against Islamists in the Middle East.”12 Because both the 
“insiders” and the “outsiders” belong to the growing Muslim community 
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in Europe, Leiken, who represents the more conservative voices in Western 
political spectrum, did not miss the chance to blame this mess on multi-
culturalism. “Multiculturalism was once the hallmark of Europe’s cultural 
liberalism,” Leiken exclaims, “which the British columnist John O’Sullivan 
defined as ‘free[dom] from irksome traditional moral customs and cultural 
restraints.’ But when multiculturalism is perceived to coddle terrorism, liber-
alism parts company.”13 The above descriptions are shrouded in mystery, and 
little is done to expose the source of this sense of alienation or the connection 
of terrorism to the autocratic rule in Arab societies.
What makes the “management” of the Middle East more interesting for 
the distant observer, and more tragic to the people who happened to be at 
the receiving end of U.S. foreign policy, is that the approach to the region, 
its future, and its long-term ramifications are far from being clear or consist-
ent. American and European leaders are for sure worried about Israel and its 
citizens. They are also worried about minority rights. But they do not seem 
to appreciate the increased interconnectedness of the world and the impact of 
what is being done today on subsequent developments in Arab societies and 
their long-term ramifications. Here is what the author of The Islamic Paradox, 
Reuel Gerecht, observes:
One may legitimately wonder whether either Democrats or Republicans, 
too, really want to push human rights and democracy in the region. 
Understanding the nexus between 9/11 and tyranny is one thing, con-
stantly cajoling and arm-twisting Middle Eastern dictators and kings to 
liberalize another. The menace of al Qaeda has substantially deepened 
the liaison relationships between the Intelligence Agency and the secu-
rity and intelligence services in the Muslim world, especially with those 
of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, the three states whose domestic 
politics, religious organizations, and foreign policies were critical to the 
development of bin Laden’s holy-warrior terrorism.14
The above passage refers of course to the collaboration between the United 
States and the three Middle Eastern countries in managing the aftermath of 
the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the power struggle that ensued 
among tribes and ethnicities for the control of the government. The solution 
was to enlist members of Taliban as soldiers in the fight to subdue the rivaling 
Mujahideen. Taliban, a word used in reference to students, were the young 
Afghans who grew up in refugee camps in Pakistan and were educated in 
literalist Salafi doctrines by Saudi religious teachers. The Salafi approach is 
anti-rationalist, originally developed to fight religious “innovations,” and is 
not particularly tolerant toward the follower of other religions, even toward 
Muslims who follow different interpretations of the Islamic scriptures, or 
those who are indifferent to their religious obligations. The Taliban indeed 
helped solve the inner fighting among Afghan factions but created more se-
rious complications, as they struggled to impose their narrow and literalist 
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interpretations of Islam on society. The “truths” they were taught by their 
Wahhabi teachers were derived from a literalist and ahistorical understanding 
of the Islamic religious tradition.15
The liberal paradox we outlined above is rooted in the transformation 
of international relations thinking and theories that took place in the post-
WWII era. While American political thinking is rooted in classical liberal-
ism, American foreign policy elites were schooled in political realism, as they 
have internalized the imperial European approach to international politics 
and its imperialist impulse. Heavyweight foreign policy strategists, such as 
Brzezinski or Kissinger, are not bothered by autocrats and tyrants of the Mid-
dle East and not even by Bin Laden. Brzezinski refused to connect the dots 
that link tyranny and terror and saw “bin Laden and al Qaeda as isolated in 
time, products of the Soviet-Afghan war, not an evolving decades-old move-
ment of Sunni militancy that has become ever more lethal and anti-Western 
under the Middle East’s post–World War II dictatorships.”16 He nonetheless 
saw the connection between the rise of Islamic militancy and the failure of 
the U.S. government to end the Palestinian suffering. Kissinger is similarly 
cautious against the fast development of democracy in Middle Eastern coun-
tries like Iraq, even though he was fine with its invasion by North Atlantic 
armies, for he had his doubt that “a secular middle class [which] can emerge 
strong enough to insist on full representative democracy.”17 This is a case 
of the cynical realist’s dismissal of the possibility of democracy and human 
rights emerging quickly in the Middle East, despite the fact that the region 
experienced democratic rule as early as 1919 in Egypt and 1949 in Syria and 
Lebanon; there were clearer voices sounding the alarm on staying the course 
of supporting authoritarian regimes, such as that of Daniel Benjamin, the 
director for counterterrorism in the National Security Council, during the 
Clinton administration. He insisted in The Age of Sacred Terror that democra-
tization is key to fighting terrorism in the Middle East.18
Violent outbursts of the far right and Islamist extremism
Violent outbursts fermented by jihadist and extremist groups have two com-
mon denominators: They have been undertaken by individuals who have (1) 
internalized simplistic and exclusivist religious interpretations of Islam or (2) 
have experienced political oppression and marginalization under tyrannical 
regimes that do not allow free debates to challenge misguided ideas and be-
liefs. Much of the exclusivist interpretations of Islam grew in Saudi religious 
institutions that have advanced literalist Salafism shaped by the tribal experi-
ence of East Arabia. The Saudi Salafism was developed in a tribal social envi-
ronment, informed by the reformist ideas of Muhammad Bin Abd al-Wahab 
(1703–1792), whose teachings were intended to remove deviations from orig-
inal principles of the faith. His teachings survived in the preaching of his 
family Āl al-Shaikh (House of Shaikh) that entered into partnership with 
the Saud family (House of Saud) that ruled East Arabia from the eighteenth 
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century until the Arab revolution that brought down the Ottoman Empire 
in 1919. The House of Saud expanded their rule to the entire Arabian Penin-
sula in 1924, with the acquiescence of the British government under Stanley 
Baldwin, who wanted to end the power of the Hashemite Kingdom in West-
ern Arabia as the old allies became an obstacle for the colonial design for the 
region.19 The House of Saud used their newly founded wealth in the 1970s 
to expand their brand of Islamic religious doctrines worldwide, investing 
heavily in religious training. Estimates of Saudi investment in madrassa and 
support of their preachers run around $10 billion.20 The Saudi government 
invested heavily in the Afghan Jihad against the Soviets, with the encourage-
ment and collaboration of the United States, and later in the development of 
Taliban and al-Qaeda in order to regain control over Afghan factions. “Even 
after the government ended its financial support of Qaeda that was controlled 
by Ben Laden, the Qaeda in Iraq continued to raise millions of dollars annu-
ally from Saudi sources.”21
The invasion of Iraq gave great boost to jihadist groups, as Iraq was turned 
into a failed state by the end of 2002. As the U.S. and European forces ex-
panded their operation against the al-Qaeda forces as they mutated into the 
Islamic State in Iraq and later in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), al-Qaeda began to 
expand its operations first to Asia and Africa, before they moved to Europe 
and United States. Al-Qaeda and ISIS found pockets of support in Western 
countries, mainly among marginalized European Muslims and to lesser ex-
tent among American Muslims who became involved in terrorism against 
their adopted countries. Soon terrorism became the preferred tool among 
extremist groups who wanted to inf luence the Western strategic positioning 
in the Middle East. Jihadist groups mushroomed ever since the 2002 invasion 
of Iraq, as their number skyrocketed to over 150 groups affiliated with ISIS 
and al-Qaeda, according to a list updated regularly by the United Nations 
Security Council.22 The majority of terrorist attacks took place in Muslim 
countries, as 75% of all terrorist deaths reported in 2015 occurred in Afghan-
istan, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Syria. Four of the five countries have been 
part of the “war on terror” campaign initiated by the Bush administration in 
2002.23 The most publicized terrorism attacks undertaken by Muslim violent 
extremists, however, took place in Western countries, including the 9/11 
attacks on New York and Washington, DC, that were followed by meticu-
lously orchestrated terrorist operations in London, New York, Madrid, and 
Germany.
Violence in the name of religious or national heritage is not an exclusive 
brand of Islamist extremists, as it has been rampant for a while in Western 
society. While one may argue that it was reawakened by Islamist extremism, 
it for sure predates the rise of jihadism and violence in the name of Islam 
in the 1980s. Attacks by far-right extremists far exceed in numbers those 
committed by Islamist extremists. Between 2012 and 2016, far-right extrem-
ists committed 130 violent incidents in the United States, United Kingdom, 
Germany, France, and Australia. Fewer violent incidents (84 attacks) were 
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committed by Islamist extremists in the same countries.24 Yet none of the 
right-wing attacks were classified as terrorist by both law enforcement and 
media organizations. Anders Breivik, a far-right extremist who committed 
one of the most heinous terrorist attacks by shooting 77 civilians in 2011 was 
never identified as terrorist, and media outlets referred to him as “killer” and 
“murderer.”25 The list of terrorist incidents involving far-right extremists is 
quite long and includes such cases as the “Munich shooting of July 2016, the 
Quebec City mosque shooting of January 2017, the Portland train stabbing 
of May 2017, vehicle attacks in Finsbury Park in June 2017 and in Char-
lottesville in august 2017 were all far-right-inspired incidents.”26 Far-right 
terrorists have gone so far as to target elected officials who were supporting 
the rights of members of ethnic and religious minorities in their districts. 
Thomas Mair, a far-right extremist, shot Helen Jo Cox in 2016, a member of 
the British Parliament. Cox was actively pursuing a European solution that 
would not take Bashar Assad off the hook, even though the Syrian dictator 
was responsible for the death of over half-a-million Syrians. She cosponsored 
a legislation calling for the creation of civilian safe havens in Syria, arguing 
for finding an “ethical solution to the conf lict” and advocating combatting 
Assad’s “indiscriminate barrel bombs.”27 She understood better than most of 
her parliamentarian colleagues the connection between terrorism and tyr-
anny, as she rejected a single-minded focus on terrorism that plays in favor of 
keeping the very system that invigorates terrorism in place. She articulated 
her views in an article published in the Huffington Post in which she insisted 
that “I have long argued that ISIS and Assad are not separate problems to be 
chosen between, but are action and reaction, cause and symptom, chicken 
and egg, impossible to untangle no matter how much we might like to.”28 
She went on to caution against reversing the priority of sound political rea-
soning. “The thing I am most concerned about and which in my view will 
most change the conf lict dynamic is the protection of civilians,” Cox stressed, 
“particularly from Assad’s indiscriminate barrel bombs. This is relegated to 
second order status in the strategy, underdeveloped and unthought out. It is a 
fatal f law in the strategy.”29
It is still a mystery as to why Thomas Mair assassinated Cox, as he re-
mained silent throughout his trial, uttering one sentence in response to a 
question during his trial to identify himself: “death to traitors, freedom for 
Britain.” When Kester Aspden, an investigative journalist, communicated 
with Mair in an attempt to find out the reasons for this senseless murder, 
the prison censor blocked Mair’s response letter, citing the need for “the 
protection of the reputation of others” as the ground for the censorship.30 
So we may not know much about the reasons other than placing Mair’s vio-
lent act in the context of silencing a brave politician who cared more about 
the people than geostrategic calculations. Assad for the far-right is a useful 
dictator who is willing to kill his own people, and he is from the vantage 
point of those who thrive on hatred and bigotry a useful idiot who should be 
supported and protected. Mair’s extremist views stem from a sense of racial 
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superiority and disdain for non-white immigrants. While he never developed 
the capacity to articulate his views, he took it upon himself to enforce views 
of the leaders of the ethnic nationalist movement and to act on his hatred 
against citizens who do not share with him his race and worldview. Mair is 
simply a foot soldier in the far-right movement and has been at the receiving 
end of ideas promoted by seasoned ideologues and articulated with eloquence 
and vigor; ideologues like Robert Spencer and Pamela Geller in the United 
States, and Geert Wilders and Andrew Anglin do the heavy lifting to keep 
the movement going. Spencer and Geller portray Western Muslims in gen-
eral, and American Muslims in particular, as a fifth column who want to 
subvert American democracy. The far-right strategy has been to engage in 
religious and racial wars of words, in the hope that these verbal wars may 
develop to shooting wars between Islam and the West. Spencer has, for ex-
ample, taken it upon himself to prove that the Qur’an is behind the surge 
in global terrorism and compares the sacred book of Islam to Hitler’s Mein 
Kampf. Anglin has taken an even more preposterous stance against European 
Muslims and immigrants in general. He founded in 2013 a neo-Nazi website 
to recycle racist propaganda called Der Stürmer, which he named after the 
Nazi’s leading newspaper. His goal is to turn the clock back to a time when 
Europe was a white continent and to do that he seems to be willing to declare 
war on non-white Europeans. He went as far as to warn white Europeans 
to choose between two scenarios: “the restoration of the European man” or 
“his complete annihilation and replacement with non-white savages predom-
inantly driven by Islam.”31
An important strategy used by the far right is to blur the lines between Isla-
mist extremists and Western Muslims who observe their religious traditions, 
and Muslims in general, charging that the extremists are the “good” Muslims 
who follow the Islamic faith, while law-abiding Muslims who contribute 
to the betterment of society are the “bad” Muslims, and that when they 
choose to follow their faith and become good Muslims, they will resemble 
the extremists. These absurd arguments, though false and built on prejudice, 
has found listening ears in the times of fear and uncertainty. In making such 
cynical arguments, far-right agitators hope to capitalize on the public igno-
rance of Islam and on the prejudice generated by news that only bring Islam 
when it reports violence and terrorism. The voices of ignorance and hate 
are still marginal in Western societies, but have been moving gradually to 
the center, capitalizing on faulty strategies in dealing with the Middle East. 
Zachary Shore, in a book titled Breeding Bin Ladens, stresses the need for new 
American and European strategies to reverse the radicalization trajectory so 
as to prevent them from becoming “incubation ground for breeding Bin 
Ladens.”32 Shore sets out to understand anti-Americanism, as he acknowl-
edges the presence of Muslim fanatics who harbor irrational hatred toward 
America. He however contends that Islamist extremists are small in number 
in proportion to most Muslims who do not have similar feelings.33 Inter-
views he conducted among European Muslims reveal a state of ambivalence 
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toward America shared by a “second circle” of Muslims who do not harbor 
ideological hatred but seem to be torn between what they see as imperialist 
strategical approach embraced by the United States and European countries 
in dealing with the Middle East and their admiration of the free and open 
society of the liberal-democratic West. He estimates that up to 40% of Ger-
man Muslims believe that “Zionism, the European Union, and the United 
States threaten Islam.”34 Many European Muslims, Shore argues, are critical 
of certain aspects of Western culture, particularly what they perceive as the 
“lack of social justice, consumerism, sexualization of women, and putatively 
hypocritical foreign policies.”35
Shore recognizes that the Muslims he investigated have a sophisticated 
approach to assessing the complex relationships they have with the societies 
they live in, and many of them are able to “hold their conflicting opinions 
of the United States in a precarious balance,” but they continue to be chal-
lenged by the dynamic situation they find themselves in. Western Muslims 
are confronted with a combination of three factors at work: the violence 
and extremism that shape the views of their countrymen, the efforts of far-
right groups to marginalize them through inf lammatory publications and 
anti-Muslim legislations, and by being constantly bombarded with the news 
of beleaguered Muslims in India, China, and Palestine.36 These tensions are 
particularly hard on first and second generations of Muslims growing in the 
West, for they know that in order to maintain their self-respect and exercise 
their civic duties they must speak out against political excesses and respond 
to false representations of their religion. While they have been able to ex-
press their values in the United States freely, they face greater challenges in 
Europe, where social prejudice against Islam is more pronounced and where 
Muslims are marginalized and face mounting pressures. This is particularly 
difficult in countries like Germany where up until recently a citizenship was 
preserved only to people of German ancestry and was not easily given on the 
evidence of birth. The political activism and participation in the multiparty 
system by German-born Muslims began to impact the system and resulted in 
a legislation, in 2000, that eased restrictive naturalization requirements, for 
German-born who lived and worked continuously in Germany.
In attempting to predict the future impact on the growth of European and 
American Muslim populations, Shore points to the future of welfare system 
in Europe, interethnic relations, and the Muslims’ impact on Western foreign 
policy toward the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian conf lict. Interest-
ingly though, he sees the impact as negative, resulting in the rise of poverty 
as a consequence of privatization of public services, the rise of ethnocentrism, 
and ethnic and religious tensions, and that it would lead to greater divergence 
between American and European positions toward Israel.37 These speculative 
conclusions, played out as extrapolations from current conditions, can be eas-
ily replaced with a more confident view of the future if one only deliberates 
on the deeper values that have always been at the core of Islam. Such negativ-
ity and pessimism have been at play in the minds of many, partly because of 
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misrepresentation of Islamic values and beliefs, presenting them as intolerant 
and domineering. It can be argued that European Muslims provide a greater 
hope for smoother navigation of globalization, as the world is moving slowly 
but steadily into a multipolar global order, as Huntington predicts. Europe is 
gradually entering into global conditions that require a better sense of recog-
nition of positive dimensions in non-European cultures and a higher capacity 
of adjustment. While European political and scientific achievements should 
rightly be a source of pride for many Europeans, they speak to the work 
values and moral commitments of the West rather than racial superiority and 
hierarchical view of humanity that are at the heart of the internal tensions 
and divisions experienced recently among segments of European society.
The assumptions that led to the pessimistic picture drawn by Shore are 
based on a misunderstanding of Islamic values and a misreading of the po-
litical dynamics in the Middle East. Although Shore seems to have the right 
intensions in illustrating why integration of Muslim in Europe is important, 
and what could happen if these necessary efforts to achieve this goal were 
never undertaken, his arguments underestimate the capacity of immigrants 
to make positive improvements under more equitable conditions. His argu-
ments ignore, for example, the fact that, like Judaism and Christianity, Islam 
is rooted in the monotheistic tradition, and that it played historically a crucial 
role in grounding monotheistic values in a rational tradition. His arguments 
are completely oblivious to the power of a faith that emphasizes agency and 
equal dignity to uplift the conditions of the migrant community when it is 
given the opportunity to prove itself.
Rather than depending on welfare, given the opportunities Western Mus-
lims would contribute to institutional welfare grounded in civil society rather 
than the state. Similarly, the assumption of rising ethnic and religious ten-
sions because of the growing presence of European Muslims is based on the 
extrapolation from the extremist outbursts on both the Islamist and far-right 
extremists. The far-right and Islamist extremism represents the fringe ele-
ments of Christian and Muslim Europeans and are both symptoms of wrong-
headed political and economic priorities set by neoliberal politics as well as 
wrong-headed foreign policies in the Middle East. The majority of Muslims 
are supportive of a political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conf lict on the 
basis of recognition of Palestinian rights and equal human rights and dignity 
for both Jews and Palestinians. This is the main contention today between 
those who support a political system in Israel that is truly ref lective of the 
liberal values of equality, freedom, and justice and those who advocate an 
exclusivist and hierarchical social order in which Palestinians are reduced to 
an underclass. A lively debate on these issues is of great benefits for everyone 
involved in this conf lict. An open, rational, and fare system is the only am-
icable solution to the conf lict that has literally drained out the United States 
financially and morally.
In concluding his book, Breeding Bin Ladens, Shore urged against succumb-
ing to the old imperial dictum “the only language they understand is force,” 
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which is frequently invoked in dealing with Muslim protests against solutions 
imposed by Western powers that ignore the human rights and dignities of in-
digenous populations. In responding to William Bennet’s “the strong horse” 
intended to rebuke the demands for looking into root causes of terrorism, 
Shore makes an opposite plea:
The United States has demonstrated overwhelming force in Iraq, prov-
ing itself the strong horse. Yet many Iraqis sided with the weak horse, at-
tacking U.S. soldiers on a daily basis. The Israelis have tried strong-horse 
tactics for decades, yet Palestinian resistance continued unabated, ending 
in the Israeli pull-out from southern Lebanon and later from Gaza. Ben-
nett is wrong that people will pick the strong horse every time. He may 
be correct that poverty is not a sufficient root cause of terrorism, at least 
as far as Al Qaeda’s leadership is concerned. But to ignore root causes is 
as foolhardy as to suggest that America is attacked because of what it does 
right.38
William Bennett, former secretary of education under Ronald Reagan, and 
the author of The Book of Virtues (1993), became the voice of virtue among 
conservatives, and his book became a bestseller for 88 weeks. In rejecting 
any discussion of root causes, he adopted an absolutist moralism that only 
judges individual actions through the criteria of “right and wrong and good 
and evil.”39 What is astonishing about his moral position is that it is anchored 
in instrumentalist rather than purposive rationality. That is, it is a tool to 
justify a community and defend it against its critics, rather than a system of 
values one needs to evaluate practical actions. His rejection of examining 
the root causes of terrorism is predicated on the assertion that the value of an 
action has nothing to do with its impact on the economic or psychological 
well-being of those at the receiving end of a particular action or policy. “Bad 
actions, wrong actions, even evil actions,” he contends, “have nothing to do 
with economics, poverty, wealth, or any other artificial construct any more 
than good actions do.”40 From Bennett’s vantage point, right and wrong are 
rooted in the virtues of the actor and not in how their act affects other hu-
man beings. If someone is virtuous then they do not need to care how others 
view their behavior and what are the consequences of their actions. This type 
of aristocratic virtues masquerading as morality belong to ancient Greece, 
in which the virtuous aristocrats have no issues in reducing two-third of 
Athenian population into slavery and still feel that they act according to the 
dictates of an ethical life. It is the type of morality that justifies the use of 
force to keep other human beings in their place, not on the ground of equal 
dignity of all but on the basis of inequality of power. Indeed, Bennett goes on 
to counsel the use of the language of force favored by the imperialist mindset 
by suggesting that “[y]ou show people a strong horse, and you show them a 
weak horse, and they will pick the strong horse every time—if they can still 
pick at all.”41 This is not an argument for morality but rather for show-off 
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and brutality. The brutality of this form of virtuous life could not be hidden 
by a metaphor borrowed from the world of gambling to which Bennett was 
addicted even after the publication of his Book of Virtue.42
Identity politics and protest movements
Advancing a political order predicated on the ethics of virtue is no joke, for 
this approach to morality, and to politics grounded in moral judgment, is 
what is at stake today. The ability of Western democracies to develop a pow-
erful political order that surpassed all forms of political systems is grounded 
in the belief that all human beings share equal dignity. The principle of equal 
dignity was born in the monotheistic traditions rooted in the Abrahamic 
faith and was given its rational grounding in the writings of rational idealism 
that grew within Islamic civilization as we saw in Chapters 4 and 5. Failing 
to see the evolution of modern morality and to equivocate its historical roots 
can lead highly educated and achieving thinkers like Bennett to attempt to 
ground their ethical thinking in Greek philosophy alone, paying little re-
spect to human dignity and the demand for equality. While we should reject 
terrorism in all its shapes and forms, we have the obligation to examine the 
political and social conditions that drive young people to choose suicidal ide-
ologies to justify their existence. Insisting on the self-righteousness of one’s 
action, while ignoring its negative impact on the life of others, is a recipe for 
disaster, not only because it is rationally absurd and historically wrong but also 
because it ignores the significance of equal dignity. Equal dignity lies today at 
the core of the demand for respect for group identity and the identity politics 
that threatens the stability and progress of Western society. Identity politics 
has risen to the surface in the second decade of the twenty-first century, in 
surprising and unpredictable ways, with the election of Donald Trump to the 
highest office in the United States and with Britain’s fateful exit of the Euro-
pean Union. The implications of these developments are serious, as both rep-
resent diametric turns away from open society and international cooperation. 
Trump’s election brought far-right politics to the center of American power 
and Brexit undermined the EU, the most impressive political development in 
the second half of the twentieth century. The rise of ethnic nationalism is not 
new in European politics, but to see it surging in the multicultural United 
States and the multinational Russian Federation is a wakeup call and serious 
blowback to liberal democracy. It is also worrying as it comes at a time when 
international cooperation has made remarkable advancements.
Fukuyama offers psychological insights into the question of identity poli-
tics, attributing its rise to a built-up resentment by marginalized individuals 
and groups. The fact that it manifests itself now among individuals and move-
ments that claim to represent majority ethnic groups, and not only minor-
ity groups, makes it more peculiar. One may suspect that national populist 
parties in Europe do exploit this resentment to advance their political for-
tune, but the size of their following and their arguments cannot be ignored. 
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Among the European leaders who seem to articulate the national populist 
concern is Victor Orban, the Hungarian Premier who advocates an “illib-
eral” form of democracy. Orban has been a critic of EU policies on issues of 
migration, human rights, culture, and national sovereignty. His views are 
close to those held by Trump and Putin, particularly in his disdain for glo-
balization, international law, and international organizations, as he sees the 
greatest struggle worldwide between “the transnational elite—referred to as 
‘global’—and patriotic national elites.”43 This is the clearest summation of 
national populism that surged across Western democracies in the last five 
years. It is a protest against the direction of world history and a blame on lib-
eral democracy. It is simply the struggle between nationalism and globalism. 
But before delving deeper to make sense of the grounds for such a turn of 
events, we need to make sense of the origin of identity politics in the very 
notion of identity founded on human dignity that was always at the heart of 
European Enlightenment.
Fukuyama struggles to analyze the significance of identity, searching for 
its intellectual roots, and finding it in the Platonic psychology and Lutheran 
inner faith. The concept derives from the conscious self, that is, from the 
individual’s struggle to organize life around the principle of authentic self. 
The individual’s awareness of the need to follow one’s own values and inner 
demands and the conf lict of such values and beliefs with the outer world. 
Luther’s example is helpful as it highlights the tension effected by his mon-
otheistic ethos which very much resembles Abraham’s defiant stance and his 
utter rejection for idolatry. Fukuyama found a memorable moment in a more 
familiar history, which provides an equally powerful example of a historic 
breakout with the Roman Christian tradition. The story of Luther has some 
of the drama one could find in the story of Abraham, which makes it a pow-
erful choice. Yet this is unfortunate choice, given the context in which the 
argument is made, since national populism emerged as a social force invig-
orated with ethnic solidarity to oppose a more inclusive political order. Na-
tional populism rejects the universal arguments advanced by rational idealism 
to treat with dignity a diverse humanity, as idealism aspires to develop a fairer 
and more inclusive modern world.
Fukuyama rejects the economic interpretation of human nature rooted in 
the English philosophical tradition and articulated by neoliberal economists 
through the theory of rational choice. The assumption of the rational choice 
theory is that people as calculating rational beings strive to maximize their 
utility. He rightly asserts that utility can explain economic action but cannot 
explain a host of other actions, including the choice soldiers make to give up 
the very “vehicle” they need to have access to any sort of utility, by sacri-
ficing their lives so that their countrymen would live in safety and liberty. 
There must be other things than the principle of “utility maximization” that 
drive individual action. Fukuyama finds in the Platonic psychology a system 
of ideas that could better explain human behavior, the notions of personal 
worth (thymos), the quest for glory (megalothymia), and the drive for equal 
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dignity (isothymia). For the Greeks, thymos represented the emotional aspect of 
the human soul that causes people to react angrily when others discount their 
contributions and ignore their sense of self-worth. It is the emotional state 
of human beings that gives them their pride and the part of the soul that is 
provoked when the individual dignity is breached by the actions of fellow hu-
man beings. Personal worth involves at one level material interests but cannot 
be reduced to economic transaction. Personal worth, or pride, can be expe-
rienced also in the political realm, and it is “the seat of today’s identity poli-
tics.”44 The notion of personal worth (thymos) is associated in the democratic 
culture with the sense of equal dignity (isothymia) shared by all members of 
the political order, but, for the Greeks, it privileged the sense of pride asso-
ciated with idea of glory (megalothymia), which is associated with the heroic 
acts of members of the aristocracy and the virtues they exhibited and, most 
importantly, courage and discipline. “Predemocratic societies,” Fukuyama 
notes, “rested on a foundation of social hierarchy, so this belief in the inherent 
superiority of a certain class of people was fundamental to the maintenance 
of social order.”45 Evidently, it was in this notion of self-worth that European 
nationalism located individual dignity as a member of a nation or ethnicity 
that was superior in certain qualities to other nations and ethnicities. And it 
was the same attitude that we encounter in the statements and positions of 
liberal democrats, like James Mill, who justified European colonialism and 
the imposition of its cultural priorities on their colonies.
Although Fukuyama associates the great notion of isothymia with “equal 
dignity,” he is aware that Greek ethics cannot easily fit modern ethics, as 
equal dignity did not have a universal application, in the manner it is used in 
modern society. He suggests that the notion of the inner self as the seat of au-
thentic faith is the foundation of dignity and identifies the concept with Lu-
ther, “the first Western thinker to articulate and valorize the inner self over 
the external social being.”46 Luther’s sense of identity remained, however, in 
the premodern world, as he did not recognize the full dignity of those who 
did not share with him his faith. To him the inner self that does not recognize 
God as the source of truth is not authentic. Yet his distinction between the 
inner self and the outer world allowed subsequent thinkers, such as Rousseau, 
who rejected the idea of the original sin, to affirm the original goodness of 
people in the state of nature. Unlike Hobbes who presented the state of nature 
as one of brutality and aggression, Rousseau identified it as possessing inher-
ent qualities such as equality, cooperation, and peaceful coexistence, which 
were later corrupted by hierarchy and inequality. From Fukuyama’s perspec-
tive, the idea of “state of nature” used by the Enlightenment thinkers was a 
proxy for the original state of human phycology and should be understood as 
“a metaphor for human nature; that is, the most basic characteristics of human 
beings that exist independently of one’s particular society or culture.”47 This 
leads Fukuyama, following the argument of Charles Taylor, to assert that in 
Rousseau we find “the modern idea of identity.” Rousseau’s secularization 
of the inner self, and the priority he gives it over social convention, is thus a 
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critical steppingstone to the modern idea of identity, Fukuyama proclaims. 
Here again we can see the direct jump from the Greek idea of identity to the 
Reformation and then to the Enlightenment with the modern becomes evi-
dent in Rousseau’s toleration of difference, which is the hallmark of modern 
form of identity. What is hidden from the Western view of the world is that 
the distinction between the inner self and outer self was first elaborated in the 
work of Harith al-Muhasibi in the eighth century and later in the work of 
Ghazali in the tenth century. Similarly, Luther’s realization of his individual 
identity is nothing but the monotheistic ideals of rational agency and moral 
responsibility identified first in the Abrahamic faith, and rationalized later 
in Islamic rational idealism, before it was reaffirmed in the action of Luther. 
As we saw in Chapter 4, the recognition of non-Muslim identity as fully 
deserving of recognition began in the constitution of Medina and remained 
valid under sharia law until the late nineteenth century. Liberal democracy 
has taken moral autonomy and political institutionalization forward with the 
development of popular consent, separation of powers, and accountability of 
political leaders. These clear improvements worked very well in highly ho-
mogenous societies but seem to encounter new challenges in multi-cultural 
and multi-religious societies. The advance of neoliberal globalization and 
the weakening of state sovereignty have led to the rise of transnational social 
movements. The new political dynamics could potentially address distor-
tions in power structures within the nation-state, produced by transnational 
economic interests of the ruling economic class. Identity politics is only one 
dimension of the struggle to regain national control over international com-
merce and the exportation of local jobs to emerging economies. However, 
for national efforts to succeed, they require addressing the changing structure 
of production, information, and regulation mechanisms that have practically 
moved from national to global institutions. Identity politics is indeed a symp-
tom of a greater problem that involves global imbalances in wealth and power 
that continue to produce excess, manipulation, and corruption.
These new developments pose real challenges and require fresh thinking as 
to how the politics of identity can be overcome in ways that the fundamental 
liberal and democratic values can accommodate the realities of globalizing 
society. The debate has already taken a global dimension, thanks to protest 
movements that highlight growing injustices and contradictions in the domi-
nant neoliberal order. We need to turn now to understand some of the griev-
ances advanced by these movements and how they relate to the globalizing 
trends under late modernity (or postmodernity) conditions.
Anti-globalization and global protest movements
The politics of identity is a symptom of greater struggle for equal dignity 
and social justice precisely because economic and geopolitical interests are 
cloaked in cultural and religious façades. The neoliberal globalization is 
not simply an economic endeavor concerned with efficient production and 
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competitive prices; it is equally concerned with developing a consumer cul-
ture worldwide and national hierarchical networks of likeminded individuals 
across the globe. Neoliberal institutions are at work in coopting and training 
the new generations of entrepreneurs in Middle East countries and linking 
them to autocratic regimes that support the neoliberal policies. Neoliberal 
globalization has produced two different types of protest movements: anti- 
globalism movements, represented by national populism and the far right, 
and global protest movement whose aim is to balance out, or complement, 
capital globalization with global justice. Yet regardless of the position taken 
with regard to globalization, the three major social forces are working out-
side the nation-state framework. There is currently a great level of f luidity 
and uncertainty in the direction of the current struggle, given the fact that 
the highly organized and more efficient of the three forces derives its control 
from a global economic system that stands on the shaky ground of staggering 
corporate and government debts. The above characterization of the main di-
vision of social movements in relation to globalization allows us to transcend 
identity politics and help us in characterizing the type of politics generated 
by the above conf licts for what it really is—“politics of unity” and “politics 
of division”—or as Bice Maiguashca suggests—“politics of solidarity” and 
“politics of difference.”48 The politics of difference that manifested itself most 
recently in national populist movements is a remnant of the political realism 
that grew out of classical nationalism and therefore aims at manipulating 
“difference” to achieve supremacy, as it sees diversity and identity differences 
as a threat to the interests of the dominant identity and, in this case, the white 
identity. The politics of unity recognizes diversity of identities as a natural 
development brought about by Europe’s willingness to expand culturally, 
economically, and politically into diverse humanity. The pushback against 
demands of equal dignity among all forms of social identity must therefore be 
viewed as an attempt to claim privilege and refuse to play by the same rules. 
As such, the politics of difference is a zero-sum game that sees the increase 
in the participation of groups of different identities as a loss for the privileges 
claimed by the dominant identity, and therefore it is willing to risk divid-
ing society by adopting an ideology based on the Self-Other identifications 
and tensions. In a way, national populism is calling the citizens of liberal 
democracy to give up the liberal ideals of freedom, equality, and justice for a 
national identity defined in ethnic and religious terms.
Dividing the citizens of the liberal democratic state in ways that contradict 
its founding principle of equality of citizens is bad on its own, but when it is 
combined with economic and political actions grounded in the liberal order, 
such as those justified by neoliberal elites who advance policies that impov-
erish and destabilize African, Latin American, and Middle Eastern countries, 
it is bound to create a divisive and unsustainable local and global politics. 
The neonationalist networks that sprang in the heart of Europe are partly 
driven by a type of mobilization that aims at creating an “internal other” of 
Western citizens in an attempt to silence critical voices of anti-liberal and 
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anti-democratic policies implemented by neoliberal elites, in partnership 
with neoconservative activists who are willing to risk undermining liberal 
democracies in order to perpetuate autocratic regimes around the world that 
advance their narrow interests.49 The national populist movement seems to 
respond to a new, and recurring, narrative that seeks to affirm the identity 
of a dominant social group in Western societies by othering the cultural and 
religious identities that characterize minority groups. The othering is cen-
tral for creating a hierarchy of truth, in which it would be possible to deny 
those whose identity is expressed through a set of values and qualities that are 
deemed different from those of the dominant identity. By turning the strug-
gle for a just and inclusive political order into struggle between ethnic and 
religious identities, the dominant holders of power can escape ethical and po-
litical scrutiny as they can identify themselves with one identity and use it to 
counter the demands of others. This is exactly the tactic preferred by political 
realists of “divide and rule,” though this time it is turned inwardly, and it is 
in many ways analogous to the sectarian politics that plagued the premodern 
Europe and currently plagues Middle Eastern societies. In Lebanon, identity 
politics establish by the French colonial power in the first half of the twen-
tieth century has degenerated lately into a state of misery and chaos, under 
which the most corrupt political leaders are assured of the support of their 
sectarian constituencies. The Lebanese state has practically collapsed as public 
services such as security, banking, electricity, and garbage collection are now 
in disarray, and despite the existence of a fairly liberal culture and democratic 
system, political leaders could not be held accountable, as they could always 
rely on the solidarity of those who share with them their sectarian identities.
Identity politics has indeed created a peculiar situation in which the pop-
ulace in liberal democracy is divided around ethnic and religious identities 
instead of uniting to address the reasons behind rising economic inequality 
and figuring out how to deal with the domination of state institutions by 
special interests at odds with common good and public well-being. Above 
all, identity politics came down to the rising voices in Western democracies 
against excesses committed by neoliberal institutions like IMF and World 
Bank single-mindedly focused on advancing corporate interests or by neo-
conservatives and international realists obsessed with power and advancing 
geopolitical interests of Western powers at the expense of the dignity and 
well-being of the nations of the Global South. These actions have a direct 
impact on the well-being of nations of the Global North in a world that is 
becoming increasingly interconnected. ATTAC is one of those movements 
that emerged in the Global North in late 1990s in Paris to address injustice 
and excess inf lected on the Global South. The movement built in less than 
a decade hundreds of offices throughout Europe and rejects the accusation 
leveled against it that it harbors anti-globalization agenda, insisting that it is 
an internationalist movement “in solidarity with the peoples of the South and 
committed to a better life for everyone.”50 ATTAC is critical of neoliberal 
policies favored by Western governments and has opposed WTO-sponsored 
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General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS), which stipulates privat-
ization of public services. These services, which include education, health 
care, and infrastructure development, are vital for the countries of the Global 
South, and privatization made them inaccessible to the large segments of the 
people of the Global South. These services are not privatized in most coun-
tries of the Global North, specifically because such services require public 
spending to be fairly provided to those who need them most.
National populists, on the other hand, are not happy with neoliberal glo-
balization but are oblivious to the impact of neoliberal policies on the Global 
South. They do not see the connection between rising immigration from 
the Global South countries or the outburst of extremism in their midst and 
across the globe and the manipulation of the Global South by their own 
governments. The main issue is about the shift of economic power beyond 
their Western boarders and how to keep immigrants from moving in and 
disrupting European culture. Although they are concerned about the im-
pact of globalization on their economic well-being, their major concern is 
with religious expressions and practices of first and second generations of 
immigrants. They raise questions as to “whether all religions support key 
aspects of modern life in the West, such as equality and respect for women 
and LGBT communities. There is absolutely no doubt that some national 
populists veer into racism and xenophobia, especially towards Muslims.”51 
Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin present a more sympathetic review of 
this transnational movement in their recent book they coauthored under the 
title National Populism, as they acknowledge the anti-Muslim character of the 
movement and the impact of xenophobic stances of some of its public fig-
ures, such as Geert Wilders, the Member of the Netherlands Parliament, who 
infamously alleges that Europe is being “Islamified.”52 They disagree with 
the commonly held view by liberal progressives who see the movement as 
the “last howl of rage,” as they point to the close relationship that developed 
between European nationalists such as the Dutch Wilder and the French Le 
Pen with members of the Republican Party and the Trump administration.53 
They point out to what they term “the educational divide” as the main fac-
tor that split the national populists from the larger population.54 National 
populists played a crucial role in the election of Donald Trump in 2016, and 
they voted for Brexit shortly after. These two events shocked European and 
American politics and raised concerns as to whether the surge of nationalism 
could lead to the return of fascism to Europe.
The fact that national populism is a transnational movement that unites 
politicians and activists across the Atlantic and Eurasia regions, and brings 
into ideological proximity Trump and Putin, underscores the extent of po-
larization of Western politics. The close personal and political relationship 
of the two leaders, whose countries were at odds over the Russian invasion 
of the Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, became evident shortly af-
ter Trump took office. The press conference held by the two leaders after 
their first summit in Helsinki, Finland, on July 16, 2018, revealed a level of 
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friendship and affinity that set the U.S. president at odds with his intelligence 
team. Trump responded to a question as to whether he believed the finding 
of the U.S. intelligence that Russia interfered in the elections that brought 
him to office he had the following to say:
My people came to me—Dan Coats came to me and some others—they 
said they think it’s Russia. I have President Putin; he just said it’s not 
Russia. I will say this: I don’t see any reason why it would be, but I really 
do want to see the server. So I have great confidence in my intelligence 
people, but I will tell you that President Putin was extremely strong and 
powerful in his denial today.55
While defending and lavishly praising autocratic leaders, such as Russia’s 
Putin and Hungary’s Orban, Trump has repeatedly rebuked liberal leaders, 
including Germany’s Merkel and Canada’s Theodor. The liberal-nationalist 
divide reveals disagreements on a host of issues, and it is quite contentious 
around issues of immigration from Muslim countries and support for Middle 
Eastern dictators. So when a nationalist populist like Viktor Orban decided 
to assign the blame to the wave of immigrants from the Middle East, and 
Syria in particular, he did not point finger to the Syrian regime under Assad 
or to Putin whose forces attacked cities indiscriminately, but to “liberal poli-
ticians within the EU, along with the billionaire Hungarian-Jewish financier 
George Soros,” who he claimed, “are engaged in a plot to f lood Hungary and 
‘Christian’ Europe with Muslim immigrants and refugees, which they see as 
part [sic].”56
Undoubtedly, the politics of identity we discussed in this and previous 
chapters is complex and multidimensional, but at the center of the tension 
is the Muslim identity. There is a strong resistance to allowing European 
Muslims to express and live their identity. The resistance is articulated in 
the language of difference. Muslims are different, and their difference is so 
pronounced that it constitutes the other that can never be included in the self. 
The othering of Muslims is linked with their Islamic beliefs and values so as 
to make those values stand in complete opposition to the dominant modern 
values. Muslims are violent, or potentially violent, because their holy book 
condones violence; because the prophet of Islam was not content to preach 
the monotheistic values but chose to fight for the realization of these values; 
because Muslims historically spread their faith through wars; because they 
suppress their women and force them to wear hijab; because they use vio-
lence to resist well-intended military invasions whose aim is to free them all; 
because they do not believe in the separation of the church and the state; and 
the complaints go on. This picture has been portrayed through news sound-
bites by commentators who have limited exposure to Islamic history and 
society; by novelists who know Islam and Muslims though fanciful f lashes 
or essentialist views of the Orient; by the conditions of underprivileged and 
marginalized Muslim immigrants in the suburbs of Paris; and by reports of 
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violent attacks by ISIS and al-Qaeda fighters. The imagery that Islam gener-
ates is for sure representative of certain segments of the Muslim reality, but it 
nonetheless provides a false representation, because it is badly caricatured and 
constructed through selective snapshots and bits and pieces of information. 
The distortion is greatly increased when the presentations are highly scripted 
to advance political agendas by powerful actors and strong political networks 
so as to mislead the public by claiming that what has been presented gives an 
accurate depiction of the full reality of Islam and Muslims. Such presentations 
of Muslim identity ignore the diversity of Muslim experience across time 
and space, as it fails to grasp the fact that all identities are contingent upon, 
and therefore susceptible to, modification and reconstruction as they interact 
with their different social environments. The missing question in all of that 
is: what kind of political environment military powers are creating in Muslim 
and Middle Eastern societies? And can we alter the relationship between the 
Global North and the Global South so as to create new environments more 
conducive to an evolving global order? Exploring the contingent nature of 
identity, and the significance of the introduction of Islam into the West in 
generating more just and inclusive global order, is central to discussing the 
future of globalization in the next and final chapter.
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Predicting the future is a risky business, shrouded with speculations and un-
certainties, yet we humans always yearn to anticipate and get a glimpse of what 
is in store for us. We have become accustomed to check the weather every 
morning before we leave our homes knowing quite well that the information 
we gather about the weather conditions of the day does not always correspond 
with our real experience. And when reality and prediction do not meet, we 
often ignore the errors made by meteorologists because we well know how 
difficult it is to figure out the weather patterns with 100% accuracy. Gaining 
a glimpse into the future is so important to us that even a probable knowledge 
of the future is worth the effort. Our desire to know what could happen in 
the near and distant future is central to many scientific and intellectual activ-
ities. We have set up organizations and disciplines to help predict hurricanes, 
earthquakes, volcano irruptions, pandemics, election results, economic reces-
sions, and so on. While many of the predictions made about the future do not 
materialize, we still find it important to gauge what is likely to happen next. 
Predicting the future of society is subject, on one level, to the same rules that 
we use to predict natural events as it involves, first, identifying patterns of 
behavior and change and then extrapolating into the future in the directions 
of these patterns. Predicting the future of human interactions has, however, 
unique and peculiar complications because such interactions and patterns are 
grounded in human subjectivity rather than in objective reality. The future of 
individuals and societies is borne in the hopes and fears, aspirations and anxi-
eties, and the ethics and follies of human beings themselves. It is borne out of 
the ideas, values, and convictions that guide people’s actions and interactions 
and in the manifestations of these ideas and values in predominant and emerg-
ing movements. That is why the battle for the future is fought over winning 
the hearts and minds of people, before winning the struggle in the tangible 
world. That is not to say that people could decide the future as they wish, for 
as we tried to illustrate, world history is grounded in certain recurring patterns 
and formations that are borne out of deep human tendencies. History has a 
specific f low that determines the most likely outcome of social choices, and it 
always matters to know the kind of values and ideas at the foundation of social 
choices. We know for instance that cooperation, mutual respect, and justice 
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strengthen society, while bickering, arrogance, and exploitation weaken so-
cial bonds. We know that when leaders of great nations are allowed by their 
populace to abuse foreign nations, it will be just a matter of time before these 
leaders turn their ill wills internally and then abuse their own people. We also 
know that social movements that cater to the greater good are bound to attract 
the support of the larger segments of the society. We know that investing in 
science and education and valuing hard work and creativity propel society 
forward and that deceiving the public and indulging in wasteful spending 
slow social progress. In short, our current exercise in this chapter is not one 
of prediction or fortune telling, but rather one of exploring possibilities and 
searching for viable solutions to challenges that stand in the way of a more 
inclusive and forward-looking future for humanity.
We argued in previous chapters that globalization as a historical process 
of global convergence has evolved over almost three millennia. Globaliza-
tion occurred over time and in stages as ancient civilizations rose and fell, 
with each reaching its zenith at a moment of greater intellectual and geo-
graphical expansion. The Egyptian, Chinese, Indian, Ancient Hebrew, Per-
sian, Roman, and the Byzantine civilizations followed similar patterns of 
rise, expansion, and decline. Islamic civilization expanded its inf luence for 
over a millennium to areas covered by all the previous civilizations, uniting 
learning, commerce, technology, and the arts of all living civilizations and 
reaching a global moment before it fell and came entirely under the in-
f luence of Western civilization. Western civilization reached geographical 
areas far beyond that of the Islamic civilization, bringing the entire globe 
under its inf luence at one level or another. The global convergence under 
modern civilization has gone far more than ever before, as convergence is 
evident in the globalization of economic, educational, technological, and 
cultural exchanges among diverse nations and societies, as well as in the 
increased support of democratic governance and the assertion of the su-
premacy of human rights. We are currently moving hesitantly between two 
moments in world history: the modern and the global. We are evidently 
in the late stage of the modern age, so late that we already began to stare 
at it in the back mirror of time as we continue to traverse a peculiar stage 
of human history we call “postmodern,” for the lack of a better word. We 
seem to be stuck in this uncertain moment, as we cannot go back to the 
modern, against the hopes of many who have already become alienated and 
nostalgic, because no one can go back without falling into the abyss of fan-
tasy. Nor do we seem to be ready to move to the global age, as important 
questions must f irst be sorted out, paramount among which is the question: 
do we have the courage to reconcile our actual life to the ideals we claim as 
our own? Are we willing to live in a world where peoples and nations are 
truly treated with equal dignity, regardless of their religion, culture, race, 
or nationality? Are we willing to commit to the same binding public and 
international laws and provide everyone equal access to public and global 
spaces, regardless of any irrelevant differences? And if the answers to those 
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questions are in the aff irmative, what are the basic ideas and conditions that 
we need to set and advance? Addressing these questions is the main objec-
tive of this f inal chapter.
Global cooperation and zero-sum games
Convergence among nations and the gravitation toward liberal democracy 
have persisted over the decades, but accountability of the ruling elites to pop-
ular scrutiny is far from perfect and varies greatly from one democratic system 
to another. The level of equal access to public debate and democratic decision- 
making ranges from significantly high in Western societies to completely 
absent in the Middle East. As we saw in previous chapters, the democratic 
process that started in Syria and Egypt ahead of many other independent 
countries of the world experienced serious setbacks as the result of the cold 
war, and later because of world powers’ unwavering support to military dic-
tators, provided in return for the latter’s willingness to protect the economic 
and geopolitical interests of Western democracies at the expense of local pop-
ulations. Delays in the development of democratic regimes in Arab countries 
are directly linked with successive American administrations, on both sides 
of the political divide, who pursued anti-democratic and anti-liberal pol-
icies under the internal pressure of the religious right and neorealists who 
are driven by either the selective and speculative interpretations of biblical 
prophecies or by imperialist ambitions in the name of national glory. These 
disruptive actions, extraneous to the trajectory of globalization, have been 
completely ignored by the advocates of the clash-of-civilizations scenario or 
partially acknowledged by the proponents of the liberal-democratic conver-
gence. The counter-democratic tendencies in the Middle East also relate to 
the complexity of the globalization process and the turbulences created by 
internal contradictions in leading liberal democratic nations. Fukuyama has 
acknowledged the genuine desire on the part of Syrians to end dictatorship 
and bring in democratic reforms, along with other Arab societies that erupted 
in popular protests against the archaic regimes supported by world powers. 
Yet Fukuyama ran quickly over the geopolitical interests that steered the con-
f lict away from its initial thrust to achieve political reform in the direction 
of democratic rule, eventually blaming the victims and attributing the fail-
ure for dislodging the tyrant squarely on “the lack of clear sense of national 
identity.”1 Iranian and Russian interventions to save the tyrant did not count; 
the full collaboration between the United States and Russia through the me-
diation of the Israeli prime minister and the manipulation of the opposition’s 
response to the Assad militias attacks did not matter. Here is how Fukuyama 
summed up how the Syrians’ struggle for democracy was frustrated:
Syria is an extreme example of what happens when a country lacks a 
clear sense of national identity. The proximate cause of the war were 
peaceful protests that broke out in 2011 against the regime of Bashar 
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al-Assad, which were triggered by the Arab Spring. Rather than stepping 
down, Assad met his opponents with fierce repression. The latter then 
responded with violence themselves, and the conf lict began to attract 
the attention of outside groups, with foreign fighters streaming in to join 
ISIS. The civil war was further deepened by support from Turkey, Saudi 
Arabia, Iran, Russia, and the United States.2
The above description only serves to mystify the realpolitik at work in the 
Middle East that seems bent for a variety of geopolitical reasons on keeping 
Syria under successive dictators who create the very environment that breeds 
extremism and suppress democratic forces in the region. Both the Obama and 
Trump administrations struck a deal with Putin government, allowing it to 
have a freehand to crack down on the militia that opposed the Assad regime, 
leaving the militia aligned with Iran and the Assad regime free to drive mil-
lions of Syrians to exile. Over 1 million of them moved to Europe, and most 
of them took shelter in Germany after most Europeans refused to take them 
in. The refugee situation led eventually to Brexit and the strengthening of 
nationalist populist movements in Europe.
The setbacks in world politics have not so far undermined the growing 
global convergence, despite serious pushbacks by nationalist and far-right 
groups. The divergence in the Middle East is caused by sociopolitical forces 
bent on preventing convergence between the South and North as they deem 
it contrary to their hierarchical values and interests. The disruption in the 
Middle East only proves that the patterns of global convergence are com-
plex because global expansion and contraction we explored in Chapter 2 are 
the result of the alignment and realignment of values and interests and the 
intellectual inf luence of reform movements. Globalization as the accumu-
lation of human knowledge and experience has persisted regardless of any 
specific cultural and civilizational convergence or divergence and regardless 
of intellectual leadership of the time. We are now approaching a period in 
modern civilization whereby we will either transform into a new level of 
collaboration and collective action capable of energizing the diverse cultures 
and religions that comprise the postmodern society or see the breakdown 
of the institutions that kept the world together. The breakdown would not 
necessarily end global convergence but would delay it until a new ideational 
and institutional formation suitable for global unity emerged. The fact that 
we find ourselves in a new realm of ideas and global tensions is an important 
indicator that we stand at the crossroads with weighty and consequential 
decisions to make that would define the future of humanity for the next cen-
tury and beyond. We are clearly in a state that is neither modern nor global 
and therefore still defined by its transitional “post” labels as post-modern, 
post-liberal, post-structural, and post-secular.
A striking point in the transition to more globally inclusive sociopo-
litical institutions is psychological, defined by the ethnocentric outlook 
grounded in political realism. It is precisely the Eurocentrism that grew 
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during Europe’s centuries of isolation under Roman Christian exclusivism. 
The disenchantment of modern European societies has practically done 
away with Roman Christianity but still kept portions of the Eurocentrism 
that was nurtured during Medieval times. Europe’s disenchantment with 
Roman Christianity was inevitable given the contradictions between the 
rational ethos of modernity and the dogmatism of the Roman Christianity, 
but the same movement away from the sacred need not necessarily apply 
to every cultural and religious experience. The Catholic Church itself has 
disavowed in the twentieth century much of the dogmas of Roman Chris-
tianity and has committed itself to more reciprocal and mutually respectful 
relationships with other religions. Rationalization as disenchantment with 
all aspects of transcendence has undermined the ethical foundation of so-
ciety, particularly on the level of popular culture, and appears in its most 
exaggerated forms as a replacement of transcendental ethics and purposive 
spiritual fulf ilment with imminent utilitarianism and naturalistic ecstatic 
escapism. The replacement is not grounded in rational justif ication but 
emanates from privileging Hellenistic Gnosticism over monotheistic tran-
scendence. The replacement appears to have practical justif ications, rooted 
in the tensions between the religious and the secular in European experi-
ence, and the failure of post-Reformation religious authorities to embrace a 
more pluralistic approach to religious and intellectual diversity. The failure 
of monotheistic religions to recognize those who do not share their met-
aphysics is a more reasonable explanation of such disenchantment than a 
claim that a naturalist or deist worldview is more rationally justif iable than 
a theist one. Such a conf lict between the secular and religious domains did 
not emerge historically in the Muslim society or in the American society 
since its formation in the seventh century through the 1950s. To the con-
trary, American society maintained a healthy balance between the secular 
and religious spheres of life and was able to steer European politics away 
from its destructive nationalism, leading to the unification of Europe in 
the early 1990s. Similarly, the rational and ethical developments of Islamic 
cultures were inspired by transcendental idealism. Islam’s pluralist ideals 
rooted in Islamic revelation were also crucial for the emergence of the 
pluralist society that recognized the moral and legal autonomy of multire-
ligious communities. The institution of science evolved from the activities 
of the rational-idealist movement led by the Mutazilite intellectuals, as we 
illustrated in Chapter 6.
By ignoring the broader historical horizons of globalization and refusing 
to ground Western modernity in previous cycles of globalization, liberal-
ism has never entertained the possibility of non-Western modernization, 
ruling out different paths to modernity. Exploring alternative possibilities 
of modernization may provide an alternative model of development at a 
time when modern society seems to gravitate toward a more stratif ied 
social order on both the national and international levels. For a perfect ra-
tional order is by def inition a limiting order that gradually reduces spaces 
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of freedom within society and would end up in an “iron cage” structure if 
things are taken to the extreme. Human beings are not purely rational but 
have in them a substantial reservoir of spiritual, emotional, and creative 
energy that triggers and nurtures spontaneity and freedom. The more so-
ciety is rigorously ordered by a myriad of regulations the more it reduces 
the capacity of people with diverse goals to experience self-realization 
and the greater the possibilities for them to experience alienation. With 
economic disparity and the reduction in the time available for people for 
self-actualization, rationalization sets the ground for greater discontent 
and possibly the breakup of the socially constructed order. The only way 
to avoid ending up in the “iron cage” anticipated by Weber is by allowing 
multiple spheres of rationalization or, to be more precise, multiple mod-
ernization paths.
For all their differences, Huntington and Fukuyama share a worldview 
that fails to see the need for cultural renewal for the continued civilizational 
development and growth. They both seem to understate the importance of 
ethical commitments to core human values, such as justice and equal dig-
nity, for maintaining the energy necessary for broad social cooperation at the 
heart of historical globalization. They both seem to privilege scientific and 
technological foundations of advanced social organization, as they downplay 
the role of cultural alignment with rational values at the foundation of every 
global civilization. Cultures advance and decline along with the vigor of the 
moral tradition that aligned social interests of the larger population. Hun-
tington’s account of the relative decline of Western culture implies that he 
rejects the linear and unidirectional view of historical change and is willing 
to embrace a somehow cyclical view of world history whereby civilizations 
are subject to rise and fall, progress and decline, similar to the one advocated 
by Spengler and Toynbee. Fukuyama, on the other hand, fully embraces a 
conception of world history advocated by Hegel, thereby rejecting the pos-
sibility of regress to socially inferior conditions. Civilizational decline pre-
supposes, he insists, the implausible event of global cataclysm that takes away 
mankind’s memory.3
The above bold assertion reveals a complete equation in the mind of Fuku-
yama between the concept of culture and civilization, that is, between the 
moral vision and worldview that drive a cultural group to embrace science, 
and the social structure that unites a growing number of communities to 
cooperate in translating their shared moral vision and technological discov-
eries into a world civilization. The above statement evidently confuses cul-
tural progress with technological progress. Recorded history, as Spengler and 
Toynbee recognized, provides strong evidence that natural science and tech-
nology continued to grow over human history as various cultures that con-
tributed to such development have undergone stages of progress and decline. 
The distinction between culture as a moral system and civilization as the total 
sum of all institutions—including social, political, economic, and scientific 
institutions—is essential for understanding the steady f low of history and the 
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rise and fall of past civilizations. Spengler sees a causal relationship between 
cultures and civilizations whereby the latter are the destiny of the former. As 
he put it,
Civilizations are the most external and artificial states of which a species of 
developed humanity is capable. They are a conclusion, the thing-become 
succeeding the thing-becoming, death following life, rigidity following 
expansion, intellectual age and the stone-built, petrifying world-city fol-
lowing mother-earth and the spiritual childhood of Doric and Gothic. 
They are the end, irrevocable, yet by inward necessity reached again and 
again.4
This movement of expansion and contraction is not arbitrary; nor is it purely 
organic. It is the result of a great moral and spiritual energy guided by a ra-
tional and creative vision. A civilization comes to life when the combination 
of spirituality and reason, of ethics and science, is combined in a group of 
people. The “combination,” it is important to stress, does not come out of a 
magical moment but emerges from a long and protracted process. Toynbee 
locates the combination in the moral energy established by religion and the 
creative version of cultural elites.5 Yet the end as envisaged by Toynbee is not 
fate but a consequence and conclusion and need not confront the modern civ-
ilization, provided that the “divine spark of creative power is still alive in us, 
and, if we have the grace to kindle it into f lame, then the stars in their course 
cannot defeat our efforts to obtain the goal of human endeavor.”6
The future need not be the war of all against all that one encounters at the 
inception of human societies in the pre-Axial age or perhaps the one envi-
sioned by Huntington. The future need not be defined through a zero-sum 
game but could quite possibly be much brighter if it was founded on win-win 
imagination and logic. And this is not a utopian assumption but repeatedly 
tried logic. The zero-sum logic almost wiped Europe out during the 30-year 
religious war in the Middle Age and in the two world wars of the twentieth 
century. It was the rational choice of opting for cooperation instead of war 
that allowed Europe to progress. Most importantly, it was the rational ide-
alism as manifested in the American liberalism rather than the cynical and 
pessimistic European realism. It was the Marshal plan implemented by the 
American idealism after WWII rather than the reparations extracted after 
WWI by European realism. What is required for a brighter future for hu-
manity as a whole is exactly the opposite of what Huntington prescribed: to 
embrace cooperation and give up domination. The two accounts by Spengler 
and Toynbee that depict the life of a civilization as one of rise, maturation, 
and demise, upon which Huntington built his model of clash of civilizations, 
refer to civilization at any particular moment in history in singular not plu-
ral terms. According to these accounts, civilizations succeed each other and 
never coexist, perhaps except in state of transitioning from one to the other. 
But Huntington provides the schematic blueprint for Western expansion and 
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domination by positing a fictitious conf lict between Western powers and 
imaginative civilizations that do not exist. What we currently have are mod-
ern societies whose lifeworld constitutes an amalgamation of traditional and 
modern cultures and whose elites and radicals are molded in modern forms 
and discourse. The fact that non-Western societies in Africa, Asia, and South 
America have duplicated Western education systems, governing structures, 
military regiments, economic systems, and modern entertainments makes 
any talk about other civilizations unreal. A more realistic description of hu-
man diversity is to talk of a world made of a plurality of religions and cul-
tures. This diversity is open to both conf lict and cooperation, and each of 
these possibilities rests on a particular type of leadership and vision. Rather 
than counseling for a strategy that generates cooperation between the West 
and the “rest,” Huntington eventually opted for a strategy of fortification and 
domination.7 We can understand Huntington’s regrets and fears only when 
we realize that it is a regret for the decrease of the West’s ability to domi-
nate the rest of the world and the fear of a reversal of fortune as the rising 
non-Western powers might move to dominate the West. The latter scenario 
is not only far removed from current reality but could also be avoided if the 
United States worked toward improving global governance in the direction 
of increasing civil society involvement in global decision-making, thereby 
strengthening true liberal democracy in the Middle East and Latin America.
Religious pluralism and democratic public order
The religious and cultural diversity of the world does not automatically trans-
late to cultural and religious wars, and a more insightful and analytical ap-
proach to understand the nature of the religious and cultural forces at work 
would paint a markedly different possibility for the global future. The secular 
state was initially set in order to create a safe space where religions, particu-
larly the Protestant and Catholic communities, could coexist in a religiously 
plural society. The challenge today is whether we can expand this experience 
to include other world religions, including Islam. The question may be thus 
stated: Why are Muslims challenged as they aspire to join European religious 
pluralism? Olivier Roy identifies two arguments that have been made by the 
critics of Islam: “the first is theological and says that the separation between 
religion and politics is foreign to Islam; the second is cultural and posits that 
Islam is more than a religion: it is a culture.”8 Oliver, however, disagrees 
with these characterizations as misleading as both do not ref lect real pro-
cesses currently underway in Muslim societies. He points out that leading 
contemporary Muslim scholars reject the equivocation of Islamic religious 
traditions with Muslim cultures and have labored consistently to separate 
Islam from culture. “This is the position of new theologians such as Arkun, 
Soruch, Kadivar, Abou Fadl, and Abu Zayd. Sharia is presented as the matrix 
of a meaning that the traditional ulema later fossilized into rigid law (fiqh).”9 
Religion is not culture; it is only the inner structure upon which various 
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cultures construct their peculiar geohistorical edifice. Cultures translate the 
values and convictions that form the core of religious experience into a set 
of relations, customs, and institutions. Most people though know religion 
only as a set of cultural edifices and grow uncomfortable when they see the 
religion they profess manifests itself in a different set of cultural and institu-
tional forms. We have already demonstrated in Chapter 4 that the exercise 
of power in early Islam was contractual and subject to limitations expressed 
in universal values of common good (maslahah) and of the just exercise of 
authority. This is why it takes someone who is well trained and experienced 
to separate the outer cultural and historical experience from the inner values 
and convictions that gave life to them, as Oliver and Feldman did in their 
analysis of the nature of the exercise of power in historical Islam. Oliver ech-
oes the structure of power articulated by Feldman. “Power is contractual,” he 
argued, “not because of the will of the people but because it is contingent: the 
sultan or the emir takes power by force and keeps it by a more or less explicit 
contract with the ulema.”10 This point was discussed in detail in Chapter 5, as 
we examined the pluralist system that emerged under Islam which provided 
moral and legal autonomy for confessional communities.
Much of the religious violence that we have experienced in recent years 
can be partly blamed on the ill-conceived ideas that all the expressions of 
the Islamic faith must be tamed through state coercion. Such efforts have al-
ways backfired either by weakening the state and strengthening the religious 
movement or by transforming religious expressions into violent responses. 
The endeavors to manipulate Islam and managing the process of secular-
ization in the Middle East have produced a fundamentalist interpretation 
of Islam decoupled from its social context and led to the emergence of glo-
balized forms of Islam that have attracted significant following throughout 
the world. Young people alienated by modern society found a version of 
religious expression detached from all national and cultural articulations of 
religious experience. The level of manipulation and the “excessive manage-
ment” of religion in the Middle East is overwhelming. First, the only place 
in the Middle East where Islamic learning was boosted in the past century 
are the Saudi Arabian seminaries, while all prominent institutions of tradi-
tional Islamic learning in Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia have been downsized and 
defunded. Saudi Arabia seminaries have taught the most literalist version of 
Islam with a special disliking to religious pluralism and diversity. Up until 
the mid-twentieth century, Saudi Arabia was a Bedouin society, with meager 
exposure to diversity and relied completely on the uniformity of customs and 
norms for maintaining its unity. Bedouin culture is in many ways analogous 
to the redneck culture of heartland United States that fears and distrusts the 
unfamiliar and which have lately produced all types of militia groups ready 
to fight against what they perceive as external threats to their culture. For 
decades, religious scholars in control of Saudi religious education have de-
clared that anyone who does not follow the Wahhabi’s Salafi interpretation of 
Islam was either infidel (kafir) or heretic (mubtadi’). This worldview mimics 
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the extreme views of radical evangelicals who bombed abortion clinics and 
is very alien to the traditional teachings of Islam that emphasized religious 
pluralism and held judgment on the fate of those who have different faiths 
and religious backgrounds. The United States went further in skewing cul-
tural balance in the body of Islam by providing military training and sup-
port for radical Muslim groups with narrow understanding of the history 
and intellectual foundation of the Islamic faith in Afghanistan, as supporting 
them deemed expedient to frustrate Soviet expansionism into Afghanistan 
and later to wrestle power from the Afghan mujahideen factions. To make 
matters worse, the United States and its Western allies turned Saudi Arabia 
into a launching pad for its operations against both Saddam Hussain’s Baathist 
regime and the Islamic Republic of Iran, paving the ground for the emer-
gence of global jihadist movement. This process formed the ground for what 
Olivier Roy terms “globalized” Islamic fundamentalism, headed by young 
radicals who, as he puts it, are “perfectly ‘Westernized’.”11 Oliver understands 
the Westernization of Islamic fundamentalism as a process that turned Islam 
from a culturally based religion into a globalized missionary and evangelizing 
movement.
But the problem is that today’s religious revival—whether under funda-
mentalist or spiritualistic forms—develops by decoupling itself from any 
cultural reference. It thrives on the loss of cultural identity: the young 
radicals are indeed perfectly “Westernized.” Among the born-again and 
the converts (numerous young women who want to wear the veil belong 
to these categories), Islam is seen not as a cultural relic but as a religion 
that is universal and global and reaches beyond specific cultures, just like 
evangelicalism or Pentecostalism.12
The complex process that produced religious revivalism in its fundamentalist 
form in Muslim societies was addressed further by Oliver in a subsequent 
work, appropriately titled Holy Ignorance, in which he faults the very process 
of secularization for producing the most fundamentalist versions of world 
religions. This counterintuitive reading of secularization is interesting, as it 
shows that secularization is not destined to bring about a secular world order, 
but more fundamentalist religious movements. Fundamentalist movements, 
whether Islamic or Christian, are global movements, playing the same glo-
balization game but with different goals in mind. Secularization as a global 
force, Oliver stresses, focuses on marginalizing religions to promote consum-
erism and, using an understanding of power rooted in neorealism, has created 
new de-territorialized religious movements detached form their cultures, as 
they “compete with secularization on its own ground: the political sphere 
(nation, state, citizen, constitution, legal system).”13 It is true that fundamen-
talist movements have had limited success in directly inf luencing decision- 
making on the institutional level of global governance but have for sure made 
a powerful impact at the societal level. The decline of the inf luence and 
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capacity of traditional religions has undermined their ability to respond to 
distortions in the meaning and history of religious thought particularly in 
Muslim societies but at varying degrees in the West as well. Secularization 
processes have also frozen the capacity of the institutions of religious learning 
to engage in theological reform and adaptation of modern society.
We are witnessing a shift of the traditional forms of religious  practice—
Catholicism, Hanafi Islam, classic Protestant denominations such as 
Anglicanism and Methodism—towards more fundamentalist and char-
ismatic forms of religiosity (evangelicalism, Pentecostalism, Salafism, 
Tablighi Jamaat, neo-Sufism, Lubavich). But these movements are rel-
atively recent. Salafism derives from Wahhabism which was founded at 
the end of the eighteenth century. The Hasidim and Haredim were born 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The various evangelical 
movements belong to the tradition of Protestant “awakenings” which 
began during the eighteenth century, while Pentecostalism dates from 
the early twentieth century.”14
Paradoxically, as religious movements became autonomous from their cul-
tural pinning they shifted their focus from purely ritualistic and doctrinal 
aspects of traditional religions to an emphasis on issues of religious freedom, 
political equality, and human rights, albeit with various degrees of central-
ized concerns and interests.15 The concerns over the impact of modernist 
political forms on the thinking of Islamist groups is echoed by Fukuyama, 
who asserts in his Identity that both “nationalism and Islamism are rooted in 
modernization,”16 This could be seen in the fact that violent reactions to per-
ceived objectification of the Muslim people by Western powers is carried out 
not by immigrant Muslims but by their West-borne and West-educated chil-
dren. Fukuyama attributes the violence to the failure of European societies to 
integrate the children of immigrants “into their new European surroundings: 
rates of youth unemployment, particularly for Muslims, are upward of 30%, 
and in many European countries a link is still perceived between ethnicity 
and membership in the dominant cultural community.”17 While immigrant 
Muslims hinged their feeling of self-worth on their ability to establish a new 
life in Europe away from the chaotic and turbulent life in the Middle East, 
the first generation of European Muslims could neither relate to their old cul-
tures nor feel a sense of belonging to their place of birth. This deep alienation 
created an identity crisis, and their need for recognition led them to embrace 
Islamic fundamentalist ideologies that have already achieved global presence 
and inf luence and complete autonomy from local cultures. The new ten-
dency on the part of some Muslims whose answers to their confusion about 
their inability to get national recognition has been in seeking membership 
in a larger, and imaginary global community of the “ummah.” Never mind 
that the “ummah” is a theoretical notion that has no actual political reality; 
the politicization of Islam generated a countermovement among nationalist 
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European groups with clear yearning to European nationalism and to a less 
culturally diverse Europe. National populism is on the rise in Europe and the 
United States, fanned by far-right and neoconservative rhetoric. The Middle 
East, which has quietly contributed to the proliferation of identities in the 
West, is also trapped in identity crises and struggles of its own, as efforts to 
cultivate national identities have been frustrated by the geopolitical lens of 
neoliberalism bent on manipulating the nationalist-Islamist divide to maxi-
mize external interests and frustrate any attempt to generate more stable po-
litical or economic unification. All of the sudden, the nationalism-globalism 
tensions are being transformed into the struggle of identities that threatens to 
tribalize liberal societies. Identity politics in Muslim societies generated by 
increased fragmentation and unscrupulous politics feeds into Western iden-
tity politics, creating a vicious circle that threatens all notions of civility and 
political enlightenment.
The creative cycle of stability and disruption
Despite the defective and contradictory approach that insists on imposing 
comprehensive liberalism on global society, the political debate continues 
to be fixated on the trajectories of convergence and conf lict politics. In dis-
cussing the expansion of liberal democracy beyond Western society, Fuku-
yama observes the instability and reversibility of such an expansion. Several 
countries in Latin America (e.g., Colombia), Asia (the Philippines), or even 
Europe (e.g., post-World War I Germany) experienced democracy for a short 
period before they capitulated yet another time to an authoritarian form of 
government. He though never asks why such a fallback happened and never 
suspects that the relapse has been triggered from the outside. In reviewing 
both Tocqueville’s and Nietzsche’s arguments on the connections between 
peoples and states, he points out to the importance of cultural values of a par-
ticular society and the need for the congruence between people’s ethos and 
state structures and processes. He summarizes the relationship between peo-
ples and states in the following terms: “The success and the stability of liberal 
democracy therefore never depends simply on the mechanical application of a 
certain set of universal principles and laws, but requires a degree of conform-
ity between peoples and states.”18 The statement could hardly be disputed 
by anyone who knows anything about how people relate to their political 
state. Still the question is what to do if those who have mastered the liberal 
language are unwilling to ask the difficult questions? To ask for example why 
the U.S. government decided to support coups whose aims were to under-
mine liberal democracy in Syria in 1949, Egypt in 1952, and Iran in 1954?
Similarly, we need to become aware of the obstacles to democracy and 
understand the impact of the cultural orientation of a people on the possi-
bilities of the realization of democratic rule that holds dictators and tyrants 
accountable. Again, let us review the four obstacles identified by Fukuyama, 
which summarize the collective wisdom on the subject: (1) the fragmentation 
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of society into antagonistic ethnic communities and the fear that democ-
racy would lead to the domination of the largest ethnic community; (2) the 
presence of religious traditions that espouse totalitarian views of life, such 
as Orthodox Judaism and fundamentalist Islam; (3) the existence of highly 
“unequal social structure, and all the habits of mind that arise from it”; and 
(4) the degree to which a nation is capable of developing an autonomous civil 
society.19 In short, the development and preservation of liberal democracy 
require the presence of cultural and religious traditions that promote the 
very values necessary for its growth and survival, such as freedom, equal-
ity, and respect for diversity. Fukuyama, who took his cues from Hegel and 
cited him frequently throughout his works, suddenly concludes that Islam 
is incapable of sustaining political democracy, in complete opposition to the 
views articulated by Hegel who saw in Islam a great equalizer. Such sharp 
disagreement with the Hegelian conception of Islam and history deserves an 
explanation of the grounds of his conclusion. Hegel recognizes that Islam 
and reformed Christianity were instrumental in establishing the principle of 
universal human equality, which led later to the rise of liberal democracy. 
He also believed that Islam succeeded to subject the secular order to moral 
evaluation long before Christianity learned to do so. However, while Fukuy-
ama credits Islam of having similar commitment to the principle of universal 
human equality, he contends that while Christianity and Islam may be able 
to adapt to democracy, they do not fully promote the conditions necessary for 
the development and survival of liberal democracy.20 This conclusion is only 
true with regards to certain cultural manifestations of Christianity and Islam, 
such as Roman Christianity or Wahhabi-Salafi Islam. Fukuyama’s conclu-
sion, which echoes a broader liberal bias, confuses culture and religion and 
ref lects the failure of modern education to connect the Enlightenment with 
the Reformation, and both with Islamic rationalism, and all together with the 
transcendental values at the foundation of modern experience. What makes 
Fukuyama’s conclusion troubling is his discounting, even dismissal, of the 
role played by reformed Christianity in furnishing the moral foundation of 
American democracy. The founding fathers of the greatest democracy of our 
times were deeply religious Christians, even though they did not try to bring 
their religious convictions to public debates in keeping with the requirements 
of public rational discourse in a diverse society. The writings of the found-
ers of the United States, such as Benjamin Franklin or Thomas Jefferson, 
reveal the depth of their religious commitments in their political thinking 
and decision-making. The same is equally true with regards to many Muslim 
intellectuals and political leaders who know that they have to speak in the 
language of universal humanity, out of care and respect for human diversity, a 
position expected from them by their very religious convictions. Fukuyama’s 
inability to connect the dots does not stem from a lack of exposure to the 
history of the modern West. For as we saw earlier, he went back as early as the 
Protestant Reformation in trying to ground modern consciousness, but then 
confined himself to examining Martin Luther’s conception of the authentic 
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self. But his examination of the emergence of the authentic self adds nothing 
to the debate as to how religions contribute to social stability and continuity 
or how secular values relate to the monotheistic values at the foundation of 
the modern West.
Still Fukuyama remains true to his classical liberal commitment as he re-
jects the subversive role played by political realism in making Western foreign 
policy less conducive to world peace and global cooperation. In a chapter 
appropriately titled “The Unreality of ‘Realism’,” in his End of History, he 
attacks the central assumption of political realism that the international order 
has an “abidingly anarchic character.” Realism develops a complex and so-
phisticated theory that affirms the anarchic nature of the international order, 
rejects any attempt to establish a morally based international political order, 
and anchors the state-of-nature-like order in human nature. Fukuyama suc-
cinctly summarizes the political and moral dilemmas created by realism:
Realism is a theory that maintains that insecurity, aggression, and war 
are permanent possibilities in the international state system, and that this 
condition is a human condition, that is, a condition that cannot be altered 
by the appearance of specific forms and types of human societies because 
it is ultimately rooted in an unchanging human nature.21
Undoubtedly, Fukuyama faults realism for justifying an aggressive foreign pol-
icy, but what is doubtful and mystifying is the lack of interest in exposing its 
connection to liberal ideology. Neoliberalism has completely embraced the 
basic assumptions of realism, most notably its obsession with power and dom-
ination, yet there is not a single mention of it in his work. The whole discus-
sion focuses on liberalism in its classical form, ref lecting a serious failure to 
acknowledge, let alone critique, the fact that neoliberalism is now the new face 
of liberalism. Notwithstanding that Fukuyama engages in selective reading 
and discussion when referencing Muslim and other communities of the South 
who continue to struggle under the conditions imposed on them by powerful 
groups in the North, he recognizes the need to replace the imperialist politics 
with one anchored in international law and human rights. The world already 
has a semblance of order with the creation of the United Nations, the inte-
gration of world economies, and the spread of the traditions of international 
humanitarian law and universal human rights. The widening acceptance of 
international law and human rights and the spread of liberal democratic ideas 
across the globe provide new grounds for questioning the very political real-
ism widely embraced by liberal democratic states. All these advancements are 
currently being threatened by the realpolitik impulse that runs deep in neolib-
eralism, as the earlier achievements of classical liberalism are being reversed by 
neoliberal excesses with a deafening silence on the part of liberal scholars and 
leaders. Despite social fragmentation, rising economic inequalities, and crush-
ing debts, liberal leaders by and large are unnerved by the deterioration in the 
quality of life and the failure of neoliberalism to remedy this dire situation.
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Overcoming current distortions in the notions of liberalism and the 
secular state requires a new public debate about dominant structures and 
processes and the place of religion in public communication. There is an 
urgent need to restore the level of tolerance necessary for social cooperation 
within political society and address the sources of antagonism among reli-
gious communities. One important source of antagonism among the three 
Abrahamic traditions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam lies, as John Nicks 
noted, in the “discursive structure” that creates the dynamic between the 
particular and the universal. While the three Abrahamic traditions affirm 
their faith in the transcendent who they all share as the source of their sacred 
revelation, the discursive structure they all embrace makes the universal 
divine enjoy a particular place in their individual scriptures. This paradox 
of the particularized universal is akin to conception of God that emerged in 
the three monotheistic traditions and has been appropriately termed “scrip-
tural universalism.”22 Scriptural universalism has been a point of contention 
throughout history and can be overcome in the political society by first iden-
tifying the universal norms of the monotheistic traditions and then articu-
lating them through a language that facilitates communicatively achieved 
consensus. Understanding the significance of articulating religious notions 
and norms in a universal language is key to overcoming political conf licts. 
This also makes Jurgen Habermas’ suggestion for communicatively based 
consensus more relevant than a solution that relies on the development of a 
metaphysical point of agreement, such as the one proposed by John Hick.23 
Hick’s approach is undoubtedly needed and helpful for dismantling the the-
ological barriers created by religious speculation, and would highlight the 
common elements in the Abrahamic traditions, and possibly among world 
religions, but may not be sufficient to realign the morality embedded in 
religious traditions with the institutions of global governance. The commu-
nicative action framework articulated by Habermas is more relevant to all 
monotheistic traditions anchored in the meanings that are rationally avail-
able in the revealed text and may provide a better starting point for global 
pluralism. Habermas’ theory of communicative action fits naturally into the 
monotheistic traditions as they all grew out of an intellectual discourse that 
evolved around the sacred text, as well as the interpretative texts accumu-
lated over generations. The thrust of Habermas’ efforts to articulate a toler-
ant pluralist political order grounded in communicative action is succinctly 
recapped by Robert Erlewine:
Habermas, operating in a very different tradition and philosophical id-
iom from Hick, works to rehabilitate the notion of rationality for con-
temporary thought after the attacks leveled at it by postmodernism. By 
grounding rationality in language—communicative rationality and lin-
guistic competence—Habermas argues against notions of incommen-
surable worldviews and language games in endless conf lict. Rather, he 
seeks to provide a social theory in which disputes can be worked out 
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through rational discussion, through the reaching of non-coerced con-
sensuses, and where a decentering of the self takes place so that it can take 
into account the Other’s point of view.24
Overcoming interreligious antagonism cannot be achieved at the level of re-
ligious dialogue from within the circles of religious authorities’ debate, given 
the level of competition among the guardians of a purely religious discourse 
in demarcating the boundaries that delineate these religions. Setting the 
peace must be left to intellectual dialogues and to the rational identification 
of the common denominators that unite the monotheistic traditions. Such 
a sensitive and difficult task is better left to the work of rationalist-idealist 
intellectuals in these traditions, as pluralism has already been articulated by 
philosophers and scholars like al-Kindi and Averroes in Islamic rational ide-
alism, as well as Kant, Locke, and Hegel, whose pluralist outlook was shaped 
and inspired by realigning Christian worldview with the intellectualism that 
was inspired by rational idealism.
Dialogical grounding of global pluralism
The future of globalization, as a system that encourages the cooperation of 
diverse cultures and societies, lies in creating inclusive pluralism capable of 
honoring peoples regardless of their ethnic or religious specificities. For that 
to happen, we need to advance a more inclusive decision-making system 
that takes into account human diversity. That requires revising the notions 
of public rationality and reason and the way we approach consensus-building 
that goes beyond cultural consensus. There is a need to mitigate the modern 
notions of the reasonable and sensible. This reformulation is particularly 
needed, given the fact that for over two centuries now, modern intellectual-
ism has been under the illusion that reason and rational thought are capable 
on their own of bringing meaning and happiness to society. Throughout this 
period, rationalism was posited as the ground for all that is good and just, 
advancing the view that all we need in order to establish a good society was 
to think rationally and systematically. Initially, and under the sway of posi-
tivism, metanarratives, particularly those attached to religious text, were met 
with skepticism and deemed unnecessary and suspicious.25 Any knowledge 
claimed prior to the Enlightenment was also considered ancient and unre-
liable and, hence, incapable of adding anything to our understanding of the 
meaning of social order and social organization.26 The postmodern critique 
has shaken such certainty as it revealed the arbitrariness and subjectivity 
of what has been declared as systematically rational and that the modern 
rational constructs do not stand on a firm foundation.27 These assertions 
resulted in serious missteps and skewed social structures and policies, which 
initially took place in the countries of the South before they moved in the 
past two decades to the North. Rampant abuses committed in the name 
of rationality, including economic exploitation and political manipulation, 
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have convinced an increasing number of thinkers and activists that rational 
secularism and the Enlightenment narrative are inadequate to address the 
moral and political crises in a globalizing order. Within Western liberalism, 
the task of rethinking the public sphere was taken up by neo-Kantianism, led 
today by John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas, who emerged in the past three 
decades to address the increased fragmentation of late-modern (or postmod-
ern) consciousness and politics under the inf luence of the post-Kantian re-
alism and materialism. This new development represents an effort whose 
aim is to bring idealism to mitigate the impact of realism, positivism, and 
materialism. The two inf luential thinkers have advanced proposals to ad-
dress late-modern moral and political crises that are not purely neo-Kantian, 
but move slightly away from the Kantian notion of the sovereign individual 
by incorporating a Hegelian emphasis that maintains “that reason cannot be 
realized monologically, and in order to be actual, must be mediated by social 
activity.”28
The affinity between Rawls’ and Habermas’ thoughts on a more inclusive 
democratic structure is evident in calling for a post-secular understanding of 
the limits of reason and in advancing arguments for a more inclusive plural-
ism, capable of accommodating religiously anchored reasons for public ac-
tion. They have also endeavored to think through a democratic model that 
accommodates diverse religious values and inputs without compromising the 
Kantian post-metaphysical rationalism. Such an approach also accommodates 
the Islamic discursive tradition, embraced by Islamic reformists who are keen 
to articulate a new political order that affirms liberal and democratic values 
and procedures. While the project advanced by the neo-Kantian thinkers 
was not intended to restore the normative foundation of the transcendental 
values of modern thought inherited from the monotheistic traditions, the 
approach might indirectly ground modern rationalism in the broader mon-
otheistic normative expectations that could frame public reason that acts out 
of a normative foundational framework. Both thinkers have been occupied 
for decades in developing political thought away from the positivistic and 
neorealistic trajectory. Rawls opted to develop a theory of justice that steers 
away from consequentialist ethical systems favored by modern positivism, 
while Habermas maintained the ethical impulse of the Frankfurt School, as 
revealed in the Dialectic of the Enlightenment, the last work written by its lead-
ing intellectuals, Horkheimer and Adorno. Habermas developed a commu-
nicative action theory that privileges the ethos embodied in the sociocultural 
foundation of modern politics, whose ethics is grounded in the values of mon-
otheistic traditions. Yet they managed to do that by preserving the rational 
foundation of the public debate by insisting on the “reasonableness” of the 
conditions of the debate. Reason is, however, presented as formal rationality, 
comprising procedures that reject any grounding in substantive rationality of 
particular cultural and religious groups, for such rationality is always tenta-
tive. Put differently, Habermas and Rawls steered away from foundational-
ism precisely because such an effort can drift toward authoritarian political 
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structures and therefore is contrary to the need to enhance democratic order 
by opening it up to a pluralistic society that entertains diverse frameworks of 
meaning and normality.
Despite their shared interests in building political legitimacy on the no-
tions of reason and consensus, they differ significantly in how the two no-
tions, central to their arguments, are interconnected. Rawls asserts that 
political consensus can be achieved by allowing its interlocutors to engage 
freely in open debate. And for that to happen “political” liberalism must 
be distinguished and separated from “comprehensive” liberalism. This does 
also require that a distinction is made between “the rational” and “the rea-
sonable.” The distinction between political and comprehensive liberalism is 
necessary for allowing social groups to negotiate the rules that govern the 
public sphere so that private interests or values are not imposed on all social 
actors, while allowing comprehensive liberalism to f lourish in private spheres 
without dominating the entire society. Habermas, on the other hand, does 
not separate the rational and the reasonable, as he sees the need to arrive at 
political consensus through normative consensus that forms the foundation 
of the democratic constitutional state.29 Even though Habermas’s account 
aims at generating normative consensus, the norms themselves are not built 
into the constitutional framework but emerge out of the ongoing exchange 
by individuals who bring diverse views of definitive substantive rationalism. 
Given the fact that the normative consensus is limited to the public sphere, 
his proposal is in line with that of Rawls. The insistence of the two thinkers 
to steer away from advancing any substantive political consensus have made 
them open to the charge of “empty formalism.” The accusation, however, 
overlooks that the substantive elements of rationality would be furnished by 
the political debate and exchange and that formal rational element is intended 
to safeguard the democratic process by ensuring that the substantive elements 
are tightly connected to practical rationality that guards against unethical and 
subversive claims that could potentially distort political outcomes.
Rawls developed in his latest book, Political Liberalism, the ideas of “over-
lapping consensus” and “public reason” to provide “the framework of the free 
institutions of a constitutional democratic regime.”30 The new formulation 
is capable of accommodating religious diversity beyond what is currently 
practiced in Western society. The society that requires a new formulation of 
the conditions for political pluralism “is characterized not simply by a plural-
ism of comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines but by a 
pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines.”31 Rawls 
is using the term “comprehensive” here to denote a set of norms that govern 
both the private and public spheres. Such a concept could be encountered in 
the premodern West when Christianity was dominated by the Papal state and 
monarchies that pledge allegiance to it and, under secularism, which Rawls 
describes in Political Liberalism as comprehensive liberalism. The first formu-
lation of pluralism in the West followed the fragmentation of the religious 
unity of Middle-Age Europe. Rawls contends that early liberal thinkers, 
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such as Kant and Hume, built the conception of reasonable pluralism on a 
“pluralism of comprehensive doctrines, including religious and non-religious 
doctrines” that defined their age. They also viewed the advent of political 
pluralism as a positive development and “as the natural outcome of the activ-
ities of human reason under enduring free institutions.”32
The principle of pluralism is essential for accommodating diverse religious, 
philosophical, and moral doctrines, but it would only work in well-ordered 
societies whose citizens affirm a shared conception of justice. For such affirma-
tion to take place, citizens must agree that “reasonable but opposing compre-
hensive doctrines belong to an overlapping consensus: that is, they generally 
endorse that conception of justice as giving the content of their political judg-
ments on basic institutions.”33 For the overlapping consensus to work, people 
should act on a form of justice that is seen as reasonable, but not necessarily ra-
tional. The distinction between the reasonable and the rational used by Rawls 
is intended to distinguish between acting on the basis of rights and acting on 
the basis of ethical values that form the basis of substantive rationality of a 
particular religious or rational moral system. Acting out of reasonable eval-
uation of a particular act or maxim constitutes political liberalism, whereas 
acting on the basis of rational evaluation belongs to comprehensive liberalism, 
articulated in a particular philosophy or religion. As Rawls puts it, “Political 
liberalism is based on political justice defined by rights, while comprehensive 
liberalism is defined by universal values adopted based on one’s worldview.”34 
Reasonable pluralism is intended therefore to maintain a condition of liberty 
whereby citizens are willing to abide by a set of political rights established 
through an overlapping consensus, even though political liberalism does not 
accommodate the full range of their comprehensive set of values. People will 
be able to act in public in accordance with their system of values as long as 
that act is done under conditions of liberty as defined by public reason, even 
though others might find that objectionable when viewed from their com-
prehensive sense of morality.35 The overlapping consensus achieved socially 
allows for the creation of constitutional consensus that provides the political 
infrastructure for democratic electoral procedures whose aim is to mediate the 
political demands of a pluralist society. The constitutional consensus as such 
is required to achieve agreement on the rule of the political game and hence 
has a formal and structural significance in comparison with the overlapping 
consensus which is substantive and value oriented.
Habermas’ communicative action theory provides additional conceptual-
ization for developing overlapping consensus, which I term here “dialogical 
consensus” because it is articulated and advanced through multilateral dia-
logues among social actors who articulate the full range of values and inter-
ests of modern society. He recognizes, through the work of Durkheim and 
Mead, that the communicative action central to social integration was histor-
ically developed by replacing the “religious symbols” of premodern society. 
This process in which the symbolic was replaced by the rational is termed by 
Durkheim as “the linguistification of the sacred.” The consensus borne out 
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discursively through rational debates in accordance with democratic rules is 
superior because it allows the citizens to accept laws and rules that are intel-
ligible and subject to ref lection and improvement. The linguistification of 
sacred symbols and meaning made it possible for authority of the sacred to be 
expressed by rational exchanges and attached to secular authority guided by a 
political text that has been debated and accepted by the society. The process 
of consensus-building proposed by Habermas provides us with an updated 
version of the discursive consensus generated by Muslim jurists around the 
tenth century. The linguistification of the sacred is surprisingly very analo-
gous to the work undertaken by the rational idealists of Islam, as it resembles 
the rational system developed first by al-Jassas and al-Ghazali, and later re-
fined by Ibn Abdul Salam and Al-Shatibi, whom we discussed in Chapter 5. 
This new formulation is bound to generate more inclusive debate across the 
cultural and religious divide in years to come and could be a launching pad 
for a more inclusive globalization process.
In the midst of the noise of extreme voices on the right and the left, a quite 
but persistent work is done by intellectuals and practitioners on both sides of 
the divide to develop the conditions for a more inclusive global order. The 
focus on dialogical consensus and global pluralism is healthy and represents 
serious work in the direction of the evolution of world history, toward more 
globally inclusive conditions. The work is still in its early stages, and there 
is a need for greater collaboration at the level of intellectual exchange and 
social-political cooperation.
The road ahead
The analysis of globalization has repeatedly pointed, throughout this book, 
to a historical trend that persisted over the past three millennia and hence 
is more likely to persist into the future. All indications point to an ever- 
increasing acknowledgment of the principles of equal dignity of all peoples 
and of shared humanity. The interdependence of societies across the globe has 
never been as important and real as it is today, with the advancement of tech-
nology and the realization that the globe is less of a disjointed geographies 
separated by mountains and oceans and more of a spaceship traveling over 
immense time and space, carrying billions of people whose fate is joined to-
gether and who have equal responsibility of maintaining the course of global 
progress and keeping the limited provisions available for this and future gen-
erations under control. After countless centuries of certainty in the boundless 
resources of planet earth, we are confronted today for the first time with the 
realization that even the air we breathe and the water we drink are precious 
commodities with limited quantities that require a global cooperation to pro-
tect and manage.
The question we confront today is not whether globalization is here to 
stay but rather what kind of a global age that awaits humanity? Will the 
diverse global society commit to the principles of equality, freedom, social 
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justice, convergence, cooperation, knowledge, and consensual relationships? 
Or will humanity succumb to the old habits of hierarchy, control, impo-
sition, abuse, violent clashes, and blissful ignorance? The answers to these 
questions are shrouded in uncertainty as global convergence hits new ob-
stacles rooted in the human follies of arrogance and greed, hidden behind 
carefully crafted language that justif ies subjugation of other people in the 
name of natural selection that necessitates social hierarchy and the order of 
rank at the root of extreme inequality and oppression. The overall world 
history should be nonetheless a source of encouragement and optimism. The 
future is, as always has been, open to possibilities grounded in the choices 
people make, the values they uphold, the ideas they embrace, and, most im-
portantly, the type of leadership that emerges in any particular moment of 
human history. These have always been the important factors in the march 
of cultures and societies in one direction or the other and the illusion of a 
directional historical movement from the East to the West or from the South 
to the North that some philosophers of history may fancy or prophesize is 
born out of a truncated views of history. The European continent was home 
to an advanced civilization that connected it to the entire Mediterranean ba-
sin in the first century under Pax Romana only to be reduced to disjointed 
cantons under feudalism with little possibilities for trade and learning in the 
eighth century. China was a great civilization in the fifth century before it 
underwent gradual degradation, leading to illiteracy and poverty in seven-
teenth and nineteenth centuries. China today is experiencing a new dawn 
of science and education, with the potential to overtake the United States 
as the global economic power, while the latter continues to fight quixotic 
wars in the Middle East that had depleted its resources and corrupted its 
government. The Islamic civilization grew and prospered for a millennium 
from the seventh to the seventeenth centuries, but the descendants of the 
people who lived under it are now living in dire conditions. While the accu-
mulation of knowledge and technology has progressed throughout history, 
the quality of life in expansive geographies has experienced long periods of 
boom and bust, at great cost to countless peoples and generations. Again, 
the question is: can we finally put an end to the state of affairs in which one 
part of humanity prospers at the expense of others? Technically, this is not 
only possible today but even desirable for the well-being of everyone who 
lives on our ever-shrinking planet. But this will not happen automatically, 
as the global dynamic is still controlled by stratif ied social hierarchies, which 
have become increasingly cut-off and isolated from the larger populations 
and seem to be willing to sacrif ice the long-term interests of humanity for 
short-term benefits to those who have an unsaturated appetite for power 
and wealth.
The future remains open to various possibilities as we stand today at an 
important juncture that deserves deep and careful thought about the best 
course of action to be taken. Will those who have the power to chart a better 
course for all people succumb to doubt, fear, and greed and hence choose to 
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put their faith in power and enjoy the comfort of the moment? Or will they 
place their faith in humanity and the potential that lies in human cooperation 
for a better future for all? Will the world witness the emergence of imagi-
native, creative, and enlightened leadership, or will we see the continuation 
of the reliance on power, force, and control by dominant elites, who in their 
moment of intoxication with power, would get lost in the illusion of using 
technological advancement to control the globalizing society? None of us can 
rationally answer those questions with full certainty, but if we were to con-
sult the deepest voices at the core of our shared humanity, I believe we would 
be willing to bet on the principles of equity and cooperation and would place 
our faith in human idealism.
The uncertainties and anxieties we found ourselves in as we complete 
the second decade of the twenty-first century is blamed on religious dif-
ferences between Islam and Christianity, the two sister religions that are so 
similar today that the only remarkable difference between them lies in the 
millennia- long debate about the abstract conceptualization of the nature of 
Christ, as well as in the ceremonial and ritualistic aspects of religion. Such 
disagreements can hardly be a foundation for collective hatred and distrust. 
The wars that are fought in the name of the struggle of “good against evil” 
ultimately rest on misconceptions and assumptions promoted by elites driven 
by ambition and particular interests and who are evidently willing to sacrifice 
the dignity and well-being of humanity for realizing the particular interests 
they represent and fulfilling their false sense of religious and ethnic suprem-
acy. This is the obvious explanation for privileging doctrinal components of 
religions borne out of speculations and junctures, while shunning the values 
and moral demands at the core of any religious teachings. These conf licts and 
clashes among religions are perpetuated by factions within these religions 
who ground their faith in power, legalism, and ideological constructs whose 
aim is to justify the aggrandizement of power and defend the benefactors of 
religious and cultural wars. These are the groups we subsumed in this study 
under the categories of extremism and doctrinal realism. These realists, sur-
prisingly, have been willing to undertake limited cooperation to keep the 
f lame of religious, sectarian, and national conf licts going. How else could we 
explain the cooperation between Western realists and Arab autocrats despite 
the fact that the latter are the main proponents of anti-liberalism? And what 
explains the cooperation between the Iranian clerics under Khomeini and the 
conservatives under Ronald Reagan in the 1980s for providing arms to the 
right-wing Sandinista front in Nicaragua? While those who work for deep-
ening the divide among nations and religions collaborate to perpetuate the 
mistrust, those who carry the rational ideals shared by nations and religions 
are in complete paralysis, drifting silently with the currents that continue to 
brew up the perfect storm that threatens the future of humanity. The world 
today is in dire need to hear from those who care deeply about the ideals of 
equality, freedom, justice, human rights, and cooperation. Academic and in-
tellectual honesty is needed today more than ever before for rational idealism 
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to emerge across religious and national divides to speak the language of peace 
and cooperation and to pave the way toward a global age that could bring 
humanity closer to the ideals that carried world cultures from the Axial Age 
to the postmodern moment on the strength of deep faith in the unity of the 
universal order and the unity of humanity.
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